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The Diary of 1636: The Second Manchu Invasion of Korea
Early in the seventeenth century, Northeast Asian politics hung in a delicate balance among the Chosŏn dynasty in Korea, the Ming in China, and the Manchu. When a Chosŏn faction realigned Korea with the Ming, the Manchu attacked in 1627 and again a decade later, shattering the Chosŏn-Ming alliance and forcing Korea to support the newly founded Qing dynasty.
The Korean scholar-official Na Man'gap (1592-1642) recorded the second Manchu invasion in his Diary of 1636, the only first-person account chronicling the dramatic Korean resistance to the attack. Partly composed as a narrative of quotidian events during the siege of Namhan Mountain Fortress, where Na sought refuge with the king and other officials, the diary recounts Korean opposition to Manchu and Mongol forces and the eventual surrender. Na describes military campaigns along the northern and western regions of the country, the capture of the royal family, and the Manchu treatment of prisoners, offering insights into debates about Confucian loyalty and the conduct of women that took place in the war's aftermath. His work sheds light on such issues as Confucian statecraft, military decision making, and ethnic interpretations of identity in the seventeenth century. Translated from literary Chinese into English for the first time, the diary illuminates a traumatic moment for early modern Korean politics and society. George Kallander's critical introduction and extensive annotations place The Diary of 1636 in its historical, political, and military context, highlighting the importance of this text for students and scholars of Chinese and East Asian as well as Korean history.
The Korean scholar-official Na Man'gap (1592-1642) recorded the second Manchu invasion in his Diary of 1636, the only first-person account chronicling the dramatic Korean resistance to the attack. Partly composed as a narrative of quotidian events during the siege of Namhan Mountain Fortress, where Na sought refuge with the king and other officials, the diary recounts Korean opposition to Manchu and Mongol forces and the eventual surrender. Na describes military campaigns along the northern and western regions of the country, the capture of the royal family, and the Manchu treatment of prisoners, offering insights into debates about Confucian loyalty and the conduct of women that took place in the war's aftermath. His work sheds light on such issues as Confucian statecraft, military decision making, and ethnic interpretations of identity in the seventeenth century. Translated from literary Chinese into English for the first time, the diary illuminates a traumatic moment for early modern Korean politics and society. George Kallander's critical introduction and extensive annotations place The Diary of 1636 in its historical, political, and military context, highlighting the importance of this text for students and scholars of Chinese and East Asian as well as Korean history.
- GenresHistoryNonfiction
354 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1636
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February 14, 2021The king of Korea’s (Chosōn’s) letter to the attacking Manchu (Qing) emperor, who had the Chosōn leader besieged in a high mountain fortress, in retaliation for Chosōn siding with the Chinese in contravention of a treaty that Korea had signed with the Manchu a few years earlier:
Behind this ritual language lie endless arguments among the king’s advisors and generals about the proper course of action. They are isolated atop a mountain, although some news does get through to their fortress. What is clear is that they were unprepared in all sorts of ways for the reaction to their trying to find a middle way between their loyalty to China, centuries old, and the new power to the north. The problem is, in a previous capitulation, Chosōn signed that treaty to foreswear China. The Manchu are not going to let ignoring the treaty go by the by. They have invaded, and Chosōn has neither prepared troops and stores for a siege, nor grasped the Qing’s large force and rapid advance.
In China, the Ming are doomed, but old cultural ties die hard and Chosōn can’t let go of the old connection. It signed the treaty with the Qing (Manchu), but its heart still lies with the Ming. Wrong choice, as history proved.
Translator George Kallander starts with a clear and thorough introduction to the Diary as a document and to the events of the period. The actual history by Na Man’gap is a combination of self-interested narrative and heavy interlacing of letters such as the one above. (Self-interested because he was one of the advisors in the fortress and he wants to come out looking good.) He covers both the military and the diplomatic machinations, because it becomes clear pretty rapidly that the Manchu are going to overpower Chosōn. But the negotiations drag on forever, due both to the discord in the Chosōn upper echelons regarding whether to fight or capitulate, and to the capricious dance of diplomacy on both sides.
Then Na Man’gap spends a few chapters on the aftermath of the war, in particular the back-stabbing and blame that follows defeat. For example, in another letter from someone to the now-puppet Chosōn king:
In some ways this is a fascinating portrayal of the operations of a government under stress and defeat. It looks remarkably familiar, in fact. In places, however, Na Man’gap’s document is a tedious recital of details of little interest to the modern general reader. Unless you are a specialist, I suggest reading the introduction to get the history, and then skimming the actual text of the seventeenth century to get a flavor of its historiography, style, and culture.
Your subject (sin), the king of Chosōn, humbly presents a letter to the great Qing Kuan wen ren sheng emperor, Your Imperial Majesty. I, your subject, committed a crime against Your Imperial Highness. I sit wearily in this solitary fortress by myself, as I know that death will approach eventually. I am deeply considering the mistakes I have made in the past, and there is no way to atone for these on my own. Although I, because of selfishness, have submitted several petitions to seek self-renewal, I do not dare to incite the heavens, which are full of rage.
Behind this ritual language lie endless arguments among the king’s advisors and generals about the proper course of action. They are isolated atop a mountain, although some news does get through to their fortress. What is clear is that they were unprepared in all sorts of ways for the reaction to their trying to find a middle way between their loyalty to China, centuries old, and the new power to the north. The problem is, in a previous capitulation, Chosōn signed that treaty to foreswear China. The Manchu are not going to let ignoring the treaty go by the by. They have invaded, and Chosōn has neither prepared troops and stores for a siege, nor grasped the Qing’s large force and rapid advance.
In China, the Ming are doomed, but old cultural ties die hard and Chosōn can’t let go of the old connection. It signed the treaty with the Qing (Manchu), but its heart still lies with the Ming. Wrong choice, as history proved.
Translator George Kallander starts with a clear and thorough introduction to the Diary as a document and to the events of the period. The actual history by Na Man’gap is a combination of self-interested narrative and heavy interlacing of letters such as the one above. (Self-interested because he was one of the advisors in the fortress and he wants to come out looking good.) He covers both the military and the diplomatic machinations, because it becomes clear pretty rapidly that the Manchu are going to overpower Chosōn. But the negotiations drag on forever, due both to the discord in the Chosōn upper echelons regarding whether to fight or capitulate, and to the capricious dance of diplomacy on both sides.
Then Na Man’gap spends a few chapters on the aftermath of the war, in particular the back-stabbing and blame that follows defeat. For example, in another letter from someone to the now-puppet Chosōn king:
Yun Pang and Kim Yu harmed our country. My memorial of the first lunar month provides a rough outline of their actions…He tied up and dispatched Yun Chip. It was Kim Yu who insisted that Yun Hwang and others were criminals…A scoundrel enticed the troops protecting the fortress…Without scruples, he forgets about the king and turns his back on the country…
In some ways this is a fascinating portrayal of the operations of a government under stress and defeat. It looks remarkably familiar, in fact. In places, however, Na Man’gap’s document is a tedious recital of details of little interest to the modern general reader. Unless you are a specialist, I suggest reading the introduction to get the history, and then skimming the actual text of the seventeenth century to get a flavor of its historiography, style, and culture.
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