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The Last Shah: America, Iran, and the Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty
The surprising story of Iran’s transformation from America’s ally in the Middle East into one of its staunchest adversaries
"An original interpretation that puts Iranian actors where they at center stage."—Michael Doran, Wall Street Journal
“An extraordinary account. . . . Deeply nuanced and eloquent.”—Benjamin Weinthal, Jerusalem Post
Offering a new view of one of America’s most important, infamously strained, and widely misunderstood relationships of the postwar era, this book tells the history of America and Iran from the time the last shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was placed on the throne in 1941 to the 1979 revolution that brought the present Islamist government to power. This revolution was not, as many believe, the popular overthrow of a powerful and ruthless puppet of the United States; rather, it followed decades of corrosion of Iran’s political establishment by an autocratic ruler who demanded fealty but lacked the personal strength to make hard decisions and, ultimately, lost the support of every sector of Iranian society. Esteemed Middle East scholar Ray Takeyh provides new interpretations of many key events—including the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq and the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—significantly revising our understanding of America and Iran’s complex and difficult history.
"An original interpretation that puts Iranian actors where they at center stage."—Michael Doran, Wall Street Journal
“An extraordinary account. . . . Deeply nuanced and eloquent.”—Benjamin Weinthal, Jerusalem Post
Offering a new view of one of America’s most important, infamously strained, and widely misunderstood relationships of the postwar era, this book tells the history of America and Iran from the time the last shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was placed on the throne in 1941 to the 1979 revolution that brought the present Islamist government to power. This revolution was not, as many believe, the popular overthrow of a powerful and ruthless puppet of the United States; rather, it followed decades of corrosion of Iran’s political establishment by an autocratic ruler who demanded fealty but lacked the personal strength to make hard decisions and, ultimately, lost the support of every sector of Iranian society. Esteemed Middle East scholar Ray Takeyh provides new interpretations of many key events—including the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq and the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—significantly revising our understanding of America and Iran’s complex and difficult history.
336 pages, Hardcover
First published January 26, 2021
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Displaying 1 - 28 of 28 reviews
June 18, 2024
كتاب تاريخي مهم
October 28, 2022
A great book for understanding Iran from the 40s till the present day.
Some key points i've learned:
- Mohammad Mossadeq the premier of Iran , the great man of the people of the 50's was not actually coup-ed by US but by his own compatriots , due to his inability to resolve the largest legal oil fiasco between the then operating british oil company AIOC and Iran. He came to power through the people , but the people devoured him
- the Shah of Iran was a man that would accumulate as much pwoer as possible but would retreat and let others take responsibility when the going would grt tough. He was a really lame leader on internal politics. He tried to modernize Iran and rightfully managed to in a way (building hospotals , universities and infrastructure) , he was the first monarch to distribute land to the masses. This being said he never let the masses interfere in politics, during his tenure meritocracy was at its lowest point... This is one of the main reason people started to hate him.
-On the other hand the shah was a master of foreign policy , being a friend of USA , while selling oil at high prices to Russia, befriending arab states while being a friend and trade partner with Israel
- USA has supproted the shah during his reign but has always tried to make him do internal reforms for his country. Truman , Eisenhower , Kennedy , Johnson and all their administrations tried as much as possible to quell his thirst for weaponry and make him focus on his people.
The most important and interesting part of the book of course was the begining of the end , the era of Khomeini. The way this dude manage to be everything for everybody , disgracing the shah and galvanizing the clergy , bazaar and students against the shah whose reforms benefitted many.
Khomeini was an ambitious ruthless yet had a chameleonic speech.
His policy was no policy , he promised pardoning of all his enemies , yet as soon as the revolution was succesful the wave of summary trials started and waves of people got murdered with the even now present accusation of "corruption on earth" .
This basically meant a sham of a trial of 10-15 minutes followed by the accused getting shot in the back of the neck. Khoemini sent countless people to their deaths , starting ironically with the ones that have helped him along the way.
A great book. Its a 4/5 because i found the period of 1945 to 1953 (Mossadeq reign and the shah quite off the stage) quite boring as in happenings , not authors writing.
Great book !
Some key points i've learned:
- Mohammad Mossadeq the premier of Iran , the great man of the people of the 50's was not actually coup-ed by US but by his own compatriots , due to his inability to resolve the largest legal oil fiasco between the then operating british oil company AIOC and Iran. He came to power through the people , but the people devoured him
- the Shah of Iran was a man that would accumulate as much pwoer as possible but would retreat and let others take responsibility when the going would grt tough. He was a really lame leader on internal politics. He tried to modernize Iran and rightfully managed to in a way (building hospotals , universities and infrastructure) , he was the first monarch to distribute land to the masses. This being said he never let the masses interfere in politics, during his tenure meritocracy was at its lowest point... This is one of the main reason people started to hate him.
-On the other hand the shah was a master of foreign policy , being a friend of USA , while selling oil at high prices to Russia, befriending arab states while being a friend and trade partner with Israel
- USA has supproted the shah during his reign but has always tried to make him do internal reforms for his country. Truman , Eisenhower , Kennedy , Johnson and all their administrations tried as much as possible to quell his thirst for weaponry and make him focus on his people.
The most important and interesting part of the book of course was the begining of the end , the era of Khomeini. The way this dude manage to be everything for everybody , disgracing the shah and galvanizing the clergy , bazaar and students against the shah whose reforms benefitted many.
Khomeini was an ambitious ruthless yet had a chameleonic speech.
His policy was no policy , he promised pardoning of all his enemies , yet as soon as the revolution was succesful the wave of summary trials started and waves of people got murdered with the even now present accusation of "corruption on earth" .
This basically meant a sham of a trial of 10-15 minutes followed by the accused getting shot in the back of the neck. Khoemini sent countless people to their deaths , starting ironically with the ones that have helped him along the way.
A great book. Its a 4/5 because i found the period of 1945 to 1953 (Mossadeq reign and the shah quite off the stage) quite boring as in happenings , not authors writing.
Great book !
October 16, 2024
Fascinating! I wanted to get my head around Iran a bit more given some of the headlines of late, but also to fill in some gaps left by some history books that address this period more generally/tangentially. This book was well put together, with the author chronologically documenting the Shah's rise to power in the 40s all the way through to the revolution in the 70s. In this, key themes were clear and complex information was accessible and demonstrably relevant. This is some well written history. Would now love to do some reading on Iran since the Ayatollahs have been running the show.
June 20, 2025
I picked up this book expecting a reaffirmation of the familiar conclusions surrounding the last Shah of Iran, such as the conventional portrayal of a despotic ruler who served merely as a puppet of Western powers with the United States exerting as much influence over Iran’s politics as the Shah himself. Little did I know that, as the author convincingly shows, this image is not only misleading but also deeply unfaithful to the actual history of the period. What awaited me was a more nuanced and complex understanding, one that went beyond the usual moralizing and the black-and-white tones that often interpret events rather than simply narrate them.
This work covers the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, beginning with his appointment after the Allied ouster of his father in 1941, through the watershed moments that defined his reign, and culminating in his fall in 1979.
The image of the Shah that emerges from this account is that of a despotic ruler whose vision for Iran required a monopoly on power concentrated in his own hands. He had no interest in sharing authority with a parliament or any form of democratic institution. He disdained democracy and saw little value in it, believing instead that Iran’s progress depended on a benevolent strongman.
Yet what had historically stabilized Iran was a system of shared power among various elites: the clergy, the landed gentry, the aristocracy... These groups, though often at odds, were still guided by a collective sense of national interest rooted in the preservation of the monarchy itself. This same network had preserved the Shah’s reign after his father was exiled by the Allies and had enabled his return following the downfall of Mossadegh, who himself had begun to concentrate power in his own hands.
By steadily weakening Iran’s institutions and independent centers of power the Shah alienated this essential support structure. In reducing the state to his own person, he created a system in which any crisis would point back to him alone, rather than being diffused through a broader ruling network, as it once had been under elite pluralism.
A deeper problem was the Shah’s defining trait: indecisiveness in times of crisis. In earlier periods, this flaw was compensated for by the presence of capable statesmen who stepped in when he faltered But by the late 1970s, the very system that had once supported him had been dismantled. No one was left to step in. The Shah was indecisive, and the army he relied on was no better. His own machinations had hollowed it out.
Rather than build a meritocratic, professional state, the Shah fostered a culture of sycophancy. In the military, generals were rewarded not for competence but for loyalty, and often encouraged to undermine one another. This undermined coordination and cohesion, and when the revolution erupted, the army was unable and unwilling to react effectively.
Another paradox shaped the Shah’s rule: he created a modernized Iran that many Iranians did not want to live in. Like many authoritarian regimes today, he offered economic benefits in exchange for political passivity. But as the middle class expanded, the demand for political participation grew louder. The Shah's refusal to accommodate this pressure only deepened public frustration, which increasingly found expression through radical channels. As his reign continued, moderate voices weakened, not just in appeal but in effectiveness. The institutions through which they could operate had been dismantled, making the radical narrative the only one left standing.
In contrast to Stephen Kinzer’s All the Shah’s Men, I found The Last Shah to be a more sober and balanced account especially in its treatment of the 1953 Mossadegh crisis.
Kinzer’s narrative is a romantic one, casting the clash between Mossadegh and his opponents in a stark moral landscape of good versus evil. But the truth, as Ray Takeyh presents it, is far more complex. While the United States was certainly complicit in the 1953 coup, it was ultimately Iranians who took the first steps. Many within the political class had grown disillusioned with Mossadegh’s increasingly authoritarian behavior. He rigged elections, disbanded parliament, usurped the powers of the monarchy, and showed little regard for the constitutional order. His stubbornness and inability to resolve the protracted oil crisis brought the country to the brink of economic collapse, and his autocratic tendencies alienated many of his former allies.
That’s not to deny that Mossadegh was a great man—he was. He deeply loved his country and genuinely sought to serve its interests. But perhaps that was precisely the problem: he was a great man who should never have become prime minister.
The same can be said of many of his detractors. While some were indeed influenced or funded by foreign powers, the majority acted out of national concern. The Iranian elites clashed with one another not because they had been bought, but because each side believed it knew what was best for the country.
This is why I appreciate works that challenge existing myths and misconceptions. History should not be approached as a morality tale. It should be studied on its own terms and without the inclusion of value judgments imposed after the fact. The moment we moralize, we risk replacing explanation with interpretation. The Last Shah corrects many of those simplistic narratives and brings overlooked dimensions back into focus.
I Highly recommend it.
Personal rating: 4/5
This work covers the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, beginning with his appointment after the Allied ouster of his father in 1941, through the watershed moments that defined his reign, and culminating in his fall in 1979.
The image of the Shah that emerges from this account is that of a despotic ruler whose vision for Iran required a monopoly on power concentrated in his own hands. He had no interest in sharing authority with a parliament or any form of democratic institution. He disdained democracy and saw little value in it, believing instead that Iran’s progress depended on a benevolent strongman.
Yet what had historically stabilized Iran was a system of shared power among various elites: the clergy, the landed gentry, the aristocracy... These groups, though often at odds, were still guided by a collective sense of national interest rooted in the preservation of the monarchy itself. This same network had preserved the Shah’s reign after his father was exiled by the Allies and had enabled his return following the downfall of Mossadegh, who himself had begun to concentrate power in his own hands.
By steadily weakening Iran’s institutions and independent centers of power the Shah alienated this essential support structure. In reducing the state to his own person, he created a system in which any crisis would point back to him alone, rather than being diffused through a broader ruling network, as it once had been under elite pluralism.
A deeper problem was the Shah’s defining trait: indecisiveness in times of crisis. In earlier periods, this flaw was compensated for by the presence of capable statesmen who stepped in when he faltered But by the late 1970s, the very system that had once supported him had been dismantled. No one was left to step in. The Shah was indecisive, and the army he relied on was no better. His own machinations had hollowed it out.
Rather than build a meritocratic, professional state, the Shah fostered a culture of sycophancy. In the military, generals were rewarded not for competence but for loyalty, and often encouraged to undermine one another. This undermined coordination and cohesion, and when the revolution erupted, the army was unable and unwilling to react effectively.
Another paradox shaped the Shah’s rule: he created a modernized Iran that many Iranians did not want to live in. Like many authoritarian regimes today, he offered economic benefits in exchange for political passivity. But as the middle class expanded, the demand for political participation grew louder. The Shah's refusal to accommodate this pressure only deepened public frustration, which increasingly found expression through radical channels. As his reign continued, moderate voices weakened, not just in appeal but in effectiveness. The institutions through which they could operate had been dismantled, making the radical narrative the only one left standing.
In contrast to Stephen Kinzer’s All the Shah’s Men, I found The Last Shah to be a more sober and balanced account especially in its treatment of the 1953 Mossadegh crisis.
Kinzer’s narrative is a romantic one, casting the clash between Mossadegh and his opponents in a stark moral landscape of good versus evil. But the truth, as Ray Takeyh presents it, is far more complex. While the United States was certainly complicit in the 1953 coup, it was ultimately Iranians who took the first steps. Many within the political class had grown disillusioned with Mossadegh’s increasingly authoritarian behavior. He rigged elections, disbanded parliament, usurped the powers of the monarchy, and showed little regard for the constitutional order. His stubbornness and inability to resolve the protracted oil crisis brought the country to the brink of economic collapse, and his autocratic tendencies alienated many of his former allies.
That’s not to deny that Mossadegh was a great man—he was. He deeply loved his country and genuinely sought to serve its interests. But perhaps that was precisely the problem: he was a great man who should never have become prime minister.
The same can be said of many of his detractors. While some were indeed influenced or funded by foreign powers, the majority acted out of national concern. The Iranian elites clashed with one another not because they had been bought, but because each side believed it knew what was best for the country.
This is why I appreciate works that challenge existing myths and misconceptions. History should not be approached as a morality tale. It should be studied on its own terms and without the inclusion of value judgments imposed after the fact. The moment we moralize, we risk replacing explanation with interpretation. The Last Shah corrects many of those simplistic narratives and brings overlooked dimensions back into focus.
I Highly recommend it.
Personal rating: 4/5
January 18, 2025
کتاب بسیار خوبی که به علت ممنوع شدن چاپش مستقیما از طریق مترجم تهیه کردم.
کتاب خواندنی که نویسنده سعی کرده جوانب دیگری از تاریخ معاصر و اثرات اون بر دوره سلطنت محمد رضا پهلوی رو بیان کنه..تاحدودی بی طرفانه موفق به انجام این کار شده.
کتاب با ترجمه بسیار روان و حاوی نکات تاریخی جالب و دقیقی هست.
از خواندنش لذت بردم
کتاب خواندنی که نویسنده سعی کرده جوانب دیگری از تاریخ معاصر و اثرات اون بر دوره سلطنت محمد رضا پهلوی رو بیان کنه..تاحدودی بی طرفانه موفق به انجام این کار شده.
کتاب با ترجمه بسیار روان و حاوی نکات تاریخی جالب و دقیقی هست.
از خواندنش لذت بردم
May 28, 2025
A first class history book that covers a fascinating time in an equally fascinating country.
February 4, 2023
Timing, topic, pace, and novelty all came together for me on this one.
I've been meaning to learn more about 20th century Iran for quite a while now, and stumbled upon this while browsing the bookstore. I'm warming up to an interest in modern politics and find the analysis of power shifts compelling. The genre is new enough that I'm happy to be exposed to new perspectives. Even if I was constantly questioning the bias of the author, at least now I have a framework of events under a certain telling that I can weigh against other views.
The author does cut a good pace. It hits a sweet spot in length where the key events and people are covered, and analysis is kept to a minimum. The tradeoff is that the analysis isn't painstakingly justified through argument--which is fine, cause all I wanted was the broad strokes of what happened. Definitely got more than that and was fully engaged throughout.
I've been meaning to learn more about 20th century Iran for quite a while now, and stumbled upon this while browsing the bookstore. I'm warming up to an interest in modern politics and find the analysis of power shifts compelling. The genre is new enough that I'm happy to be exposed to new perspectives. Even if I was constantly questioning the bias of the author, at least now I have a framework of events under a certain telling that I can weigh against other views.
The author does cut a good pace. It hits a sweet spot in length where the key events and people are covered, and analysis is kept to a minimum. The tradeoff is that the analysis isn't painstakingly justified through argument--which is fine, cause all I wanted was the broad strokes of what happened. Definitely got more than that and was fully engaged throughout.
March 12, 2025
A good and balanced look at the Shah's era in Iran. Takeyh does a great job of highlighting the outsized role the US played in Iran at the time, while not making the mistake so many do of overemphasizing it. Both the 1953 coup and 1979 revolution were primarily Iranian affairs, and this book is worthwhile based solely on the fact that Takeyh emphasizes this. I hope this book helps in correcting the maddening myths that are so prevalent regarding US-Iran relations in the Cold War, promulgated by taking people like Kermit Roosevelt's accounts at face value.
May 28, 2022
Great book. Disabuses the common conception that the US fomented the 1953 coup.
August 30, 2025
A balanced if not entirely comprehensive account of the rule of the last Shah of Iran. Many books have been written on Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Some, such as Zonis's Majestic Failure, are probing and relentlessly critical, while others, like Andrew Scott Cooper's The Fall of Heaven, attempt rehabilitation. Ray Takeyh's work, however, is objective and even-handed. It acknowledges the Shah's genuine efforts in social modernization, land reform, women's rights, and his desire to raise Iran's standing in the region and the world, driven by his belief in a Great Civilization in which the Persians, as in antiquity, would assume their rightful place among the world's great powers.
The book's valuable perspective lies in showing how the Shah's own governance undermined his rule. In the name of coup-proofing, he weakened political, economic, and military institutions, fostered personalistic politics, encouraged factionalism, and hindered coordination across government. By 1978, the state, and especially the military, was incapable of anticipating or suppressing the revolutionary wave that overthrew him. The Shah himself recognized he had over-concentrated power in his own hands, in a way that undermined his own dynasty's life expectancy—but by the time he attempted to carry out reforms, the country had already swept by a wave of revolutionary fervor.
The book is also useful in detailing Iranian political life before 1953, a period which is often overlooked in histories of the Shah's reign and, while corrupt and unstable, contained the roots of a pluralistic and potentially even democratic culture whose suppression as the Shah's reign continued fundamentally weakened the Pahlavi state. In his early reign, the Shah was served by statesmen, many of whom with their own agendas, but by the end of his rule, they had been replaced by sycophants who were unable to rise to the occasion. The alienation of the clergy and emasculation of the aristocracy likewise weakened the base of the regime, and efforts to cultivate the urban middle class, peasantry, and military ultimately proved unsatisfactory in way of replacement.
Equally important is the counter-narrative Takeyh offers regarding the 1953 events, often described as an Anglo-American overthrow of a democratic government led by Mohammad Mossadegh. Takeyh argues Mossadegh was neither democratic in principle nor praxis, pointing out his indecisiveness, autocratic tendencies, and inability to maintain control of the forces he unleashed during the Embargo Crisis. The book underlines that the architects of the coup were found within Iran, not in London or Washington, whose intelligence agencies played a supportive but fundamentally secondary role. More thoroughly and effectively than any other prior work I've encountered, Tayekh is able to deflate the myth of (the sainted democrat) Mossadegh and put his tenure into adequate historical context.
At fewer than 300 pages, the book cannot cover every turn of the Shah's rule. It is not a biography, and it largely omits his personal life, which could have offered further insight into his indecisive character and repeated failures in times of crisis. It also says little about his family or their activities beyond that they invited controversy. Readers seeking greater depth should turn to the many other biographies and histories of the Shah and Pahlavi Iran. Still, as a high-level, balanced account, Takeyh's book is a valuable starting point.
The book's valuable perspective lies in showing how the Shah's own governance undermined his rule. In the name of coup-proofing, he weakened political, economic, and military institutions, fostered personalistic politics, encouraged factionalism, and hindered coordination across government. By 1978, the state, and especially the military, was incapable of anticipating or suppressing the revolutionary wave that overthrew him. The Shah himself recognized he had over-concentrated power in his own hands, in a way that undermined his own dynasty's life expectancy—but by the time he attempted to carry out reforms, the country had already swept by a wave of revolutionary fervor.
The book is also useful in detailing Iranian political life before 1953, a period which is often overlooked in histories of the Shah's reign and, while corrupt and unstable, contained the roots of a pluralistic and potentially even democratic culture whose suppression as the Shah's reign continued fundamentally weakened the Pahlavi state. In his early reign, the Shah was served by statesmen, many of whom with their own agendas, but by the end of his rule, they had been replaced by sycophants who were unable to rise to the occasion. The alienation of the clergy and emasculation of the aristocracy likewise weakened the base of the regime, and efforts to cultivate the urban middle class, peasantry, and military ultimately proved unsatisfactory in way of replacement.
Equally important is the counter-narrative Takeyh offers regarding the 1953 events, often described as an Anglo-American overthrow of a democratic government led by Mohammad Mossadegh. Takeyh argues Mossadegh was neither democratic in principle nor praxis, pointing out his indecisiveness, autocratic tendencies, and inability to maintain control of the forces he unleashed during the Embargo Crisis. The book underlines that the architects of the coup were found within Iran, not in London or Washington, whose intelligence agencies played a supportive but fundamentally secondary role. More thoroughly and effectively than any other prior work I've encountered, Tayekh is able to deflate the myth of (the sainted democrat) Mossadegh and put his tenure into adequate historical context.
At fewer than 300 pages, the book cannot cover every turn of the Shah's rule. It is not a biography, and it largely omits his personal life, which could have offered further insight into his indecisive character and repeated failures in times of crisis. It also says little about his family or their activities beyond that they invited controversy. Readers seeking greater depth should turn to the many other biographies and histories of the Shah and Pahlavi Iran. Still, as a high-level, balanced account, Takeyh's book is a valuable starting point.
November 6, 2025
This book is a waste of time. Despite some effort to dispel the false narrative of Mossadeq being some glorified angel that was betrayed by everyone and everything, the author simply extends an anti-Shah narrative that is simply tiresome at this point. Some things are just outright lies and the author presents his narrow minded ideas as facts. The fallacy of the shah being dictatorial and selfish does not hold weight amongst Iranians or anyone that has truly studied the era without bias. I’ll leave this review highlighting some of the outlandish claims that are made by the shameless author and you can judge for yourself:
- “pervasive repression was making peaceful protest impossible”
- “the shah had contempt for democratic rule” - right, that’s why he would rather leave than act as a dictator
- “[Reza Shah’s] flirtations with Hitler…” more nonsense, Iran had trade relations with Germany prior to the latter becoming Nazi & Reza Shah acquiesced to the Allied request of expelling German personnel from Iran in 22 August 1941, not that that prevented the Allies from invading and occupying Iran 3 days later….
- “the shah was infatuated with the West” - a simple Google search would dispel this
- “Iranians reclaimed their religion” - Islam, Shia or otherwise, is not indigenous to Iran. This, again, is an attempt to simplify Iran for it to be palatable to Westerners
- “by the time Jimmy Carter came into power, it was too late. For all of America’s meddling, the revolution was truly a Persian affair” - right, let’s conveniently ignore the Carter administration’s active and deliberate attempt to get rid of the shah and present Khomeini as an alternative
- “Reza Shah came to power through his own cruelty” - Yes, how cruelly he obtained royal ascent for his premiership in ‘21 and a parliamentary majority for his ascension to the throne in ‘25. Ridiculous
- “no one mourned the passing of their [Pahlavi] dynasty” Yes, no one except the overwhelming majority of Iranians
- “the shah lacked the emotional resolution one needs in a crisis” Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was perhaps the only ruler of the past century who would not and did not allow for power to trump his personal convictions and morality. In the coup attempt by Mossadeq of ‘53, in Khomeini’s call to jihad in ‘63, and ultimately effective coup of ‘79, he would rather lose power than kill his own people. The one thing he did NOT lack was emotional resolution.
The most egregious part of this book is the intentional omission of the role of outside powers in conspiring (spending billions and training terrorists - the Soviet Union with Fadaeyin e Islam, Mojahedin e Khalq, the PLO with Gaddafi’s money training Islamists how to bomb and wage guerrilla tactics on a civilian population, Carter’s administration meeting and coordinating with Khomeini multiple times, Sullivan specifically telling the Shah to not call on the army, etc…) to destabilize Iran from within.
Simply put, this is not a serious book.
- “pervasive repression was making peaceful protest impossible”
- “the shah had contempt for democratic rule” - right, that’s why he would rather leave than act as a dictator
- “[Reza Shah’s] flirtations with Hitler…” more nonsense, Iran had trade relations with Germany prior to the latter becoming Nazi & Reza Shah acquiesced to the Allied request of expelling German personnel from Iran in 22 August 1941, not that that prevented the Allies from invading and occupying Iran 3 days later….
- “the shah was infatuated with the West” - a simple Google search would dispel this
- “Iranians reclaimed their religion” - Islam, Shia or otherwise, is not indigenous to Iran. This, again, is an attempt to simplify Iran for it to be palatable to Westerners
- “by the time Jimmy Carter came into power, it was too late. For all of America’s meddling, the revolution was truly a Persian affair” - right, let’s conveniently ignore the Carter administration’s active and deliberate attempt to get rid of the shah and present Khomeini as an alternative
- “Reza Shah came to power through his own cruelty” - Yes, how cruelly he obtained royal ascent for his premiership in ‘21 and a parliamentary majority for his ascension to the throne in ‘25. Ridiculous
- “no one mourned the passing of their [Pahlavi] dynasty” Yes, no one except the overwhelming majority of Iranians
- “the shah lacked the emotional resolution one needs in a crisis” Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was perhaps the only ruler of the past century who would not and did not allow for power to trump his personal convictions and morality. In the coup attempt by Mossadeq of ‘53, in Khomeini’s call to jihad in ‘63, and ultimately effective coup of ‘79, he would rather lose power than kill his own people. The one thing he did NOT lack was emotional resolution.
The most egregious part of this book is the intentional omission of the role of outside powers in conspiring (spending billions and training terrorists - the Soviet Union with Fadaeyin e Islam, Mojahedin e Khalq, the PLO with Gaddafi’s money training Islamists how to bomb and wage guerrilla tactics on a civilian population, Carter’s administration meeting and coordinating with Khomeini multiple times, Sullivan specifically telling the Shah to not call on the army, etc…) to destabilize Iran from within.
Simply put, this is not a serious book.
July 25, 2025
This book is ethnically cleansed by the US's Council on Foreign Relations. Do not read this book if it is your first book on Pre-Revolution Iran. This book hides behind some light criticism of the United Kingdom in order to appear neutral. First, it failed to mention that the UK hid actual oil revenue and profit figures in order to bypass the profit-sharing agreement with Iran. Rather than the agreed mid-teen profit sharing percentage, the UK was taking upward 80%+ of the oil profit. Moreover, Takeykh mentioned but refused to put in focus the oil embargo (reserved for wartime operations) the UK put on Iran which crippled Iran economy and created instabilities that the US later capitalized to undermine Mosaddegh. Lastly, it ignored the details and context of "All the Shah's Men" by Stephen Kinzer and CIA's Operation Ajax in order to blame Mosaddegh for the fall of Iran's democracy. Takeyh spent pages after pages exaggerating things about Mosaddegh while barely discuss the legality, ethics, and justification of the US's covert operation to subvert Iran democracy.
July 23, 2021
I took this one on as almost a homework assignment: didn't know much, needed to learn more. A very involved sled through the politics of Iran from the immediate post WWII period through to the Ayatollah takeover in the last 70s. So yes, happened largely in my lifetime, but beyond the oil and the hostage crisis I was miserably uninformed. Sometimes, in a read like this about American, British, and Soviet "diplomacy" one is struck by what a quagmire it all was when ethnocentrism and colonialism clash with religious beliefs. Exhaustively researched and everyone's ox gets gored.
March 24, 2023
I picked up this book because it was reviewed in Foreign Affairs and because I knew some things about the revolution that ended the Shah's reign, but not about the man whose monarchy was ended.
There's relatively little in here about the man himself, it's mostly about the key players and developments going on around him, plus his own incompetence and inability to say, transition to a constitutional monarch. I couldn't always follow who was who, especially the myriad Iranian politicians and military players, so a cast of characters at the beginning would have been helpful.
There's relatively little in here about the man himself, it's mostly about the key players and developments going on around him, plus his own incompetence and inability to say, transition to a constitutional monarch. I couldn't always follow who was who, especially the myriad Iranian politicians and military players, so a cast of characters at the beginning would have been helpful.
July 8, 2025
The audiobook was a great method of experiencing this novel.
This novel starts around the end of WWII and ends right after the 1979 Revolution. This book was so informative that it makes me realize how much more of a shame it is that most students aren’t taught this in history classes. I think this is crucial information (in addition to what occurs after 1979 to present day) to help understand current events. While social media is helpful with learning tidbits, well reviewed novels seem to be the way to go in our day and age.
This novel starts around the end of WWII and ends right after the 1979 Revolution. This book was so informative that it makes me realize how much more of a shame it is that most students aren’t taught this in history classes. I think this is crucial information (in addition to what occurs after 1979 to present day) to help understand current events. While social media is helpful with learning tidbits, well reviewed novels seem to be the way to go in our day and age.
August 6, 2021
This is the first in-depth analysis of the fall of Iran's Reza Pahlavi I found in English which didn't take sides from the beginning. The book was objectively written, thoroughly researched, and the prose was really good. It might have been better if the book didn't really focus so much on the American involvement in the Shah's later years and focused more on the internal affairs but the coverage overall was quite balanced and insightful.
April 19, 2024
İran siyasi tarihinin bu revizyonunda
en yeni ve kışkırtıcı iddialar şunlardır
ikna edici atıf veya başka bir şekilde desteklenmeyen
Kanıt. Sömürgecilik girişimleri
etkisi, ve sonunda-- ve belki de
Orta Doğu'nun en önemli ülkelerinden biri için şaşırtıcı olmayan bir şekilde
çalışılmış olaylar dizisi - birkaç değerli
tarihsel kayıtlara yapılan eklemeler de dahil edilmiştir.
Analizlerin çoğu özenle seçilmiş ve uygulanmıştır.
analiz oldukça sığ ve tek taraflıdır.
en yeni ve kışkırtıcı iddialar şunlardır
ikna edici atıf veya başka bir şekilde desteklenmeyen
Kanıt. Sömürgecilik girişimleri
etkisi, ve sonunda-- ve belki de
Orta Doğu'nun en önemli ülkelerinden biri için şaşırtıcı olmayan bir şekilde
çalışılmış olaylar dizisi - birkaç değerli
tarihsel kayıtlara yapılan eklemeler de dahil edilmiştir.
Analizlerin çoğu özenle seçilmiş ve uygulanmıştır.
analiz oldukça sığ ve tek taraflıdır.
January 26, 2025
It was always going to be a bit depressing, knowing that it ends with an absolute piece of work like Ruhollah 'I wish I'd murdered more people' Khomeini coming to power.
I'd have appreciated a bit more context at the start, and more detail on Iran's domestic developments. The focus is very much on what the key political players over the decades said and did.
I'd have appreciated a bit more context at the start, and more detail on Iran's domestic developments. The focus is very much on what the key political players over the decades said and did.
August 1, 2025
An excellent book if you want to learn more about the 1953 coup and the revolution and a lot more throughout the sha's reign.
this book will provide you with much more detail than the common mainstream sources.
highly recommend!
this book will provide you with much more detail than the common mainstream sources.
highly recommend!
October 7, 2021
Brilliant, credible, essential and incisive history.
October 26, 2021
Suprisingly good and interestingly written take on Iran.
February 21, 2023
I’m so sad I have wasted my time on this book. Too subjective a tone for an alleged “historian!”
March 3, 2024
I learned a lot from this book It's an interesting account of the Shah that deviates from the standard narrative. The person of Mossadeq is particularly well detailed.
June 7, 2024
very well crafted, with an honest and unbiased evaluation of the situation. i liked it.
April 3, 2025
Well done history. Explained with cultural and political context the Pahlavi Dynasty.
September 23, 2025
This book seems to me too much on the side of the Western nations, and particularly apologetic of the British role. I will have to look for a better text to build my knowledge of the Iranian history.
December 24, 2023
Yet another story of how colonialism and western imperialism destroyed a country. "Western Interests", "Regime changes", "arms exports" and for what, oil? Detterence against russia? I found the book to be a little biased towards America absolving it from all that has happened in Iran even though it was the most involved in its politics for vested interests.
December 2, 2025
Takeyh offers a well researched account of Iranian history from the times of occupation until after the Islamic Revolution.
He does a great job of linking the sphere of high politics with a grounded account of the social forces shaping the landscape of possibilities of Iranian politics. The effort put into scouring American and British archives is great and allows him to portray the two most important relations of Iran in a nuanced manner. The Shah's psychology also got the attention it deserved. All of this allows the reader to grasp the challenges and constraints politicians in Iran and the West faced.
His writing style is pleasent and theres lots of dry wit.
The only small criticism I have is that the change from failed liberalization to Islamic revolution could have been portrayed in a bit more detail. The respective chapters felt like they lacked a passage linking them more neatly together.
Overall a great read.
5/5
He does a great job of linking the sphere of high politics with a grounded account of the social forces shaping the landscape of possibilities of Iranian politics. The effort put into scouring American and British archives is great and allows him to portray the two most important relations of Iran in a nuanced manner. The Shah's psychology also got the attention it deserved. All of this allows the reader to grasp the challenges and constraints politicians in Iran and the West faced.
His writing style is pleasent and theres lots of dry wit.
The only small criticism I have is that the change from failed liberalization to Islamic revolution could have been portrayed in a bit more detail. The respective chapters felt like they lacked a passage linking them more neatly together.
Overall a great read.
5/5
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