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The Black Banners (Declassified): How Torture Derailed the War on Terror after 9/11
Widely heralded on publication as a "must-read" (Military Review) and "important window on America’s battle with al-Qaeda" (Washington Post), Ali Soufan’s revelatory account of the war on terror as seen from its front lines changed the way we understand al-Qaeda and how the United States prosecuted the war—and led to hard questions being asked of our leaders.
When The Black Banners was published in 2011, significant portions of the text were redacted. After subsequent review by the Central Intelligence Agency, those redactions have been lifted. Their removal corrects the record on how vital intelligence was obtained from al-Qaeda suspects and brings forth important new details on the controversial use of enhanced interrogation techniques (torture) to extract information from terror suspects. For many years, proponents of the use of these techniques have argued that they produced actionable intelligence in the war on terror. This edition of The Black Banners explodes this myth; it shows Soufan at work using guile and intelligent questioning—not force or violence—to extract some of the most important confessions in the war, and it vividly recounts the failures of the government’s torture program. Drawing on Soufan’s experiences as a lead operative for the FBI and declassified government records, The Black Banners (Declassified) documents the intelligence failures that lead to the tragic attacks on New York and Washington, DC, and subsequently how torture derailed the fight against al-Qaeda. With this edition, eighteen years on from the first sanctioned enhanced interrogation technique, the public can finally read the complete story of what happened in their name after the events of 9/11.
The Black Banners (Declassified) includes a new foreword from Ali Soufan that addresses the significance of the CIA’s decision to lift the redactions.
When The Black Banners was published in 2011, significant portions of the text were redacted. After subsequent review by the Central Intelligence Agency, those redactions have been lifted. Their removal corrects the record on how vital intelligence was obtained from al-Qaeda suspects and brings forth important new details on the controversial use of enhanced interrogation techniques (torture) to extract information from terror suspects. For many years, proponents of the use of these techniques have argued that they produced actionable intelligence in the war on terror. This edition of The Black Banners explodes this myth; it shows Soufan at work using guile and intelligent questioning—not force or violence—to extract some of the most important confessions in the war, and it vividly recounts the failures of the government’s torture program. Drawing on Soufan’s experiences as a lead operative for the FBI and declassified government records, The Black Banners (Declassified) documents the intelligence failures that lead to the tragic attacks on New York and Washington, DC, and subsequently how torture derailed the fight against al-Qaeda. With this edition, eighteen years on from the first sanctioned enhanced interrogation technique, the public can finally read the complete story of what happened in their name after the events of 9/11.
The Black Banners (Declassified) includes a new foreword from Ali Soufan that addresses the significance of the CIA’s decision to lift the redactions.
640 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 2011
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5900 people want to read
About the author
Ali H. Soufan
6 books108 followersAli H. Soufan, a former FBI special agent, served on the front lines against al-Qaeda and gained an international reputation as a top counterterrorism operative and interrogator. He has been profiled in The New Yorker and featured in books, newspaper articles, and documentaries around the globe.
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April 10, 2016
Ali Soufan was an FBI Special Agent in charge of Al Qaeda-related research and attacks when the World Trade Center was attacked on 9/11. He knew and had worked closely with NYC FBI Special Agent John O’Neill before O'Neill resigned to work in the towers as security chief there. Born in Lebanon, Soufan is an Arabic-speaker that gave him more immediate access to informants and materials collected as a result of raids on plot suspects. This is his story of how the investigation into the U.S.S. Cole bombing and the World Trade Center attacks unfolded.
Soufan comes across as insightful, meticulous, and fiercely devoted to his task. Through his telling we see the culture of suited and pressed (buttoned-up) FBI contrast sharply with the looser, intuitive (unbuttoned) CIA, with whom it had to work closely. The FBI was meant to focus internally in the U.S. while the CIA was tasked outside the country, but in the case of terrorism, they often were meant to cooperate. Soufan’s testimony illustrates how important it is to have personnel who can function with a maximum of critical thinking and a minimum of ego expression, and how often that simple requirement is the fulcrum upon which patient legwork rests. This is one of the ultimate crime stories, not without its moments of ludicrous missteps and the sudden discovery of important clues.
While the level of detail in this book may be interesting only to other investigators (or the investigators of investigators, like the 9/11 Commission), casual readers/listeners can glean some important insights into the nature of terrorism, Islamic society, Al Qaeda, the FBI, the CIA, effective methods of interrogation, the tenor and tone of U.S. State Department and administration policies, and Yemen involvement and/or acquiescence in allowing the plots to unfold. For those insights, it is an indispensable document.
What specifically struck me was the nature of the folk we have come to call our enemy. Soufan managed to show that many of the “extensive network of terrorists” are simple people in technologically backward nations who don’t think linearly, often name themselves from the town in which they originate, have a very shallow vision of the world outside their immediate purview, are fiercely adherent to blood and tribal connections, and are as impressed and overwhelmed by great wealth and power as any human with limited horizons. The nature of the enemy has evolved since then, but reading this was a little like discovering the stuff missing from the back of our car wasn’t stolen: we’d left the hatchback open and the stuff had fallen out. Shock, dismay, and what could we have done differently?
The other thing I learned was how interrogations can be conducted. In many cases, interrogations are like the blind man and the elephant. The interrogator is not always sure what exactly it is that he/she expects to find. The information might be false, but there are ways of circling back to clarify inconsistencies. What Soufan shows us is that a painstaking and agonizingly slow process by knowledgeable and respectful interrogators can yield results that more aggressive methods (like Enhanced Interrogation Techniques) do not. Soufan points out that CIA documents later asserted that EIT were meant to “gradually” elicit information, not get the information quickly. Long after the interrogations were finished, detainees admitted lying during EIT sessions in order to end the torture. One thing should have been glaringly obvious to those involved in these interrogations: Going to the dark side negates everything we are, and fear is our greatest enemy.
The CIA only gained authority for interrogations on September 17, 2001 when President Bush wrote a “Memorandum of Notification” that allowed CIA to capture, detain, and interrogate terrorism suspects.” Previously the CIA collected information, and the FBI and military intelligence conducted interrogations. The CIA had no institutional experience or expertise in this area and were making it up as they went along. They hired a psychologist, Boris, with no experience and used EIT of his devising on high value detainees.
The curious and revelatory thing about this book is that it was published September 12, 2011 and yet it is written as though it were a diary: at the beginning we do not see the end, even though we already know the history. We only gradually perceive Soufan’s growing confidence and awareness of the outlines of the endeavor in which he is engaged. Because of his language skills and his experience growing up in Lebanon and the U.S., he was not as intimidated as others by confusion in the environment into which he was thrust: he recognized the detainees for what they were. Some were high level operatives and many were mere conduits. He could get information from all of them without inflating their respective roles. Respect and patience and behind the scenes research did more for information recovery than any EIT devised. The transformation of a new FBI recruit to one of the most respected names in terrorist interrogation is one Soufan allows us to trace. Yes, he is telling the story, but it has some credence because of his growing anger at and diligent recording of CIA activities conducted on behalf of the White House and authorities there, which have been authenticated by the 9/11 committee.
If we did not have enough evidence of incompetence, hubris, and the pernicious nature of covert activities run amok, the evidence presented here should suffice to close the CIA down. Instead we learn that some of the most egregious acts were made by folks now seeded throughout congress oversight committees. I understand mistakes, but I cannot understand why the mistakes are not taken to heart. Some mistakes are too big to forgive.
By now we all know the failures of intelligence that led to 9/11. A 2006 article profiling Soufan by Lawrence Wright in The New Yorker covers much of the material in this book in a much shorter format, but it did not yield the insights that I gleaned from this lengthier account.
What I’d really like to know now, after reading Guantánamo Diary
by detainee Mohamedou Ould Slahi, is what Ali Soufan made of that case. We know Soufan visited Guantanamo and probably interviewed Slahi because at one point Slahi was thought to be the highest value detainee in the facility. Soufan does not mention Slahi in his chapter on Guantanamo. If he did not consider him a high-value detainee then, he may have some kind of moral obligation to speak out now about that case because Slahi is still being held.
I listened to the Blackstone Audio production of this book, ready by Neil Shah. Shah did a terrific job with pronunciation and pacing. The book was heavily redacted towards the end, so this provided some discontinuity, but it was comprehensible enough.
Soufan comes across as insightful, meticulous, and fiercely devoted to his task. Through his telling we see the culture of suited and pressed (buttoned-up) FBI contrast sharply with the looser, intuitive (unbuttoned) CIA, with whom it had to work closely. The FBI was meant to focus internally in the U.S. while the CIA was tasked outside the country, but in the case of terrorism, they often were meant to cooperate. Soufan’s testimony illustrates how important it is to have personnel who can function with a maximum of critical thinking and a minimum of ego expression, and how often that simple requirement is the fulcrum upon which patient legwork rests. This is one of the ultimate crime stories, not without its moments of ludicrous missteps and the sudden discovery of important clues.
While the level of detail in this book may be interesting only to other investigators (or the investigators of investigators, like the 9/11 Commission), casual readers/listeners can glean some important insights into the nature of terrorism, Islamic society, Al Qaeda, the FBI, the CIA, effective methods of interrogation, the tenor and tone of U.S. State Department and administration policies, and Yemen involvement and/or acquiescence in allowing the plots to unfold. For those insights, it is an indispensable document.
What specifically struck me was the nature of the folk we have come to call our enemy. Soufan managed to show that many of the “extensive network of terrorists” are simple people in technologically backward nations who don’t think linearly, often name themselves from the town in which they originate, have a very shallow vision of the world outside their immediate purview, are fiercely adherent to blood and tribal connections, and are as impressed and overwhelmed by great wealth and power as any human with limited horizons. The nature of the enemy has evolved since then, but reading this was a little like discovering the stuff missing from the back of our car wasn’t stolen: we’d left the hatchback open and the stuff had fallen out. Shock, dismay, and what could we have done differently?
The other thing I learned was how interrogations can be conducted. In many cases, interrogations are like the blind man and the elephant. The interrogator is not always sure what exactly it is that he/she expects to find. The information might be false, but there are ways of circling back to clarify inconsistencies. What Soufan shows us is that a painstaking and agonizingly slow process by knowledgeable and respectful interrogators can yield results that more aggressive methods (like Enhanced Interrogation Techniques) do not. Soufan points out that CIA documents later asserted that EIT were meant to “gradually” elicit information, not get the information quickly. Long after the interrogations were finished, detainees admitted lying during EIT sessions in order to end the torture. One thing should have been glaringly obvious to those involved in these interrogations: Going to the dark side negates everything we are, and fear is our greatest enemy.
The CIA only gained authority for interrogations on September 17, 2001 when President Bush wrote a “Memorandum of Notification” that allowed CIA to capture, detain, and interrogate terrorism suspects.” Previously the CIA collected information, and the FBI and military intelligence conducted interrogations. The CIA had no institutional experience or expertise in this area and were making it up as they went along. They hired a psychologist, Boris, with no experience and used EIT of his devising on high value detainees.
The curious and revelatory thing about this book is that it was published September 12, 2011 and yet it is written as though it were a diary: at the beginning we do not see the end, even though we already know the history. We only gradually perceive Soufan’s growing confidence and awareness of the outlines of the endeavor in which he is engaged. Because of his language skills and his experience growing up in Lebanon and the U.S., he was not as intimidated as others by confusion in the environment into which he was thrust: he recognized the detainees for what they were. Some were high level operatives and many were mere conduits. He could get information from all of them without inflating their respective roles. Respect and patience and behind the scenes research did more for information recovery than any EIT devised. The transformation of a new FBI recruit to one of the most respected names in terrorist interrogation is one Soufan allows us to trace. Yes, he is telling the story, but it has some credence because of his growing anger at and diligent recording of CIA activities conducted on behalf of the White House and authorities there, which have been authenticated by the 9/11 committee.
If we did not have enough evidence of incompetence, hubris, and the pernicious nature of covert activities run amok, the evidence presented here should suffice to close the CIA down. Instead we learn that some of the most egregious acts were made by folks now seeded throughout congress oversight committees. I understand mistakes, but I cannot understand why the mistakes are not taken to heart. Some mistakes are too big to forgive.
By now we all know the failures of intelligence that led to 9/11. A 2006 article profiling Soufan by Lawrence Wright in The New Yorker covers much of the material in this book in a much shorter format, but it did not yield the insights that I gleaned from this lengthier account.
What I’d really like to know now, after reading Guantánamo Diary
by detainee Mohamedou Ould Slahi, is what Ali Soufan made of that case. We know Soufan visited Guantanamo and probably interviewed Slahi because at one point Slahi was thought to be the highest value detainee in the facility. Soufan does not mention Slahi in his chapter on Guantanamo. If he did not consider him a high-value detainee then, he may have some kind of moral obligation to speak out now about that case because Slahi is still being held.
I listened to the Blackstone Audio production of this book, ready by Neil Shah. Shah did a terrific job with pronunciation and pacing. The book was heavily redacted towards the end, so this provided some discontinuity, but it was comprehensible enough.
October 21, 2012
This book completely changed my perspective about EIT, or enhanced interrogation techniques. I believed, hook, line & sinker all of the misinformation from the CIA, et. al. regarding the intelligence obtained using these methods. While I have not been supportive of the methods, I was convinced that the information we were gathering was in fact due to torture. From reading this book, however, I learned that all of the intelligence we supposedly gained from torture, was actually gained from traditional interrogation methods and claimed, secretly of course, that this was obtained from these methods.
There were significant redactions of information Mr. Soufan claimed to have been public testimony or information in the public domain. It was actually humorous in parts due to the fact you knew Mr. Soufan was speaking of himself and he had to redact the pronouns I and me. After finishing the book, it became apparent the CIA was attempting to exert payback on Mr. Soufan.
I recommend this book for anyone interested in the investigation into the 1998 US Embassy bombings, the 2000 Cole attack, September 11th or the prosecution of terrorists captured in the wake of these events.
There were significant redactions of information Mr. Soufan claimed to have been public testimony or information in the public domain. It was actually humorous in parts due to the fact you knew Mr. Soufan was speaking of himself and he had to redact the pronouns I and me. After finishing the book, it became apparent the CIA was attempting to exert payback on Mr. Soufan.
I recommend this book for anyone interested in the investigation into the 1998 US Embassy bombings, the 2000 Cole attack, September 11th or the prosecution of terrorists captured in the wake of these events.
October 16, 2014
Would I call the book exciting? Not exactly. Exasperating? Often, due to a combination of many CIA imposed redactions in the later chapters of the book, and partly due to being reminded of how poorly the "war on terror" was handled in its early phases. But if you asked if the book was informative, interesting, and well worth the read, the answer is absolutely!
The author, Ali Soufan, is a native Arabic speaker who spent eight years as an FBI special agent, from the time just before 9/11 and through the period of the most significant battles against Al Qaeda. Soufan seemed to be something of a legend within the FBI because of his interrogation skills and insights into Arab culture, and now that he's left the FBI, can tell his stories from this most important timeframe.
Soufan's account has been called the most detailed to date by an insider concerning the American investigations of Al Qaeda and the major attacks that the group carried out, including bombings of American Embassies in East Africa, the U.S. Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole, as well as the Sept. 11 attacks. It's unfortunate that the Central Intelligence Agency required significant redactions to several chapters in the book, especially since many of the redacted passaged are currently in the pubic record. Yet the redactions are not exactly surprising since the Agency leadership and lack of cooperation with the CIA is a frequent target of Mr. Soufan in this book.
Initially, I had my doubts that I'd be able to keep the seemingly endless list of incomprehensible names, places, and descriptions straight in my mind, but that was a needless concern. Soufan ably presents clear and impressive descriptions of the FBI's investigative efforts in identifying those responsible for the terrorist attacks against our country. One can't help but feel proud of the skill and dedication of the Agents performing these important tasks.
On the other hand, once can't help being angry to hear about how rules put in place by bureaucrats in the intelligence agencies prevented cooperation between the FBI and CIA, and hearing how had those barriers not been in place, several of those successful attacks against our country may have been prevented. Also infuriating was hearing of how senior members of the Administration pressured the FBI to draw conclusions to support ideological positions despite facts to the contrary. Equally disturbing was hearing Soufan's very believable descriptions of how senior administration officials and certain CIA officials distorted and inflated the effectiveness of "enhanced interrogation techniques". Soufan's first-person account of his successful interrogations of Al Qaeda and terrorist suspects using professional and skillful techniques vs. "enhanced techniques" is very believable. Many have claimed that waterboarding and enhanced techniques just don't work, and Mr. Soufan makes the case that the FBI tried and true techniques produce results without undermining our principles or breaking our laws.
I had considered myself fairly well informed about the fight against Al Qaeda and terrorism over the past ten years, but found there was much I didn't know once I started reading this book. Despite the interruptions to the flow of the narrative caused by the redactions, I found this a book well worth reading.
The author, Ali Soufan, is a native Arabic speaker who spent eight years as an FBI special agent, from the time just before 9/11 and through the period of the most significant battles against Al Qaeda. Soufan seemed to be something of a legend within the FBI because of his interrogation skills and insights into Arab culture, and now that he's left the FBI, can tell his stories from this most important timeframe.
Soufan's account has been called the most detailed to date by an insider concerning the American investigations of Al Qaeda and the major attacks that the group carried out, including bombings of American Embassies in East Africa, the U.S. Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole, as well as the Sept. 11 attacks. It's unfortunate that the Central Intelligence Agency required significant redactions to several chapters in the book, especially since many of the redacted passaged are currently in the pubic record. Yet the redactions are not exactly surprising since the Agency leadership and lack of cooperation with the CIA is a frequent target of Mr. Soufan in this book.
Initially, I had my doubts that I'd be able to keep the seemingly endless list of incomprehensible names, places, and descriptions straight in my mind, but that was a needless concern. Soufan ably presents clear and impressive descriptions of the FBI's investigative efforts in identifying those responsible for the terrorist attacks against our country. One can't help but feel proud of the skill and dedication of the Agents performing these important tasks.
On the other hand, once can't help being angry to hear about how rules put in place by bureaucrats in the intelligence agencies prevented cooperation between the FBI and CIA, and hearing how had those barriers not been in place, several of those successful attacks against our country may have been prevented. Also infuriating was hearing of how senior members of the Administration pressured the FBI to draw conclusions to support ideological positions despite facts to the contrary. Equally disturbing was hearing Soufan's very believable descriptions of how senior administration officials and certain CIA officials distorted and inflated the effectiveness of "enhanced interrogation techniques". Soufan's first-person account of his successful interrogations of Al Qaeda and terrorist suspects using professional and skillful techniques vs. "enhanced techniques" is very believable. Many have claimed that waterboarding and enhanced techniques just don't work, and Mr. Soufan makes the case that the FBI tried and true techniques produce results without undermining our principles or breaking our laws.
I had considered myself fairly well informed about the fight against Al Qaeda and terrorism over the past ten years, but found there was much I didn't know once I started reading this book. Despite the interruptions to the flow of the narrative caused by the redactions, I found this a book well worth reading.
April 6, 2012
Interrogation represents intelligence collection in its most visceral form. Sitting in “the box” with one’s enemy, maintaining composure and decorum, all while outwitting them to the point that they provide valuable information against their will requires the skills of a chess master combined with a thespian. It is clear after reading The Black Banners that former FBI Agent Ali Soufan embodies this ability and more.
A Lebanese-American assigned to the FBI’s counterterrorism office in New York City, Soufan was pivotal as an interrogator for many investigations in the war with al Qaeda to include the East Africa Embassy bombings, the attack on USS Cole, and 9/11. In fact, Soufan was in Yemen on 9/11 conducting the Cole investigation, and collected the first intelligence that proved al Qaeda was responsible for 9/11.
The Black Banners describes many interrogations that are reminiscent of other great books on the subject such as The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War Against al Qaeda by Chris Mackey and Greg Miller and How to Break a Terrorist: The U.S. Interrogators Who Used Brains, Not Brutality, to Take Down the Deadliest Man in Iraq. Like Alexander, Soufan provides detailed and convincing commentary on Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (read: waterboarding and the like) versus The Informed Interrogation Approach. This alone makes his work an important book for all who work in the intelligence field.
Soufan’s book is equally valuable for its study of Al Qaeda itself. While it is not as informative as other examples that focus primarily on the terror group, like The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 by Lawrence Wright, it serves as a great companion to such works.
The Black Banners is an important study of an American patriot and his invaluable service to our nation. It should serve as an addition to any student of modern history, and of course, military and intelligence enthusiasts.
Thank you, Mr. Soufan.
A Lebanese-American assigned to the FBI’s counterterrorism office in New York City, Soufan was pivotal as an interrogator for many investigations in the war with al Qaeda to include the East Africa Embassy bombings, the attack on USS Cole, and 9/11. In fact, Soufan was in Yemen on 9/11 conducting the Cole investigation, and collected the first intelligence that proved al Qaeda was responsible for 9/11.
The Black Banners describes many interrogations that are reminiscent of other great books on the subject such as The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War Against al Qaeda by Chris Mackey and Greg Miller and How to Break a Terrorist: The U.S. Interrogators Who Used Brains, Not Brutality, to Take Down the Deadliest Man in Iraq. Like Alexander, Soufan provides detailed and convincing commentary on Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (read: waterboarding and the like) versus The Informed Interrogation Approach. This alone makes his work an important book for all who work in the intelligence field.
Soufan’s book is equally valuable for its study of Al Qaeda itself. While it is not as informative as other examples that focus primarily on the terror group, like The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 by Lawrence Wright, it serves as a great companion to such works.
The Black Banners is an important study of an American patriot and his invaluable service to our nation. It should serve as an addition to any student of modern history, and of course, military and intelligence enthusiasts.
Thank you, Mr. Soufan.
October 28, 2011
http://www.npr.org/2011/09/13/1404014...
This got 4 stars because it is a very important book written mostly in the first person. There is a great deal of detail, naming names and places, though much has been redacted by the CIA. It was tough getting through the beginning, but well worth slogging through the background part.
Soufan demonstrates that absolute power absolutely corrupts. After the tragedy of 9/11, the country was in the mood for revenge. Bush and his neo-cons were more than ready to jump to their own conclusions about what happened and what to do. The intelligence community was charged with backing into these conclusions with their research.
The CIA had no interrogation unit and resented the FBI's expertise, especially Soufan, an Arabic speaking American born in Lebanon. Sadly, though the USS Cole bombing investigation was directly related to 9/11, the FBI interrogators were shoved aside while the CIA used inexperienced academics to conduct "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EIT)", though never tried before. When that failed miserably, the "Enhancements" escalated to torture. (Waterboard him again and again and again until he talks!)
Soufan documents this sad tale and how the "War on Terror" was only prolonged and made more difficult by poor leadership. One CIA agent said that of course waterboarding was constitutional because the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfelt, had written a memo that it was. The FBI response was, no, the Secretary does not interpret law.
If you want to understand recent history, read what the participants wrote. These patterns of setting aside constitutional guarantees continue to happen when leaders insist that, "But this time it is different". Reference: Barbara Tuchman's "The March Folly" and J William Fullbright's "The Arrogance of Power" as just a start.
This got 4 stars because it is a very important book written mostly in the first person. There is a great deal of detail, naming names and places, though much has been redacted by the CIA. It was tough getting through the beginning, but well worth slogging through the background part.
Soufan demonstrates that absolute power absolutely corrupts. After the tragedy of 9/11, the country was in the mood for revenge. Bush and his neo-cons were more than ready to jump to their own conclusions about what happened and what to do. The intelligence community was charged with backing into these conclusions with their research.
The CIA had no interrogation unit and resented the FBI's expertise, especially Soufan, an Arabic speaking American born in Lebanon. Sadly, though the USS Cole bombing investigation was directly related to 9/11, the FBI interrogators were shoved aside while the CIA used inexperienced academics to conduct "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EIT)", though never tried before. When that failed miserably, the "Enhancements" escalated to torture. (Waterboard him again and again and again until he talks!)
Soufan documents this sad tale and how the "War on Terror" was only prolonged and made more difficult by poor leadership. One CIA agent said that of course waterboarding was constitutional because the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfelt, had written a memo that it was. The FBI response was, no, the Secretary does not interpret law.
If you want to understand recent history, read what the participants wrote. These patterns of setting aside constitutional guarantees continue to happen when leaders insist that, "But this time it is different". Reference: Barbara Tuchman's "The March Folly" and J William Fullbright's "The Arrogance of Power" as just a start.
December 6, 2012
A more correct subtitle would have been: Ali Soufan thinks Ali Soufan was a great FBI agent. This is not to say that the author is not knowledgable about the subject of Al Qaeda or that his experiences with the bureaucracy and methodology of the American intelligence system shouldn't sicken the citizen at large, but it is to say that the scope of this book is narrower than the title would lead one to believe. Additionally, while some of the redactions were easily dismissed, the absence of entire pages or, lo, an entire chapter tends to be a bit distracting. I blame the CIA for the redactions, but I blame the author for publishing the book in such a condition, and I'm sure the publishers blame Mr. Soufan for wasting a great deal of black ink as well.
February 8, 2018
کتاب در مورد یک مامور لبنانی اف بی آی است که برای اولین بار به فعالیت های فردی به نام بن لادن مشکوک می شود و مقاله ای در مورد این فرد به بالادستی های خود در آن سازمان ارائه میکند. این شخص بعدا جزو اولین تیم تخصصی پیگیری فعالیت های تروریستی القاعده می شود.
کتاب با جزئیات خیلی زیادی نوشته شده به شکلی که می شود یک کتاب دیگر از روی آن نوشت
تمامی شواهد، ساعت ها، اسامی، تاریخ ها و مکان های جغرافیایی با دقت خیلی زیادی هر بار تکرار شده اند. این نکته میتواند در عین حال نقطه ی قوت و ضعف کتاب باشد.
در طول داستان روز به روز و قدم به قدم با فعالیت ها و پیگیری های تیم اف بی آی و سیس آی ای و خیلی از گروه های ضد تروریسم آمریکایی دیگر آشنا میشویم. نکته ی جالبی که در طول این کتاب نظر من را جلب کرد روش بازجویی ها از تروریست ها بود که به نظرم می تواند خیلی آموزنده باشد.
همچنین آشنا شدن با شخصیت واقعی تروریست هایی که اکثر ما تنها با نام آنها آشنا هستیم و آنها را موجوداتی بی رحم و وحشی میبینیم نیز خیلی جذاب بود.
به طور کلی به نظر من مطالعه و آشنایی با موضوعاتی از این دست امروز بیشتر از هر زمان دیگری اهمیت پیدا کرده است چرا که در دنیایی زندگی میکنیم که چهره ی جنگ و مبارزه تغییر کرده. پنتاگون سالها پیش و در اوج بحران نظامی عراق و افغانستان اسم جالبی را برای مشکلات نیروهای نظامی خود در مناطقی که در آن با مشکلات insurgency و terrorism رو به رو بود انتخاب کرد:
Catastrophic Success
این کلمه بعدا ها توسط جورج بوش هم در مورد عراق مورد استفاده قرار گرفت. این جمله اشاره به پیروزی نیروی نظامی سازمان یافته ی آمریکا در مقابل نیروهای نظامی سازمان یافته ی عراق و بعد شکست در نگهداری و حفظ موقعیت های امنیتی و استراتژیک نیروهای آن کشور دارد.
متاسفانه بسیاری از بخش های کتاب حذف شده اند و در خیلی از صفحات، مخصوصا در بخش های پایانی کتاب با مواردی از این دست زیاد رو به رو میشوید:
[XXX words redacted]
[xx words redacted]
که این مسئله باعث سخت شدن فهم مطالب کتاب میشود.
نکته ی جالب توجه اینکه اف بی آی به طور کلی مخالف استفاده از روش های خشونت بار در بازجویی ها بوده به دلیل اینکه معتقد بوده افراد مورد بازجویی انتظار دارند دقیقا چنین رفتاری با آنها بشود و برای اینکار آموزش دیده اند. این مسئله صحت داشته و بعدا عدم کارایی روش های خشونت بار در بازجویی ها که توسط سی آی ای انجام میشده خودش را نشان می دهد.
در صورتی که شما هم مثل من به طبیعت تروریسم، جنگ های خیابانی و نامتقارن علاقه دارید این کتاب می تواند خیلی جالب و ارزشمند باشد. و در صورتی که هری پاتر میخوانید هرگز سمت این کتاب نروید چون در این کتاب خبری از اژدها و چوب جادویی نیست
کتاب با جزئیات خیلی زیادی نوشته شده به شکلی که می شود یک کتاب دیگر از روی آن نوشت
تمامی شواهد، ساعت ها، اسامی، تاریخ ها و مکان های جغرافیایی با دقت خیلی زیادی هر بار تکرار شده اند. این نکته میتواند در عین حال نقطه ی قوت و ضعف کتاب باشد.
در طول داستان روز به روز و قدم به قدم با فعالیت ها و پیگیری های تیم اف بی آی و سیس آی ای و خیلی از گروه های ضد تروریسم آمریکایی دیگر آشنا میشویم. نکته ی جالبی که در طول این کتاب نظر من را جلب کرد روش بازجویی ها از تروریست ها بود که به نظرم می تواند خیلی آموزنده باشد.
همچنین آشنا شدن با شخصیت واقعی تروریست هایی که اکثر ما تنها با نام آنها آشنا هستیم و آنها را موجوداتی بی رحم و وحشی میبینیم نیز خیلی جذاب بود.
به طور کلی به نظر من مطالعه و آشنایی با موضوعاتی از این دست امروز بیشتر از هر زمان دیگری اهمیت پیدا کرده است چرا که در دنیایی زندگی میکنیم که چهره ی جنگ و مبارزه تغییر کرده. پنتاگون سالها پیش و در اوج بحران نظامی عراق و افغانستان اسم جالبی را برای مشکلات نیروهای نظامی خود در مناطقی که در آن با مشکلات insurgency و terrorism رو به رو بود انتخاب کرد:
Catastrophic Success
این کلمه بعدا ها توسط جورج بوش هم در مورد عراق مورد استفاده قرار گرفت. این جمله اشاره به پیروزی نیروی نظامی سازمان یافته ی آمریکا در مقابل نیروهای نظامی سازمان یافته ی عراق و بعد شکست در نگهداری و حفظ موقعیت های امنیتی و استراتژیک نیروهای آن کشور دارد.
متاسفانه بسیاری از بخش های کتاب حذف شده اند و در خیلی از صفحات، مخصوصا در بخش های پایانی کتاب با مواردی از این دست زیاد رو به رو میشوید:
[XXX words redacted]
[xx words redacted]
که این مسئله باعث سخت شدن فهم مطالب کتاب میشود.
نکته ی جالب توجه اینکه اف بی آی به طور کلی مخالف استفاده از روش های خشونت بار در بازجویی ها بوده به دلیل اینکه معتقد بوده افراد مورد بازجویی انتظار دارند دقیقا چنین رفتاری با آنها بشود و برای اینکار آموزش دیده اند. این مسئله صحت داشته و بعدا عدم کارایی روش های خشونت بار در بازجویی ها که توسط سی آی ای انجام میشده خودش را نشان می دهد.
در صورتی که شما هم مثل من به طبیعت تروریسم، جنگ های خیابانی و نامتقارن علاقه دارید این کتاب می تواند خیلی جالب و ارزشمند باشد. و در صورتی که هری پاتر میخوانید هرگز سمت این کتاب نروید چون در این کتاب خبری از اژدها و چوب جادویی نیست
November 13, 2020
While I had had my eye on this book for a long time, I was put off by the prospect of having to wade through page after page full of redacted material thanks to CIA-imposed censorship in the original version. The publication of this declassified edition eliminates that problem and I've finally gotten around to delving into Ali Soufan's account of his part in tackling al-Quaeda before and after 9/11. His career makes for interesting reading, he brings a lot of insight into his work and was involved in a number of high-profile investigations. In addition to a scathing critique of the communication failures and obstructionism between FBI and CIA he is also very vocal about his condemnation of the "harsh methods" of interrogation (Since other than in the subtitle of the book, he insists on being one of those people who shy away from actually using the word, much to my dismay - Repeat after me, people: It's torture. That's what we're talking about. "Coercive methods", my ass.) adopted by CIA and military in the so-called War on Terror. He provides clear, convincing (for those who still needed convincing on this issue) arguments for why such methods should not be used and how interrogations should be conducted instead. The only thing about this that leaves a bad taste in my mouth is the fact that his arguments only amount to A) it doesn't work, i.e. doesn't get you the intel you need and B) it makes prosecution difficult, with the occasional sidenote of "oh, and it makes America look bad". (How about: "You shouldn't be fucking torturing people, for any reason. Period."?)
February 9, 2023
Finally, some “new” (to me) information regarding AQ and the attacks they carried out over the years. I’ve read many books on 9/11, OBL, and AQ, and for the most part, they’re all just the same recycled information. This book, however, gives an insider’s story on the FBI’s investigation of the Kenya bombings, the USS Cole bombing, and, of course, 9/11. The author being Muslim and from Lebanon served him well in his career with the FBI. The only thing that really bothered me about this book was the amount of redacted information. If this was for effect, great, the blacked out pages did their job creating the “classified” appearance. But so much of what appeared redacted in a number of chapters were the pronouns I, me, and my. At that point, I felt like my brain was filling in the blanks to match the verbs.
July 26, 2021
*The book can be helpfully read alongside Lawrence Wright's _The Looming Tower. In fact, Wright's is the more compelling tale. Still, this provides a great deal of information if people want to go beyond Wright's presentation.
*Embedded in the book is the argument for his Informed Interrogation techniques, which follow standard practices honed over decades by the FBI. He argues that these strategies are vastly more effective, useful, and humane than the "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" of the Bush Era. I found his argument compelling, and it helped me think more clearly about the early years of the Global War on Terror.
*Embedded in the book is the argument for his Informed Interrogation techniques, which follow standard practices honed over decades by the FBI. He argues that these strategies are vastly more effective, useful, and humane than the "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" of the Bush Era. I found his argument compelling, and it helped me think more clearly about the early years of the Global War on Terror.
November 14, 2011
This is a book I would consided owning. A book that I would want to have on my shelf ready to reference if I needed to.
Ali Soufan was one of the FBI's leading experts on al-Qaeda and their leading expert on interrogating high value detainees, both before and shortly after 9/11. He writes of the successes that he and his team had while using traditional criminal interrogation techniques. Inexplicably even as he was in the middle of an interrogation with a cooperating witness, the CIA decided that they needed to pay an outside consultant to instigate a program of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" (EIT). The cooperating witness was stripped naked, humiliated, forced to stand in uncomfortable positions for hours at a time, deprived of sleep, blasted with loud music and white noise, and eventually waterboarded. He promplty stopped cooperating and refused to talk.
Soufan blows the lid off of the argument that the EITs were both necessary and effective. He provides mountains of evidence to back up his claims that the program was unpopular in the intelligence community (especially within the FBI), it was illegal, it was ineffeciently run, it was innefectual, it was counter productive. He points out numerous claims of successful retrieval of intelligence by the program as either blatant lies or taking credit for intelligence that was gained without the use of EITs.
The writing style of the book, as a whole, is very good. He has a natural narrative style and peppers the book with numerous personal anecdotes. At times these anecdotes break up the rhythm of the story. They appear out of nowhere and lead to nowhere. I got the impression that the book needed more time in the editing process before publication. The author does state in the introduction that the book was rushed a bit to publish on the 10th anniversary of 9/11.
The book is, at times, heavily redacted. The first page of the book describes Soufan's process of having it cleared by the FBI. It was inexplicably sent to the CIA for clearance as well and even more strangley the CIA redacted certain parts of it that were clearly declassified material. Reading the redacted sections shows that the CIA was obviously trying to cover up sections that made them look bad. The redactions are at times completely ridiculous. Some entire passages simply black out the pronouns, I, we, us, our. These can be easily deciphered by reading the context of the passage. I look forward to a revised edition with the redacted parts visible, but highlighted so we can see what was deemed so secret.
This is a book that should be read by every American.
Ali Soufan was one of the FBI's leading experts on al-Qaeda and their leading expert on interrogating high value detainees, both before and shortly after 9/11. He writes of the successes that he and his team had while using traditional criminal interrogation techniques. Inexplicably even as he was in the middle of an interrogation with a cooperating witness, the CIA decided that they needed to pay an outside consultant to instigate a program of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" (EIT). The cooperating witness was stripped naked, humiliated, forced to stand in uncomfortable positions for hours at a time, deprived of sleep, blasted with loud music and white noise, and eventually waterboarded. He promplty stopped cooperating and refused to talk.
Soufan blows the lid off of the argument that the EITs were both necessary and effective. He provides mountains of evidence to back up his claims that the program was unpopular in the intelligence community (especially within the FBI), it was illegal, it was ineffeciently run, it was innefectual, it was counter productive. He points out numerous claims of successful retrieval of intelligence by the program as either blatant lies or taking credit for intelligence that was gained without the use of EITs.
The writing style of the book, as a whole, is very good. He has a natural narrative style and peppers the book with numerous personal anecdotes. At times these anecdotes break up the rhythm of the story. They appear out of nowhere and lead to nowhere. I got the impression that the book needed more time in the editing process before publication. The author does state in the introduction that the book was rushed a bit to publish on the 10th anniversary of 9/11.
The book is, at times, heavily redacted. The first page of the book describes Soufan's process of having it cleared by the FBI. It was inexplicably sent to the CIA for clearance as well and even more strangley the CIA redacted certain parts of it that were clearly declassified material. Reading the redacted sections shows that the CIA was obviously trying to cover up sections that made them look bad. The redactions are at times completely ridiculous. Some entire passages simply black out the pronouns, I, we, us, our. These can be easily deciphered by reading the context of the passage. I look forward to a revised edition with the redacted parts visible, but highlighted so we can see what was deemed so secret.
This is a book that should be read by every American.
November 29, 2011
This has been the best book for blowing apart the supposed benefits of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques since Matthew Alexander's books Kill or Capture and How to Break a Terrorist: The U.S. Interrogators Who Used Brains, Not Brutality, to Take Down the Deadliest Man in Iraq
When I finished reading this book I knew three things, that my understanding that the FBI and the CIA had learned to work together, under the same agenda, since 9/11, was wrong, and that I was still deeply against the use of enhanced techniques as a way of extracting information from prisoners.
The third realisation was that the CIA is a very tarnished machine and the more we learn about their activities in books such as these and in arenas such as the post 9/11 and Gitmo Inquiries, the more its gloss will wash off.
Ali Soufan is a unforgettable narrator. An interrogator of gentle persuasion and manipulation, a credit to the FBI and a credit to the United States. His book, The Black Banners is a legacy that should be valued. It is not only a work that feels true, but is proven to actually be true, which is refreshing. I do not leave this book wondering whether it was one man's distorted version of events.
I had a few issues that landed it the 4 stars instead of 5. It is an issue of editorial perspective. the editor should have held this books publishing date back so they could make more sense of the mess Ali Soufan was left with when the CIA censored the book. As a result, the book, in parts, is a mass of black censor lines and you can have page after page where nothing connects. A word here, a half a paragraph there, two parts of a sentence missing the middle. Surely if the publishing date was held back the author and editor could have made something better of these areas. The other issue I had was for the first half of the book I felt many parts needed shaving down. A good editing cull would have done this book many favours for the first half. From 9/11 onwards, it was a lot more focused and streamlined.
An eye opening book and a must read for every American, and for every international, who needs to know how 9/11 could have been stopped, why aggressive interrogations render confessions tainted and unreliable, and how Osama Bin Laden could have been caught three times over from 2002 and why it never happened until 2011.
When I finished reading this book I knew three things, that my understanding that the FBI and the CIA had learned to work together, under the same agenda, since 9/11, was wrong, and that I was still deeply against the use of enhanced techniques as a way of extracting information from prisoners.
The third realisation was that the CIA is a very tarnished machine and the more we learn about their activities in books such as these and in arenas such as the post 9/11 and Gitmo Inquiries, the more its gloss will wash off.
Ali Soufan is a unforgettable narrator. An interrogator of gentle persuasion and manipulation, a credit to the FBI and a credit to the United States. His book, The Black Banners is a legacy that should be valued. It is not only a work that feels true, but is proven to actually be true, which is refreshing. I do not leave this book wondering whether it was one man's distorted version of events.
I had a few issues that landed it the 4 stars instead of 5. It is an issue of editorial perspective. the editor should have held this books publishing date back so they could make more sense of the mess Ali Soufan was left with when the CIA censored the book. As a result, the book, in parts, is a mass of black censor lines and you can have page after page where nothing connects. A word here, a half a paragraph there, two parts of a sentence missing the middle. Surely if the publishing date was held back the author and editor could have made something better of these areas. The other issue I had was for the first half of the book I felt many parts needed shaving down. A good editing cull would have done this book many favours for the first half. From 9/11 onwards, it was a lot more focused and streamlined.
An eye opening book and a must read for every American, and for every international, who needs to know how 9/11 could have been stopped, why aggressive interrogations render confessions tainted and unreliable, and how Osama Bin Laden could have been caught three times over from 2002 and why it never happened until 2011.
May 12, 2012
Interesting, but there was little here that I didn't find in Lawrence Wright's "The Looming Tower." he also provides some very interesting insights into the 9/11 plot and the many opportunities to stop it that we missed; according to him, that is. Hindsight is always perfect, and whining and complaining about how much the CIA screwed up isn't going to change the fact that it happened. Hell, if 9/11 wouldn't have happened, would we be the country we are today? Besides, even if we had captured Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar before 9/11, would that have derailed the plot. Probably not. Mihdhar and Hazmi were replaceable parts in a determined killing machine. As for how much the CIA is criticized for its "failures" regarding Zacarias Moussaoui, that was the FBI's case, not the CIA's.
The book's basic structure is that of an organization's internal history: It gives very quick summaries of the events, presented mostly as a chronology rather than being organized into story lines. And an important function is to acknowledge the people involved. Are you an FBI employee who received a tip-line phone call? Expect to get at least a paragraph in the book. Such internal histories are compilations that are intended to be consulted, not read. Analogy: If you want to learn how great movies come to be, reading hundreds of pages of Academy Awards acceptance speeches is unlikely to provide insight.
In this book you will be hard-pressed to find anything negative done by, or said by Ali Soufan. He always does the right thing, and says the right thing which always avoids some international diplomatic and intelligence agency scandal. According to this book, which totally does not stroke the author's huge ego, Ali Soufan was the best intelligence officer the US had at the time. He spoke Arabic and all. That's unheard of, particularly in the intelligence world.
Sometime Ali's harshest words are against the CIA and a certain ex-ambassador to Yemen, Mrs. Bodine. Now, recall that he has allegedly interviewed many dangerous terrorists who are often depicted as neutral characters at worst. Due to the nature of this book it is not possible to know for sure the veracity of Soufan's many claims, however reason tells me that if the author is never wrong, and never has a bad day in his job, he is probably lying. In this book he's simply trying to say this: CIA failed to stop 9/11, and ambassador Barbara Bodine loved Yemen more than America.
On page 206, the censored word means CIA station chief. On page 243, the censored words refer to Clark shannon, Maggie Gillespie, and Tom Wilshire.
The book's basic structure is that of an organization's internal history: It gives very quick summaries of the events, presented mostly as a chronology rather than being organized into story lines. And an important function is to acknowledge the people involved. Are you an FBI employee who received a tip-line phone call? Expect to get at least a paragraph in the book. Such internal histories are compilations that are intended to be consulted, not read. Analogy: If you want to learn how great movies come to be, reading hundreds of pages of Academy Awards acceptance speeches is unlikely to provide insight.
In this book you will be hard-pressed to find anything negative done by, or said by Ali Soufan. He always does the right thing, and says the right thing which always avoids some international diplomatic and intelligence agency scandal. According to this book, which totally does not stroke the author's huge ego, Ali Soufan was the best intelligence officer the US had at the time. He spoke Arabic and all. That's unheard of, particularly in the intelligence world.
Sometime Ali's harshest words are against the CIA and a certain ex-ambassador to Yemen, Mrs. Bodine. Now, recall that he has allegedly interviewed many dangerous terrorists who are often depicted as neutral characters at worst. Due to the nature of this book it is not possible to know for sure the veracity of Soufan's many claims, however reason tells me that if the author is never wrong, and never has a bad day in his job, he is probably lying. In this book he's simply trying to say this: CIA failed to stop 9/11, and ambassador Barbara Bodine loved Yemen more than America.
On page 206, the censored word means CIA station chief. On page 243, the censored words refer to Clark shannon, Maggie Gillespie, and Tom Wilshire.
June 3, 2013
This is a very interesting yet disturbing book that left me somewhat concerned about our country's future and its perception by the rest of the world community. The author is a former FBI agent who was born in Lebanon and is a naturalized US citizen. Because of his fluency in Arabic and as a practicing Muslim, he became heavily involved in the FBI's intelligence gathering efforts following the East Africa embassy bombings, the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen, and then 9/11 and the hunt for Osama bin Laden.
The history of these events presented by the author is interesting and sheds much light on how we were able to identify and track down some of the perpetrators. What is disturbing is the evidence of turf wars that went on between the FBI and CIA and the lack of information sharing that may have prevented some of these events, including 9/11, from happening. The story behind our use of enhanced interrogation techniques to extract intelligence information and the stories fed to the public by high ranking government officials makes me wonder about the integrity of those running the show here in America.
As with most works of history, one needs to be a bit careful and consider the source or sources. On the surface, this book portrays the FBI as taking the moral high ground but that organization hasn't always been squeaky clean either. I'm left to wonder if the author isn't tooting his own horn (and the FBI's) just a bit too loudly. I'm just sayin'.
The history of these events presented by the author is interesting and sheds much light on how we were able to identify and track down some of the perpetrators. What is disturbing is the evidence of turf wars that went on between the FBI and CIA and the lack of information sharing that may have prevented some of these events, including 9/11, from happening. The story behind our use of enhanced interrogation techniques to extract intelligence information and the stories fed to the public by high ranking government officials makes me wonder about the integrity of those running the show here in America.
As with most works of history, one needs to be a bit careful and consider the source or sources. On the surface, this book portrays the FBI as taking the moral high ground but that organization hasn't always been squeaky clean either. I'm left to wonder if the author isn't tooting his own horn (and the FBI's) just a bit too loudly. I'm just sayin'.
July 5, 2017
This book is highly detailed about the operations conducted in Yemen by the FBI in the aftermath of USS Cole bombing in 2000. There are serious redactions in the book and they made the whole reading experience very distracting.
The insights put forth by Ali on the methods of interrogation is definitely an interesting read. If you are looking for an early history of Al Qaeda then this book does not cover that part, Ali has hardly mentioned anything about the formation of Al Qaeda and its objectives(there are little pieces of history spread across a few initial chapters).
The book covers the period from 1993 - wtc bombings(very briefly though) then moves on to East african embassy bombings in 1998, USS Cole bombing in 2000 and finally to 9/11. The book follows different Al Qaeda operatives, their origins, how they came in contact with Al Qaeda, why and how they joined the group and internal command structure within the group.
The book also points out that how CIA could have prevented some of the major plots(including 9/11!) but did not despite explicit requests from FBI for specific intelligence. Its interesting to note that how CIA and military's hubris and their sense of superiority prevented them from actually preventing the plots and also prevented prosecutors to try the captured terrorists because they had wrongful interrogation techniques.
The insights put forth by Ali on the methods of interrogation is definitely an interesting read. If you are looking for an early history of Al Qaeda then this book does not cover that part, Ali has hardly mentioned anything about the formation of Al Qaeda and its objectives(there are little pieces of history spread across a few initial chapters).
The book covers the period from 1993 - wtc bombings(very briefly though) then moves on to East african embassy bombings in 1998, USS Cole bombing in 2000 and finally to 9/11. The book follows different Al Qaeda operatives, their origins, how they came in contact with Al Qaeda, why and how they joined the group and internal command structure within the group.
The book also points out that how CIA could have prevented some of the major plots(including 9/11!) but did not despite explicit requests from FBI for specific intelligence. Its interesting to note that how CIA and military's hubris and their sense of superiority prevented them from actually preventing the plots and also prevented prosecutors to try the captured terrorists because they had wrongful interrogation techniques.
June 14, 2015
Ali Soufan was unique among post-9/11 government interrogators for refusing to employ torture, and also for being one of the few Arab speaking Muslims doing counterterrorism work for the FBI. While he is ultra-nationalistic he was also relatively principled in his behavior, and seems to genuinely believe and strive for the higher values America espouses.
This book was interesting for detailing his own personal achievements at the FBI as well as for its history of Al Qaeda up to and after 9/11. Of particular note were his recollections of interrogations - wherein he used normal rapport-building with Al Qaeda detainees rather than abuse and torture - and the responses he received. His recollections of interrogating Abu Jandal, Salim Hamdan, and several individuals related to the USS Cole bombing were instructive.
Like all memoirs this one is to some degree self-serving, but for the most part his recollections are backed up by some objective corroboration. He is probably one of the few relatively heroic post-9/11 American security-state figures, though I was disturbed by his involvement in the Tarik Shah sting operation detailed towards the end (events recollected in the recent film (T)error).
This book was interesting for detailing his own personal achievements at the FBI as well as for its history of Al Qaeda up to and after 9/11. Of particular note were his recollections of interrogations - wherein he used normal rapport-building with Al Qaeda detainees rather than abuse and torture - and the responses he received. His recollections of interrogating Abu Jandal, Salim Hamdan, and several individuals related to the USS Cole bombing were instructive.
Like all memoirs this one is to some degree self-serving, but for the most part his recollections are backed up by some objective corroboration. He is probably one of the few relatively heroic post-9/11 American security-state figures, though I was disturbed by his involvement in the Tarik Shah sting operation detailed towards the end (events recollected in the recent film (T)error).
October 8, 2011
While the book is longer than it needs to be and isn't as well written as you'd think it'd be based on the co/ghost-author, it's an interesting read and an important book that shows how wrong the first eight years of the war on terror was and how poorly the Bush administration handled counterterrorism, detainees, and interrogation methods. While it sometimes reads a bit too memoir-y and the author clearly has some personal issues with the CIA (most of which are based on legitimate professional reads), it's still worth reading.
September 11, 2012
Alongside Michael Scheuer's "Imperial Hubris," this is one of the books that I think is indispensable to any American wishing to get a good grasp on the War on Terror. Ali Soufan is extraordinarily genuine; and you will find yourself rooting for him in his contemporary memoir detailing his work in the FBI--specifically on al-Qaeda and the more regional Islamic groups affiliated with them.
I recommend this book to all of my friends; especially if you'd like to better understand the quagmire America's War on Terror has become.
I recommend this book to all of my friends; especially if you'd like to better understand the quagmire America's War on Terror has become.
January 4, 2020
A very interesting book to read after watching the Hulu mini-series “The Looming Towers”. The book is written by former FBI special agent Ali Soufan.
The FBI and CIA forced the author to redact some of the original text, so there are blackouts. I would be interested in reading the full version, if one is released in the future.
The FBI and CIA forced the author to redact some of the original text, so there are blackouts. I would be interested in reading the full version, if one is released in the future.
July 4, 2017
There have been a large number of essays and books on Al-Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks over the past ten years. There are perhaps as many theories and conclusions about what the Al-Qaeda is like and what its goals are and why Muslims join them as well. Browsing through them and reading some of them in depth, I find that many of them are contradictory to one another. Some say that Al-Qaeda is a hierarchical, well-organized outfit while others say it is dysfunctional and ridden with internal dissensions. One cannot escape the feeling that the experts really do not have a handle on the problem of the fascination Al-Qaeda has for Muslims around the world. So, I didn’t have much of an inclination to read this book when it appeared on the bookstores. However, it is written by an Arabic-speaking Lebanese-American, who worked with the FBI for many years and was deeply involved in interrogating suspects on the WTC bombing in 1993, the bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, the USS Cole attack in Yemen and finally, the 9/11 attacks. I thought his perspective and experience should be different and more authentic compared to what I have seen from many other journalists. I wasn’t disappointed.
The book is mainly about the investigations that the FBI did on the above-mentioned terrorist attacks, how they tracked down and captured the suspects and the perpetrators, how they were debriefed or interrogated and what the problems and impediments that the FBI faced in the process. It makes for quite an absorbing read if one is interested in such cloak and dagger stories. It is a rather voluminous book at more than 500 pages with many portions redacted because of the CIA’s objections to the content. I found the book providing a couple of insights - one, into the essence of interrogation of suspects and detainees and secondly, on the beliefs that drove Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda members to do what they are doing.
Many journalists and experts in the past have opined that Al-Qaeda’s goal is to establish an Islamic Caliphate in the middle-east that would be run under Sharia Law, which will act as a catalyst to all Muslim lands to do likewise. Others have talked about Jihad being the duty of every Muslim and that Al-Qaeda wants to drive out infidels from the Holy land and from every other land belonging to Muslims. But Ali Soufan provides a different view. He says Al-Qaeda is inspired by the Hadith’s saying that “if you see black banners coming from Khurasan, join that army;even if you have to crawl over ice; no power will be able to stop them….and they will finally reach Baitul Maqdis (Jerusalem) where they will erect their flags…” . Khurasan refers to the modern day regions of eastern Iran, parts of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan. Though the pronouncement is not in the Quran but only in the Hadith, which is said to be written by others and not the Prophet, Al-Qaeda and many muslims believe it to be the exhortation of the Prophet himself and hence dedicate themselves to making this a reality. Soufan’s interrogations with captured Al-Qaeda operatives at many levels confirm this conclusion as well. Soufan is well-versed with the Quran and the Hadith and is often able to show the Al-Qaeda guys their false or incomplete understanding of both the Quran and the Hadith.
The book comes down hard on the decision of the Bush Administration to use Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, aka torture, in dealing with the captured Al-Qaeda operatives. The author says that they accomplish little by way of intelligence gathering. Rather, it forces the detainees to just say things that their tormentor wants them to say, simply to put an end to the pain inflicted. Soufan provides some key insights into interrogation approaches. He says that interrogation skills and knowledge cannot be picked up from doing just a few sessions. They come from studying a group and the subject deeply. It comes from lots of interrogation experience working alongside experts. Key to successful interrogation is to never let the suspect know that he is giving you information you didn't know. If he gets to know, it lessens the chances of his giving you more information as he realizes he's said too much. No two interrogations of two different detainees are ever the same. The detainees have different childhoods, different experiences in Al-Qaeda, different intellect. Hence, it is about playing what you know about the detainee against him and outwitting him. Soufan shows this in practice as he traps Abu Jandal, Osama’s bodyguard, in his own lies and ego; Ali al-Bahlul , Bin Laden’s secretary and propagandist, on his commitment to Al-Qaeda and his religious knowledge; L’Houssaine Kherchtou, an early Moroccan jihadi, on how Al-Qaeda declined to pay for his wife’s Caesarian section and with yet another detainee, using his childhood feelings toward his brother. Soufan found that Al-Qaeda’s upper echelons were dominated by Egyptians and that this caused resentment among the Gulf Arabs, who are used to seeing Egyptians widely working under them in the Gulf. He used this to his advantage to extract information. Another insight Soufan brings to this process is that you cannot get through to them while they are active in the organization, since they are busy planning or hiding or executing tasks. Only during the recruiting stage or when they are eventually caught is it possible to get through to them and make them sing. In a bizarre summing up, Soufan compares the interrogation process to Dating since we have greater degrees of success in dating if we know the date’s likes and dislikes!
Apart from this, the book talks about the lack of co-operation between the CIA and the FBI, the bureaucracy that impeded valuable information from being shared by the CIA with the FBI that could have prevented the 9/11 attacks and similar things that one is familiar with. Soufan also questions the approach of the Bush administration in dealing with terrorism as a ’war on terror’. His view is that it should be approached as a criminal act and dealt with through standard FBI investigation methods within the framework of the legal requirements of US laws.
At times, I felt that there is a bit self-promotion in the book as you come across statements bordering on “...if only they had done what I had suggested, we could have avoided big catastrophes like the USS Cole and so on…”. But one must overlook this because it is perhaps inevitable that in an intensive career in FBI, like that of Ali Soufan, there would always be such occasions and it is most likely true. However, some other conclusions made me feel that FBI operatives like Ali Soufan are so fully immersed in their jobs of debriefing suspects and capturing extremists that they lose the detached perspective of the ordinary citizen outside. For example, while talking about Abu Jandal’s debriefing, Soufan says that the Abu Jandal debriefing was the most successful interrogation of any Al-Qaeda operative and that it was immensely valuable in the war in Afghanistan. That may be true from his standpoint but a citizen outside the FBI would wonder what he is talking about as ‘success in Afghanistan’. After fifteen years of war in Afghanistan and a trillion dollars down the drain, the Taliban seems to be back in control there and many thousands more extremists are filling the ranks of ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra and myriad other organizations. According to retired general Jack Keane, Al-Qaida has grown fourfold in the five years between 2010 and 2015. ISIS, which began when the US pulled out politically and military from Iraq, grew from an organization less than 3,000 to an organization over 30,000 in three years. Radical Islamists are spread from Western Africa through the Middle East, all the way to the Indian sub-continent. Success in Abu Jandal’s debriefing seems to have been irrelevant to the larger goal of stopping the rise of Islamic extremism.
This book gives an important perspective on Al-Qaeda and the Torture-tolerant approach of the CIA in dealing with Islamic extremism. The title ‘Black Banners’ is probably not only inspired by the proclamation in the Hadith but also by the way the CIA bureaucracy has forced Ali Soufan to smear parts of the book with black lines all over them, reminiscent of a black banner. In some ways, the book shows how far we have moved away from our own ideals of democracy in the blind pursuit of the ‘War on Terror’.
June 25, 2025
The networking of Al-Qaeda has fascinated me for years. Despite being raised on the history of key moments and battles, such as Black Hawk Down, the formation and understanding of the terrorist network has always slipped my grasp. That was one of my favorite aspects of this book. It lays out the formation of the terrorist network from the very beginning and allows you to grasp its identify from the ground up.
It provides answers surrounding the 9/11 attack and the subsequent search for Bin Laden. The EIT program goes to show how far human hubris can mutate and the catastrophic impacts it can have. For two prominent U.S. government agencies to refuse to cooperate on such important issues simply out of a few individual’s desires for fame and personal identification is humbling to say the least. Ali makes astute points how terror and torture don’t need to be our responses, even if it is the directed attack that is done against us. It deeply reminds us that we cannot control another person (i.e. the terrorist) but we can control how we respond (Ali Soufan interrogation method).
It provides answers surrounding the 9/11 attack and the subsequent search for Bin Laden. The EIT program goes to show how far human hubris can mutate and the catastrophic impacts it can have. For two prominent U.S. government agencies to refuse to cooperate on such important issues simply out of a few individual’s desires for fame and personal identification is humbling to say the least. Ali makes astute points how terror and torture don’t need to be our responses, even if it is the directed attack that is done against us. It deeply reminds us that we cannot control another person (i.e. the terrorist) but we can control how we respond (Ali Soufan interrogation method).
April 1, 2020
Ali Soufan was intrigued by Al Qaeda from the 1970’s and would make a lifelong study of them like his friend and boss, John O’Neil. His grasp of culture, ideology, relationships and individuals had him successfully tease apart actionable information from interrogations.
That success would be interrupted by political dysfunction which saw the advocacy of enhanced interrogation techniques which never worked. His first person account is fascinating and instructive as this affected our lives for at least two decades.
Of particular interest to me was a chapter about operations in Singapore and his acknowledgement of our techniques of intelligence gathering which aligned with his.
It was difficult keeping up with names and pseudonyms at first and there is a glossary at the end which could help.
That success would be interrupted by political dysfunction which saw the advocacy of enhanced interrogation techniques which never worked. His first person account is fascinating and instructive as this affected our lives for at least two decades.
Of particular interest to me was a chapter about operations in Singapore and his acknowledgement of our techniques of intelligence gathering which aligned with his.
It was difficult keeping up with names and pseudonyms at first and there is a glossary at the end which could help.
July 15, 2021
This book is fantastic, brimming with information that clearly explains how politics and ignorance mixed to make a shitty situation worse. If you want to understand why 9/11 happened and how our government fucked up its response to Islamic Terrorism, read this book.
Then, read The Looming Tower by Lawrence Wright for further insights into the attacks. Finish up your studies with Legacy of Ashes by David Weiner, a definitive history of the CIA and how it became the incompetent pile of shit it has been in the last 30 years. Well, it was always incompetent, the stakes were higher now than they were when the CIA was first formed.
So, yeah. Read this book.
Then, read The Looming Tower by Lawrence Wright for further insights into the attacks. Finish up your studies with Legacy of Ashes by David Weiner, a definitive history of the CIA and how it became the incompetent pile of shit it has been in the last 30 years. Well, it was always incompetent, the stakes were higher now than they were when the CIA was first formed.
So, yeah. Read this book.
October 29, 2021
A fantastic window into the FBI’s involvement in al-Qaeda investigations and the inter-agency discord between the CIA and FBI that developed post-9/11. Arguably, Soufan was one CIA brief away from preventing what happened that day. Hearing his side of the story must be taken with a grain of salt given possible biases, but it proved for a sobering portrait of the broken approach we took to intelligence gathering in the years after al-Qaeda became a top priority for U.S. agencies.
October 7, 2021
A great look into the investigations into Al Qaeda in the years leading up to 9/11 as well as the fallout from it.
January 3, 2014
In the introduction to the audio, the author reveals that some of the book has been redacted by the CIA. He doesn’t believe there is any reason for this, the CIA has no jurisdiction once the FBI has approved it, which they did, but still, they have made requested changes. He does not believe there are any secrets revealed in the book, but allowed the redacting so the book could be published on time. He has vowed to fight back and restore the book to its original state.
Born in Beirut, Lebanon, he was proud to be an American. Because he was brought up in a war torn country, he appreciated his life in America. When he interviewed for the job with the FBI, it was in response to a dare, but once he passed the interviews and exams, he decided he really did want to join. It excited him to be able to work to protect America. Admirably, he wanted to give something back to the country that had given him so much. Fluent in Arabic, he is perfect for the job. He began working there in 1998. His Middle Eastern background, and his assertiveness, helped him rise through the ranks and move ahead within the departments he was involved.
Soufan’s command of the Arabic language and his familiarity and understanding of the Koran was sometimes better than that of the prisoners he questioned. He believed that knowledge was key in questioning anyone, and he was often able to persuade those captured to confess when he was able to prove their beliefs, especially relating to Islam and the Koran, were inaccurate. He outsmarted many with his expertise. He did not believe in enhanced interrogation techniques or rendition, and according to his perception of events, he illustrates its failures. Many of his statements of fact seemed, indeed, however, to be a matter of opinion since there two distinctly diverse opinions exist about many of the events he describes.
Soufan provides information on several investigations, among which are the Kohl, 9/11, and Abu Ghraib and Bin Laden. He informs the reader about the background of many members of Al Quaeda, revealing their personalities and how they got to their positions and involvement in the organization, migrating over from the Mujahedeen. He also describes the personalities of the people he worked with in the FBI. Sometimes it felt to me like they had a good old boy group mentality; they “protected the herd”.
When describing his many investigations, he reveals the lack of cooperation existing in the government organizations with oversight. The CIA would not share information with the FBI, the ambassador to Yemen, Bodine, inhibited the investigation, being more concerned with protecting the Yemeni opinion and reaction to the United States, than with helping to capture terrorists and bringing those involved in the Kohl attack to justice.
The disorganization and lack of cooperation among the higher-ups in the CIA, the State Department, the FBI, and also the roadblocks set up by the ambassador to Yemen disrupted the investigations, and it is implied, perhaps led to the bombing of the World Trade Center. Had the information been shared, they might have been able to connect the dots and the outcome might have been different, not only for that attack, but for others as well. They were aware of many of the planners who implemented the process and also of many of those involved in the actual deeds. Had politics not played such a large role in many of the investigations, some alleged and/or suspected terrorist attacks might have been avoided.
There is a lot of information provided that I was not aware of and some that I cannot be certain was true. I wondered if some viewpoints and/or opinions given as facts, depended on political proclivities. It certainly sounded, at times, like the White House was at fault for many of the delays in the investigation and that may have led to unnecessary deaths. However, the author seems to lean left and does not seem to judge the left and right equally with regard to terrorism and its tactics. Also, for the most part, he blames everyone for all the failures except for the FBI, the agency for which he worked.
The book, as an audio, seemed too long and too detailed. The myriad names were confusing. The redacted and blank parts were enormously distracting and tedious, and quite frankly, annoying. Listening to words that literally said, blank said blank to blank, was meaningless. It could have been a really good book, but instead, it became mediocre. Perhaps they shouldn’t have rushed to publication, perhaps they should republish when they can get rid of the blank told this and the blank said this in blank location and provide the reader with real facts instead of blank ones.
Born in Beirut, Lebanon, he was proud to be an American. Because he was brought up in a war torn country, he appreciated his life in America. When he interviewed for the job with the FBI, it was in response to a dare, but once he passed the interviews and exams, he decided he really did want to join. It excited him to be able to work to protect America. Admirably, he wanted to give something back to the country that had given him so much. Fluent in Arabic, he is perfect for the job. He began working there in 1998. His Middle Eastern background, and his assertiveness, helped him rise through the ranks and move ahead within the departments he was involved.
Soufan’s command of the Arabic language and his familiarity and understanding of the Koran was sometimes better than that of the prisoners he questioned. He believed that knowledge was key in questioning anyone, and he was often able to persuade those captured to confess when he was able to prove their beliefs, especially relating to Islam and the Koran, were inaccurate. He outsmarted many with his expertise. He did not believe in enhanced interrogation techniques or rendition, and according to his perception of events, he illustrates its failures. Many of his statements of fact seemed, indeed, however, to be a matter of opinion since there two distinctly diverse opinions exist about many of the events he describes.
Soufan provides information on several investigations, among which are the Kohl, 9/11, and Abu Ghraib and Bin Laden. He informs the reader about the background of many members of Al Quaeda, revealing their personalities and how they got to their positions and involvement in the organization, migrating over from the Mujahedeen. He also describes the personalities of the people he worked with in the FBI. Sometimes it felt to me like they had a good old boy group mentality; they “protected the herd”.
When describing his many investigations, he reveals the lack of cooperation existing in the government organizations with oversight. The CIA would not share information with the FBI, the ambassador to Yemen, Bodine, inhibited the investigation, being more concerned with protecting the Yemeni opinion and reaction to the United States, than with helping to capture terrorists and bringing those involved in the Kohl attack to justice.
The disorganization and lack of cooperation among the higher-ups in the CIA, the State Department, the FBI, and also the roadblocks set up by the ambassador to Yemen disrupted the investigations, and it is implied, perhaps led to the bombing of the World Trade Center. Had the information been shared, they might have been able to connect the dots and the outcome might have been different, not only for that attack, but for others as well. They were aware of many of the planners who implemented the process and also of many of those involved in the actual deeds. Had politics not played such a large role in many of the investigations, some alleged and/or suspected terrorist attacks might have been avoided.
There is a lot of information provided that I was not aware of and some that I cannot be certain was true. I wondered if some viewpoints and/or opinions given as facts, depended on political proclivities. It certainly sounded, at times, like the White House was at fault for many of the delays in the investigation and that may have led to unnecessary deaths. However, the author seems to lean left and does not seem to judge the left and right equally with regard to terrorism and its tactics. Also, for the most part, he blames everyone for all the failures except for the FBI, the agency for which he worked.
The book, as an audio, seemed too long and too detailed. The myriad names were confusing. The redacted and blank parts were enormously distracting and tedious, and quite frankly, annoying. Listening to words that literally said, blank said blank to blank, was meaningless. It could have been a really good book, but instead, it became mediocre. Perhaps they shouldn’t have rushed to publication, perhaps they should republish when they can get rid of the blank told this and the blank said this in blank location and provide the reader with real facts instead of blank ones.
December 10, 2020
There’s a line that Benedict Cumberbatch (as Alan Turing) delivers in the movie, The Imitation Game, that goes, “Do you know why people like violence? Because it feels good. Humans find violence deeply satisfying.” This quote is apparently something Turing actually said, and is a pretty probing insight for a guy who, in his time, was considered a little less than fully human. Turing – who endured the travails of a British boarding school, lived through two World Wars, and was chemically castrated by his government for being gay – certainly knew something about the human propensity toward violence, as well as the pleasure that can be derived from its engagement. And this same notion, albeit obliquely, colors all of what Soufan writes about in The Black Banners, a book about the ideologies that individuals employ to justify violence as a means to an ideological end, which eventually mutates into violence as a means to a pleasurable end. Page by page, Soufan (in agonizingly wooden prose (this was clearly written by a guy used to writing government reports, so even the times where he attempts to write dialogue just reads as exposition with quotation marks around it)) walks through how he joined the FBI after becoming interested in Islamic Extremism in the early nineties (when no one had even heard of Osama bin Laden or could find Afghanistan on a map of Afghanistan), joined the FBI’s Islamic Extremist task force, went on missions to east Africa and west Asia where he interrogated committed Islamist terrorists (including al-Qaeda members (an organization no one had ever heard of)), learned how to successfully interrogate terrorists, and became the FBI’s go-to interrogator for captured Islamic extremists. That Soufan meets with success is not accidental. He comes from a Muslim family, and so is intimately tied to Islamic cultural traditions (including, of course, the Quran and the Hadith); he speaks Arabic fluently, and so can understand and talk to interrogatees directly, recognizing the subtleties in emphasis and tenor of their usage; he has an academic background in the subject of Islamist terrorism, and so is practiced in research and recognizes the value in such labor. This last point is one that comes up a lot in the book, and establishes the conflict between the FBI and the CIA that people who are going to read this book are going to read this book for. Because of the Byzantine command structure of the various American law-enforcement and investigative agencies, following 9/11, when Soufan and the FBI were still investigating the USS Cole bombing, the FBI was gradually disallowed from conducting interrogations of captured, suspected al-Qaeda terrorists. The reason the FBI, and Soufan specifically, was denied this access was because the CIA thought they had a better plan involving the use of enhanced interrogation techniques. Using these techniques, the CIA had been told (by psychologists John Bruce Jessen and James Elmer Mitchell, two guys who had never conducted an interrogation before or knew anything about al-Qaeda or knew anything about Islam or knew anything about psychology or knew anything about the Geneva Conventions) would yield better results faster. Jessen and Mitchell were, as we all now know, given human test subjects on which to practice their theoretical techniques. And, as we also all now know, these techniques didn’t work. Soufan’s process, which was intimate and labor-intensive and tedious and took time and worked, was just too unsatisfying for the purple, bespittled fury of an aggrieved America. In other words, the academic method was dropped and the brutal method was adopted because, as Turing tells us, the latter felt better. And if that isn’t already fucked up enough, the CIA (this is documented!) lied about the success of the EIT program in order to keep it going by claiming that intel Soufan had gathered was won through their method. So much of America’s response to 9/11 – Camp X-Ray, the Patriot Act, the Iraq War, EITs (i.e., torture), Abu Ghraib, extraordinary renditions, black sites – looks to me like a desire to inflict violence on a misunderstood enemy rather than a desire to seek justice in a court of law. Central, therefore, to this response is not only that thing Turing said, but also this crucial misunderstanding which, to me if to no one else, looks to be born from a willful ignorance that would rather punch than talk (or read). And that willful ignorance, again to me if to no one else, feels baked in to American culture. There needs to be more books like this, and we need to read them.
July 29, 2018
There are three themes that stood out in Soufan's memoir of his experience in the War on Terror:
1.) Law Enforcement - The reader is allowed behind the scenes to see how the FBI and other intelligence agencies were able to follow the trail that led to the capture of high profile targets along with their subsequent interrogations. In Soufan's perspective, the Constitution is to be considered, interrogation is not a dirty word (when practiced appropriately), and the behind the scenes investigative work is non-stop and grueling. This was great to read. It's one thing to be dazzled at the Navy Seal raids or caught up in the intrigues of the CIA, but the process of discovering facts and applying them wisely makes this narrative unique and thought-provoking.
2.) Departmental Infighting - One would like to think that the United States government is beyond petty competition between their departments and agencies, and would share information like one big fluid community. Not the case. The odd barriers that prevented information sharing and encouraged lying between the CIA and FBI were fascinating. Yet...disappointing and disgusting. Now, I do take memoirs with a grain of salt as they need to be compared with other first person accounts and broader histories for accuracy. However, something in Soufan's accounts rings genuine. The edition I read has the redactions from the CIA in the text and it appears to me that they were censoring simply to save themselves from embarrassment.
3.) Higher Ideals - EITs are condemned in this book while smart and crafty interrogation techniques are prized. This is great. It has been quite a while since I first saw the headlines about the policies of waterboarding and frightening prisoners with dogs. Rereading them in this book made me nauseous as I've learned a thing or two about the Founding-Constutional generation which sharpens my own personal take on what it means to be an American. EITs do not fit into my definition. To hear recent talk about reincorporating them into our agencies' practices are frightening.
I'm reminded of a lecture Tony Judt gave to a group of tenured faculty members when he brought up a quick statement about George Orwell. He referenced the dystopian world of 1984 and how it may strike modern audiences as eerily familiar. He then cautioned for us to make sure we are reading the proper Orwell. In Animal Farm, the animals overthrew farmers whose behavior they found to be at odds with their own worldview. Judt draws a comparisons to extreme contemporary security measures, like EITs, that should remind us of the last thought in the book: “The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from man to pig, and from pig to man again; but already it was impossible to say which was which.” Soufan's recollections are a contemporary reminder of the pitfalls associated with becoming too belligerent in our policies and forgetting some of the reasons why we label certain groups as enemies.
1.) Law Enforcement - The reader is allowed behind the scenes to see how the FBI and other intelligence agencies were able to follow the trail that led to the capture of high profile targets along with their subsequent interrogations. In Soufan's perspective, the Constitution is to be considered, interrogation is not a dirty word (when practiced appropriately), and the behind the scenes investigative work is non-stop and grueling. This was great to read. It's one thing to be dazzled at the Navy Seal raids or caught up in the intrigues of the CIA, but the process of discovering facts and applying them wisely makes this narrative unique and thought-provoking.
2.) Departmental Infighting - One would like to think that the United States government is beyond petty competition between their departments and agencies, and would share information like one big fluid community. Not the case. The odd barriers that prevented information sharing and encouraged lying between the CIA and FBI were fascinating. Yet...disappointing and disgusting. Now, I do take memoirs with a grain of salt as they need to be compared with other first person accounts and broader histories for accuracy. However, something in Soufan's accounts rings genuine. The edition I read has the redactions from the CIA in the text and it appears to me that they were censoring simply to save themselves from embarrassment.
3.) Higher Ideals - EITs are condemned in this book while smart and crafty interrogation techniques are prized. This is great. It has been quite a while since I first saw the headlines about the policies of waterboarding and frightening prisoners with dogs. Rereading them in this book made me nauseous as I've learned a thing or two about the Founding-Constutional generation which sharpens my own personal take on what it means to be an American. EITs do not fit into my definition. To hear recent talk about reincorporating them into our agencies' practices are frightening.
I'm reminded of a lecture Tony Judt gave to a group of tenured faculty members when he brought up a quick statement about George Orwell. He referenced the dystopian world of 1984 and how it may strike modern audiences as eerily familiar. He then cautioned for us to make sure we are reading the proper Orwell. In Animal Farm, the animals overthrew farmers whose behavior they found to be at odds with their own worldview. Judt draws a comparisons to extreme contemporary security measures, like EITs, that should remind us of the last thought in the book: “The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from man to pig, and from pig to man again; but already it was impossible to say which was which.” Soufan's recollections are a contemporary reminder of the pitfalls associated with becoming too belligerent in our policies and forgetting some of the reasons why we label certain groups as enemies.
August 13, 2022
The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War against al-Qaeda by Ali Soufan is a difficult book for me to place. Originally I had thought of it as a more anecdotal version of the Looming Tower. After a few chapters, I began to suspect that this may be something of a vanity project for Ali Soufan, as he was either a person of immense importance at the epicenter of a great many events, or he was inflating his own position and chose to convey instances where he had close proximity to power. I stopped thinking that when we arrive at 9/11, and Soufan conveys the events that follow.
How much of this book is designed by Ali Soufan to rage against the bureaucratic machine, protest against his critics at the CIA, and convey his own outrage at the use of enhanced interrogation methods and how much of that just comes off naturally from any retelling of the events is anyone's guess. I have concerns, particularly with relation to the friction between the FBI and the CIA. How much of it is potentially imagined, and how much of that is most definitely not simply suspicion is beyond my power. There are far too many points of negative contact for Ali Soufan to come across as anything other than positive. The CIA and the CTC certainly come away from this book with a lot of bruises, and Ali calls them out early on for redacting large portions of his book that he feels shouldn't have been touched, which further adds to the conflict. In the last part when he resigns from the FBI, he notes that the CIA put a target on his back, and anyone paying attention would not have been surprised by the possibility.
The book has immense instrumentality from 9/11 onward, even if part of it seems slanted. The part before 9/11 is similar to what has been published elsewhere that I read, such as the Looming Tower. Not bad, but worth a head's up in case anyone feels the need to skip ahead a little bit.
If you are interested in the war on terror, intelligence, or memoirs of particularly noteworthy public figures in the intelligence community, I recommend it.
Score?
90/100 | A-
How much of this book is designed by Ali Soufan to rage against the bureaucratic machine, protest against his critics at the CIA, and convey his own outrage at the use of enhanced interrogation methods and how much of that just comes off naturally from any retelling of the events is anyone's guess. I have concerns, particularly with relation to the friction between the FBI and the CIA. How much of it is potentially imagined, and how much of that is most definitely not simply suspicion is beyond my power. There are far too many points of negative contact for Ali Soufan to come across as anything other than positive. The CIA and the CTC certainly come away from this book with a lot of bruises, and Ali calls them out early on for redacting large portions of his book that he feels shouldn't have been touched, which further adds to the conflict. In the last part when he resigns from the FBI, he notes that the CIA put a target on his back, and anyone paying attention would not have been surprised by the possibility.
The book has immense instrumentality from 9/11 onward, even if part of it seems slanted. The part before 9/11 is similar to what has been published elsewhere that I read, such as the Looming Tower. Not bad, but worth a head's up in case anyone feels the need to skip ahead a little bit.
If you are interested in the war on terror, intelligence, or memoirs of particularly noteworthy public figures in the intelligence community, I recommend it.
Score?
90/100 | A-
February 5, 2012
This is the most detailed account yet, from an insider, about how we might have been able to prevent 9/11 had politicians taken it more seriously (BushCo) and had the CIA, and even a few FBI agents, not believed in this "wall" of separation between intelligence and criminal investigation.
Ali Soufan also details not only how torture ("enhanced interrogation techniques") don't work, he at the same time describes how traditional police-type interrogations can and do work, with the right person in charge, even with people like hardened al-Qaeda operatives.
To refresh the memory of some, or to inform others who don't know who he is, Soufan was the FBI's top Arabic-speaking agent, who was already on the trail of al-Qaeda's growth before the East African embassy bombings in 1998. He investigated them, the Cole bombing in Yemen in 2000, and many al Qaeda operatives after 9/11
Well, the CIA felt "the need," as Soufan notes in the introduction, to redact/censor stuff that was already in the public record, probably out of petty spite over his mentioning the Agency's obstructiveness, time after time, with FBI agents. (This alone refutes some of the nuttery of former CIA agent Michael Scheurer.)
And, at times, this gets ridiculous.
In one chapter, describing the interrogation of al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah, due to the details of the pages, we can tell just what the CIA insisted had to be blacked out. The first word in the chapter is "I," with Soufan talking about how he was packing a suitcase for a vacation when he was ordered off to Pakistan. Also censored are other individual words such as "we," "me," "my" and "us."
(Soufan is charitable in general in the book but has not a lot of good to say about the CIA.)
Anyway, this is a definite 5-star read; I don't get why many people praised this book so much, then only gave it four stars.
Ali Soufan also details not only how torture ("enhanced interrogation techniques") don't work, he at the same time describes how traditional police-type interrogations can and do work, with the right person in charge, even with people like hardened al-Qaeda operatives.
To refresh the memory of some, or to inform others who don't know who he is, Soufan was the FBI's top Arabic-speaking agent, who was already on the trail of al-Qaeda's growth before the East African embassy bombings in 1998. He investigated them, the Cole bombing in Yemen in 2000, and many al Qaeda operatives after 9/11
Well, the CIA felt "the need," as Soufan notes in the introduction, to redact/censor stuff that was already in the public record, probably out of petty spite over his mentioning the Agency's obstructiveness, time after time, with FBI agents. (This alone refutes some of the nuttery of former CIA agent Michael Scheurer.)
And, at times, this gets ridiculous.
In one chapter, describing the interrogation of al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah, due to the details of the pages, we can tell just what the CIA insisted had to be blacked out. The first word in the chapter is "I," with Soufan talking about how he was packing a suitcase for a vacation when he was ordered off to Pakistan. Also censored are other individual words such as "we," "me," "my" and "us."
(Soufan is charitable in general in the book but has not a lot of good to say about the CIA.)
Anyway, this is a definite 5-star read; I don't get why many people praised this book so much, then only gave it four stars.
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