Having read Field's book on Waterloo, I decided to also read his take on Quatre Bras, which occurred two days before the great battle of June 18, 1815. Quatre Bras was certainly smaller in scale since it concerned only the French left wing under Marshal Ney and elements of the Allied army, but it is no less interesting because of its importance in conjunction with the other battle fought that day at Ligny.
After reading this book, I discovered some facts that previously escaped me, in particular that Napoleon really did not care about 'winning' at Quatre Bras as long as Ney kept the Allies in place so they would not reinforce Blucher at Ligny. For Napoleon, Ligny and the destruction of the Prussian Army was essential. Then, he could turn and with Ney's men they could take the Anglo-Dutch Army.
I had realized that Napoleon felt his only chance to win was to keep the two armies apart, but after reading this book, it would seem that Marshal Ney did not fully realize his part in the day's fighting.
He did not display the aggressve spirit of other battles, and in one of the great 'moments' in a battle, he recalled d'Erlon's 1st Corps when it was on its way to Ligny to reinforce Napoleon. Unfortunately for the French, d'Erlon tried to play it safe, splitting his forces which only served to do little for either Ney or Napoleon.
Field also points out some of Napoleon's mistakes, particularly on the morning of the 17th, but it is the story of the Belgian crossroads at Quatre Bras that is at the crux of this book. This is just another good example of the vagaries of battle. As Field points out, Napoleon was working against time, and by midday of the the 17th, his two opponents had slipped away from him, only to meet again at Waterloo.