Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logic and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception offers the only full-length examination of the relationships between Deleuze, Bergson and Merleau-Ponty.
Henri Bergson (1859-1941), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) succeeded one another as leading voices in French philosophy over a span of 136 years. Their relationship to one another's work involved far more than their overlapping lifetimes. Bergson became both the source of philosophical insight and a focus of criticism for Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze. Deleuze criticized Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology as well as his interest in cognitive and natural science. Author Dorothea Olkowski points out that each of these philosophers situated their thought in relation to their understandings of crucial developments and theories taken up in the history and philosophy of science, and this has been difficult for Continental philosophy to grasp. She articulates the differences between these philosophers with respect to their disparate approaches to the physical sciences and with how their views of science function in relation to their larger philosophical projects.
In Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, Olkowski examines the critical areas of the structure of time and memory, the structure of consciousness, and the question of humans' relation to nature. She reveals that these philosophers are working from inside one another's ideas and are making strong claims about time, consciousness, reality, and their effects on humanity that converge and diverge. The result is a clearer picture of the intertwined workings of Continental philosophy and its fundamental engagement with the sciences.
230702: read third time. like it even more. this time read more on d and 'the event' and better understand, if not necessarily agree with his critiques of phenomenology. he believes p does not retain 'vital power', does not create 'concepts', does not offer way to correct, does not offer 'power', against limitations of p. p is seen as static. 'logic of sense' d's concepts mostly described in The Logic of Sense are said more dynamic, empowering. all I can say is everything is up for interrogation. it is wonderful to read the entire syllabus of continental philosophy read being sympathetically explored. she does not hesitate to note when certain authors are just mistaken, such as b about special relativity, but also that in fact current understanding is coming closer and closer to his thoughts...
how merleau-ponty interprets b is fascinating to see lineage of thought, d as overarching interlocutor have not read many primary work but see by books on my deleuze shelf that I have really liked many works on d.
220124: three of my favourite philosophers, so it is no surprise this book is excellent, engaging, exciting. books on, by, referring to m-p (75), b (56), d (28). the three are ultimately viewed through deleuze. whom i have read on much more than by, whose ideas are least familiar, most challenging, who also brings in the pragmatist philosopher charles pierce- of whom i have read nothing- and builds, discusses, argues against those other two, against bergsonism and phenomenology. book begins with m-p, then b, then critiques of d. i do not know where current arguments are on these ways of thought, but surprise myself by recognising some thinkers quoted...
after intro that notes 'three body problem' of how their philosophies interact, there is an interesting philosophical critique of language in the novel Embassytown, that immediately gives an idea of postmodern critiques of naturalism, formalism, that the author will develop. b has his ideas, m-p and d will interrogate them. for b the universe of motion cannot be made of immobile sections, for m-p the motion is always relative to the central observer, for d images remain images and have no need of immediate motion for meaning...
chapter 2 is d and guatarri's critique of logic, which, to the extent understood, is difficult to summarise...
chapter 3 is bergson and bergsonism, which i could follow, have read enough, and explains both his disputes about time with einstein and beginning of analytic-continental schism in philosophy with arguments with bertrand russell. rather than 'wrong' the impression is mostly b is misunderstood at that time, now better appreciated...
chapter 4 is duration, motion, temporalization in b, m-p, d...
chapter 5 is phenomenology and the event- m-p's radical ideas compared to d's...
chapter 6 is philosophy of the event- a lot on d's book on the artist francis bacon, and 'the logic of sensation', for there is logic against chaos in art, in science, in philosophy...
no, i cannot claim to understand it all, but of what is understood i am very impressed... possibly need prof to more fruitfully examine text, especially to better understand how pierce fits in, how logic is critiqued in chapter 2, whether b does or does not escape analytic denunciations, if i understand the philosophy of 'the event' versus phenomenological 'doxa', maybe need to read more primary texts by d. there is also question of 'why' i read this book: philosophy takes the place of religion in my life, that is, it is its own reason. there are things i do not understand but expect to eventually by cobbling together many, many texts that rehearse similar arguments. mainly, as it is b i have read easiest and feel understand best, i am heartened by how d rescues his thought from say russell, want to better understand how 'images' are everything, somehow between thought virtual and the real. and the brain is not identical with the mind etc. as usual, there is the impression of more ideas to read, books to read, and so little time...
I had the opportunity to chair a panel in which two scholars responded to this book by Dorothea Olkowski and in which she gave her response. Her works are very wide-ranging and well researched, as she is a woman philosopher who has had to stake her ground (several areas of turf) in a male-dominated field. In this book, she introduces the three authors in question in terms of “the three-body problem in continental philosophy”, the status of science of autonomous, generating its own elements, standing outside time and outside the lived experience of a subject. Each author takes on this problem in different ways. Hence, she addresses the relationship between the creation of ideas and their actualization in relation to semiology, logic, and the cosmos in these authors’ philosophies. For more on this text, one can also listen to Dorothea’s discussion in the podcast on the Machinic Unconscious Happy Hour.