A condensed account of old Berti’s recollection of his two main achievements: Aristotelian metaphysics and the dialectics in ancient and modern times.
1. He starts with an old Aristotelian question: Metaphysics is the science of being as being. But what is its subject? Is it being in general, the most universal, or the eminent being, the most particular l? Berti’s answer: you must distinguish subject from object.
2. The answer: the subject is the Principle, the cause primo.
Why have a science devoted to this subject? Because people live, and life itself is problematic. The only thing not problematic is the problem itself: whenever you ask why you must ask, you are already asking. Thinking is the highest form of life.
People cannot escape experience. Denying experience is itself an experience. So Berti accepts that everything is experiential. Yet the aim of metaphysics is precisely not to treat experience as absolute, for the Principle is always not yet experienced.
Metaphysics is not just ontology, nor is it onto-theology. It should be neither purely immanent nor transcendent. It takes a middle path: it accepts that nothing in reality is beyond experience, yet firmly resists treating experience as absolute.
He extends dialectics, generalizes experience into life, and turns the law of non-contradiction from a mere logical principle into a principle of life. It brings to mind the work of François Wolff.
The first chapter, a historical survey of the concept of metaphysics, is full of gems. The second chapter offers a very elegant taxonomic framework, based on the standard of immanence versus transcendence.
He writes almost up to German idealism, with some occasional small digressions about analytical philosophy. Claims like using conservation of mass to show the insistence of substance should be taken as the old master’s personal flourish.