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Money, Power, and the People: The American Struggle to Make Banking Democratic
Banks and bankers are hardly the most beloved institutions and people in this country. With its corruptive influence on politics and stranglehold on the American economy, Wall Street is held in high regard by few outside the financial sector. But the pitchforks raised against this behemoth are largely rhetorical: we rarely see riots in the streets or public demands for an equitable and democratic banking system that result in serious national changes.
Yet the situation was vastly different a century ago, as Christopher W. Shaw shows. This book upends the conventional thinking that financial policy in the early twentieth century was set primarily by the needs and demands of bankers. Shaw shows that banking and politics were directly shaped by the literal and symbolic investments of the grassroots. This engagement remade financial institutions and the national economy, through populist pressure and the establishment of federal regulatory programs and agencies like the Farm Credit System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Shaw reveals the surprising groundswell behind seemingly arcane legislation, as well as the power of the people to demand serious political repercussions for the banks that caused the Great Depression. One result of this sustained interest and pressure was legislation and regulation that brought on a long period of relative financial stability, with a reduced frequency of economic booms and busts. Ironically, this stability led to the decline of the very banking politics that brought it about.
Giving voice to a broad swath of American figures, including workers, farmers, politicians, and bankers alike, Money, Power, and the People recasts our understanding of what might be possible in balancing the needs of the people with those of their financial institutions.
Yet the situation was vastly different a century ago, as Christopher W. Shaw shows. This book upends the conventional thinking that financial policy in the early twentieth century was set primarily by the needs and demands of bankers. Shaw shows that banking and politics were directly shaped by the literal and symbolic investments of the grassroots. This engagement remade financial institutions and the national economy, through populist pressure and the establishment of federal regulatory programs and agencies like the Farm Credit System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Shaw reveals the surprising groundswell behind seemingly arcane legislation, as well as the power of the people to demand serious political repercussions for the banks that caused the Great Depression. One result of this sustained interest and pressure was legislation and regulation that brought on a long period of relative financial stability, with a reduced frequency of economic booms and busts. Ironically, this stability led to the decline of the very banking politics that brought it about.
Giving voice to a broad swath of American figures, including workers, farmers, politicians, and bankers alike, Money, Power, and the People recasts our understanding of what might be possible in balancing the needs of the people with those of their financial institutions.
400 pages, Kindle Edition
First published September 5, 2019
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September 30, 2021
Money, Power, and the People: The American Struggle to Make Banking Democratic, Christopher W. Shaw, 2019, 410 pages, ISBN 9780226636337, Library-of-Congress HG.2481.S49.2019 College Library. Dewey 332.10973
An excerpt here: https://www.laphamsquarterly.org/roun...
Publisher: https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/...
About the book, including chapter synopses: https://www.bibliovault.org/BV.landin...
Author's website https://chriswshaw.com/ Twitter: https://mobile.twitter.com/chris_w_sh...
"The nation must own the banks, or the banks will own the nation." p. 156.
Some will rob you with a six gun, and some with a fountain pen. --Woody Guthrie, 1939, "The Ballad of Pretty Boy Floyd." p. 1.
Before World War II, workers and farmers demanded, and achieved, some carveouts from the overarching all-for-the-rich narrative. Postwar complacency let the hoarders of wealth increasingly again get their way. p. 12.
There were financial panics in 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, 1907, and 1921.
The Panic of 1907 led to public demand for banking reform. p. 14. [See also James Livingston's /Origins of the Federal Reserve System: Money, Class, and Corporate Capitalism, 1890-1913/, detailing the post-1893 debate. https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... ] The 1907 panic was precipitated by bad bets by the Heinze brothers in copper stock, which brought down the Knickerbocker Trust. pp. 16-18. National City Bank had $201 million in deposits in 1905. More than half of the 33 national banks with more than $20 million in deposits were in New York. pp. 20, 193. J.P. Morgan used the 1907 panic to prey on the holders of distressed assets. p. 23. Workers felt the yoke of debt servitude, p. 25, and saw grasping, parasitic, domineering bankers running the country to their own profit. pp. 37, 107, 201. A 1913 Congressional investigation found that 180 men held 746 directorships in 134 corporations capitalized at over $25 billion. p. 88. In 1933, the directors of the eight largest New York banks held a total of 3,741 corporate directorships. p. 174.
5 million workers were unemployed in the winter of 1907-1908, many with no food or fuel. Production was 28% of its pre-panic level. p. 45. Banker J.P. Morgan gloated that workers would have to take pay cuts or starve. p. 45.
Senate Majority Leader Nelson W. Aldrich https://www.goodreads.com/author/show... got rich from trolley stock bought for him by bankers who benefited from his legislative efforts. pp. 41, 55. His son became chairman of Chase National Bank. p. 192.
Permitting people to deposit money with the U.S Post Office Department had wide support among the public and immense opposition from bankers. Bankers kept Congress from establishing postal banking in 1908 or 1909, p. 61. A postal banking law passed in 1910, permitting deposits of up to $500, earning the depositor 2% interest, when banks were paying 3%. p. 72. By 1912, people were depositing $1 million per week in the 5,185 savings-depository post offices. p. 89. "There is no more excuse for a private bank than for a private post office."
Bankers were also rabidly hostile to deposit insurance, considering it a threat to private ownership. pp. 62-64.
Bankers wanted a (privately-owned) central bank. pp. 44, 250. They hatched a plan in secret, then aggressively lobbied Congress and courted newspaper editors. p. 80. The Federal Reserve Act, 1913, was a victory for bankers. p. 87. [See America's Bank: The Epic Struggle to Create the Federal Reserve, Roger Lowenstein, 2015, for how the bankers got the law passed. https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... . See The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve, Peter Conti-Brown, 2016, for a bit on the structure and governance of the Fed. https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... .] President Taft (R, 1909-1913) had followed bankers' lead on banking questions. p. 90. President Wilson (D, 1913-1921) had hoped regional reserve banks would decrease Wall Street's control over credit. p. 92. All national banks were required to join the Federal Reserve System. p. 103. The Federal Reserve banks are private corporations, owned and managed by the member banks, who receive dividends [set at 6% per year, by law]. p. 103. But at least the Federal Reserve Board members in Washington were to be appointed by the U.S. president. p. 95.
Federal Land Banks were established in 1916, to loan farmers money at lower interest and longer terms than banks had provided. President Wilson supported it, trying (successfully) to win re-election. p. 106.
Crop prices fell 57% in 1920. p. 111.
Labor unions opened their own banks, but bank clearinghouses refused them loans when runs threatened, so, though they were solvent, they went out of business. pp. 116, 214.
The Banking Act of 1927 permitted banks to buy and sell securities. p. 119.
Andrew Mellon, one of the richest men in the U.S., was U.S. secretary of the treasury, 1921-1932. He advocated, and achieved, cutting public spending and lowering taxes on corporate profits, inherited wealth, and personal incomes. p. 120. His prescription for the Depression: "liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate." p. 121. He thwarted a plan to keep banks from failing: at least 16 of his Pittsburgh-area competitors' banks failed. Congressman Wright Patman sought to impeach Mellon for financial dealing as U.S. treasury secretary. Mellon resigned in 1932.
The money supply fell 33%, 1929-1933. Farmers' net income fell 70%. At one grain elevator in South Dakota, corn was listed at minus 3¢/bushel. p. 122. Banks would not lend, demanded loan-repayment at pre-Depression terms, and foreclosed.
Farmers and workers got the House of Representatives to pass a bill directing the Fed to increase the money supply to reflate commodity prices. But bankers' friend Senator Carter Glass killed it in the Senate. p. 127. Glass also killed deposit guaranty, from 1930 through 1932. pp. 143, 145-146.
By 1932, even Glass introduced bills to put mild curbs on bankers' irresponsible speculation with other peoples' money. Bankers opposed even those: setting the stage for greater reforms when Democrats took over in 1933. p. 149.
President Hoover (1929-1933) bailed out banks ($2 billion), but not people. pp. 130, 144-145. New York banks demanded, and got, the city of New York to cut spending, including teacher and other employee pay, as a condition of (high-interest) loans.
Banks began assessing fees on depositors in the Depression. p 132.
All but about 60 of Chicago's 229 banks failed, October 1929-July 1932. p. 135. 4,500 banks failed in the U.S. Theft by bankers was a large part of the problem. Large depositors with inside information removed their funds first. p. 136.
Radical banking-reform candidates for president in 1932 started well, ran out of money, and supported FDR. p. 152.
By 1933, 25% of all labor union members were unemployed. 70%, in the building trades. p. 165. 1932 motor vehicle production was 25% of 1929. p. 166.
Even FDR took bankers' advice on banking policy. He passed up the opportunity for government ownership of banks. Proving to America that, "he who owns, controls." p. 173. The New Deal made people enough better off that they stopped clamoring for the government to own all the banks. pp. 219, 222, 225.
The "Glass-Steagall" Banking Act of 1933 separated commercial banking and investment banking, but permitted branch banks. pp. 181, 192. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation guaranteed deposits. p. 182.
The U.S. Government bailed out the Bank of America in 1933 (recently renamed from the Bank of Italy): with 1 million depositors, it was considered "too big to fail." p. 193.
"2-3 billion dollars of purchasing power is destroyed each year by excessive interest rates." --Senator Wright Pattman, 1934, in favor of federal credit unions. p. 218.
FDR in 1935 wanted to reestablish public confidence in private banking. p. 237.
The Federal Reserve Bank governors furthered the interests of bankers (which they were), thwarting the Federal Reserve Board from advancing the public interest. pp. 240, 250.
Senator Glass tried to restore investment banking powers to commercial banks. FDR refused. p. 253.
The Banking Act of 1935 put the Fed's open-market operations under political control. p. 254. Now the Fed could adjust the money supply to stabilize the economy. p. 255.
The public had wanted government-owned banks. No joy. We got regulators who /could/ act in the public interest--or, if the public isn't vigilant and vocal, could instead quietly act to enrich bankers. p. 256. The Fed drastically cut the money supply in the 1980s, increasing interest rates bankers could charge; agricultural exports fell by more than 40%, 1983 to 1986. Farm values fell; farmers had to pay more for credit. p. 291. Deindustrialization accelerated. By 2003, U.S. GDP was only 12% from manufacturing; over 20% to the financial sector. p. 292.
People supported credit unions, and stopped agitating for government-owned banks, in the 1940s. p. 270.
End of postal banking: Eisenhower's appointee as Postmaster General appointed a banker recommended by the American Banking Association to head the Postal Savings bureau. p. 282. He called for the end of postal banking, and instructed postmasters to remove its only publicity, a poster in the lobby. Interest on postal savings was capped by law at 2%; banks were then paying 4%. Bankers finally succeeded in killing the program in 1966. p. 284.
New York banks' campaign contributions had financed Richard Nixon's election to Congress (R-CA). p. 286.
In 1973, trading of national currencies as commodities in foreign-exchange markets began. This facilitated a race to the bottom in wages, working conditions, and environmental protections. p. 287. International financial transactions changed from 90% for long-term investment and trade, to 90% speculation. p. 290.
By 1975, Chase Manhattan bank president David Rockefeller Sr. was able to demand that the mayor of New York City reduce public expenses in order to get access to the bond market. p. 288. The city eliminated 20% of its police, almost half of its sanitation workers, and 19,000 school teachers.
Financial deregulation spawned the savings and loan crisis and the 2008 financial crisis. p. 292.
The Financial Services Act of 1999 authorized a single institution to act as a bank, a securities firm, and an insurance company. p. 295. The Clinton administration let industry lobbyists approve the legislation before it was introduced in Congress. The resulting too-big-to-fail banks made risky home loans, and sold them as bonds to unsuspecting investors. In the ensuing 2007-2008 crash, homeowners lost $8 trillion of wealth. Unemployment and recession followed. The bankers were bailed out with a $16 trillion blank check. After the bailout, the six largest banking corporations held assets equal to 63 percent of U.S. GDP. p. 300. Homeowners were not bailed out. p. 296. Average wage and benefit costs per employee at Goldman Sachs were $661,490 in 2007.
The upshot: spoiler alert: money and power are winning.
Author's July 2020 article on post-office banking: https://www.washingtonpost.com/outloo...
Other articles by the author:
https://muckrack.com/christopher-shaw...
Shaw's November 2021 book on corporate efforts to dismantle the U.S. Postal Service: https://m.barnesandnoble.com/w/first-...
Banking books: https://www.goodreads.com/review/list...
An excerpt here: https://www.laphamsquarterly.org/roun...
Publisher: https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/...
About the book, including chapter synopses: https://www.bibliovault.org/BV.landin...
Author's website https://chriswshaw.com/ Twitter: https://mobile.twitter.com/chris_w_sh...
"The nation must own the banks, or the banks will own the nation." p. 156.
Some will rob you with a six gun, and some with a fountain pen. --Woody Guthrie, 1939, "The Ballad of Pretty Boy Floyd." p. 1.
Before World War II, workers and farmers demanded, and achieved, some carveouts from the overarching all-for-the-rich narrative. Postwar complacency let the hoarders of wealth increasingly again get their way. p. 12.
There were financial panics in 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, 1907, and 1921.
The Panic of 1907 led to public demand for banking reform. p. 14. [See also James Livingston's /Origins of the Federal Reserve System: Money, Class, and Corporate Capitalism, 1890-1913/, detailing the post-1893 debate. https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... ] The 1907 panic was precipitated by bad bets by the Heinze brothers in copper stock, which brought down the Knickerbocker Trust. pp. 16-18. National City Bank had $201 million in deposits in 1905. More than half of the 33 national banks with more than $20 million in deposits were in New York. pp. 20, 193. J.P. Morgan used the 1907 panic to prey on the holders of distressed assets. p. 23. Workers felt the yoke of debt servitude, p. 25, and saw grasping, parasitic, domineering bankers running the country to their own profit. pp. 37, 107, 201. A 1913 Congressional investigation found that 180 men held 746 directorships in 134 corporations capitalized at over $25 billion. p. 88. In 1933, the directors of the eight largest New York banks held a total of 3,741 corporate directorships. p. 174.
5 million workers were unemployed in the winter of 1907-1908, many with no food or fuel. Production was 28% of its pre-panic level. p. 45. Banker J.P. Morgan gloated that workers would have to take pay cuts or starve. p. 45.
Senate Majority Leader Nelson W. Aldrich https://www.goodreads.com/author/show... got rich from trolley stock bought for him by bankers who benefited from his legislative efforts. pp. 41, 55. His son became chairman of Chase National Bank. p. 192.
Permitting people to deposit money with the U.S Post Office Department had wide support among the public and immense opposition from bankers. Bankers kept Congress from establishing postal banking in 1908 or 1909, p. 61. A postal banking law passed in 1910, permitting deposits of up to $500, earning the depositor 2% interest, when banks were paying 3%. p. 72. By 1912, people were depositing $1 million per week in the 5,185 savings-depository post offices. p. 89. "There is no more excuse for a private bank than for a private post office."
Bankers were also rabidly hostile to deposit insurance, considering it a threat to private ownership. pp. 62-64.
Bankers wanted a (privately-owned) central bank. pp. 44, 250. They hatched a plan in secret, then aggressively lobbied Congress and courted newspaper editors. p. 80. The Federal Reserve Act, 1913, was a victory for bankers. p. 87. [See America's Bank: The Epic Struggle to Create the Federal Reserve, Roger Lowenstein, 2015, for how the bankers got the law passed. https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... . See The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve, Peter Conti-Brown, 2016, for a bit on the structure and governance of the Fed. https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... .] President Taft (R, 1909-1913) had followed bankers' lead on banking questions. p. 90. President Wilson (D, 1913-1921) had hoped regional reserve banks would decrease Wall Street's control over credit. p. 92. All national banks were required to join the Federal Reserve System. p. 103. The Federal Reserve banks are private corporations, owned and managed by the member banks, who receive dividends [set at 6% per year, by law]. p. 103. But at least the Federal Reserve Board members in Washington were to be appointed by the U.S. president. p. 95.
Federal Land Banks were established in 1916, to loan farmers money at lower interest and longer terms than banks had provided. President Wilson supported it, trying (successfully) to win re-election. p. 106.
Crop prices fell 57% in 1920. p. 111.
Labor unions opened their own banks, but bank clearinghouses refused them loans when runs threatened, so, though they were solvent, they went out of business. pp. 116, 214.
The Banking Act of 1927 permitted banks to buy and sell securities. p. 119.
Andrew Mellon, one of the richest men in the U.S., was U.S. secretary of the treasury, 1921-1932. He advocated, and achieved, cutting public spending and lowering taxes on corporate profits, inherited wealth, and personal incomes. p. 120. His prescription for the Depression: "liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate." p. 121. He thwarted a plan to keep banks from failing: at least 16 of his Pittsburgh-area competitors' banks failed. Congressman Wright Patman sought to impeach Mellon for financial dealing as U.S. treasury secretary. Mellon resigned in 1932.
The money supply fell 33%, 1929-1933. Farmers' net income fell 70%. At one grain elevator in South Dakota, corn was listed at minus 3¢/bushel. p. 122. Banks would not lend, demanded loan-repayment at pre-Depression terms, and foreclosed.
Farmers and workers got the House of Representatives to pass a bill directing the Fed to increase the money supply to reflate commodity prices. But bankers' friend Senator Carter Glass killed it in the Senate. p. 127. Glass also killed deposit guaranty, from 1930 through 1932. pp. 143, 145-146.
By 1932, even Glass introduced bills to put mild curbs on bankers' irresponsible speculation with other peoples' money. Bankers opposed even those: setting the stage for greater reforms when Democrats took over in 1933. p. 149.
President Hoover (1929-1933) bailed out banks ($2 billion), but not people. pp. 130, 144-145. New York banks demanded, and got, the city of New York to cut spending, including teacher and other employee pay, as a condition of (high-interest) loans.
Banks began assessing fees on depositors in the Depression. p 132.
All but about 60 of Chicago's 229 banks failed, October 1929-July 1932. p. 135. 4,500 banks failed in the U.S. Theft by bankers was a large part of the problem. Large depositors with inside information removed their funds first. p. 136.
Radical banking-reform candidates for president in 1932 started well, ran out of money, and supported FDR. p. 152.
By 1933, 25% of all labor union members were unemployed. 70%, in the building trades. p. 165. 1932 motor vehicle production was 25% of 1929. p. 166.
Even FDR took bankers' advice on banking policy. He passed up the opportunity for government ownership of banks. Proving to America that, "he who owns, controls." p. 173. The New Deal made people enough better off that they stopped clamoring for the government to own all the banks. pp. 219, 222, 225.
The "Glass-Steagall" Banking Act of 1933 separated commercial banking and investment banking, but permitted branch banks. pp. 181, 192. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation guaranteed deposits. p. 182.
The U.S. Government bailed out the Bank of America in 1933 (recently renamed from the Bank of Italy): with 1 million depositors, it was considered "too big to fail." p. 193.
"2-3 billion dollars of purchasing power is destroyed each year by excessive interest rates." --Senator Wright Pattman, 1934, in favor of federal credit unions. p. 218.
FDR in 1935 wanted to reestablish public confidence in private banking. p. 237.
The Federal Reserve Bank governors furthered the interests of bankers (which they were), thwarting the Federal Reserve Board from advancing the public interest. pp. 240, 250.
Senator Glass tried to restore investment banking powers to commercial banks. FDR refused. p. 253.
The Banking Act of 1935 put the Fed's open-market operations under political control. p. 254. Now the Fed could adjust the money supply to stabilize the economy. p. 255.
The public had wanted government-owned banks. No joy. We got regulators who /could/ act in the public interest--or, if the public isn't vigilant and vocal, could instead quietly act to enrich bankers. p. 256. The Fed drastically cut the money supply in the 1980s, increasing interest rates bankers could charge; agricultural exports fell by more than 40%, 1983 to 1986. Farm values fell; farmers had to pay more for credit. p. 291. Deindustrialization accelerated. By 2003, U.S. GDP was only 12% from manufacturing; over 20% to the financial sector. p. 292.
People supported credit unions, and stopped agitating for government-owned banks, in the 1940s. p. 270.
End of postal banking: Eisenhower's appointee as Postmaster General appointed a banker recommended by the American Banking Association to head the Postal Savings bureau. p. 282. He called for the end of postal banking, and instructed postmasters to remove its only publicity, a poster in the lobby. Interest on postal savings was capped by law at 2%; banks were then paying 4%. Bankers finally succeeded in killing the program in 1966. p. 284.
New York banks' campaign contributions had financed Richard Nixon's election to Congress (R-CA). p. 286.
In 1973, trading of national currencies as commodities in foreign-exchange markets began. This facilitated a race to the bottom in wages, working conditions, and environmental protections. p. 287. International financial transactions changed from 90% for long-term investment and trade, to 90% speculation. p. 290.
By 1975, Chase Manhattan bank president David Rockefeller Sr. was able to demand that the mayor of New York City reduce public expenses in order to get access to the bond market. p. 288. The city eliminated 20% of its police, almost half of its sanitation workers, and 19,000 school teachers.
Financial deregulation spawned the savings and loan crisis and the 2008 financial crisis. p. 292.
The Financial Services Act of 1999 authorized a single institution to act as a bank, a securities firm, and an insurance company. p. 295. The Clinton administration let industry lobbyists approve the legislation before it was introduced in Congress. The resulting too-big-to-fail banks made risky home loans, and sold them as bonds to unsuspecting investors. In the ensuing 2007-2008 crash, homeowners lost $8 trillion of wealth. Unemployment and recession followed. The bankers were bailed out with a $16 trillion blank check. After the bailout, the six largest banking corporations held assets equal to 63 percent of U.S. GDP. p. 300. Homeowners were not bailed out. p. 296. Average wage and benefit costs per employee at Goldman Sachs were $661,490 in 2007.
The upshot: spoiler alert: money and power are winning.
Author's July 2020 article on post-office banking: https://www.washingtonpost.com/outloo...
Other articles by the author:
https://muckrack.com/christopher-shaw...
Shaw's November 2021 book on corporate efforts to dismantle the U.S. Postal Service: https://m.barnesandnoble.com/w/first-...
Banking books: https://www.goodreads.com/review/list...
February 28, 2020
A terrific book that's worth uplifting. Through deep research, Shaw recreates the milieu throughout 100 years of political struggle in the U.S., with a special focus on the Progressive and New Deal eras, to see how the public mood raged and then settled with regards to the financial industry. We have a history of deep, rich antipathy to banks, such that a substantial amount of the public sought their total destruction and nationalization. Glass-Steagall was watered-down compromise reform—Glass himself was a pro-bank puppet—that only achieved its status as a liberal bulwark decades later. This and other fascinating nuggets make up this important book.
August 25, 2021
American banking changed irrevocably between 1907 and 1935, the years this book chronicles. From the creation of the Postal Savings Banks in 1910, to the Federal Reserve in 1913, to the Federal Land Banks in 1916, and then to everything from the FDIC to the effective "nationalization" of the Federal Reserve in New Deal, the government became permanently involved in the banking world.
This book treats federal involvement as part of the struggle of the great masses against evil bankers. While it does note the many times bankers got part of what they wanted (President Taft had the Postal Savings Banks invest in the 2% government bonds the banks wanted off their books, the 1935 reform act allowed bankers to keep loans to themselves and reduced assessments on the FDIC), the main thrust is to show that "the people," usually meaning farmers and labor unions, were the impetus behind financial reform. For most of those reforms he chronicles, he's probably right. Bankers railed against the postal savings banks, the FDIC, the 1935 reform, and many others. While he plays down banker support for the original Federal Reserve and other acts, he's right that people have underestimated the amount of popular demand for just these sorts of actions.
The repetitions of popular support can get a little tiresome, but this book does give a distinct and more "bottom up" look at the transformation of banking in the first 40 years of the 20th century.
This book treats federal involvement as part of the struggle of the great masses against evil bankers. While it does note the many times bankers got part of what they wanted (President Taft had the Postal Savings Banks invest in the 2% government bonds the banks wanted off their books, the 1935 reform act allowed bankers to keep loans to themselves and reduced assessments on the FDIC), the main thrust is to show that "the people," usually meaning farmers and labor unions, were the impetus behind financial reform. For most of those reforms he chronicles, he's probably right. Bankers railed against the postal savings banks, the FDIC, the 1935 reform, and many others. While he plays down banker support for the original Federal Reserve and other acts, he's right that people have underestimated the amount of popular demand for just these sorts of actions.
The repetitions of popular support can get a little tiresome, but this book does give a distinct and more "bottom up" look at the transformation of banking in the first 40 years of the 20th century.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews