A global account of military strategy, which examines the practices, rather than the theories, of the most significant military figures of the past 400 years. Strategy has existed as long as there has been organized conflict. In this new account, Jeremy Black explores the ever-changing relationship between purpose, force, implementation, and effectiveness in military strategy and its dramatic impact on the development of the global power system. Taking a total view of strategy, Black looks at leading powers--notably the United States, China, Britain, and Russia--in the wider context of their competition and their domestic and international strengths. Ranging from France's Ancien Regime and Britain's empire building to present day conflicts in the Middle East, Black devotes particular attention to the strategic practice and decisions of the Kangxi Emperor, Clausewitz, Napoleon, and Hitler.
Jeremy Black is an English historian, who was formerly a professor of history at the University of Exeter. He is a senior fellow at the Center for the Study of America and the West at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, US. Black is the author of over 180 books, principally but not exclusively on 18th-century British politics and international relations, and has been described by one commentator as "the most prolific historical scholar of our age". He has published on military and political history, including Warfare in the Western World, 1882–1975 (2001) and The World in the Twentieth Century (2002).
This very academic yet still fast paced book truly is a tour-de-force of military strategy. Broken down into eras which are usually span around a century, Jeremy Black provides an excellent introduction to strategy before proceeding to take us through the strategies (or at least strategic outlooks) of virtually every major power since the 18th Century. The best part of this book is Jeremy's broad view of strategy being contextual, dynamic, and very much shaped by a societies or organization's "strategic culture" (e.g. the cultural views of what constitutes strategy and how it is used). While many Soldiers and statesmen try to explain just how different strategy is from policy and the components of strategy are from each other (generally ends, ways, and means), this book quite correctly shows how these things often blend, routinely over-lap, and occasionally are virtually the same. I highly recommend this book to people with a deep interest in strategy and / or military history, but not for casual readers due to this narrative's academic tone and very focused subject.
I confess myself disapinted. I had quite higher expectations from Black given his reputation and skill. There are some useful remarks as a whole, but the book certainly lacks depth.
Dense commentary on strategy through military history. It is a challenging read for the general audience seeking an introduction to the subject. For the historian or one knowledgeable in this subject, the book is clearly, precisely, and technically written, well footnoted, with a robust bibliography.
Black walks the reader through the history of European conflict and military doctrine highlighting the use of strategy as a concept and it's usefulness.
Why I started this book: Grabbed it from Audible's free selections months ago and then rushed to listen to it when it was expiring.
Why I finished it: This was deeper in the weeds than I expected but I liked that Black pointed out; that 1. strategy is very case dependent. 2. the history of strategy has focused on European experiences and wars. 3. Carl von Clausewitz's works suffer from extreme sentence irregularities allowing each new translation to highlight the hobby horse of the day... and that Clausewitz was never on a winning team, so his insights are less profitable that they are celebrated as being. 4. Winston Churchill's Mediterranean proposal was long term strategic as he was thinking of blocking the Russians and the Germans from the warm water ports and supplies. The Americans who didn't have a history of Russian competition, and who already had a two front war, were less patient with this strategic vision.
Açıkçası en ilgili çekici kısmı Soğuk Savaş ve sonrası olan strateji bölümüydü. Fakat oldukça yoğun akademik dille yazılmış olması ve konular hakkında örneklendirmelerin yetersiz olması kitabın anlaşılmasını zorlaştırıyor.