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Published March 24, 2020
The standard economics and finance paradigms ignore money and liquidity. Markets are assumed to exist everywhere and at all times, and frictionless trade is supposed to occur. Yet paradoxically, illiquidity is the ultimate friction and without sufficient liquidity there would be a widespread market failure and no trade.
Economies with strong productivity growth and net capital inflows often enjoy rising asset prices, especially when their nominal exchange rates are relatively stable. And, because appreciating capital asset prices tend to attract more investors, these moves can be amplified by further capital inflows, thereby, fueling an asset price spiral.
The fact that the modern financial system has turned from a new financing system to a refinancing system that is more than ever dependent on the supply of potentially flaky safe assets to help rollover increasingly flaky debts creates a negative feedback that highlights the inherent dangers in credit markets.
It is our contention that ‘modern money’ really starts where conventional definitions of money supply end. In other words, the well-known monetary aggregates, e.g. M0, M1 and M2, are only the tip of the growing iceberg of short-term claims that, as the 2007-2008 GFC shows, can severely disrupt the markets. - M2 money, the broadest official US monetary measure, comprises notes and coins, as well as insured household deposits.
It excludes the uninsured claims of institutional money managers, corporations and Forex reserve managers, as well as offshore Eurodollar balances. Together this combined broad funding pool stands close to US$26 trillion, easily dwarfing the US$15 trillion that makes up M2 money supply.
A plausible reason why liquidity is shunned in the traditional literature is that it is perceived to be both hard to measure and difficult to define. But just because a task is challenging, there is no reason not to try.
Economics is itself often guilty of raising to heights of great importance factors that are easily measured. This fallacy can be colourfully described by the tale of the drunkard searching for lost keys under a streetlamp: not because this is where they were lost, but simply because that is where the light is better! Often economic truths lie in the shadows where they can be hard to see.
The huge US current account deficit, sustained over two decades, which persuaded many experts ahead of the GFC that the US dollar would slump, actually hid a massive build-up of short-term offshore gross US dollar borrowings by foreigners that required all too frequent refinancing. These were offset by foreign holdings of longer term US ‘safe’ assets, such as US Treasuries.
Not surprisingly, the unfolding of the GFC was accompanied by a sharp US dollar appreciation, as those foreign financial institutions that had also used short-term dollar funding to invest in riskier long-term dollar assets were forced to hurriedly deleverage.