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Musíme si promluvit o Putinovi: Jak se Západ mýlí v nebezpečném vládci Ruska
O Vladimiru Putinovi už vyšly desítky knih. A většina z nich stále opakuje stejné omyly, klišé a mýty, tvrdí britský profesor Mark Galeotti, přední odborník na současné Rusko. V jedenácti kapitolách rozebírá sarkasticky a poutavě jeden zažitý omyl po druhém: Proč Putin není geniální stratég. Proč se nehlásí k žádné konkrétní ideologii. Proč není tak populární, jak by se mohlo zdát. Jak dokáže být loajální ke svým lidem. A co bude dělat, až mu skončí volební období? Na základě dlouholetých výzkumů i osobní zkušenosti a mnoha rozhovorů s ruskými politiky, členem Putinovy osobní stráže nebo federálními daňovými úředníky přináší překvapivý a v mnoha ohledech realističtější pohled na jednoho z nejmocnějších mužů současné globální politiky.
116 pages, Hardcover
First published February 1, 2019
158 people are currently reading
2029 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 207 reviews
June 11, 2022
A concise and almost perfect introduction to Putin and 21 st century Russia. Academician and prolific writer on Russia, Mark Galeotti shares a well researched (from his own experiences, including conversations and formal interviews) look at the man, and the country, away from the Western lens, and also away from what is put out by the Kremlin.
Is Putin and Russia behind Trump's ascendance and Brexit? What are his plans for The Crimea, for the Ukraine overall and for Syria? Does Russia have a plan, a clear goal? Is Putin really that popular amongst Russians? All these questions and many more are looked at. I found this book enlightening on so many points, but especially how it exposes the multiple political, military and capitalist fiefdoms that operate unilaterally by interpreting vague policy assertions from Putin, and how they sometimes get it completely wrong. A must read for anyone remotely interested in Russia, Putin or geopolitics. I wish it was a bit more detailed, and a lot longer, but then maybe it wouldn't have worked so well? 8 out of 12.
2020 read
Is Putin and Russia behind Trump's ascendance and Brexit? What are his plans for The Crimea, for the Ukraine overall and for Syria? Does Russia have a plan, a clear goal? Is Putin really that popular amongst Russians? All these questions and many more are looked at. I found this book enlightening on so many points, but especially how it exposes the multiple political, military and capitalist fiefdoms that operate unilaterally by interpreting vague policy assertions from Putin, and how they sometimes get it completely wrong. A must read for anyone remotely interested in Russia, Putin or geopolitics. I wish it was a bit more detailed, and a lot longer, but then maybe it wouldn't have worked so well? 8 out of 12.
2020 read
April 20, 2021
Cred că sunt la a treia carte din ultima perioadă care discută și dezbate subiectul Putin și toate aceste cărți ajung la aproximativ aceleași concluzii în privința acestui om pe care, se pare, Occidentul îl înțelege prea puțin. (Autor este, de data aceasta, Mark Galeotti, istoric și expert în istoria modernă, politica și securitatea Rusiei.)
Așadar, pe scurt (pentru că voi reveni): Putin joacă mereu la cacealma, nefiind un jucător de șah, ci un judocan care se folosește de slăbiciunile adversarului; tocmai de aceea este greu să-i anticipăm mișcările, pentru că nici el nu știu ce o să facă în următorul pas; îi punem mereu în cârcă trecutul kaghebist, dar adevărul este că a fost un ofițer de securitate fără realizări; nu gândește în termeni comuniști, ci are o gândire de secol 19 - vrea ca Rusia să fie o mare putere și să-și împartă sferele de influență cu Occidentul; atuul său vine din încrengătura creată în jurul său, de bogătași și politicieni, nu din curaj, inspirație sau filosofie politică. Etc. Etc.
O carte scurtă, dar plină de miez.
Așadar, pe scurt (pentru că voi reveni): Putin joacă mereu la cacealma, nefiind un jucător de șah, ci un judocan care se folosește de slăbiciunile adversarului; tocmai de aceea este greu să-i anticipăm mișcările, pentru că nici el nu știu ce o să facă în următorul pas; îi punem mereu în cârcă trecutul kaghebist, dar adevărul este că a fost un ofițer de securitate fără realizări; nu gândește în termeni comuniști, ci are o gândire de secol 19 - vrea ca Rusia să fie o mare putere și să-și împartă sferele de influență cu Occidentul; atuul său vine din încrengătura creată în jurul său, de bogătași și politicieni, nu din curaj, inspirație sau filosofie politică. Etc. Etc.
O carte scurtă, dar plină de miez.
December 4, 2019
This is a short and quite entertaining book on Putin, what his world looks and mind works like. It's not a Putin-apologist piece - it does tackle various biases we (as in "the west") may have regarding Putin, but instead of simply explaining them away, it offers new, maybe equally disturbing perspectives. It's a case of "it may not be the kind of bad you think it is, it might be another kind of bad - or worse".
To achieve this, author and Russia expert Mark Galeotti presents various few chapters each focussing on a "special" Putin (mis)conception, for example: Yes, he was KGB, "but not as you know it". Or: Putin doesn't want to revive neither the USSR nor tzarism, he just wants to... well, you know, something like make Russia great again. And so on. One main thing I take home from this is that Putin doesn't have the grand masterplan to destroy all things free and liberal - he rather uses whatever method is best to achieve his general goals (people listening to him, Russia and himself being respected and such).
The book is too short and superficial to give any real deep insights, but it's a good first introdution and anything but a dry essay.
To achieve this, author and Russia expert Mark Galeotti presents various few chapters each focussing on a "special" Putin (mis)conception, for example: Yes, he was KGB, "but not as you know it". Or: Putin doesn't want to revive neither the USSR nor tzarism, he just wants to... well, you know, something like make Russia great again. And so on. One main thing I take home from this is that Putin doesn't have the grand masterplan to destroy all things free and liberal - he rather uses whatever method is best to achieve his general goals (people listening to him, Russia and himself being respected and such).
The book is too short and superficial to give any real deep insights, but it's a good first introdution and anything but a dry essay.
March 6, 2022
A brief introduction into Putin's world. A story that shows how he is a human and not a simple machine, how he is not as smart as he would want the world to see. A short, easy to read novel.
March 28, 2022
Prin comparație cu alte lucrări pe subiectul „Putin”, Mark Galeotti pare a se apropia cel mai mult de realitatea numită putinism, chiar dacă, sunt convins, invazia Ucrainei l-a luat prin surprindere. Cartea ne oferă totuși informații relevante. Având în vedere dimensiunile relativ reduse, sunt punctate aspecte esențiale legate de viața și mai ales de modul de conducere impus de acest fost ofițer KGB în Rusia.
Sistemul P-C-R (Pile-Relații-Cunoștințe) (re)instaurat de Putin, un sistem binecunoscut est-europenilor, în care devotamentul față de șef este moneda forte a funcționării sociale, este bine punctat de autor. Este subliniată (e drept, succint) evoluția profesională a lui Putin, dar este mai bine reliefat modul de creare și funcționare a verticalei puterii în Rusia contemporană: o structură de tip mafiot, în care capo di tutti i capi tronează peste alți mici dictatori, intitulați oligarhi, cei care și-au împărțit diversele domenii economice ale țării. Ei taie și spânzură pe aceste „domenii”, cu o singură condiție: să-i fie devotați marelui șef...
Întregul recenzumat: aici
Sistemul P-C-R (Pile-Relații-Cunoștințe) (re)instaurat de Putin, un sistem binecunoscut est-europenilor, în care devotamentul față de șef este moneda forte a funcționării sociale, este bine punctat de autor. Este subliniată (e drept, succint) evoluția profesională a lui Putin, dar este mai bine reliefat modul de creare și funcționare a verticalei puterii în Rusia contemporană: o structură de tip mafiot, în care capo di tutti i capi tronează peste alți mici dictatori, intitulați oligarhi, cei care și-au împărțit diversele domenii economice ale țării. Ei taie și spânzură pe aceste „domenii”, cu o singură condiție: să-i fie devotați marelui șef...
Întregul recenzumat: aici
June 22, 2019
"The French poet and essayist Charles Baudelaire once wrote 'the cleverest ruse of the devil is to persuade you he does not exist'; perhaps Putin's cleverest ruse is to persuade you that he is behind everything."
I think this is the best way to sum up not only this book, but Putin and Russia too.
I think this is the best way to sum up not only this book, but Putin and Russia too.
July 31, 2022
3,25/5
February 14, 2021
Title should be “How everyone gets him wrong except me”.
A couple of interesting nuggets but otherwise uninformative. Author comes off as an arrogant know-it-all.
A couple of interesting nuggets but otherwise uninformative. Author comes off as an arrogant know-it-all.
February 27, 2022
Ținând cont de vremurile actuale o carte foarte bună și concisa
April 20, 2022
One of the prevailing clichés about Putin is that he is a master strategist, carefully calculating his every move, always one step ahead of the West. The reality is very different, writes Mark Galeotti: “In geopolitics as in judo, Putin is an opportunist. He has a sense of what constitutes a win, but no predetermined path towards it. He relies on quickly seizing any advantage he sees, rather than on a careful strategy… This helps explain why we are so often unable to predict Putin’s moves in advance – he himself doesn’t know what he’ll do next.”
The fact that Putin is a judoka, rather than a chess grandmaster, is also reflected in his style of government. Galeotti describes it as an “adhocracy”—a diffuse and informal system defined less by top-down commands than by bottom-up opportunism. Putin may set the overall tone and define broad objectives, but he very rarely gives direct instructions as to what he expects to be done. Instead, everything is based on unspoken rules and understandings, known as ponyatiye in Russian criminal jargon. Putin is essentially presiding over an army of smaller judokas, or “policy entrepreneurs,” who are constantly cooking up crazy schemes to please the boss:
“In some ways the system works in the same way as the start-up economy: lots of people with ideas – some good, some bad, some already being tried on a small scale and others that exist purely in their creators’ imaginations – all try to interest the one big investor in the Kremlin. Trying to predict what ideas will come out of this process based on Putin’s character is a completely futile task.
Instead, Putin’s state generally responds to opportunities. A British prime minister calls for a referendum on leaving the European Union; American Democratic Party officials practise poor computer security; people in the West begin to lose faith in their political systems and elites; opaque financial structures allow ‘dark money’ to distort economies and corrupt politics; social media bypasses the traditional press. Russia created none of these opportunities, but has demonstrably tried to exploit them. In effect, we in the West define what Putin’s state does to us, while he is simply taking advantage of the failures, broken promises and stress points in our systems.”
This approach to statecraft has generated a tremendous amount of tactical flexibility and initiative, but at the cost of duplication and corrosive competition. One example of such unhealthy rivalry is the hydra-headed monster of Russia’s intelligence services, consisting of the FSB, the SVR, the GRU, and the FSO. Galeotti notes that the existence of four overlapping spy agencies has created “a vicious cycle of escalating claims and conspiracy theories, as the various services compete for the boss’s attention with ever-more-lurid allegations. When Putin claims that the West is trying to undermine him, that Ukraine is run by neo-Nazis or that a secret ‘deep state’ conspiracy dominates Washington, is he just posturing, or is he in fact repeating eye-catching nonsense from intelligence briefings that aim to enthral rather than educate him?”
That last bit might hold some important clues about Putin’s botched invasion of Ukraine. And it begs a very interesting question: “While Putin certainly controls Russia’s intelligence agencies, how far do they control or at least influence him in return, through the picture of the world they paint?”
The fact that Putin is a judoka, rather than a chess grandmaster, is also reflected in his style of government. Galeotti describes it as an “adhocracy”—a diffuse and informal system defined less by top-down commands than by bottom-up opportunism. Putin may set the overall tone and define broad objectives, but he very rarely gives direct instructions as to what he expects to be done. Instead, everything is based on unspoken rules and understandings, known as ponyatiye in Russian criminal jargon. Putin is essentially presiding over an army of smaller judokas, or “policy entrepreneurs,” who are constantly cooking up crazy schemes to please the boss:
“In some ways the system works in the same way as the start-up economy: lots of people with ideas – some good, some bad, some already being tried on a small scale and others that exist purely in their creators’ imaginations – all try to interest the one big investor in the Kremlin. Trying to predict what ideas will come out of this process based on Putin’s character is a completely futile task.
Instead, Putin’s state generally responds to opportunities. A British prime minister calls for a referendum on leaving the European Union; American Democratic Party officials practise poor computer security; people in the West begin to lose faith in their political systems and elites; opaque financial structures allow ‘dark money’ to distort economies and corrupt politics; social media bypasses the traditional press. Russia created none of these opportunities, but has demonstrably tried to exploit them. In effect, we in the West define what Putin’s state does to us, while he is simply taking advantage of the failures, broken promises and stress points in our systems.”
This approach to statecraft has generated a tremendous amount of tactical flexibility and initiative, but at the cost of duplication and corrosive competition. One example of such unhealthy rivalry is the hydra-headed monster of Russia’s intelligence services, consisting of the FSB, the SVR, the GRU, and the FSO. Galeotti notes that the existence of four overlapping spy agencies has created “a vicious cycle of escalating claims and conspiracy theories, as the various services compete for the boss’s attention with ever-more-lurid allegations. When Putin claims that the West is trying to undermine him, that Ukraine is run by neo-Nazis or that a secret ‘deep state’ conspiracy dominates Washington, is he just posturing, or is he in fact repeating eye-catching nonsense from intelligence briefings that aim to enthral rather than educate him?”
That last bit might hold some important clues about Putin’s botched invasion of Ukraine. And it begs a very interesting question: “While Putin certainly controls Russia’s intelligence agencies, how far do they control or at least influence him in return, through the picture of the world they paint?”
October 25, 2025
Anekdotisch en slecht geschreven. Ook blijkt Galeotti een slechte voorspeller van de toekomst.
March 2, 2022
Exkurz do prostredia infikovaného Putinovou predstavou o Rusku. Toto prostredie je šedivé, neexistuje v ňom priateľstvo a bezprostredné okolie funguje na báze predstáv o tom, čo sa od nich očakáva. Neistota, patologický strach, ale taktiež veľká nepredvídavosť v konaní. Mark Galeotti strávil v tomto prostredí dostatočne dlhý čas na to, aby ponúkol stručný, ale komplexný obraz o Putinovi, ktorý je nebezpečný, ale zďaleka nie nezraniteľný.
January 29, 2019
Let's call this a brief introduction into modern Russia. The book challenges the main myths regarding Putin and/or Russia, but due to lack of volume fails to bring deeper insights. Still, it will give you to get a basic grasp of what is going on within the walls of Kremlin and around them. If you read Zygar, don't bother.
June 25, 2021
Disappointed in this book. It feels like there is more opinion here than facts. Galeotti tries to create causation based on biased sources. Not a good feel into who the real Putin is.
December 19, 2021
I have no idea why I read this book, review to come!
November 28, 2025
“Russians can be unhappy, yet still loyal. Putin is to a large extent being rated not as a man, not even as a politician, but as an icon of Russia. To vote for him is not to endorse a program, but to express patriotism”
[..]
“Even in Ukraine, a country much closer to Moscow’s heart, had he wanted to annex the ethnically Russian Donbas region, he could have done that in 2014. Indeed, when Putin made it clear that this was not going to happen, he disappointed and angered many Russian nationalists who had seen him as their champion.”
——
📖 Tot me genomen op papier
Soms voelt het zo lekker je te vernoegen als je denkt te weten hoe een verhaal afloopt. Als je halverwege een detective al een donkerbruin vermoeden hebt whodunnit. In het geval van dit boek is de genoegdoening minder aanwezig. Het boek zinspeelt de hele tijd op een mogelijk vertrek van Poetin als president, maar volgens Goodreads werd de Nederlandse vertaling van dit boek (die ik dus las) gepubliceerd in maart 2022, een maand nadat Poetin Oekraïne binnenviel…
Galeotti behandelt, naast borstklopperij dat hij als enige weet hoe het zit, een aantal interessante analyses en voorspellingen: 1) oud-KGB medewerker Poetin is verzot op de KGB en voor zijn nieuwsvoorziening volledig afhankelijk van de biased KGB rapportages 2) hoewel veel aan Poetin toegerekend kan worden, is Poetin niet zo machtig en daadkrachtig als men hoopt/wenst/denkt. Hij is conflictvermijdend en grijpt meestal niet in als bevriende oligarchen hem in de weg lopen, maar hij geniet ook niet zoveel steun van de Russische bevolking 3) Poetin heeft geen andere opties dan te sterven in het harnas.
Of deze analyses, mogelijk inmiddels gecorrigeerd of ingehaald door de door Poetin ingezette oorlog, hout snijden durf ik niet te zeggen, maar ik ga wel de komende tijd berichtgeving proberen te lezen met deze observaties in mijn achterhoofd.
[..]
“Even in Ukraine, a country much closer to Moscow’s heart, had he wanted to annex the ethnically Russian Donbas region, he could have done that in 2014. Indeed, when Putin made it clear that this was not going to happen, he disappointed and angered many Russian nationalists who had seen him as their champion.”
——
📖 Tot me genomen op papier
Soms voelt het zo lekker je te vernoegen als je denkt te weten hoe een verhaal afloopt. Als je halverwege een detective al een donkerbruin vermoeden hebt whodunnit. In het geval van dit boek is de genoegdoening minder aanwezig. Het boek zinspeelt de hele tijd op een mogelijk vertrek van Poetin als president, maar volgens Goodreads werd de Nederlandse vertaling van dit boek (die ik dus las) gepubliceerd in maart 2022, een maand nadat Poetin Oekraïne binnenviel…
Galeotti behandelt, naast borstklopperij dat hij als enige weet hoe het zit, een aantal interessante analyses en voorspellingen: 1) oud-KGB medewerker Poetin is verzot op de KGB en voor zijn nieuwsvoorziening volledig afhankelijk van de biased KGB rapportages 2) hoewel veel aan Poetin toegerekend kan worden, is Poetin niet zo machtig en daadkrachtig als men hoopt/wenst/denkt. Hij is conflictvermijdend en grijpt meestal niet in als bevriende oligarchen hem in de weg lopen, maar hij geniet ook niet zoveel steun van de Russische bevolking 3) Poetin heeft geen andere opties dan te sterven in het harnas.
Of deze analyses, mogelijk inmiddels gecorrigeerd of ingehaald door de door Poetin ingezette oorlog, hout snijden durf ik niet te zeggen, maar ik ga wel de komende tijd berichtgeving proberen te lezen met deze observaties in mijn achterhoofd.
November 5, 2023
Well, this was certainly an interesting book, but in the end I wonder what I trust myself to take away from it.
The book is an easy read and feels like a collection of chatty essays on aspects of Putin's personality as a person and politician. As a former researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague and visiting professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Galeotti has intimate knowledge of Russia and Putin's politics, and access to Kremlin insiders without being himself one.
And that is great, and most of the chapters in the book reveal angles and interpretations that would be difficult to develop from daily news reports in the media alone. But the biggest issue I had with the book is its publication date. Penguin published it first in 2019, but must have felt that Putin's current notoriety warranted a re-issue in 2022. However, rather than re-evaluating some of the observations he made three years prior in the cold light of the Ukraine war that we are seeing unfold today, Mark chose to republish his original thoughts with a short chapter of a few pages stuck on at the end. He stylised this chapter as a "coda" and clearly designed it as a vehicle to bring his thoughts up to date, and make them relevant. But as this chapter is the only place in the book where we are treated to observations on Putin's current activities, most of the book feels oddly dated, and some of his thoughts do not quite seem to have passed the test of time.
So in chapter 11, which deals with the question whether Putin may feel that he acquired enough of a legacy for him to call it a day, and by extension discusses the question how the West should relate to him, we are treated to this verdict: "Containing the harm Russia can do to us and minimising his [Putin's] opportunities for mischief is probably the best we can hope for, however depressing and unambitious that may sound" [p140]. This observation rings hollow in my ears, seeing the ongoing destruction of the Ukraine every day on the news. I am even less convinced by Mark's conclusion, offered on the same page, that "Russia is slowly moving towards Europe and European values, as it works its way through the traumas resulting from the end of empire".
I do not believe these verdicts can stand in light of Russia's war in Ukraine. And if Mark was perhaps too optimistic about this in 2019, what else might he have misjudged? In his coda, we read that "Putin's system may well survive as long as Putin himself remains in the Kremlin" [p143], a statement that feels disappointingly obvious, all the more so as it is the concluding observation in the chapter designed to update Mark's historical perspective of 2019.
So, in the end, I still think this book is worth reading. But I do not feel that it offers much of substance, it is better enjoyed as flavouring of a view the reader may already have formed before reading the book.
The book is an easy read and feels like a collection of chatty essays on aspects of Putin's personality as a person and politician. As a former researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague and visiting professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Galeotti has intimate knowledge of Russia and Putin's politics, and access to Kremlin insiders without being himself one.
And that is great, and most of the chapters in the book reveal angles and interpretations that would be difficult to develop from daily news reports in the media alone. But the biggest issue I had with the book is its publication date. Penguin published it first in 2019, but must have felt that Putin's current notoriety warranted a re-issue in 2022. However, rather than re-evaluating some of the observations he made three years prior in the cold light of the Ukraine war that we are seeing unfold today, Mark chose to republish his original thoughts with a short chapter of a few pages stuck on at the end. He stylised this chapter as a "coda" and clearly designed it as a vehicle to bring his thoughts up to date, and make them relevant. But as this chapter is the only place in the book where we are treated to observations on Putin's current activities, most of the book feels oddly dated, and some of his thoughts do not quite seem to have passed the test of time.
So in chapter 11, which deals with the question whether Putin may feel that he acquired enough of a legacy for him to call it a day, and by extension discusses the question how the West should relate to him, we are treated to this verdict: "Containing the harm Russia can do to us and minimising his [Putin's] opportunities for mischief is probably the best we can hope for, however depressing and unambitious that may sound" [p140]. This observation rings hollow in my ears, seeing the ongoing destruction of the Ukraine every day on the news. I am even less convinced by Mark's conclusion, offered on the same page, that "Russia is slowly moving towards Europe and European values, as it works its way through the traumas resulting from the end of empire".
I do not believe these verdicts can stand in light of Russia's war in Ukraine. And if Mark was perhaps too optimistic about this in 2019, what else might he have misjudged? In his coda, we read that "Putin's system may well survive as long as Putin himself remains in the Kremlin" [p143], a statement that feels disappointingly obvious, all the more so as it is the concluding observation in the chapter designed to update Mark's historical perspective of 2019.
So, in the end, I still think this book is worth reading. But I do not feel that it offers much of substance, it is better enjoyed as flavouring of a view the reader may already have formed before reading the book.
February 4, 2022
A short but insightful book about Putin's regime and his way of thinking.
February 8, 2022
read between every line
If this guy isn't being paid by the media in the West, this is his application form for the role. Annoyed that I gave the guy money to read his propaganda, but there are some interesting insights to be had, when you know how to read pamphleteer.
If this guy isn't being paid by the media in the West, this is his application form for the role. Annoyed that I gave the guy money to read his propaganda, but there are some interesting insights to be had, when you know how to read pamphleteer.
September 16, 2023
Bănuiesc că s-a vrut de la început un scurt ghid despre Putin (ca persoană dar și ca ,personalitate'), pentru cei mai puțin familiarizați cu subiectul. Dacă acesta e scopul, atunci autorul l-a atins. Pentru cei care au aprofundat anterior subiectul, cartea poate părea însă o pierdere de vreme, pentru că aproape nu oferă detalii noi sau inedite.
Principalele idei, așa cum le-am perceput eu:
1. Președintele Putin întruchipează dorințele și fricile unui întreg popor, de aceea a și reușit să se mențină la putere pentru atât de mult timp (25 de ani).
2. Putin este loial celor care îi sunt loiali. Face, însă, o distincție clară între cercul intim și simpli ,,supuși" sau colaboratori. De asemenea face o diferență crucială între dușman și trădător.
3. Spre deosebire de multe alte personaje din politica rusească, V.P. NU este un extremist. Cunoaște istoria și parțial filosofia, însă nu face din acestea un scop în sine, ci un instrument. E capabil să mintă și/ sau să răstălmăcească vorbele proprii după cum îi pică bine cartea politică.
4. Putin nu vrea să refacă URSS. Este mai degrabă un nostalgic față de frica și respectul pe care le avea cândva Vestul față de Rusia, și nu neaparat fața de ideea de imperiu.
5. El crede că gândeste în cheia unui spion (fiind fost kgb-ist), și deși își ia informațiile de la principalele servicii de securitate rusești, nu a fost niciodată unul veritabil. Putin este mai degrabă un birocrat extrem de talentat, capabil să țeasă intrigi și relații acolo unde este necesar.
5. Se gândește, poate, la pensionare. El i-a asigurat securitatea personală fostului președinte Elțin. Dar lui cine îi va asigura acest lucru?
Principalele idei, așa cum le-am perceput eu:
1. Președintele Putin întruchipează dorințele și fricile unui întreg popor, de aceea a și reușit să se mențină la putere pentru atât de mult timp (25 de ani).
2. Putin este loial celor care îi sunt loiali. Face, însă, o distincție clară între cercul intim și simpli ,,supuși" sau colaboratori. De asemenea face o diferență crucială între dușman și trădător.
3. Spre deosebire de multe alte personaje din politica rusească, V.P. NU este un extremist. Cunoaște istoria și parțial filosofia, însă nu face din acestea un scop în sine, ci un instrument. E capabil să mintă și/ sau să răstălmăcească vorbele proprii după cum îi pică bine cartea politică.
4. Putin nu vrea să refacă URSS. Este mai degrabă un nostalgic față de frica și respectul pe care le avea cândva Vestul față de Rusia, și nu neaparat fața de ideea de imperiu.
5. El crede că gândeste în cheia unui spion (fiind fost kgb-ist), și deși își ia informațiile de la principalele servicii de securitate rusești, nu a fost niciodată unul veritabil. Putin este mai degrabă un birocrat extrem de talentat, capabil să țeasă intrigi și relații acolo unde este necesar.
5. Se gândește, poate, la pensionare. El i-a asigurat securitatea personală fostului președinte Elțin. Dar lui cine îi va asigura acest lucru?
March 10, 2022
Não chega a ser um livro, lê-se mais como um artigo extenso. Bom para termos alguma noção de quem é o presidente da Rússia mas com pouca informação concreta, achei que fosse mais explicativo e aprofundasse mais alguns pormenores. Ficou muito por contar mas lê-se muito rápido, tem apenas 100 páginas.
June 7, 2021
Poetin in 160 pagina’s
April 19, 2024
A capa e o título indicam, desde logo, aquele que será o conteúdo do livro em questão: Vladimir Putin, um dos homens mais poderosos do mundo.
Um livro bastante sucinto, que funciona quase como um almanaque. Os intentos de Putin, os seus objetivos e a visão que o mesmo tem perante o ocidente e as suas movimentações políticas.
Além disso, acedemos a uma biografia breve com os marcos de Putin. Desde os primórdios da sua carreira no KGB, aos seus tempos de judoca e às funções que atualmente lhe reconhecemos.
A obra conta com alguns testemunhos inéditos de intervenientes que foram, de alguma maneira, próximos dele.
Um livro muito bem resumido que permite ter uma visão abrangente e elucidativa deste que já é uma personagem da história política e mundial, com tudo aquilo que de "positivo" e negativo isso implica.
Um livro bastante sucinto, que funciona quase como um almanaque. Os intentos de Putin, os seus objetivos e a visão que o mesmo tem perante o ocidente e as suas movimentações políticas.
Além disso, acedemos a uma biografia breve com os marcos de Putin. Desde os primórdios da sua carreira no KGB, aos seus tempos de judoca e às funções que atualmente lhe reconhecemos.
A obra conta com alguns testemunhos inéditos de intervenientes que foram, de alguma maneira, próximos dele.
Um livro muito bem resumido que permite ter uma visão abrangente e elucidativa deste que já é uma personagem da história política e mundial, com tudo aquilo que de "positivo" e negativo isso implica.
February 25, 2019
Here's a funny joke Galeotti collected from Russia, in which Stalin appears to Putin in a dream and asks him whether he can be of any assistance (Stalin seems to have improved a lot post-mortem):
Putin replies, 'Why is everything here so bad? What should I do?
'Execute the entire government and paint the Kremlin blue.'
'Why blue?' replies a perplexed Putin.
'I had a feeling you would only want to discuss the second part.'
It summarizes the current situation pretty well, I think.
Putin replies, 'Why is everything here so bad? What should I do?
'Execute the entire government and paint the Kremlin blue.'
'Why blue?' replies a perplexed Putin.
'I had a feeling you would only want to discuss the second part.'
It summarizes the current situation pretty well, I think.
May 18, 2023
This both humanized Putin and reiterated any vilification of him I've seen in the media, amazing that he is both! I think anyone mildly interested in Putin / current Russian politics should pick this up. It's a short (almost) insider-scoop on Russia, super informative, and an easy read. The second half reads far more interestingly than the first so do give it 60 pages before putting it down.
June 27, 2020
This is a light and entertaining read, but I wouldn't quote anything you read inside it. The best part is on page 6, where he recommends better books written on the subject. Less of a short biography than a long opinion piece. Nice cover though.
November 15, 2025
"But this helps explain why we are so often unable to predict Putin's moves in advance – he himself doesn't know what he'll do next."
I picked this one up in the London airport on a whim. I've been curious about this guy since he never seems to go away. Bruh... he's been at the helm since 2000 and changed Russia's constitution in 2020 to keep him in power potentially until 2036 (eligible for 2 six-year terms after 2024). "Power is what he desires most. Power is active, ephemeral, it must constantly be refreshed and reasserted." He also has an extreme love of country. He believes Russia should be a significant player on the world stage and has, throughout his reign, led them further and further away from that destiny. I didn't realize the sanctions the West imposed upon them after their invasion in Ukraine. They can't export oil and gas to the EU or US. Innovation is hamstrung because they can't import sensitive tech like semiconductors which power modern weapons systems. It's a lot of stuff.
What I understand about him now is that he's Russia's cold unemotional leader who rewards those who are loyal to him. He's not as aggressive or violent as other world leaders have been historically, despite the charge into Ukraine. He's bogged down in his ultranationalist ideology and genuinely believes Ukraine, at least the eastern sphere of Ukraine, wants to be "with Russia." But the guy is not calculated. He takes most of his strategy from Judo, the martial art he's trained in. In Judo the idea is to use the opponent's momentum, balance, and forge against them. It's more about exploiting timing, leverage, and balance so their own movements create openings. What's the moral here? Putin leads like a Judo master. Sometimes he'll announce empty threats just to see how the West will react, trying to create an opening. From the book, it's clear: "containing the harm Russia can do to us and minimizing his opportunities for mischief are probably the best we can hope for, however depressing and unambitious that may sound." The pen may be mightier than the sword, but silence often spares you the fight.
He's an uninspiring playground bully where opportunists and sycophants surround him because it's in their best interest. Not because they genuinely believe in the guy. He's hell bent on cementing a legacy in Russia for generations to come, thinking the Ukraine invasion would be his crown jewel which was a huge misfire. He might be remembered from the grave, but not for the reasons he expects.
I picked this one up in the London airport on a whim. I've been curious about this guy since he never seems to go away. Bruh... he's been at the helm since 2000 and changed Russia's constitution in 2020 to keep him in power potentially until 2036 (eligible for 2 six-year terms after 2024). "Power is what he desires most. Power is active, ephemeral, it must constantly be refreshed and reasserted." He also has an extreme love of country. He believes Russia should be a significant player on the world stage and has, throughout his reign, led them further and further away from that destiny. I didn't realize the sanctions the West imposed upon them after their invasion in Ukraine. They can't export oil and gas to the EU or US. Innovation is hamstrung because they can't import sensitive tech like semiconductors which power modern weapons systems. It's a lot of stuff.
What I understand about him now is that he's Russia's cold unemotional leader who rewards those who are loyal to him. He's not as aggressive or violent as other world leaders have been historically, despite the charge into Ukraine. He's bogged down in his ultranationalist ideology and genuinely believes Ukraine, at least the eastern sphere of Ukraine, wants to be "with Russia." But the guy is not calculated. He takes most of his strategy from Judo, the martial art he's trained in. In Judo the idea is to use the opponent's momentum, balance, and forge against them. It's more about exploiting timing, leverage, and balance so their own movements create openings. What's the moral here? Putin leads like a Judo master. Sometimes he'll announce empty threats just to see how the West will react, trying to create an opening. From the book, it's clear: "containing the harm Russia can do to us and minimizing his opportunities for mischief are probably the best we can hope for, however depressing and unambitious that may sound." The pen may be mightier than the sword, but silence often spares you the fight.
He's an uninspiring playground bully where opportunists and sycophants surround him because it's in their best interest. Not because they genuinely believe in the guy. He's hell bent on cementing a legacy in Russia for generations to come, thinking the Ukraine invasion would be his crown jewel which was a huge misfire. He might be remembered from the grave, but not for the reasons he expects.
January 1, 2025
Een boekje van 150 pagina’s over Poetin, uit 2019, dus nog van vóór de oorlog in Oekraïne. Mijn belangrijkste les komt uit het eerste hoofdstuk: Poetin is een judoka, geen schaker. Er is niet een vooropgezet plan, maar hij maakt gebruik van mogelijkheden die hij ziet om zijn belangrijkste doelen te bereiken: intern oppositie de mond snoeren en extern, vooral in het Westen, respect afdwingen. De oorlog in Oekraïne bewijst dat hij geen schaker is, want loopt uit op een gigantische mislukking, omdat hij zich verkeken heeft op de veerkracht van de Oekraïners en op de bereidheid van het Westen om hen te steunen. Ook in dit eerste hoofdstuk legt Galeotti uit dat het niet mogelijk en nodig is om binnen Rusland de elites te vertellen wat zij moeten doen. Neen, het is vooral zo dat zijn echte of would-be bondgenoten als politieke ondernemers proberen te doen wat zij denken dat de baas wil dat er gebeurt. Naarmate je beter bent in het inschatten van zijn wensen kom je dichter bij de macht. Dat betekent ook dat er af en toe dingen gebeuren waar Poetin niet persé blij van wordt. Maar omdat Poetin heel weinig ideologisch gedreven is, kun je dit meestal corrigeren door je loyaliteit te betonen, dan is Poetin vaak bereid vergevingsgezind te zijn. Maar helemaal zeker weten doe je dit nooit… Het onderscheid tussen vijanden en verraders is van wezenlijk belang. Vijanden kunnen vergiffenis krijgen als ze spijt betuigen, verraders moeten worden vernietigd.
Galeotti ziet de Oekraïne-oorlog volgens mij niet aankomen, maar bevestigd wel zijn beeld van Poetin als een niet-ideologisch gedreven opportunist, die bovenal op zoek is naar het behoud van zijn macht. Het machtssysteem van Poetin maakt dat hij niet zomaar de macht uit handen kan geven aan een opvolger, omdat hij niet zeker kan weten of zijn opvolger hem nog in de nabijheid van de macht zal dulden. En zo wordt het 2025, is Poetin 72 jaar en is er nog geen zicht op het einde van zijn leiderschap.
Galeotti ziet de Oekraïne-oorlog volgens mij niet aankomen, maar bevestigd wel zijn beeld van Poetin als een niet-ideologisch gedreven opportunist, die bovenal op zoek is naar het behoud van zijn macht. Het machtssysteem van Poetin maakt dat hij niet zomaar de macht uit handen kan geven aan een opvolger, omdat hij niet zeker kan weten of zijn opvolger hem nog in de nabijheid van de macht zal dulden. En zo wordt het 2025, is Poetin 72 jaar en is er nog geen zicht op het einde van zijn leiderschap.
Read
February 21, 2022This was a good day to finish this book. Putin just tonight recognized Donbas as an independent state raising the stakes immensely.
It offers an extremely readable and short tour of some of the myths and facts of Putin.
It sets out some of the misconcetions that have arisen. Putin is not a great strategist rather a serial disrupter attempting to force recognition of Russia's status as a great power which is still lacking despite 2 decades of rule.
Putin is both popular and unpopular. I liked his explanation of this paradox.
The real animating impulse of putin is a abborance of national disorder, national weakness and decay. The insecurity over Russias abject fall in prestige and relevance since the 1990s is the driving force behind putin's outlook says this book.
Putin is fed a diet of misleading information which only worsens the problem of compounding his preexisting attitudes towards American power and hypocrisy. He despises traitors and there are power feuds among the corrupt agencies and officials inside his country which damages the governments capacity for effective government leaving russian citizens unhappy and pushing putin into distractions and further autocratic measures.
While the book would have benefited from sourcing some of the claims it makes are just asserted, I found it an interesting and quick guide to Putin and his obsessive revanchist nationalist worldview.
"It had a terminal disease without a cure- a paralysis of power" - Vladimir Putin on the USSR and its fall.
It offers an extremely readable and short tour of some of the myths and facts of Putin.
It sets out some of the misconcetions that have arisen. Putin is not a great strategist rather a serial disrupter attempting to force recognition of Russia's status as a great power which is still lacking despite 2 decades of rule.
Putin is both popular and unpopular. I liked his explanation of this paradox.
The real animating impulse of putin is a abborance of national disorder, national weakness and decay. The insecurity over Russias abject fall in prestige and relevance since the 1990s is the driving force behind putin's outlook says this book.
Putin is fed a diet of misleading information which only worsens the problem of compounding his preexisting attitudes towards American power and hypocrisy. He despises traitors and there are power feuds among the corrupt agencies and officials inside his country which damages the governments capacity for effective government leaving russian citizens unhappy and pushing putin into distractions and further autocratic measures.
While the book would have benefited from sourcing some of the claims it makes are just asserted, I found it an interesting and quick guide to Putin and his obsessive revanchist nationalist worldview.
"It had a terminal disease without a cure- a paralysis of power" - Vladimir Putin on the USSR and its fall.
April 1, 2024
Stručné, prehľadné demýtizovanie, hoci také trochu novinársky povrchné. Stále prevážne užitočné a aktuálne, napriek tomu, že niektoré pozorovania staré 6 rokov už celkom neplatia.
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