La luz que se apaga

by Ivan Krastev, Stephen Holmes, Sara de Albornoz Domínguez (Translator)

¿Cómo se ha ido desmoronando nuestro mundo made in USA tras los sucesos de 1989?

El final de la Guerra Fría dio comienzo a una "Era de la Imitación" llena de inestabilidad. Después de 1989, negarse a seguir el ejemplo de Occidente no era una opción, lo cual fue para los imitadores una imposición neocolonial humillante y, entre los imitados, alentó una arrogancia imperial y un total desinterés por el funcionamiento de otros países.

Krastev y Holmes sostienen que este es el origen de la caída del orden liberal: Rusia y Estados Unidos favorecen el desmantelamiento de la seguridad global, la Unión Europea abandona las promesas de su proyecto, la fe en la democracia cae en picado...

La luz que se apaga descubre las causas de este desconcertante escenario, producto de la arrogancia neocolonial y la resistencia anticolonial engendradas en 1989.

Genres: Politics, Nonfiction, History, Political Science, Philosophy, Russia, Sociology

352 pages, Paperback

First published October 17, 2019

About the author

Ivan Krastev (Bulgarian: Иван Кръстев, born 1965 in Lukovit, Bulgaria), is a political scientist, the chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, permanent fellow at the IWM (Institute of Human Sciences) in Vienna, and 2013-14-17 Richard von Weizsäcker fellow at the Robert Bosch Stiftung in Berlin.

He is a founding board member of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a member of the board of trustees of the International Crisis Group and is a contributing opinion writer for The New York Times.

From 2004 to 2006 Krastev was executive director of the International Commission on the Balkans chaired by the former Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato. He was Editor-in-Chief of the Bulgarian Edition of Foreign Policy and was a member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (2005-2011).

His books in English include "After Europe" (UPenn Press, 2017), "Democracy Disrupted. The Global Politics on Protest" (UPenn Press, May 2014), "In Mistrust We Trust: Can Democracy Survive When We Don't Trust Our Leaders", (TED Books, 2013); "The Anti-American Century", co-edited with Alan McPherson, (CEU Press, 2007) and "Shifting Obsessions: Three Essays on the Politics of Anticorruption" (CEU Press, 2004). He is a co-author with Stephen Holmes of a forthcoming book on Russian politics.

Reviews

[Meike · Rating 4 out of 5]

English: The Light that Failed: A Reckoning
This is PoliSci as I love it: Krastev and Holmes rethink the current state of the world by focusing on the concept of imitation, and they manage to provide a new perspective for the analysis of the present and the projection of the future. A very, very short synopsis would be this: After the wall came down, former Soviet satellite states were eager to imitate the West which ended in their disillusionment; Russia, on the other hand, spend some time appeasing the West until they took up a strategy of cynical imitation of the West that exploits the West's weaknesses; now, the American President dropped the idea of American exceptionalism and the intent to export democratic political ideas (a foreign policy ideal that shaped the new world order after WW II, especially Germany) and started imitating Russian authoritarianism.

It is shocking how much sense these arguments make. The authors dedicate one third of the book to the post-Communist transformation in Eastern Europe, to Russia and to the US each. They talk about how people in Eastern Europe perceived their new status to be that of "lesser" Europeans trying to keep up, how they suffered under the migration of young citizens to the West, and they point out that the fact that the Soviet Empire imploded in the first place is largely due to the successful nationalist movements inside the individual states - but all of this does not mean that they sympathize with the new right-wing leaders there, on the contrary. They are looking for explanations in order to understand and to develop better policy alternatives, not to excuse racism and bigotry.

The chapters about Putin and Trump are particularly strong because the fact that both of them lie is not the main point of the line of argument, it's just a given: As important as the discussion about the loss of truth is, these rhetorical decisions are all part of a much larger political worldview and a social darwinist strategy aiming at subjugation and humiliation. Putin wants to humiliate the West that deems itself the winner of the Cold War - for him, this fight is not yet over, and he tries to prove that the West is cynical about its values by subverting Western political behavior. Trump is in turn fascinated by Putin's dismissal of Western values, values he doesnt' share. I've never thought about this complex web of issues under the lense of imitation, and I'm intrigued. In the last part of the book, the authors briefly discuss China, a nation that imitates Western economic strategy without adopting democratic or social policies.

While I partly felt like the authors might over-estimate Trump's level of reflection and I was rather bothered by the insufficient discussion of the role of the EU (which mainly features as an anonymous bureaucracy - a stereotype that is not only unfair but, in times of Brexit, also rather dangerous), I was for the most part deeply impressed by this book, as it does not repeat what we keep hearing again and again, but rather makes new connections and paints a bigger picture. Highly recommended.

You can learn more about the book on our latest podcast episode.

[Linda · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Light that Failed: A Reckoning
"What distinguishes national populists is that they never apologize for anything that their nation has done in its entire history. To behave like a villain while presenting oneself as a victim is the nationalistic populist singular conceit."

The Light that Failed examines the post- 1989 failure of liberal democracy in Eastern Europe, Russia, and the emergence of Trump in the United States. Ivan Krastev, a fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, and Stephen Holmes, a professor at NYU School of Law, provide a thoughtful and original analysis of the rise of populism and reactionary nativism based upon the theory of imitation. Their overarching argument is that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the push to imitate the western democracies of Europe and the US caused a considerable backlash.

While I initially intended to elaborate on the authors' ideas in some depth, I was just diagnosed with Covid and lack the energy. So instead, I am posting links to a detailed analysis of their ideas.

I also want to thank GR friend Meike for recommending the book.

https://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ideas/st...

https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/07/0...

[John Hatley · Rating 4 out of 5]

In 1989 the Berlin Wall was breached. In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed. In 2019 the world in general and Europe in particular seems as divided as ever. Why? The Light that Failed is a brilliant book. It’s the only book I’ve discovered to date that presents so many convincing explanations of what has been happening in the world since 1989. It goes beyond just explaining events by providing answers to the questions what went wrong, why did things go wrong and why are things still going wrong.

[Lubinka Dimitrova · Rating 5 out of 5]

An utterly engrossing book that illuminates so many aspects of the post-communism realities we are facing today. Presenting the subsequent drive for democratization and liberalization as processes of imitation, the authors discern three strategies which all explain the path that Russia, the post-Soviet satellites and communist China followed after 1989:

"The difference between post-communist China, post-communist Central Europe and post-communist Russia closely tracks the distinction between three styles or strategies of development: namely, imitating the means (or borrowing), imitating the ends (or converting), and imitating the appearances (or simulating). Central European elites, at first, genuinely embraced imitation of Western values and institutions as the quickest path to political and economic reform. They were aspiring converts, whose identification of normalization with Westernization eventually allowed a reactionary counter-elite to capture the most politically potent symbols of national identity.

In Russia, by contrast, post-Soviet elites merely pretended that they were imitating Western norms as well as Western institutions, when they were only using the façade of democratic elections and voluntary market exchanges based on legally secured private-property rights to preserve their power, pocket the country’s wealth, and block the kinds of democratic reform that would have threatened insider privilege and perhaps led to state collapse and further territorial disintegration. They were strategic impostors.

China, by contrast, was both openly and clandestinely borrowing from the West while insisting that the country’s developmental trajectory retained its ‘Chinese characteristics’. They were ingenious appropriators. Employing joint-venture agreements to force Western firms to transfer innovative technologies to their Chinese partners neither involves democratic hypocrisy not puts national identity at risk. Similarly, while one-third of all foreign students at American universities are from China, they study mostly science and engineering, not liberalism and democracy."

The analysis of Russia's "holding the mirror" to the USA by following the exact same (vile) practices, but justifying them as "We just do here (eg Crimea) what you did there (Serbia and Kosovo)" was truly enlightening in many aspects, both when it comes to Russia's strategy and to USA's worldviews.

Lastly, the authors' analysis of Trump's presence and popularity on the world scene made so much sense. Trump persuaded a lot of Americans that America can be great without being good. That is why the authors consider him a “radically transformative political figure,” not a “brief deviation of a purportedly normal order.” As one of the author says in a recent interview:

"He has done something that’s unheard of. He is the first president in American history who has openly declared that America does not stand for a teachable idea. It shouldn’t be a model for other countries. It has no right to lecture other countries. It’s not exceptional. We certainly shouldn’t have gone into Iraq and Afghanistan to help Iraqis and Afghanis. If we had gone there to take the oil and take the minerals, that would have been fine, in his mind. The only reason ever to use military force is to steal other countries’ wealth. He says this. He says America is not morally superior to any other country. He says it in crowds and people will scream, "USA, USA!" No other president has ever done such a thing."

[Emiliya Bozhilova · Rating 4 out of 5]

Книгата на Кръстев и Холмс се явява естествено допълнение на ”Пътят към несвободата” от Тимъти Снайдър.

Тук географската ос също е права като стрела. Централна и Източна Европа (ЦИЕ) - Русия - САЩ - Китай. Оста на идеите обаче се разклонява в доста по-заплетени вариации след края на Студената война, като е все по-далеч от пророкувания край на историята, когато ще възтържествува една истина и общественото устройство, която я отразява.

Мечтите на ЦИЕ към наваксването към (западно)европейското благополучие (и съответните идеали, които са го способствали) крушират до голяма степен в лошата имитация на просперитет и свободи, осигурена от местните елити. Те са или старите използвачи в ново амплоа, или чисто криминални елементи на лов за риба в мътна вода, или - в много по-малка степен - чистосърдечни ентусиасти без грам практически опит в икономиката, приемащи безкритично всичко с етикета “произведено на Запад”. В резултат - много малко благоденствие, и неголяма свобода. Процесът на търсене на световния заговор, довел до този провал, лашка от националистически бълнувания на несъстояла се история и никога несъществували традиции до откровено криминален цинизъм.

Ако ЦИЕ все пак е ентусиаст за западните идеи и свободи, Русия рони сълзи над погасналия си имперски блясък. След дивото, бандитско разграбване на де що има ресурс, охранените нови “капиталисти” решават, че и им е дошло времето за реванш с гнилия Запад. Измислят си традициите, разписват ги в закони - и който не му харесва, изходът често е летален, но в името на родината. “Духовността” иде да замести всяка друга липса (на пари, възможности, здравеопазване, ред), без да я отстрани. Вълкът - сит, агнето - доволно си бленува в търбуха на звяра. А лъжата на режима няма за цел да заблуждава, а да покаже властта на този режим над реалността, отричайки я като неправилна. Вярващите ще живеят в правилната, официална реалност, където фактите са фикция.

САЩ пък са се уморили да играят ролята на месия. Те всъщност никога не са били, но са си вярвали и от време на време някой им се е връзвал. И идва време за провинциален, расистки, религиозен изолационизъм. И времето на Тръмп. Много съм любопитна какво предстои да се случи на тази голяма географска територия в близко бъдеще. Тук патосът - предполагам на Холмс - ми дойде малко в повече. САЩ като либерален фар - как пък не! И натъртване, че хубавите практики “винаги” са били така. Хайде де, та сегрегацията вилня бясно чак до 1965 г., как винаги? Ами корупцията и военните авантюри - например режимът на Пиночет? Или намесите на ЦРУ в Африка? САЩ никога не са били този фар, който част от техните интелектуалци бленуват. Но пък е интересна среда, много храна за ума (и науката, и бизнеса) идва от тази посока, спор няма. Въпросът е - докога? И доколко?

Накрая - Китай. Ще живеем ли в синоцентеричен свят? Засега май не е още много ясно, поради факта, че цяла цивилизация се прави на държава в здравата хватка на новия си окопал се главен кормчия. Но предупрежденията са налице.
—���

Това, което винаги ме е удивлявало, когато чета американци да коментират родината си, е чистосърдечното религиозно прехласване (или респективно - също толкова люто осъждане). Винаги е толкова едностранчиво. В много случаи опитът да се тушира този комплекс е похвален - и предвид колко е трудно да се пребори, се радвам да видя резултатите от тази борба. Тук частта за САЩ е доста неравномерна и слаба, но си има интересните страни.
——

Значението на безпристрастната информация, на безстрастните факти (доколкото е възможно) като стожер не само на ценности, но и на икономически прогрес и на социална солидарност, срещу пропагандните твърдения в стил “така е, защото НИЕ така казваме, и ако ТИ си лоялен, ще вярваш, ще кимаш и ще умираш за каузата - беден, но праведен” е най-силното послание. Критичен разум срещу пожелателно мислене. Формално от Просвещението насам (иначе - от памти-века) на разума хич не му е лесно…

3,5⭐️

[Gavin Armour · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mittlerweile ist es unwidersprochen, daß der liberale, pluralistische und vor allem kapitalistische Westen – auch wenn das ein weit umgreifender Begriff ist – in den Jahren 1989/90 siegesbesoffen dem Glauben verfiel, daß der Untergang des Kommunismus ein weltgeschichtlich folgerichtiges Ereignis gewesen sei und die liberale Demokratie sozusagen das natürliche Staatsmodell der Zukunft sei – und zwar global gesehen. Paradigmatisch war es Francis Fukuyama, der mit seinen Thesen vom „Ende der Geschichte“ diese Haltung vertrat. Wer Augen hatte, zu sehen, und Ohren, um zu hören, der ahnte früh, daß dies ein etwas naiver Ansatzpunkt war. Nun, ca. 30 Jahre später, stellen teils die gleichen Leute, die damals der Meinung waren, einen welthistorischen „Sieg“ errungen zu haben, verwundert fest, daß sich in weiten Teilen der Welt – ob im Osten Europas, ob in Russland oder in China – keinesfalls demokratische Modelle westlicher Prägung durchgesetzt haben. Vielmehr sind es ganz unterschiedliche, meist un-ideologische Modelle mal mehr, mal weniger demokratischen Anstrichs, die zunehmend gewählt werden. „Gewählt“ im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes: Ob Viktor Orbán in Ungarn, Jarosław Kaczyński in Polen oder – wenn auch in einem strukturell anderen System und Verfahren – Wladimir Putin in Russland, wurden Vertreter einer „illiberalen Demokratie“ mit überzeugenden Mehrheiten gewählt, also vom Volk in Machtpositionen gehoben und darin bestätigt. China stellt einen Sonderfall dar, da das Land bei steter wirtschaftlicher Öffnung seit den 1980er Jahren politisch-ideologisch einfach seinen kommunistischen Werten treu geblieben ist und zumindest formal weiter ein Ein-Parteien-System herrscht, das sich de facto längst ent-ideologisiert hat.

Warum dies geschah, weshalb sich gerade die osteuropäischen Länder – und Regionen, nimmt man die sogenannten „neuen“ Bundesländer des wiedervereinigten Deutschlands hinzu – von den Verheißungen der sozialen Marktwirtschaft und jenen des Kapitalismus und damit auch denen der liberalen Demokratie abgewandt haben, versuchen seit geraumer Zeit viele kluge Wissenschaftler und Theoretiker zu hinterfragen und zu analysieren. Philip Ther untersuchte bspw. DAS ANDERE ENDE DER GESCHICHTE und legte eine essayistische Studie der Entwicklungen seit 1989 vor. Ivan Krastev und Stephen Holmes legen mit DAS LICHT, DAS ERLOSCH (THE LIGHT THAT FAILED; Original erschienen 2019) eine allerdings tiefgreifendere Analyse vor, die nicht nur einen – wenn auch gesondert aus einem ganzen Komplex an Erklärungen herausgegriffenen – Grund für das Versagen der liberalen Demokratie in den Ländern des ehemaligen Ostblocks benennt, sondern hoch interessante und auch verstörende Einblicke in die Entwicklung vor allem des nach-sowjetischen Russland bietet.

Der Kernbegriff, um den die Autoren kreisen, ist der der „Nachahmung“. Sie konstatieren, daß die Länder Osteuropas nach 1989/90 damit begannen, die liberalen Demokratien des Westens teils zu imitieren, teils in leicht abgeänderter Form zu adaptieren. Zunächst war dies Ausdruck des Glaubens und der Hoffnung, auf recht schnellem Wege den Wohlstand zu erreichen, den man im Westen vermutete. Allerdings – das machen Krastev und Holmes sehr deutlich – ahmte man ein Modell nach, wie man es sich vorstellte, kein real existierendes, sondern eine idealisierte Form des Westens, die man teils vom Hörensagen, teils aus den Medien, teils aber wirklich nur aus der Werbung kannte. Die Enttäuschung, die solcher Nachahmung folgen musste, war diesen idealisierten Vorstellungen inhärent.

Schnell jedoch kommen die Autoren zu Differenzen und deutlichen Unterschieden der Ausprägungen dieser Nachahmungen. Was im Ideal wie eine wunderbare Vorstellung einer hehren Zukunft wirkte, entpuppte sich im Laufe der Zeit als ein Frankenstein-Geschöpf, bei dem die einzelnen Teile, aus denen es zusammengesetzt wurde, kaum zueinander passen und dessen Selbstwahrnehmung zu Selbsthass, Verachtung des „Schöpfers“ und Ablehnung dessen, was einst verheißen wurde, geführt hat. Doch während Länder wie Polen und Ungarn, die teils von Leuten geführt werden, die einmal in klarer Opposition zu den in ihren Ländern herrschenden Systemen standen, in Viktor Orbáns Fall sogar wirkliche Dissidenten waren, sich daran machten, den westlichen Liberalismus wirklich zu simulieren, in der Hoffnung, aufzuholen und ähnlichen Wohlstand zu generieren, liegen die Dinge bspw. in Russland ganz anders.

Nach einer Dekade des brutalsten Raubtierkapitalismus´, während dessen übelsten Jahren Mitte der 90er Jahre der Staat nur durch eine reine Demokratie-Simulation zusammengehalten werden konnte, änderte sich die Politik Russlands unter Wladimir Putin fundamental. Nachdem Putin feststellen musste, daß er sich auf westliche Versprechen – keine Ausweitung der NATO bspw. – nicht verlassen konnte, imitierte er die westliche Demokratie immer stärker ex negativo. Er mühte sich nicht, die wirklichen Errungenschaften zu installieren – Menschenrechte, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, sozialer Ausgleich – sondern jene Verirrungen, die er als bigott empfand und mit deren Imitation er meinte, dem Westen die Maske herunterreißen zu können und seine wirkliche, hässliche Fratze zu entblößen. Übergriffigkeit auf andere Länder, verlogenen Kriege, die angeblich für die Menschlichkeit, allzu oft aber erkennbar nur für Rohstoffe geführt wurden, innere Widersprüche – Putin wollte diese Seiten des Westens und seiner Versprechungen offenlegen. Krastev und Holmes konstatieren hier eine extrem kurzsichtige Politik, deren Movens durchaus auch Rache ist. Zugleich verfolgt Putin das Ziel, Russland, dessen Trauma des Verlusts nach 1990/91 im Westen nie wirklich wahrgenommen wurde, wieder als Großmacht auf die politische Weltbühne zu hieven. Dabei bieten die Autoren erstaunliche Einblicke in die Simulation einer Demokratie. So beschreiben sie bspw. die ofenkundig manipulierten Wahlen in Russland als genau so gewollt. Gerade die Manipulation, von der jeder weiß, stellt den starken Staat aus. Sie beschreiben dies als eine Art unausgesprochenen Akt zwischen der Bevölkerung und dem Staat, bzw. seinen herrschenden Repräsentanten: Das Volk wird „beschützt“, verzichtet dabei bereitwillig auf gewisse rechtsstaatliche Freiheiten, der autoritäre Staat beweist dem Volk (und sich selbst) seine Macht gerade eben dadurch, daß er Wahlen manipuliert. Dies zu können, ist die eigentliche Aussage des gesamten Vorgangs.

Krastev und Holmes bieten in dem Russland-Kapitel genau solch atemberaubende Einblicke, die in westlichen Analysen selten bis gar nicht erwähnt werden, die aber ihrer eigenen Logik nach zwingend sind. Auch mit gewissen westlichen Vorurteilen räumen die beiden auf. Während in Deutschland mit dem Aufkommen einer Partei wie der AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) offener Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit scheinbar gesellschaftsfähig wurden, permanent eine Angst vor Überfremdung geschürt wurde, wo man als realistisch denkender Mensch weder eine „Umvolkung“, noch einen „Untergang des Abendlandes“ erkennen kann, beruhten die osteuropäischen Ängste auf geradezu gegenteiligen Analysen: Länder wie Ungarn, aber auch Rumänien und Bulgarien, erlebten in den 30 Jahren seit der europäischen Wende einen enormen Abfluß an Bildung und Fachkraft. Die gebildeteren Bürger dieser Länder suchten ihr Heil in (West)Europa, suchten Arbeit in den westlichen Ländern, studierten (wie übrigens auch Orbán) an westlichen Eliteuniversitäten und blieben oftmals dort. Zwar machen die demographischen Ängste, die sich hinter diesen Abgängen oftmals eines Viertels der Bevölkerung verstecken, fremdenfeindliche und demagogische Ausfälle nicht besser oder entschuldigen sie gar, dennoch lernt man die Differenzen zwischen westlichen Ängsten, die gelegentlich wie Kollektiv-Paranoia wirken, und durchaus berechtigten Ängsten in den betreffenden Ländern zu verstehen. Das daraus illiberales staatliches Verhalten resultiert, ist allerdings besorgniserregend und keineswegs zwangsläufig oder folgerichtig. Daran lassen auch die Autoren keine Zweifel aufkommen.

Der Titel des Buches spielt auf eine Geschichte von Rudyard Kipling an, die er einst mit zwei Enden ausstattete: Einem pessimistischen und einem optimistischen. Genauso sehen Krastev und Holmes den Ausgang der aktuellen politischen Situation, global gesehen. Allerdings postulieren sie in ihren Schlußkapiteln eine Entwicklung, die zunächst auf wenig Gutes hoffen lässt. Im Fall der USA unter Donald Trump thematisieren sie die Ängste des Nachgeahmten. Trump behauptet offen die Nachteile der Nachahmung für den Nachgeahmten, der dadurch nur Nachteile habe, da er gebe, aber wenig dafür bekomme. Deshalb wolle er ein America First das weniger bedeute, Amerika zuerst, sondern Amerika als Gleicher unter Gleichen, ein Wettbewerb, in dem es sich dann immer durchsetzen könne, da es schlicht stärker, innovativer und wirtschaftsmächtiger sei. Das Trump´sche Amerika will nicht mehr nachgeahmt werden, es will einfach sein Ding durchziehen, was im Falle dieses spezifischen Präsidenten eben auch bedeutet, daß der Gewinner all der abgeschlossenen Deals alles bekommt – the winner takes it all. Eine brutale Vorstellung internationalen Handels und Handelns.

China wiederum sehen die Autoren als die eigentliche Herausforderung der Zukunft. Denn hier hört die Nachahmung auf. China will nicht nachahmen, China transformiert. Es will die Errungenschaften westlicher Industrie und Wirtschaft, doch zu seinen eigenen, nicht-demokratischen Bedingungen. Wenn, wie das Buch es behauptet, die 30 Jahre nach dem Mauerfall und dem Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus in seiner real existierenden Variante, eine Übergangsphase gewesen sind, stellt sich die Frage: Was nun? China gibt darauf eine zumindest aktuell scheinbar wirkmächtige Antwort. Es beweist, daß die Idee, daß mit der Marktwirtschaft Liberalismus und schließlich die Demokratie, wir der Westen sie kennt, auf gleichsam natürlichem Wege folgten, eine Fehleinschätzung war und ist. Vielmehr zeigt China dem Westen, daß man auch in einem autoritären Ein-Parteien-System durchaus erfolgreich wirtschaften kann, dabei aber die Demokratie komplett außen vorlässt. Ein Modell, das vor allem für westliche Politiker vom Schlage eines Donald Trump oder Boris Johnson durchaus attraktiv wirken könnte.

So bleibt die Zukunft – wie meist – offen und die Geschichte schreitet voran, auch wenn westliche Konservative dies lange nicht wahrhaben wollten. Um auf den aktuellen Stand des Diskurses zu gelangen, sollte man DAS LICHT, DAS ERLOSCH unbedingt lesen. Es hilft, einzuschätzen, zu verstehen, aber auch, den Alarmismus aus der Debatte zu nehmen. Trotz seines etwas hart klingenden Untertitels – EINE ABRECHNUNG – ist dies ein im besten Sinne des Wortes aufklärerisches Werk.

[Margarita Garova · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Не е тайна, че смяната на страната е по-лесна от промяната на страната.”

В следването на добрите примери принципно няма нищо лошо. Под това твърдение с готовност биха се подписали бившите съветски сателити след падането на Берлинската стена, когато нетърпението им да заменят една натрапена отвън политическа и икономическа система с тази на западната пазарна икономика и либерална демокрация, беше в основата на онази неповторима енергия от началото на 90-те. Към днешна дата, уви, от този първоначален ентусиазъм не е останало много. Отвореността към света отстъпи на провинциалното капсулиране, проевропейските настроения – на антиевропейската реторика, а либералният космополитизъм беше възприет като заплаха за националната идентичност. Доброволната и желана имитация на демократични институции постави тези държави в сложни психологически отношения с държавите-примери, с придружаващите имитацията чувства на малоценност и възхищение.

Неслучайно Иван Кръстев и Стивън Холмс търсят именно психологическите основания на популизма в държавите от Централна и Източна Европа, заедно със съответните му национални модификации в Русия и САЩ от ерата “Тръмп”. Въпреки че финансовата криза от 2008 г. беше първото по-сериозно разклащане на либералната идея, причините за възхода на популистите не са толкова финансови (двете крепости на популизма – Полша и Унгария се справят икономически относително прилично), колкото социални и демогр��фски – обезлюдяването на тези държави след отварянето на границите засилва усещането им за загуба на собствена физиономия на фона на все по-национално размитите западни общества. Оттам и вкопчването в националистически митове за “автентично полското”, “истинския унгарец” и “традиционното християнско семейство”, за кръвната връзка с дедите – опасни алюзии, от които обичаше да се възползва един друг режим.

Също така самата идея, че след рухването на единия полюс в Студената война, либерализмът няма алтернатива като идеология е още един коз за отправяне на предизвикателства от кандидат-авторитаристите.

При Русия трансформацията преминава от повърхностна симулация на капитализъм до откровено пародиране на западния модел с обратен знак, за да се стигне до ролята на “търпелив рушител” на западния ред. Как и с какви средства – вече знаем.

Няма да се спирам на американския случай, защото Тръмп е минало (макар че според някои, тръмпизмът не е), а и защото ми се струва, че тази част от книгата е относително слаба на фона на другите две – с по-изразен публицистичен характер, за сметка на дълбочината на анализа.

Авторите не оплакват края на либералния ред, такъв какъвто го познавахме доскоро, като дори си позволяват известен оптимизъм по отношение на това, което наричат “политически алтернативи”. Времето ще покаже дали имат право.

“Корените на авторитарния шовинизъм и ксенофобия в Централна и Източна Европа се крият в политическата психология, а не в политическата теория. Където популизмът е на власт, той не се уповава на интелекта.”

[Andrew Norton · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Light that Failed’s first sentence says ‘the future was better yesterday’. And so it was. Thirty years ago there were high hopes for the future of liberal democracy, especially in Central Europe, which had just peacefully ended communist rule. But that is yesterday’s future, replaced now with central European governments dismantling liberal democracy, authoritarian regimes in Russia and China causing trouble around the world, and many established liberal democracies suffering from serious political dysfunction.

In trying to explain what is going on, The Light that Failed: A Reckoning, reads to me more like a pre-20th century political classic than contemporary political analysis (one of its authors, Stephen Holmes, has previously written excellent books on the history of liberalism and its critics; I have ordered the English-language books of his Bulgarian co-author Ivan Krastev). The Light that Failed has evidence and examples, but not the relentless facts and data of recent journalistic or academic accounts. Instead, its contribution is the categories it uses to understand events and its psychological insight.

The book’s central concept is imitation. Individuals and societies are always copying each other, but this process can be experienced in very different ways. In Central Europe, the first post-communist political leaders and many of their people wanted to imitate the West: democracy, individual freedom, a market economy. And a triumphalist West wanted its model to be imitated; including in countries where the political elites and many of their people were not asking for advice.

In the early post-communist era, the Central European and Russian experiences had major points of difference. For the Central Europeans the end of communism meant liberation and hope. For the Russians it was humiliation: defeat in the Cold War, disintegration of the Soviet Union, and falling living standards. They did not want to imitate the West; that they felt pressure to do so was another sign of their weakness.

When Russia borrowed Western ideas it usually did so cynically. As Krastev and Holmes say, simulating democracy was politically useful for the Russians in the 1990s. Russia’s political elite found faking democracy easy because they had been faking communism for decades. In Russia and other ex-communist countries, the shift to private property was abused by the former communist elites for self-enrichment.

Russia still has elections, but this is imitation in form rather than substance, about the governing elites maintaining their control rather than risking being replaced. Rigged elections do not give voters a genuine choice, but instead inform the regime about the loyalties and competence of lower-level officials. The political struggle in Russia is not between rival forces seeking democratic mandates, but between these lower-level officials vying for approval from the powerful. By introducing new candidates and policies at elections, the governing elites gain an opportunity to renew and rebrand themselves.

Alongside this cynicism there was, as The Light that Failed argues, a genuine problem in transplanting ideas and institutions. The social and cultural conditions for democracy in Russia were missing. The communists had destroyed civil society and the social groups that might have otherwise formed the basis for political parties. People in Russia don’t think of politics as a way of improving their lives – it generally hasn’t in the past. It seems that the Soviet-era idea of voting only for the people in power still has some sway, ‘”popularity” in Russia is consequence not a cause of the power one yields’.

Subversive imitation of the West also influences Russia’s foreign policy, with revenge for Russia’s humiliations a major motive. Russian interference in US politics is a mocking copy of US intervention in the politics of other countries. When Russia invaded Crimea, Putin’s justification lifted passages of text directly from Western leaders supporting their intervention in Kosovo. He aims to highlight hypocrisy and to show that Western principles hide Western self-interest.

In Central Europe, as noted, the post-communist era started out much more positively than in Russia. But since then things have deteriorated badly with ‘illiberal democrats’ coming to power in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Thirty years on from the fall of communism, these countries again have much in common with Russia.

The former communist European countries share with Russia serious population and demographic issues (Krastev and Holmes describe Russia as combining European birth rates with African mortality rates). Large numbers of young people have left for the Western countries that never experienced communism, depriving their home countries of the people most likely to support liberal democracy, rupturing relations between the generations, and exacerbating concern among those who remain about their country’s future.

As Krastev and Holmes note, this is an unusual post-revolutionary pattern – normally people on the losing rather than winning side of a revolution go into exile. But because the communists had imprisoned their own people the right to travel was one of the most important freedoms of the post-communist era (and one that still exists, despite other political reversals).

The demographic vulnerability of Central European countries partly explains the anti-immigration politics of its populist leaders. Although their foreign-born residents are currently a low proportion of their total population, leaders of Central European countries believe that the free movement of people could change the nature of their small and ageing societies, particularly if the migrants are from culturally very different countries in Africa and the Middle East. Highlighting the migrant crisis in Western Europe also serves to make it a less attractive place for young Central Europeans.

Migration and the global financial crisis are among the reasons why, for many of those remaining in Central Europe, the countries of Western Europe are no longer models they want to imitate. But even without these issues the process of Westernisation and EU membership had became an affront to national dignity. The soft colonisation of Brussels was much more benign than the hard colonisation of Moscow; every new EU country freely applied to join. But once in EU membership could still feel like control from the outside (and hence Brexit, outside the scope of this book).

Although principally about Europe, The Light that Failed also discusses Trump, given the obvious parallels between him, Putin and Central European leaders. The US, with its strong civil society and liberal democratic political culture, has much better prospects of self-correction than does Central Europe (Russia is I think doomed to despotism). But Trump highlights how even countries with long democratic histories are vulnerable to political disturbance.

The specific aspect of the Trump analysis I will mention, because of its parallels to the communist era, is his attitude to truth. Krastev and Holmes cite George Kennan’s Cold War analysis of Russian disbelief in truth. Rather than statements being judged genuinely true or false, with true statements valuable and false statements not, the Russians looked for a statement's purpose or effect. Something was true not because it was based on an independently verifiable reality, but because it served the Party’s interests. Something was false not because it was incorrect, but because it served a purpose contrary to the Party’s interests.

Similarly Trump seems not to care whether what he says is true or false, being only concerned whether his statements will help him ‘win’. The willingness of Trump’s supporters to accept and repeat his untruths is, for him, a useful test of their loyalty (like participation in sham Russian elections is a test of loyalty to Putin). And ‘paying no price for telling easily exposable untruths is an effective way to display one’s power and impunity’.

There will always be liars, and it is a cliché of democratic politics that politicians don’t always tell the truth. But usually straight-out lies, statements that are known to be untrue in the moment they are said, are rare in democratic politics, because politicians lose respect even among their supporters when caught out. The Trump phenomena is striking not just because of his indifference to the truth but because so many Americans don’t care enough to drop their support.

The Light that Failed is not intended to be the last word on any of its subjects. I’ll look out for reviews from people who know much more about Russia and Central Europe than I do. But I found it a fresh and stimulating take on why the future looked better yesterday than it does today.

[Dorin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Krastev and Holmes look at how political regimes or, better yet, political leaders imitate each other. What caught my interest was their view on the political transition in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. They look at Poland and Hungary, because they make the clearest dissenting note with the rest of Europe. I was particularly interested in this. I see the domino effect of illiberalism and of the far-right extremism. I already resigned myself to it. But I still try to understand it. I know that all the populism and demagogy, all the pompous speeches, the persecution complex are just a cover for the corruption and the need for more and more power. I was hoping there are more subtle explanations.

About Hungary and Poland:
In the cases of Orban and Kaczynski, the authors argue that underneath the surface, there are deep insecurities. Eastern European countries were very hopeful after the fall of communism. They thought that the switch to democracy, to liberalism, to market economy and the rule of law will be immediate, not a long process. They were seeing themselves as part of the West. But the transition proved to be a road too long. They became frustrated. The West did not understand the East. They did not understand that corruption, for example, was part of eastern societies simply because they did not know anything else.

The never-ending transition made the East go into imitation. They started emulating and imitating what was easy. They adopted the institutions, not their spirit, the laws, but not the principles. It all became form without substance. With time, leaders grew tired of being told what to do to become western. They were seeing the western leaders, bureaucrats and consultants as being smug and arrogant. These eastern political leaders started to look for their independence. With different crises coming to Europe, they were looking for their own solutions, because from their point of view the West was failing. It did not have what it takes to do what needs to be done.

Let’s take the immigration crisis, for example. Orban looked at it as an opportunity to save the Hungarian society. With falling birth-rates, Hungary, a small nation, risks to disappear. He started channelling the frustration with the West to erect himself as a saviour, not only of Hungary, but of Europe itself. He will do, he thinks, what the West is afraid to do.

“When Orban and Kaczynski attacked Western liberalism, they did so while claiming the mantle of Europeanness for themselves, describing Central Europe not only as the true Europe but as Europe’s last line of defence. Fanon would have never said anything of the kind about Frances former colonies in Africa. the PiS government frequently cites the heroic role of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under Jan III Sobieski in lifting the Muslim invasion of Europe. Both Orban and Kaczynski, in fact, present themselves to their publics as what Carl Schmitt called `forestallers`: heroic resisters against a looming Islamic takeover of Europe. The illiberal democrats of Central and Eastern Europe are now prepared, they say, to take up the historic anti-Muslim mission so recklessly abandoned by Western Europeans. […] This is why Central and East Europeans, to the perplexity of some, declare themselves adamantly pro-European even as they also claim to be violently anti-EU.”

The authors also explain the conflict along generational lines. Parents, who lived in communism, don’t understand their children. Because the children adopted without any consideration the Western way of life and thinking. The parents, seeing that they cannot program their children with their own values, they began demanding from the state to do it for them. Sounds a little weird, but this does explain why these leaders, the likes of Orban and Kaczynski, the far-right in other countries, have so much traction among the older population.

About the USA:
Orban and other illiberals think they are winning. When they look at Trump (the book was written during his presidency), they see how he is imitating them. This is the supreme blow they can give to the West. Now, not Eastern Europe is looking to the West, but the West is seeing the East as a model. (This is true about Western European countries as well, where right-wing populist parties are winning).

Trump and his electorate have similar fears as Orban or Polish PiS. They are afraid that the whites will no longer be the majority. The latino population is growing. There is a lot of positive discrimination towards the minorities and the blacks. The whites are tired of being always at fault for everything. They hate political correctness. They feel they are left behind. The liberals/democrats look at them as second-hand citizens. They are poorly educated, without college degrees, workers and farmers, whilst the democrats promote nice-looking college degree-holders. So, naturally, they like that someone is paying attention to them. They feel seen, after a very long time.

Trump is using this anger and frustration. Yes, he does not have a clear overview of what he is trying to accomplish, but he has intuition. By making America great again Trump wants the USA to look inwards, not outwards. He is tired of constant American attempts to export their way of life. He thinks this weakens his country. Other powers prosper because they do not care about ideology, but about making money and growing their economy. He wants to get rid of all the rules that are constraining American power in the world.

Yes, he lies, but he does so to show that he does not care, that rules do not apply to the powerful. He wants the same for the USA.

About Russia:
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian politicians did not want to become like the West. They only pretended to do so. Up until around 2010 Putin was still keeping the appearances. But he grew tired of it. He saw no more point in it. He wants to show now that he can get away with anything.

Elections in Russia are not a pretence, an appearance at emulating democracy. Nobody believes they can bring out change. They do have different goals. Elections are a way of bringing together all the people of Russia, a very vast country, deeply divided along different lines. Elections mean unity. They are also a way of testing leaders from the regions, their loyalty and their power. If they don’t cope, they are replaced. During elections Putin identifies his possible adversaries so he can get rid of them.

“Unlike the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation cannot hope to defeat the West. What it does hope to do is to bring the West to the point of breaking into pieces, just as happened to the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union itself in 1989-91. That the result will be a stable world in which Russia’s interests will be protected is impossible to imagine.”

About China:
China simply does not care about ideology, about regimes, democracy, communism or anything else. Chinese leaders only want to do business. Your country can be liberal, illiberal, far-right, far-left, it makes no difference, as long as you are friendly to China and its interests. China does not imitate and it doesn’t want anyone to imitate it. It only cares about money flowing.

All in all, instructive reading, although a bit difficult/challenging at times.

[Ilze Paegle-Mkrtčjana · Rating 5 out of 5]

Grāmata, kas būtu pelnījusi visas desmit zvaigznes, bijusi vien Goodreads šāda opcija - reti gadās lasīt tekstu, kur katrā lappusē burtiski dzirksteļo oriģinālas idejas. Protams, ne jau viss ir ideāls, par diezgan daudzām interpretācijām, idejām un secinājumiem noteikti var strīdēties, taču svarīgākais šajā gadījumā ir un paliek intelektuālais stimuls, autoru prasme ievadīt diskusiju par lietām, kuras jau sen būtu vajadzējis vērtēt un pārvērtēt

[Ietrio · Rating 1 out of 5]

An average blend of "my tribe is the best tribe there is" and "I want the good old times back".

[Carla · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ivan Krastev wrote a great opinion piece in the New York Times about how Boris Johnson was going to solidify his recent electoral win among the former labor voters: continue hammering on the themes of Brexit - Britain first, anti-immigrant - and beef up social welfare programs that the British working class depends on. Johnson is a Tory.

I had stumbled across this opinion piece; needless to say, I wanted to read more by Krastev.

Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, Victor Orban. Krastev and Stephen Holmes take the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall as their jumping off point to ask why the apparent triumph of liberal democracy has sputtered, doused by the rise of a politics that channels the grievances of those - mainly white, middle and working class people - who were left behind by the neoliberal heyday of the last three decades. I have not read a more compelling explanation of Donald Trump's popularity.

One major problem with the book is the clumsy theoretical framing around the concept of imitation. Although I am persuaded by their arguments the triumph of strongman politics, I think their book suffers from trying to fit them all under a unifying theoretical framework such as the 'Age of Imitation.' The argument about 'imitation', the argument about political psychology vs political theory, these arguments require a much longer, more pointed work.

The 'Light that Failed' is a great exploration of recent history; it is messy political psychology or theory or whatever else it is trying to be.

[Мария · Rating 5 out of 5]

Пока это лучшая (в моем списке) книга о том, что происходит. Мы до сих пор переживаем последствия 1989 года, исчезновения СССР, и всё влияет на всё. Трамп еще в 80-е интуитивно понял, что идея американской исключительности, которая окрепла после окончания Холодной войны, разрушительна для самой Америки. Понадобились интервенции начала XXI века, чтобы американцы прониклись этой мыслью и выбрали Трампа. Важнейшая концепция книги — имитация. Имитация пост-советскими странами западных образцов, ее нюансы и последствия (имитация выборов в России имитирует не демократию, а авторитаризм, типа, у нас все под контролем). В итоге книга вселяет скорее оптимизм: это неизбежная фаза, и она пройдет (непонятно, правда, что придет ей на смену).

[Maureen · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a book that is not always easy to read and certainly not easy to review, I am still thinking about it despite finishing it weeks ago.
The question it asks is why did the West 'win' the Cold War but lose its influence subsequently.
Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes argue that the supposed end of Communism turned out to be only the beginning of the age of the autocrat. Looking at the history of the last thirty years, they believe that the rise of autocratic rule stems from resentment at the post-1989 imperative to become 'Westernised'. The resentment felt particularly by European nations, feeling pressure to conform to Western ideals and the perceived bureaucracy of the EU, is they believe at the heart of the pushback we are currently witnessing.
From Reagan's 'tear down this wall' we move to the nations of Europe, and even America itself, actually building walls. The current Russia/US relationship is dealt with and they suggest that Russian interference in the US election was a sign that Russia acknowledges, and is now imitating, US electoral interference around the world. A fascinating read and a keeper as I'm sure rereading it will be worthwhile in future.

[Arcturus · Rating 5 out of 5]

"A múltban jobb volt a jövő."

Mi okozza, hogy ma a világban egyre szaporodnak a szélsőségek, és miért kerül a liberális demokrácia egyre több helyen válságba? Ennek a folyamatnak egy kevéssé tárgyalt szegmensét és okát elemzi a könyvében Ivan Krasztev bolgár politológus, aki személyesen is megtapasztalta és megtapasztalja Kelet-Európa és a posztszovjet tömb hozzáállását "a Nyugathoz", és Stephen Holmes amerikai jogász és politológus, akinek szakterülete az európai liberalizmus és antiliberalizmus története.

Krasztev és Holmes - bár egyikük sem állítja, hogy csak ebből a szegmensből állna a probléma lényege - arra az egy, kevéssé tárgyalt, és általában annak kisebb jelentőséget tulajdonított dolognak tudják be, hogy sikeresen terjed az antidemokratikus illiberalizmus: hogy a nyugat a második világháború után létrehozta és megerősítette a liberális demokratikus szerveződéseket, melyből a kelet - a szovjet uralom miatt is, de véleményem szerint nem csak azért - kimaradt. Majd a 80-as években (és persze a megelőző évtizedekben is), amikor már tudható és látható volt, hogy a Szovjetunió napjai meg vannak számlálva, a liberális és demokratikus nyugat vált a kelet szemében az áhított nagysággá, minden jó forrásává. Ezért 1989-91 után a lemaradt keleti országok megpróbálták behozni a lemaradást, és utánozni a nyugatot annak rendszereiben, felépítésében, hirtelen szabad piac lett, szabad választások.

Most, 30 év múltán ez az utánzási kényszer visszaütött, és sorra kerülnek hatalomra vagy hatalom közelébe az illiberális és antidemokratikus erők. Egyrészt dacból, másrészt elkeseredettségből. Dacból, mert a nyugati rendszer utánzása azt jelenti, hogy a keleti emberek nem elég jók, hogy létrehozzák a maguk rendszerét - ezt a nyugat el sem fogadja, hiszen az Európai Unióba való belépéshez komoly gazdasági és demokratikus feltételeknek kell megfelelni. Amire nem volt felkészülve az EU, hogy mi történik akkor, ha egy már tagország radikalizálódik és válik gyakorlatilag Európa-ellenessé, földbe tiporva annak törvényeit, saját szája íze szerint kiforgatva (és hivatkozva) azokat, miközben módszeresen építik le a demokráciát, a szabad sajtót, az oktatást - teszik mindezt Európa pénzéből, hangoztatva, hogy ők aztán az igazi európaiak. És elkeseredettségből, hiszen mégsem lett tejjel-mézzel folyó kánaán, pedig megpróbálták.

A populista politika azonban mindig a múltból építkezik, két okból: egyrészt maga választhat ki egy neki tetszetős múltat, amit isteníthet és visszasírhat (a legjobb, ha ténylegesen és tényszerűen nagyon keveset tudunk erről a múltról, mert így aztán bármi belefér - nálunk erre az Árpád-kor környékét jelölték meg), másrészt pedig erősen hat a nosztalgia az emberekre. Persze nem emlékezhetünk arra, mi történt 11 évszázaddal ezelőtt, de abból kiindulva, hogy régenmindenjobbvolt, hiszen 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 évtizede (ki-ki a korából fakadóan) még mindenki olyan nagyon boldog volt!, akkor még régebben csak még jobb lehetett minden. Ezzel a retorikával és arra való erősítéssel pedig arra irányítják a figyelmet, a félelmet és a gyűlöletet, ami nekik éppen megfelel, egy szürreális, alternatív történelmi hurkot létrehozva.

A keleti populisták pedig egyre hangsúlyosabbá válnak mindenhol, egyre több nyugat-európai is radikalizálódik, hiszen a populisták egyszerű rigmusaikkal egyszerű megoldásokat kínálnak a valóban fennálló globális problémákra. Valójában persze nem megoldás az, amit kínálnak, de a megoldás látszata. Ez pedig vonzza az embereket - így lesznek az egykori sértett utánzókból bosszúálló úttörők, akik lassan, de egyre biztosabban kivezetik Európát a liberális demokráciából. Holmes és Krasztev szerint ez az utánzási politika sokkal fontosabb és sokkal nagyobb tényező, mint amennyire eddig számítottak. Bár persze nem állítják, hogy csak ebből és az ebből fakadó dacból szökkent szárba az erősödő illiberalizmus és antidemokratizmus, mégis most csak erről az oldalról vizsgálták a kérdést.

Véleményem szerint van egy másik, nagyon fontos oldala is (a sok gazdasági, politikai és egyéb vonatkozás mellett), mégpedig az emberi oldal. Mi itt Kelet-Európában (amit földrajzilag lehet mondani középnek is, de más szempontból nem) mindig is csodáltuk a nyugatot, és át akartuk venni az intézményeit. Meg is tettük - de tettük mindezt jellegzetes posztszovjet módon, egy kicsit privatizálva itt, egy kicsit lopva a közösből ott. A szovjet rendszer néplelkét nem alakítottuk át, mert nem tudtuk, hogyan tegyük, így az átvett nyugati rendszerek sem működtek jól, hiszen nem maguktól fejlődtek ki, általunk, a mi társadalmi és tudatos változásaink által, hanem erőszakkal és utánzásból, és ezt az erőszakot saját magunkot követtük el. Nem voltunk szabadok, nem éltünk demokratikus országban gyakorlatilag soha, honnan kéne tudnunk, hogy milyen intézmények és hogyan tartják meg a demokráciát? Mert a hatalmi ágak szétválasztása (ami már nálunk nincs meg!), a négyévente tartott választások csupán az hegy csúcsa. Mi úgy értük el ezt a csúcsot, hogy nem tettük meg felfelé az utat, hanem helikopterrel vittek fel. Nem volt időnk akklimatizálódni, nem szoktunk hozzá a más világhoz, nem jártuk végig az utat, és persze, hogy zuhanásba kezdünk. Egyszerűen fogalmunk sincs, hogyan kéne életben maradni a magasban, és fogalmunk sincs, hogy kéne lemászni onnan, alapvető tudásunk és eszközeink hiányoznak ehhez. Nem annyira a politikusoknak, leginkább az emberek többségének, akik még mindig a szocialista rendszert és Kádárt sírják vissza. Megkapták, kicsit máshogy, de nagyon hasonlóan.

A könyv az utánzási kényszer szülte politikából kinövő antidemokratizmust vizsgálja, amely Lengyelországban és Magyarországon sikeresen hatalomra került, de egyre nagyobb méreteket ölt Európa-szerte. Oroszország helyzete más, különleges, hiszen a szovjet hatalmat anno ők "szállították", és sosem kerültek ilyen utánzási spirálba - leginkább csak tettették, hogy ők is demokratikus és liberális ország, egészen 1999-2000 környékéig, amikor is Putyin már egyre inkább kimutatta, milyen vezető is valójában. Azóta az eszköztára csak bővült, és sikeresen változtatták szitokszóvá a liberalizmust, hirdetve a demokráciát, ami nincs. Sosem jött el a megjósolt ut��pia, és ez épp annyira a nyugat, mint a kelet hibája is. A fenálló globális problémákra pedig továbbra sem tudunk megoldást találni, inkább sárdobálunk ide-oda, meg lopunk innen-onnan, nem törődve sem tömegekkel, sem a jövővel. Persze a liberális demokrácia csupán egyetlen út a sok közül, sok hibával, de az egyik legjobb, amit sok-sok évszázad alatt az emberi társadalom ki tudott termelni magából. Mi nem ezt választottuk, sértettségből, dacból, kilátástalanságból és tudatlanságból.

Érdekes szempontokat is figyelembe vesz azonban a Krasztev és Holmes, mégpedig azt a pszichológiai nyomást, amit az utánzók éreznek, hogy sosem érhetik el a nagy előd szintjét, és ez egyre inkább frusztráltságot, majd dacot és sértettséget szül. Kevés politikai kérdésekkel foglalkozó kötet veszi górcső alá a történések pszichológiai oldalát, de a szerzőpáros ezt nem felejtette el. Azt viszont igen, hogy a Kelet-Európai gazdasági csoda leginkább csak egy üres lufi, és bár sok posztszovjet ország vagyonokat költött külsőségekre, a lakosság nagyobb része továbbra is anyagi problémákkal küzd. Ez a fajta kilátástalanság pedig mindig is hajlott a populista eszmék felé. A fiatalok egy viszonylag nagy része elhagyja a keleti országokat, mert kilátástalannak látja a helyzetét, a jövőjét ott, az idősebbek elég jelentős része pedig felül a vadkeleti vonatra, és gyűlölettel fordulnak mind a nyugat felé, akik elrabolják a gyermekeiket, mind mindenki más felé. Ezt a generációs társadalmi szakadékot és tendenciát a populista politikusok és tanácsadók észrevették, ügyesen generálják, erősítik és ki is használják.

Elvitathatatlan tény azonban, hogy a populizmus rengeteg forrásból táplálkozik és erősödik, ennek csupán egyike (igaz, a legfontosabb) az oktatási "reform", hogy a felnövekvő következő generáció a rendszernek megfelelő ideológiai képzést kapja. (Miközben éppen ezzel vádolják a szabad kutatásra, a kételkedésre, a tényekre, tudományokra épülő oktatást.) Eközben viszont tényleges, tűzoltó-jellegű gazdasági és szociális segítséget nyújtanak az elszegényedett családoknak, akik így mindig őket fogják választani. Egyszerű, néhány szóból álló és könnyen érthető üzenetekkel kampányolnak, nem véletlenül, hogy megértse minden réteg - miközben a liberális elit ellenszenvet vált ki ezekből az emberekből, mert összetett mondatokban, érthetetlen szakszavakat használnak, és a populisták segítségnyújtását lefizetésnek tekintik. Noha valójában az is, hiszen az illiberális kormányok valós, tényleges szociális segítséget nem nyújtottak senkinek, meg sem próbálták megszüntetni az okokat és kiépíteni egy szociális hálót - oktatással, információátadással, képzésekkel, lehetőségek teremtésével -, egyszerűen csak a kezükbe nyomtak egy valójában kicsi, de az érintettek számára mégis nagy összeget rendszerint a választások előtt nem sokkal, illetve azóta is kampányolnak a különféle "szociális" intézkedéseikkel.

Krasztev és Holmes azonban nem csak az illiberális antidemokratizmus változásait és térnyerését, hanem a nyugati jellegű liberalizmus változását és problémáit is kritikával illeti, hiszen "mindkét" fél hibás a kialakult helyzetben, és nem úgy tűnik, hogy lesz közeledés a nézőpontokban.

Érdekes és mindenképp tanulságos kötet, hathatósan és jól érvelnek a nézeteik mellett, még ha - akár csak terjedelmi okokból is - sok szempontot kihagynak az értékelésből. Hogy mi lesz ebből a helyzetből a kiút? Nem tudom. Véleményem szerint hamarosan, néhány évtizeden belül a már most is tapasztalható klímaváltozás miatti egyre gyarapodó problémák és krízisek zárójelbe fogják helyezni ezt az egészet, még azelőtt, hogy akár véres, akár békés feloldásban véget érne az eszmék harca.

A kötetet Széky János fordította, aki maga is írt 2015-ben egy könyvet Bárányvakság címmel, ami éppen arról szól, hogy hogyan került a magyar nép, a nyolcvanas évek vége után, ugyanaz a nemzedék, aki elvileg rendszert váltott és szabadságot harcolt ki (még ha harc nélkül is) ismét egy rosszul funkcionáló állami hatalom kötelékébe, méghozzá önként és dalolva - magyarul a Kádár rendszertől a NER-ig? Érdekelne a fordító véleménye a kötetről, adott-e nagy felismeréseket számára, vagy volt-e olyan, amivel nem értett egyet.

[Kitty · Rating 4 out of 5]

mulle avastas eelmine loetud Krastevi raamat, "Pärast Euroopat", üsna kõvasti muljet - sain sealt esimest korda tõuke mõelda, et tõesti, mis sai Fukuyama lubatud ajaloo lõpust, ja üleüldse, mis juhtus (Brexit ja Trump ja populismi võidukäik jne). siin arendatakse seda teemat edasi ja uuritakse, kuidas ikkagi läks nii, et 30 aastat pärast raudse eesriide langemist ei ole kõik maailma riigid liberaalsed demokraatiad.

kolm põhiteemat võetakse siin ette - Kesk-Euroopa populistid (põhiliset keskendutakse Poolale ja Ungarile), Venemaa ja Trump. lõpus kergelt puudutatakse Hiinat ka. läbivaks teemaks on valitud jäljendamine - tees on enamvähem see, et nii idablokist vabanenud Euroopa riigid, Venemaa kui Hiina on 30 aastat jäljendanud lääne liberaalset demokraatiat, igaüks omal moel. Kesk-Euroopas on katse lääne väärtusi omaks võtta viinud illusioonide purunemise ja reaktsioonilise illiberaalsuseni; Venemaa matkis algusest peale teadlikult ja omakasupüüdlikult ainult protsesse, mitte väärtusi (oo, kuidas see Venemaa-peatüki lugemine pani praegusi Ukraina-teemalisi uudiseid uue pilguga lugema) ja Hiina valis jäljendamiseks teaduse ja tehnoloogia, aga ei tunne mingit vajadust isegi teeselda, et neil oleks mingi soov demokraatiat kehtestada.

mulle need Vene ja Trumpi peatükid (viimases räägitakse pikemalt sellest, kuidas USA jaoks ei ole tegelikult kuidagi vajalik ega kasulik, et maailm neid väga jäljendaks, kui liberaalsed väärtused kord juba üle parda on heidetud - pigem vastupidi) tundusid selged ja usutavad; Kesk-Euroopa jutt tekitas päris palju vastuseta jäänud küsimusi. ei tea, kas oli see esimene peatük lihtsalt nõrgem või oli asi selles, et mul oli siin rohkem taustateadmisi ja isiklikke arvamusi.

väga kerge lugemine ei olnud ausalt öeldes; võibolla eestikeelses tõlkes olnuks lihtsam jälgida. aga väga huvitav oli küll ja päris mitu mõtet kirjutasin endale välja, et neid kunagi omaette edasi mõelda.

[Karolina · Rating 5 out of 5]

Spoiła w całość wiele wniosków które gdzieś tam kołatały się po głowie nigdy nie wyartykułowane, dała odpowiedzi na pytania których nie zdążyłam sobie zadać ale podświadomie potrzebowałam znać na nie odpowiedź.

[Mad Hab · Rating 4 out of 5]

Overall, this is a great book—interesting and entertaining. The first half has very difficult English to understand, as it seems the author chose words from the bottom of the English corpus frequency list. I didn't like the chapter on Trump—how can you know what Trump wants or feels? Still, it's worth reading.

[Венцислав · Rating 2 out of 5]

In trying to explain the crisis of modern liberal democracy in Europe and the growing divide between the East and West part of the continent, "The Light That Failed" presents some fundamental truths and, regrettably, comes to some fundamentally wrong conclusions.

It's a narrative that is deeply flawed by, what I suspect are Mr. Krastev's writing contributions, incessant criticism of the political course undertaken by Hungary and Poland, while completely glossing over the rest of the region. In fact, throughout the book the supposed divide in modern Europe is presented as between the West and those two particular states, the rest of the East being reduced to short remarks such as "and other countries." Many of the factors that have lead to the rise of autocratic populism in Eastern Europe nowadays are correctly determined by the authors - the clash of cultural values stemming back from the Great Schism of Christianity and Europe, the historical fate of eastern nations being subjugated by empires for centuries and lacking strong institutions, the prevalent corruption that is part of national psyche, the precipitous demographic decline, and especially the deep disappointment of the transition to capitalism and the huge inequalities that it brought to these societies.

Yet, where all of these factors are common throughout the region, the narrative keeps the focus strictly on the "troubled members" of the EU - Poland and, in particular, Viktor Orban's Hungary. Yes, you will hear criticism of Orban frequently and throughout the book, turning what should be an objective analysis of liberal democracy's decline into a treatise of subjective criticism. What makes Poland and Hungary, two countries with significantly higher freedom of speech ratings, social mobility index, median per capita GDP and overall standard of living objectively "worse liberal democracies" and the targets of vehement liberal criticism by the authors than, say, Borisov's Bulgaria - a country roiled in excessive corruption, embezzlement, disruptive socio-economic divisions, and disastrous freedom of speech rating?

One who's personally familiar with Eastern Europe's modus vivendi, whether due to being a resident of the region (as myself, being a Bulgarian) or a researcher, would remain with the strong sense that what Stephen Holmes and Ivan Krastev point as the biggest issue of modern European liberalism is daring to voice criticism of the Brussels' brand of liberalism and not what amounts to trumping liberal values underfoot while keeping a strong declarative stance in support of it - as many autocratic Prime Ministers and Presidents other than Duda and Orban do. And where this tragic hypocrisy of the West supporting Eastern Europe's current autocratic, corrupt, declarative style-over-substance brand of pseudo-"liberalism" should be the conclusion of the book, it instead divulges into prolonged criticism of just a particular facet of the issue that's easier to swallow for the Western reader/listener.

What you can take from "The Light that Failed" is some excellent insight into the political turmoil now engulfing the EU, made possible by great effort and research, and some thoughtful insight - and end up with some terrible conclusions that will grossly skew your understanding of the underlying issue.

Excellent Audible narration by John Sackville! 5/5 for narrator performance.

[Oliver · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very thoughtful discussion of how liberal democracy has failed to become the global norm after this seemed to be almost assumed following the events in 1989. A deeper look at Eastern and Central Europe; Russia, USA of Trump and China. Excellent for setting recent decades and years in perspective.

[Vladislav Burda · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Light That Failed

This book is quite unique. It was made by two authors: one is a profound journalist, writer, and democracy defender from Bulgaria; the other, a professor of law in the US, who had previously focused on researching criminals and the connection between tax and liberty.

It seems that they have only this book together but had plans to write more about Russia. The book is built with a solid structure.

In the beginning, there is a description of the fall of the Berlin Wall, which divided time in Europe and the world into “before” and “after.” The first chapter is dedicated to the bright outliers of the movement toward democracy—Hungary and Poland—and why local nationalism rose and became so destructive for the democracy of Eastern Europe.

The authors introduce the concept of imitation as something Eastern European countries wanted to replicate, not because they truly or authentically needed it, but just because other developed countries had it.

The second chapter is about Russia and Putin. It discusses why nobody paid enough attention to his speech in Munich in 2007, where he effectively declared war on the West. The chapter explores the difference between Russian imitation and that of Eastern Europe, why Russia quickly refused to imitate, and how a generation that lost the Soviet Union, its voice, and its authority in the face of new generation, decided to take revenge and fiercely support the communist regime.

The third chapter is about the phenomenon of Trump—the first US president who insists that other countries don’t need to imitate or repeat US policies because the US has no achievements worth replicating. He was the first president not proud of his country, whose heroes and personal friends—Putin and Orbán—are some of the biggest enemies of US democracy.

The last chapter focuses on China, which sees itself not as a country, but as a civilization. That’s why Chinese people never fully adopt or assimilate into other countries. Instead, they build Chinatowns and maintain Chinese traditions, values, and cuisine wherever they are.

China was a great example for Russia, showing that communism and socialism could survive and even be economically prosperous. This explains the seemingly natural union between China and Russia today.

As a Ukrainian, what I found most interesting was the moment when the authors mentioned Harvard research on the roles of Davids and Goliaths in 19th-century wars and contemporary wars. In the 19th century, only 12% of countries with fewer resources won wars, but by the end of the 20th century, that number had grown to 55%.

It seems that Ukraine, being a David, has a great chance against Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian war. However, the authors view Russia not as a Goliath, but as a David fighting against the US (Goliath). In this case, the high probability of winning doesn’t seem as promising anymore.

P.S. This book has the same name as Rudyard Kipling’s book, which was written more than 100 years ago. Kipling wrote two versions of his book, one with a happy ending to please his mother. Krastev and Holmes did not propose two versions of the book, but they emphasized that the future could either bring hope or tragedy—and that decision is up to us!

[Torsten · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mein zweites politisches Sachbuch dieses Jahr, wooo 🙂

Krastev & Holmes stellen die These auf, dass die aktuellen Probleme und der Niedergang des in die Welt exportierten (westlichen) Liberalismus seine Ursache in seiner (teilweise simulierten) Nachahmung durch die ehemaligen Ostblockländer und die darauf folgende Enttäuschung hat. Dabei gehen sie besonders auf die Entwicklungen in Polen & Ungarn, Russland & der ehemaligen UdSSR und der USA unter Trump ein.

Die USA sind ihrer Meinung nach ein Beispiel für Verdrossenheit des Nachgeahmten, der die meisten von den USA angestoßenen weltweiten Entwicklungen (Globalisierung, Verbreitung des Liberalismus etc.) am Ende als eigenen Nachteil sieht.

Damit schließt sich dann auch der Kreis: Die in vielen Ländern in Osteuropa aufkommenden Ressentiments und offener Haß gegenüber Liberalismus, Postnationalismus und der zentralen Brüsseler (Fremd?)verwaltung finden nun auch im Kernland des Liberalismus, den USA, rege Nachahmung. Wobei sie damit wiederum anderen Politikern wie Bolsenaro als Vorbild, bzw. Ausrede seines rassistischen Handelns genutzt wird.

Zum Schluß wird noch auf China als mittlerweile neue Supermacht eingegangen. Die dadurch zu erwartete Zukunft des Liberalismus und der Geopolitik wird beleuchtet.

Ich habe die sehr günstige Ausgabe der bpb gelesen. Auch für mich als Laien war das Buch sehr informativ und erhellend. Teilweise etwas repetitiv, nicht immer konsistent, was dem insgesamten Eindruck aber kaum schmälert. Eine klare Empfehlung für an aktueller geopolitischer Lage interessierte Leser.

[Saskia · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very interesting update on global politics, covering the disappointing way in which Eastern European countries have failed to truly adopt democracy and the fashion in which Russia is going through the motions and increasingly trying to disrupt the post 1989 democratic constellation. On the other hand, the US have gradually given up their role of spreading the democratic gospel across the globe, sharply marked by the presidency of Donald Trump. The role and ambitions of China are also investigated. Very insightful.

[Cristian · Rating 4 out of 5]

As insightful as everything else I've read by Krastev. Thank god for someone non-occidental who can dive deep into the experience and the mindset of easterners. The first two chapters focusing on Orban and Putin are also the strongest. This book should be ESSENTIAL READING for every politician and journalist and historian from the west dealing with eastern European matters.

The chapter on the US and Trump: not without its merits, but also repeating some of the clichés you've read elsewhere.

The fourth, and quite short chapter on China felt like someone from the outside trying to make sense of the inner workings of a very different player. I've read and heard more interesting takes on China, but I understand that this book's thesis of the "Age of Imitation" wouldn't have been complete without the master imitators themselves.

Overall a fantastic book with some minor omissions as well as a few concessions to the liberal framing of Trump's populist revolt (or "revolt").

[Beatriz · Rating 5 out of 5]

I recommend this book for everybody interested in recent history and politics. It has opened my eyes to understand the connection between events happening in different countries as a result of the end of the Cold World.

The authors describe the world since then, focused on the East European countries, Russia, USA and China.

Why the western liberal democracy concept has failed to be the winner of the Cold World and why populisms are here to stay. The imitation game is over.

[Peter Crofts · Rating 4 out of 5]

Go online, look up the small mountain of recent books lamenting the end of liberal democracy. You will find an additional mountain of reviews of books by neoliberal Olympians like Albright, Snyder, Zakaria etc. Now do a search for reviews of this timely book. You will find close to none. That, in itself, speaks volumes.

Krastev and Holmes rely on Girard, specifically his ideas of human dynamics and imitation, in large part to explain what they see as a form of bad faith or false consciousness, adopted in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War, that is presently coming undone. It's leading to much unfocused anger, which is being channeled by cynical, intellectually bankrupt reactionaries.

Ultimately it is a book about the contextless, historically ignorant application of a set of so called "universal" principles by liberal democrat technocrats. They sound more and more to me like a priestly class which each passing day. Varoufakis' "Adults in the Room" gives a similar impression of this technocrat arrogance and overreach.

There are some startling parallels between the present political moment in parts of Eastern Europe and the interwar period, when the Versailles imposed liberal democracies began to turn to to ethnic and/or religious definitions of what constituted "the nation". It offers no excuse for what is happening, nor does it support this turn to the right. But it does offer an explanation, in part, for what is happening.

It's difficult to place this book on the bleached out political spectrum of politics which dominates Anglo American discourse. That in itself is reason to give it a look.

[Perbrisis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Klarsynt och verklighetsförankrat resonemang om tiden efter kalla kriget. Ingen bok som jag har läst har på ett så bra sätt förklarat Orbán, Putin och Trump med sådan skärpa och djup. Oumbärlig för den som vill förstå populismens framgångar i det som skulle varit liberalismens epok.

[Sandra · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.3/5
Interesting and insightful analysis and perspectives delivered in at times unreadable fashion. The longest 200 pages book I have ever read.

[Rafael · Rating 5 out of 5]

Original argument and interesting analysis of Central Europe, Russia, China and the US, though it gets slightly repetitive.

[Johannes Lilover · Rating 3 out of 5]

Skippable... but I will start calling all of my fellow Estonian friends who are living abroad - immigrants.