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The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War
From the author the classic The Wizards of Armageddon and Pulitzer Prize finalist comes the definitive history of American policy on nuclear war—and Presidents’ actions in nuclear crises—from Truman to Trump.
Fred Kaplan, hailed by The New York Times as “a rare combination of defense intellectual and pugnacious reporter,” takes us into the White House Situation Room, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s “Tank” in the Pentagon, and the vast chambers of Strategic Command to bring us the untold stories—based on exclusive interviews and previously classified documents—of how America’s presidents and generals have thought about, threatened, broached, and just barely avoided nuclear war from the dawn of the atomic age until today.
Kaplan’s historical research and deep reporting will stand as the permanent record of politics. Discussing theories that have dominated nightmare scenarios from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Kaplan presents the unthinkable in terms of mass destruction and demonstrates how the nuclear war reality will not go away, regardless of the dire consequences.
Fred Kaplan, hailed by The New York Times as “a rare combination of defense intellectual and pugnacious reporter,” takes us into the White House Situation Room, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s “Tank” in the Pentagon, and the vast chambers of Strategic Command to bring us the untold stories—based on exclusive interviews and previously classified documents—of how America’s presidents and generals have thought about, threatened, broached, and just barely avoided nuclear war from the dawn of the atomic age until today.
Kaplan’s historical research and deep reporting will stand as the permanent record of politics. Discussing theories that have dominated nightmare scenarios from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Kaplan presents the unthinkable in terms of mass destruction and demonstrates how the nuclear war reality will not go away, regardless of the dire consequences.
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First published January 28, 2020
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April 2, 2020
I read Kaplan's Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War and discovered it to be a very lucid explanation of the technological challenges faced by the security departments around the world. So naturally, I was anxious to check out his most recent book, courtesy Net Galley, for which I am grateful.
It's an immensely enjoyable, if a bit scary, book about the political infighting and territoriality of the armed services and policy development of nuclear weapons. There was a lot of jockeying between the Navy, Army, and Air Force as to who would control "the bomb". and unfortunately much of that in-fighting controlled policy. Curtis LeMay, a brilliant leader in the organization and implementation of the bombing campaigns (read fire-bombing) in Europe and then Japan, as head of the Strategic Air Command was all in favor of a virtual first strike with everything as the SAC bombers were quite vulnerable. (His philosophy was simply to bomb everything.)
The Navy, meanwhile, was eager to get funds for the development of large numbers of ballistic missile equipped Polaris submarines, arguing that if the Russians never knew where you were the deterrent effect was far greater and more valuable. The Army, on the other hand, promoted the use of smaller tactical nukes on the battlefield suggesting that a nuclear counterattack to defend Europe against Russian aggression would lead to a Russian withdrawal and peace discussions. The casual manner in which civilian casualties (not to mention military) were discussed was a bit disheartening.
The man who replaced LeMay at SAC was Thomas Power. Even LeMay thought he was excessive: "There was a cruelty to Power’s zest for bombing cities. Even LeMay privately referred to his protégé as a “sadist.” When Bill Kaufmann briefed him on the Counterforce strategy at SAC headquarters, Power reacted with fury. “Why do you want us to restrain ourselves?” he screamed. “Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards!” After a bit more of this tirade, Power said, “Look. At the end of the war, if there are two Americans and one Russian, we win!” Kaufmann snapped back, “You’d better make sure that they’re a man and a woman.” Power stormed out of the room. "
One surprising and note-worthy section was on how Cheney, of all people, was instrumental in reducing the huge number of weapons by half. All of the president's since have failed to reject the no-first-strike policy. Trump, himself, in his on-again, off-again relationship with North Korea didn't hesitate to wave the arsenal and threaten its use.
Kaplan describes the abyss that policy makers then and since have become trapped in. The mere idea of how many times cities (people) need to be nuked in order to assure our victory, even as we ourselves are annihilated, inevitably leads to comparisons with Alice in Wonderland.
That about sums up the insanity faced by all the presidents since Hiroshima. The importance of policy discussions and analysis worries me when I read that our current president disdains not just the briefing books, but the idea of analysis, preferring to rely on his "gut feeling" no doubt the most attuned gut in the history of the world. But then he's such a self-described "stable genius."
A good companion book to McNamara's memoir, "In Retrospect" and Ellsberg's "Secrets." Each is ostensibly more about Vietnam but each reveals much a bout how decisions are made in government. Other titles I will have to read are Kaplan's "Wizards of Armaggedon", Ellsberg's "The Doomsday Machine," and Bruce Kuklick's "Kennan to Kissinger" and I'm sure many others, but we only live so long.
It's an immensely enjoyable, if a bit scary, book about the political infighting and territoriality of the armed services and policy development of nuclear weapons. There was a lot of jockeying between the Navy, Army, and Air Force as to who would control "the bomb". and unfortunately much of that in-fighting controlled policy. Curtis LeMay, a brilliant leader in the organization and implementation of the bombing campaigns (read fire-bombing) in Europe and then Japan, as head of the Strategic Air Command was all in favor of a virtual first strike with everything as the SAC bombers were quite vulnerable. (His philosophy was simply to bomb everything.)
The Navy, meanwhile, was eager to get funds for the development of large numbers of ballistic missile equipped Polaris submarines, arguing that if the Russians never knew where you were the deterrent effect was far greater and more valuable. The Army, on the other hand, promoted the use of smaller tactical nukes on the battlefield suggesting that a nuclear counterattack to defend Europe against Russian aggression would lead to a Russian withdrawal and peace discussions. The casual manner in which civilian casualties (not to mention military) were discussed was a bit disheartening.
The man who replaced LeMay at SAC was Thomas Power. Even LeMay thought he was excessive: "There was a cruelty to Power’s zest for bombing cities. Even LeMay privately referred to his protégé as a “sadist.” When Bill Kaufmann briefed him on the Counterforce strategy at SAC headquarters, Power reacted with fury. “Why do you want us to restrain ourselves?” he screamed. “Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards!” After a bit more of this tirade, Power said, “Look. At the end of the war, if there are two Americans and one Russian, we win!” Kaufmann snapped back, “You’d better make sure that they’re a man and a woman.” Power stormed out of the room. "
One surprising and note-worthy section was on how Cheney, of all people, was instrumental in reducing the huge number of weapons by half. All of the president's since have failed to reject the no-first-strike policy. Trump, himself, in his on-again, off-again relationship with North Korea didn't hesitate to wave the arsenal and threaten its use.
Kaplan describes the abyss that policy makers then and since have become trapped in. The mere idea of how many times cities (people) need to be nuked in order to assure our victory, even as we ourselves are annihilated, inevitably leads to comparisons with Alice in Wonderland.
That about sums up the insanity faced by all the presidents since Hiroshima. The importance of policy discussions and analysis worries me when I read that our current president disdains not just the briefing books, but the idea of analysis, preferring to rely on his "gut feeling" no doubt the most attuned gut in the history of the world. But then he's such a self-described "stable genius."
A good companion book to McNamara's memoir, "In Retrospect" and Ellsberg's "Secrets." Each is ostensibly more about Vietnam but each reveals much a bout how decisions are made in government. Other titles I will have to read are Kaplan's "Wizards of Armaggedon", Ellsberg's "The Doomsday Machine," and Bruce Kuklick's "Kennan to Kissinger" and I'm sure many others, but we only live so long.
July 2, 2020
Opening of the nuclear age with the ruthless bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought in a new dimension in warfare. The unacceptable level of devastation in infrastructure and human lives at first presented a scenario to presidents and generals that immensely favoured those who possessed the weapons. However, the nuclear gap between the US and its arch enemy, the Soviet Union, closed in just one decade thanks in most part to espionage by politically motivated scientists and technicians who worked in the American nuclear effort. With Russia acquiring the nuclear capability, stalemate returned in international policy. Both sides tried hard to be one step ahead of their rival by devising grand plans for a nuclear first strike which would cripple the enemy’s atomic stockpile. The other side then matched the challenge by diversifying its weapon launch capacity to land, undersea and air. While all this was going on, the nuclear weapons were multiplying. Any skirmish between the two superpowers or between their proxies quickened the pulse of the world as each side boasted of an arsenal that had the potential to destroy the planet many times over. With the demise of communism and collapse of the Soviet Union, the nuclear standoff cooled considerably and the number of weapons greatly reduced. But with the rise of rogue states like Pakistan and North Korea attaining nuclear capability and a resurgent Russia under Putin, they once again begin to assume greater significance. This book is a snapshot of how American politicians and military men handled them for seven decades after World War II. Fred Kaplan is an American author and journalist who has six books to his credit and handles a weekly column ‘War Stories’ for the ‘Slate’ magazine.
Kaplan presents the calm confidence of the US establishment immediately after the world war when Russia did not possess nuclear weapons. This enabled them to casually examine the stakes if nuclear weapons were launched in response to conventional warfare such as in Korea. But the situation didn't stay stagnant for long. The US resolve was tested when Khrushchev tried to deploy Soviet missiles in Cuba. The US posture was belligerent but Kaplan provides details from classified documents that reveal its climb down. President Kennedy reached a secret deal with his Soviet counterpart to dismantle American missiles deployed in Turkey in response to Soviet withdrawal of its own weapons from Cuba.
The unquestioned premise of Cold War nuclear policy was that deterrence required persuading the Soviets that the American president would use nuclear weapons first, in response to aggression against it or its allies in Europe or elsewhere. The NATO member states basked under the nuclear umbrella unfolded by the US. This was essentially an American guarantee to launch nuclear weapons at the Soviet Union in response to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe even by conventional means. This made the nuclear weapons the centrepiece of Trans-Atlantic security. But the actual fact was that there was no scenario in which using nuclear weapons would give the US or any country an advantage because of the extreme damage caused by a nuclear strike. However tightly they guarded their skies, it was still possible that many of the enemy’s nuclear warheads would hit the homeland. This was the conclusion that every president of the nuclear age and most high level political officials had reached. Yet those presidents and officials also realised that they had to act as if they would use nuclear weapons or else their threats might not be credible in a crisis. On the one hand they wanted the Soviets to think these things would actually be used to ensure deterrence. On the other, they did not want to make a weapon too easy or tempting to use if war broke out.
The book also points out efforts to stem the tide of brinkmanship. Way back in 1963 itself, the US, USSR and UK signed a treaty outlawing tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, under the ocean or in outer space. Contrary to the popular image they had cultivated, we see many truculent presidents adopting a very sane outlook on nuclear issues. Reagan entered the White House with an entourage bent not merely on deterring and containing the Soviet Union but on weakening and rolling back its empire. But once he was assured of the earnestness of Gorbachev, he scaled down his plans and offered drastic cuts in the arsenal. The Soviet Empire was in tatters at the time. Gorbachev realised that the Soviet Union was in shambles, its ideology moribund and its economy dysfunctional. Its military budget consumed nearly all of the government’s resources.
People would normally presume that nuclear weapons being highly destructive, its uses and deployment are most meticulously planned. Kaplan provides stunning details of sloppy preparedness. Each arm of the US military such as the Army, Navy and Air Force fixed their targets in isolation and two targets which may physically be very near so as to suffer lethal damage as the result of a nuclear strike on the other, were given no attention to the offensive redundancy. In 1991, a critical review to weed out redundancy and an imaginative selection of targets was undertaken. As a result, the requirement of nuclear weapons came down from 12,000 to 5,888. This reduction stemmed not from an arms control treaty or relaxation of international tensions, but rather from a purely technical, deep dive analysis of how many weapons US policy required. We see that at the height of the nuclear standoff, the city of Moscow was targeted by 689 nuclear weapons, many releasing more than a megaton of explosive power. By comparison, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima had the power of only fifteen kilotons.
The book is easy to read, but too many acronyms and too many characters from the US bureaucracy prove to be a spoilsport. After a while, readers lose track of who’s who with the long line of secretaries, deputy and deputy assistant secretaries dancing before their eyes in the text. The book presents only the American perspective. It includes many references that express doubt on the sanity of decisions taken by the current President, Donald Trump.
The book is recommended.
Kaplan presents the calm confidence of the US establishment immediately after the world war when Russia did not possess nuclear weapons. This enabled them to casually examine the stakes if nuclear weapons were launched in response to conventional warfare such as in Korea. But the situation didn't stay stagnant for long. The US resolve was tested when Khrushchev tried to deploy Soviet missiles in Cuba. The US posture was belligerent but Kaplan provides details from classified documents that reveal its climb down. President Kennedy reached a secret deal with his Soviet counterpart to dismantle American missiles deployed in Turkey in response to Soviet withdrawal of its own weapons from Cuba.
The unquestioned premise of Cold War nuclear policy was that deterrence required persuading the Soviets that the American president would use nuclear weapons first, in response to aggression against it or its allies in Europe or elsewhere. The NATO member states basked under the nuclear umbrella unfolded by the US. This was essentially an American guarantee to launch nuclear weapons at the Soviet Union in response to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe even by conventional means. This made the nuclear weapons the centrepiece of Trans-Atlantic security. But the actual fact was that there was no scenario in which using nuclear weapons would give the US or any country an advantage because of the extreme damage caused by a nuclear strike. However tightly they guarded their skies, it was still possible that many of the enemy’s nuclear warheads would hit the homeland. This was the conclusion that every president of the nuclear age and most high level political officials had reached. Yet those presidents and officials also realised that they had to act as if they would use nuclear weapons or else their threats might not be credible in a crisis. On the one hand they wanted the Soviets to think these things would actually be used to ensure deterrence. On the other, they did not want to make a weapon too easy or tempting to use if war broke out.
The book also points out efforts to stem the tide of brinkmanship. Way back in 1963 itself, the US, USSR and UK signed a treaty outlawing tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, under the ocean or in outer space. Contrary to the popular image they had cultivated, we see many truculent presidents adopting a very sane outlook on nuclear issues. Reagan entered the White House with an entourage bent not merely on deterring and containing the Soviet Union but on weakening and rolling back its empire. But once he was assured of the earnestness of Gorbachev, he scaled down his plans and offered drastic cuts in the arsenal. The Soviet Empire was in tatters at the time. Gorbachev realised that the Soviet Union was in shambles, its ideology moribund and its economy dysfunctional. Its military budget consumed nearly all of the government’s resources.
People would normally presume that nuclear weapons being highly destructive, its uses and deployment are most meticulously planned. Kaplan provides stunning details of sloppy preparedness. Each arm of the US military such as the Army, Navy and Air Force fixed their targets in isolation and two targets which may physically be very near so as to suffer lethal damage as the result of a nuclear strike on the other, were given no attention to the offensive redundancy. In 1991, a critical review to weed out redundancy and an imaginative selection of targets was undertaken. As a result, the requirement of nuclear weapons came down from 12,000 to 5,888. This reduction stemmed not from an arms control treaty or relaxation of international tensions, but rather from a purely technical, deep dive analysis of how many weapons US policy required. We see that at the height of the nuclear standoff, the city of Moscow was targeted by 689 nuclear weapons, many releasing more than a megaton of explosive power. By comparison, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima had the power of only fifteen kilotons.
The book is easy to read, but too many acronyms and too many characters from the US bureaucracy prove to be a spoilsport. After a while, readers lose track of who’s who with the long line of secretaries, deputy and deputy assistant secretaries dancing before their eyes in the text. The book presents only the American perspective. It includes many references that express doubt on the sanity of decisions taken by the current President, Donald Trump.
The book is recommended.
Want to read
February 9, 2020WSJ review: https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-bomb... (Paywalled. As always, I'm happy to email a copy to non-subscribers)
Excerpt:
"An amazing chapter, tantalizingly called “Pulling Back the Curtain,” tells of how, in 1989, a relatively young Defense aide named Franklin Miller persuaded his boss, Dick Cheney, to allow a quiet investigation of the actual targeting details of the military’s famous Single Integrated Operational Plan. These sites hitherto had been kept a closed secret at Strategic Air Command in Omaha, Neb.—which is to say that, until that time, no civilian, no secretary of defense, certainly no president, had seen any of this information.
Mr. Kaplan’s account of what Mr. Miller and his subordinate, Gil Klinger, discovered has a fantastical “Dr. Strangelove”-like quality to it, partly hilarious, partly outrageous. There was really only one targeting strategy at SAC, it seems, and it was completely at odds with all the all the sophisticated study being done at the time in universities and think tanks, based on such concepts as “calibrated signaling,” “stages of escalation” or “command and control of nuclear weapons.”
SAC had, instead, a simple equation: If there were, say, 10,000 nuclear warheads at the disposal of the aptly named Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, there simply had to be 10,000 named targets in the Soviet Union destined to receive them—it didn’t matter if they were empty Arctic air bases, places that were termed “political-relocation sites,” railway bridges (but not the important nearby road bridges). In some instances, a place was set to receive not one large nuclear bomb but many. Moscow and its environs alone would be hit by 689 rockets, each capable of releasing “more than a megaton of explosive power”—a supreme act of nuclear overkill."
Excerpt:
"An amazing chapter, tantalizingly called “Pulling Back the Curtain,” tells of how, in 1989, a relatively young Defense aide named Franklin Miller persuaded his boss, Dick Cheney, to allow a quiet investigation of the actual targeting details of the military’s famous Single Integrated Operational Plan. These sites hitherto had been kept a closed secret at Strategic Air Command in Omaha, Neb.—which is to say that, until that time, no civilian, no secretary of defense, certainly no president, had seen any of this information.
Mr. Kaplan’s account of what Mr. Miller and his subordinate, Gil Klinger, discovered has a fantastical “Dr. Strangelove”-like quality to it, partly hilarious, partly outrageous. There was really only one targeting strategy at SAC, it seems, and it was completely at odds with all the all the sophisticated study being done at the time in universities and think tanks, based on such concepts as “calibrated signaling,” “stages of escalation” or “command and control of nuclear weapons.”
SAC had, instead, a simple equation: If there were, say, 10,000 nuclear warheads at the disposal of the aptly named Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, there simply had to be 10,000 named targets in the Soviet Union destined to receive them—it didn’t matter if they were empty Arctic air bases, places that were termed “political-relocation sites,” railway bridges (but not the important nearby road bridges). In some instances, a place was set to receive not one large nuclear bomb but many. Moscow and its environs alone would be hit by 689 rockets, each capable of releasing “more than a megaton of explosive power”—a supreme act of nuclear overkill."
December 3, 2021
The title is misleading. While there is a good bit of information here of interest you have to work to pick it out of this bland, repetitive text. Kudos to the author though for putting in the work and doing a hell of a research job. This book is very dry and at times reads like a textbook.
First off part of the "secret history" is missing. This book assumes you know everything about nuclear bombs, nuclear physics, nuclear science, and just nuclear knowledge already. This history begins after WWII. There is nothing here about the plotting, formulation, tests, and making of the first nuclear bombs or the decision to use them on Japan to end WWII.
This covers the cold war extensively and the plans to use the ever-increasing number, power, and sophistication of nuclear bombs. From President Eisenhower to Trump this covers how the military gained control of nuclear bombs from its intended civilian council, the infighting the military branches had to control who had the most and would be able to use them, and what targets to hit with how many bombs and what the repercussions might be of an all-out nuclear war and how to stop an all-out nuclear war but still use nuclear bombs, and what the Presidents thought about it and how they tried to increase or decrease them within the US and other countries around the world.
Some of the plans now available because the passage of time and the FOIA law (Freedom of Information Act) are truly horrific. You have to wonder when reading them if the military had any brain cells among their top generals.
An eye-opener to be sure, some of this should be standard learning to see just how far we have come and how bad things can get if the leaders of the world got angry and pushed the big red button in a fit because they don't understand the magnitude of what they are doing.
First off part of the "secret history" is missing. This book assumes you know everything about nuclear bombs, nuclear physics, nuclear science, and just nuclear knowledge already. This history begins after WWII. There is nothing here about the plotting, formulation, tests, and making of the first nuclear bombs or the decision to use them on Japan to end WWII.
This covers the cold war extensively and the plans to use the ever-increasing number, power, and sophistication of nuclear bombs. From President Eisenhower to Trump this covers how the military gained control of nuclear bombs from its intended civilian council, the infighting the military branches had to control who had the most and would be able to use them, and what targets to hit with how many bombs and what the repercussions might be of an all-out nuclear war and how to stop an all-out nuclear war but still use nuclear bombs, and what the Presidents thought about it and how they tried to increase or decrease them within the US and other countries around the world.
Some of the plans now available because the passage of time and the FOIA law (Freedom of Information Act) are truly horrific. You have to wonder when reading them if the military had any brain cells among their top generals.
An eye-opener to be sure, some of this should be standard learning to see just how far we have come and how bad things can get if the leaders of the world got angry and pushed the big red button in a fit because they don't understand the magnitude of what they are doing.
May 28, 2020
Very biased information. It was neutral until the Obama and Trump references. Obama was portrayed as an omniscient and worldly leader that had an answer for everything whereas Trump is a buffoon that is threatening the world with Armageddon. How naïve and aloof can an author be. The most biased and slanted book on nuclear weaponry I have read.
March 24, 2020
Interesting, fearsome, and a full on anxiety creator.
May 2, 2020
An important book on the history of US nuclear strategy. Due to the COVID-19 outbreak it took a lot longer to read this. Kaplan, the defense writer for Slate, does a really good job of recounting the history of nuclear strategy but dives into the details of how it was formulated and implemented (not always the same). While reading the accounts of how Presidents like Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, both Bush's and Obama dealt with their responsibility of being able to single-handedly initiate world war III, it's a terrifying contrast to the current occupant of the White House, Mr Trump. As Kaplan writes: "The presidents who fell deep into this hole, who faced the abyss where the logic led, avoided its end point--avoided war--by scrambling out of the hole, snapping out of the logic, like snapping out of a bad dream". "Trump, a man who believed he knew a lot but in fact knew very little and who lacked the impulse or curiosity to learn more, was more susceptible to the wiles of a clever briefer than any of his predecessors...."
October 10, 2022
It's... fine. I incorrectly expected a spiritual sequel to "The Wizards of Armageddon" but it's not only nowhere near the depth or controversial takes from the 80s, it's just not up to depth of the topic in general. The author mostly recounts well-known historical facts with a few wikipedia-level details here and there, like mentioning that LeMay was called "Bombs Away LeMay". Thanks, I guess? It might be good enough as an introduction for uninterested audience, for anyone else there are much deeper and more thoughtful positions such as Maloney's "Emergency War Plan", Sixmith's "The War of Nerves", or even Whipple's "The Spymasters" (which, despite being a book about CIA directors, explores the White House in more depth that this one marketed as definitive history from Truman to Trump)
February 6, 2020
Well crafted and comprehensive. Kaplan moves from the archival past of the 1940s and 1950s to the present day smoothly and effectively. He overturns many myths about the US nuclear posture and shows that presidents have rarely controlled the strategic arsenal as well as they thought.
September 20, 2020
This was a diappointing book. I wanted to enjoy it and I thought it would be an interesting addition to my "75th Anniversary of the Bomb Reads".
This book talks about the history of the Bomb after the bomb was dropped.
I couldn't get into it. I didn't quite finish it before it was auto-returned... but I'm not going to bother checking it out again.
This book talks about the history of the Bomb after the bomb was dropped.
I couldn't get into it. I didn't quite finish it before it was auto-returned... but I'm not going to bother checking it out again.
September 11, 2022
A revelatory book based on previously classified documents … it tells the history of American nuclear war plans and the issues that policymakers have grappled with since the advent of the nuclear bomb age. The conversations and considerations are scary and they are just as pressing as they were in the Cold War.
Illuminating and well written.
Illuminating and well written.
August 14, 2024
This was so boring.
April 15, 2020
This book is well-written and engaging, but there's very little new here...Ronald Reagan was an aggressive maniac who would've eagerly ignited WWIII had it not been for the peace-loving MikhailGorbachev, and whose "obsession" with SDI was the the real obstance to peace...Donald Trump is mentally ill and needs to be removed from office immediately...blah blah blah.
September 27, 2020
This book is an astonishing examination of US nuclear weapons strategy from the inception of “the bomb” through today. Despite the triumphalism of most post-Cold War historical interpretations, the threat of nuclear war is far from vanquished. After reading this, you will be surprised that we were able to survive.
The cast of characters includes presidents, policy makers, analysts, and military leaders. The figure of Curtis LeMay looms large, and his impact was felt long after his retirement.
Perhaps the most fascinating thing found in these pages is the stubborn resistance (and outright insubordination) of the Strategic Air Command and its cabal of war planners as they repeatedly ignored presidential directives over the course of multiple administrations. The author points out that nuclear war planning was driven for many years by the supply of nuclear weapons, not by strategic requirements. This mentality justified a grotesquely bloated number of missiles and warheads, even as sitting presidents ordered revisions to the war plans that would realign those plans with reality. The absurdity of the US Air Force’s insatiable thirst for more and more nukes (and the close calls caused by the Cuban Missile Crisis and Operation Able Archer) reinforces the necessity for civilian control of the military.
The specter of nuclear war still haunts us today but in a way that is arguably more troubling than during the height of the Cold War. Today the strategic problems posed by nuclear weapons are largely ignored by the public and even most policy makers. Nukes are an inconvenient reality that will not go away - regardless of how much we wish they would.
The cast of characters includes presidents, policy makers, analysts, and military leaders. The figure of Curtis LeMay looms large, and his impact was felt long after his retirement.
Perhaps the most fascinating thing found in these pages is the stubborn resistance (and outright insubordination) of the Strategic Air Command and its cabal of war planners as they repeatedly ignored presidential directives over the course of multiple administrations. The author points out that nuclear war planning was driven for many years by the supply of nuclear weapons, not by strategic requirements. This mentality justified a grotesquely bloated number of missiles and warheads, even as sitting presidents ordered revisions to the war plans that would realign those plans with reality. The absurdity of the US Air Force’s insatiable thirst for more and more nukes (and the close calls caused by the Cuban Missile Crisis and Operation Able Archer) reinforces the necessity for civilian control of the military.
The specter of nuclear war still haunts us today but in a way that is arguably more troubling than during the height of the Cold War. Today the strategic problems posed by nuclear weapons are largely ignored by the public and even most policy makers. Nukes are an inconvenient reality that will not go away - regardless of how much we wish they would.
March 17, 2020
An amazing history of our nuclear weapons program and how every President, from Truman to Trump, has had to grapple with the question of when and how to use them.
This story really starts with the Eisenhower Administration, where the military actually promoted the nightmare scenario where the US can launch a first strike nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union, and survive the counterattack. Luckily, every President since then has looked into that abyss and when given an opportunity to use nukes, stepped back from the edge. But the most disturbing chapter was the chapter on Trump. Not having any knowledge of nuclear weapons history and diplomacy, it is clear that he is the least knowledgeable about this topic. And yet the most erratic. The author makes the strong case that over the years the threat of nuclear war has diminished. But now it has reared its ugly head again.
This was an extremely well written book, despite the technical details of nuclear weaponry. Kaplan makes use of many recently declassified documents and recordings from every Administration, especially the Kennedy Administration, with its involvement with the Berlin Wall crisis and the Cuban middle crisis. I thoroughly enjoyed this behind the scenes look at the decisions made, and not made, that affect us to this day.
This story really starts with the Eisenhower Administration, where the military actually promoted the nightmare scenario where the US can launch a first strike nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union, and survive the counterattack. Luckily, every President since then has looked into that abyss and when given an opportunity to use nukes, stepped back from the edge. But the most disturbing chapter was the chapter on Trump. Not having any knowledge of nuclear weapons history and diplomacy, it is clear that he is the least knowledgeable about this topic. And yet the most erratic. The author makes the strong case that over the years the threat of nuclear war has diminished. But now it has reared its ugly head again.
This was an extremely well written book, despite the technical details of nuclear weaponry. Kaplan makes use of many recently declassified documents and recordings from every Administration, especially the Kennedy Administration, with its involvement with the Berlin Wall crisis and the Cuban middle crisis. I thoroughly enjoyed this behind the scenes look at the decisions made, and not made, that affect us to this day.
October 24, 2020
הספר של פרד קפלן על הפצצה הוא הוא הישג מרשים של היסטוריה צבאית ובירוקרטיה. קפלן, מי שכתב את Wizards of Armageddon, החליט לחזור לנושאי האסטרטגיה הגרעינית, מדיניות ההרתעה והישיבות הסודיות של נשיאי ארצות הברית והגנרלים המשרתים אותם. קפלן עובר מטרומן עד טראמפ, סוקר את יחסי הכוחות בין הנשיא ובין הגנרלים שלו, ועל כיצד התמודדו נשיאי ארצות הברית עם האחריות החשובה ביותר - הכפתור האדום. הוא עושה זאת באמצעות שימוש במסמכים מקוריים אשר רק לאחרונה הולבנו לציבור. אייזנהאואר, קנדי, קרטר ורייגן הם מן הסתם דמויות מפתח, וכמובן גם מקנאמרה, קיסינג'ר וכמובן קרטיס לה מיי המשוגע.
הטרנד הכללי העולה מהספר הוא שמרבית הנשיאים (להוציא אייזנהאואר, וכמסתבר... טראמפ) רצו לצמצם את כמות כלי הנשק הגרעיניים של המדינה, אך מצאו את עצמם נגררים אחר הצבא בהגדלת כמות ראשי הנפץ הגרעיניים כדי לענות על "איומים" של הצד השני. לכמות ראשי הנפץ הגרעיניים יש משמעות חשובה - אם תאגור יותר מידי יהיה לך יתרון על פני הצד השני, אך הדבר יוסיף אמינות להנחה שאתה תשתמש בנשק כ"מכה ראשונה" ומכאן לחשש של הצד השני ולרצון מצידו להתחמש עוד יותר. מנגד, אם תשמור על שוויון בין כמות ראשי הנפץ עם הצד השני, לא תוכל להרשות לעצמך להחזיק במדיניות תגובה גרעינית ("מכה שנייה"). מלחמה גרעינית "מצומצת" לא באה בחשבון, זה הכל או כלום. גם מלחמה קונבנציונאלית בין מעצמות היא בלתי אפשרית, ולכן כל מלחמה תוביל בהכרח למותם של מאות מליוני אנשים.
יותר מידי אנקדוטות טובות בספר מכדי לציין. המלצת קריאה חמה. ובואו נקווה כי גם הרוסים אוהבים את ילדיהם.
הטרנד הכללי העולה מהספר הוא שמרבית הנשיאים (להוציא אייזנהאואר, וכמסתבר... טראמפ) רצו לצמצם את כמות כלי הנשק הגרעיניים של המדינה, אך מצאו את עצמם נגררים אחר הצבא בהגדלת כמות ראשי הנפץ הגרעיניים כדי לענות על "איומים" של הצד השני. לכמות ראשי הנפץ הגרעיניים יש משמעות חשובה - אם תאגור יותר מידי יהיה לך יתרון על פני הצד השני, אך הדבר יוסיף אמינות להנחה שאתה תשתמש בנשק כ"מכה ראשונה" ומכאן לחשש של הצד השני ולרצון מצידו להתחמש עוד יותר. מנגד, אם תשמור על שוויון בין כמות ראשי הנפץ עם הצד השני, לא תוכל להרשות לעצמך להחזיק במדיניות תגובה גרעינית ("מכה שנייה"). מלחמה גרעינית "מצומצת" לא באה בחשבון, זה הכל או כלום. גם מלחמה קונבנציונאלית בין מעצמות היא בלתי אפשרית, ולכן כל מלחמה תוביל בהכרח למותם של מאות מליוני אנשים.
יותר מידי אנקדוטות טובות בספר מכדי לציין. המלצת קריאה חמה. ובואו נקווה כי גם הרוסים אוהבים את ילדיהם.
August 24, 2025
Kaplan is a veteran national security reporter who has written on nuclear history before. Here he relies on recently declassified materials to tell the story of a US military bureaucracy hell-bent on Armageddon.
In the 1950's, nuclear weapons were a game of both quantity and quality. Every year seemed to bring bigger bombs and more, many more, bombs. Deterrence was the name of the game; being able to kill your opponent -- a state, not a mere army -- many times over, even after they had launched the barrage which would destroy you (also a state) would deter the opponent from trying anything foolish. The strategy was first dubbed 'assured destruction'; but a perhaps-disillusioned, perhaps-joking nuclear analyst called it 'mutually assured destruction', or MAD: a term which unsurprisingly stuck.
After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, US political leaders were horrified at how close the world has come to destruction. During the crisis, Kennedy had struggled with his military leadership, who had been pushing him towards the edge, rather than away from it. From there on, US administrations were intent on reducing the risk and destructivity of any nuclear war. Kaplan tells the story of how their attempts to impose civilian control on nuclear strategy were thwarted by the MAD military bureaucracy.
One of the central problems of government is how to control the departments executing various policies. These are termed 'principal-agent problems': the principal, e.g. an administration, has a particular set of goals, but the agent -- say, an office under a government department -- has their own incentives. Bureaucrats seek self-preservation, trying to make their departments indispensable, finding new work for themselves. They control the flow of information to their political masters and choose which policy options to present to a minister. And they may effectively live in a bubble, seeing the world only through the lens of their own office's worldview, rather than in terms of the public good.
'The Bomb' presents a fascinating look at the most perverse principal-agent problem: the struggle of successive US administrations trying to control Strategic Air Command (SAC), the arm of the US military tasked with planning for a nuclear war.
At the heart of this struggle is the strategy prepared for the contingency of the US becoming the target of a nuclear attack (or initiating a pre-emptive attack), with the anodyne name of Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP. While SAC accepted that the political leaders had the ultimate decision-making power in a war, they insisted that the military leaders -- the professionals, after all -- had the final say on *how* any nuclear war was going to be fought. And they saw 30 million dead Americans as a victory, if the Soviets had lost 100 million. The SAC kept control of the agenda, and would decide what options they would offer to the President should the other side launch an attack.
Set up after the Second World War and nurtured by commanders responsible for the bombardment of German and Japanese cities, the SAC had a clear view of its task: to ensure the killing of as many 'bastards' as possible if the missiles ever started flying. Presidents and department secretaries were horrified by the idea of having to take decisions which would kill tens or hundreds of millions of civilians, and wanted the SAC to find options for more limited attacks. The SAC fastidiously followed political directives to the letter, while thwarting any intentions to limit the 'collateral damage' that they saw as the primary goal. Asked to destroy military targets only, they took a wide interpretation of the term 'military' and then drew up plans that would not only destroy such targets many times over, but then nuke the ruins for good measure. Asked to target the enemy's ability to recover from a nuclear war (in the hope that this would deter the Communists from starting one), the SAC would plan to obliterate factories -- conveniently located in cities. Asked to target the enemy leadership, the SAC would humbly oblige, again targeting the various offices and dwellings of the minor ministers -- again located across the Soviet Union in cities ranging from Moscow to provincial backwaters. To the military men, China was fair game even after Nixon had gone to Beijing to warm relations. "Is this on paper?", spluttered Kissinger.
The problem of fighting a nuclear war is, of course, that it requires wholly inhuman decisions of the leaders tasked with it. With MAD, a nuclear war is perfectly irrational: a decisionmaker understands that starting a nuclear war will utterly destroy their own country, and thus should never start one. Yet excessive confidence in this conclusion may tempt some leader to push too far. And would the President follow through with a retaliatory attack which implied killing 300 million civilians -- is the threat of retaliation credible? And, yet, would they not, if their own country was under such an attack? Would planning smaller retaliatory attacks even be serious enough to really deter an adversary?
Ironically, given his later reputation, it was Dick Cheney, as Secretary of Defense under George H.W. Bush, who took a crowbar to the immensely secretive SAC and forced it to really spell out how its plans were made and what they contained. (Such as planning to lob nearly 700 warheads into a 50-mile circle drawn about Moscow.) In the 1990's, the Soviet Union had collapsed and the United States was developing increasingly advanced and accurate weapon systems, allowing them a sense of security even with a much-reduced number of warheads. Yet, as we are now painfully aware, the nuclear bomb and questions of nuclear deterrence -- and of nuclear war -- did not magically vanish in 1990. They just went into hiding for a few decades, to return to haunt us once the unipolar moment had passed.
Like most books on nuclear weapons, 'The Bomb' is a disturbing read. However, we've known about the ridiculous amount of megatonnage looming in silos and lurking at the depths of the ocean for a long time. What 'The Bomb' excels in is in describing the perverse struggle between the military planners and their supposed political masters, leaving the reader wondering whether this aspect of the nuclear problem has truly gone away.
In the 1950's, nuclear weapons were a game of both quantity and quality. Every year seemed to bring bigger bombs and more, many more, bombs. Deterrence was the name of the game; being able to kill your opponent -- a state, not a mere army -- many times over, even after they had launched the barrage which would destroy you (also a state) would deter the opponent from trying anything foolish. The strategy was first dubbed 'assured destruction'; but a perhaps-disillusioned, perhaps-joking nuclear analyst called it 'mutually assured destruction', or MAD: a term which unsurprisingly stuck.
After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, US political leaders were horrified at how close the world has come to destruction. During the crisis, Kennedy had struggled with his military leadership, who had been pushing him towards the edge, rather than away from it. From there on, US administrations were intent on reducing the risk and destructivity of any nuclear war. Kaplan tells the story of how their attempts to impose civilian control on nuclear strategy were thwarted by the MAD military bureaucracy.
One of the central problems of government is how to control the departments executing various policies. These are termed 'principal-agent problems': the principal, e.g. an administration, has a particular set of goals, but the agent -- say, an office under a government department -- has their own incentives. Bureaucrats seek self-preservation, trying to make their departments indispensable, finding new work for themselves. They control the flow of information to their political masters and choose which policy options to present to a minister. And they may effectively live in a bubble, seeing the world only through the lens of their own office's worldview, rather than in terms of the public good.
'The Bomb' presents a fascinating look at the most perverse principal-agent problem: the struggle of successive US administrations trying to control Strategic Air Command (SAC), the arm of the US military tasked with planning for a nuclear war.
At the heart of this struggle is the strategy prepared for the contingency of the US becoming the target of a nuclear attack (or initiating a pre-emptive attack), with the anodyne name of Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP. While SAC accepted that the political leaders had the ultimate decision-making power in a war, they insisted that the military leaders -- the professionals, after all -- had the final say on *how* any nuclear war was going to be fought. And they saw 30 million dead Americans as a victory, if the Soviets had lost 100 million. The SAC kept control of the agenda, and would decide what options they would offer to the President should the other side launch an attack.
Set up after the Second World War and nurtured by commanders responsible for the bombardment of German and Japanese cities, the SAC had a clear view of its task: to ensure the killing of as many 'bastards' as possible if the missiles ever started flying. Presidents and department secretaries were horrified by the idea of having to take decisions which would kill tens or hundreds of millions of civilians, and wanted the SAC to find options for more limited attacks. The SAC fastidiously followed political directives to the letter, while thwarting any intentions to limit the 'collateral damage' that they saw as the primary goal. Asked to destroy military targets only, they took a wide interpretation of the term 'military' and then drew up plans that would not only destroy such targets many times over, but then nuke the ruins for good measure. Asked to target the enemy's ability to recover from a nuclear war (in the hope that this would deter the Communists from starting one), the SAC would plan to obliterate factories -- conveniently located in cities. Asked to target the enemy leadership, the SAC would humbly oblige, again targeting the various offices and dwellings of the minor ministers -- again located across the Soviet Union in cities ranging from Moscow to provincial backwaters. To the military men, China was fair game even after Nixon had gone to Beijing to warm relations. "Is this on paper?", spluttered Kissinger.
The problem of fighting a nuclear war is, of course, that it requires wholly inhuman decisions of the leaders tasked with it. With MAD, a nuclear war is perfectly irrational: a decisionmaker understands that starting a nuclear war will utterly destroy their own country, and thus should never start one. Yet excessive confidence in this conclusion may tempt some leader to push too far. And would the President follow through with a retaliatory attack which implied killing 300 million civilians -- is the threat of retaliation credible? And, yet, would they not, if their own country was under such an attack? Would planning smaller retaliatory attacks even be serious enough to really deter an adversary?
Ironically, given his later reputation, it was Dick Cheney, as Secretary of Defense under George H.W. Bush, who took a crowbar to the immensely secretive SAC and forced it to really spell out how its plans were made and what they contained. (Such as planning to lob nearly 700 warheads into a 50-mile circle drawn about Moscow.) In the 1990's, the Soviet Union had collapsed and the United States was developing increasingly advanced and accurate weapon systems, allowing them a sense of security even with a much-reduced number of warheads. Yet, as we are now painfully aware, the nuclear bomb and questions of nuclear deterrence -- and of nuclear war -- did not magically vanish in 1990. They just went into hiding for a few decades, to return to haunt us once the unipolar moment had passed.
Like most books on nuclear weapons, 'The Bomb' is a disturbing read. However, we've known about the ridiculous amount of megatonnage looming in silos and lurking at the depths of the ocean for a long time. What 'The Bomb' excels in is in describing the perverse struggle between the military planners and their supposed political masters, leaving the reader wondering whether this aspect of the nuclear problem has truly gone away.
September 28, 2021
A solid if not spectacular overview of the history of US Nuclear strategy/posture, this work follows how various presidents, from Truman to Trump managed the US nuclear arsenal and the plans for implementing the use of such weapons (if the need ever arose). There are good insights into the plans, but it can be a bit of a surface level overview. Also, there are some hints of the author's political bias, especially in language describing the actions of George W. Bush, Cheney and Trump. Yet, it does not completely cloud the narrative. This work does tend to leave out some key parts/issues (surely Bush and Obama would not have merely disregarded the various issues with the nuclear force in the 2000s-early 2010s, but this work barely acknowledges them, which had significant impacts on US nuclear posture).
A decent/quick read, but maybe a starter for other works about US nuclear strategy/posture.
A decent/quick read, but maybe a starter for other works about US nuclear strategy/posture.
June 10, 2020
Very disappointing
Gradually becomes partisan, gossipy and useless. Level of detail for some useless, irrelevant mundane side-stories is mind-boggling, to the point where one almost wonders if the author will soon tell us the color of the protagonists' underwear as well.
It's essentially a ton of (mostly irrelevant) info/details on how the relationships between the various US Armed services and the White House function, it doesn't provide much new. Approximately 99.5% of it is focused on the US/US-view of the world
Not too sure who this book intends to satisfy and even less sure that it has successfully done so
Gradually becomes partisan, gossipy and useless. Level of detail for some useless, irrelevant mundane side-stories is mind-boggling, to the point where one almost wonders if the author will soon tell us the color of the protagonists' underwear as well.
It's essentially a ton of (mostly irrelevant) info/details on how the relationships between the various US Armed services and the White House function, it doesn't provide much new. Approximately 99.5% of it is focused on the US/US-view of the world
Not too sure who this book intends to satisfy and even less sure that it has successfully done so
September 15, 2020
Fascinating. Horrifying. The bomb has not gone away, though those who remember the horror of its destructive power are aging and dying. One hopes a book like this not only recounts the history (and near misses) but informs today's citizenry to keep nuclear arms use/proliferation from falling off the collective radar.
What today is considered "low yield" is as powerful as the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki....
Let that sink in...
What today is considered "low yield" is as powerful as the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki....
Let that sink in...
April 25, 2023
An American looks at the American nuclear bomb from an exclusively American viewpoint.
Nine countries currently have nuclear weapons. Most of those barely get mentioned in this book; there is no definitive statement that three of them – Israel, India, and Pakistan in fact have The Bomb (there is reference to “Israel having enough plutonium for a bomb” - but not that they have one (or more) and to Pakistan's uranium enrichment program – but while that facilitates having The Bomb, it is not dispositively equivalent). No mention is made of the states having The Bomb and giving it up – Ukraine, Kazahstan, Belarus, South Africa (the last three not even name-checked for any reason). Nor of states that started a nuclear weapons program and ended it short of building The Bomb, to include Sweden, Germany, and South Korea (per a 2022 study by Vipen Narang, “At least 29 countries have made efforts to become nuclear; 19 have specifically tried to develop nuclear bombs, and 10 have succeeded”). The other “Nuclear Weapon States” - NWS, as defined by the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) also get short shrift. No, this is a book about the American Bomb.
Narrowing his topic further, Kaplan spends little time on the US Navy, and that almost exclusively on the ballistic missiles carried by submarines; no discussion of nuclear weapons carried by aircraft or sea-launched cruise missiles, the barest mention of nuclear weapons for the war at sea. The US Army also gets little attention, even though its Davy Crockett (extremely-) short-range rockets (not mentioned at all) and nuclear artillery rounds posed an extremely high risk of rapid escalation to nuclear war if the USSR and Warsaw Pact had invaded West Germany in the 1960s. Nor is General MacArthur ever mentioned, despite his fervent desire to expend most of the US nuclear arsenal on China after its intervention in Korea in 1950. Also missing in action is Barry Goldwater – a nuclear hawk defanged by a daisy.
The focus here is Presidents (some of them), and Air Force generals, particularly those with Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha, Nebraska. Kaplan spends little to no time on FDR, LBJ, or Ford. As to the latter, he invests nuclear civilian policy with McNamara and Kissinger, as if their Presidential bosses had little influence or control. For the others, the Presidents are shown as attempting to control how a nuclear war will be fought, only to be thwarted by USAF/SAC operational planners, who always find one more target to hit with two or three more weapons, compiling their list in their ever-so-secret, close-hold, “don't show this to the civilians” Blue Book. This is a point that is stressed, underscored, and emphasized, again and again. So much so, that by the time civilian control is finally asserted over the nuclear war plans at SAC, and the number of nuclear weapons cut drastically (and SAC disestablished), the reader is left wondering what just happened, and why now, not earlier or later. But as with the introduction of new weapon systems (especially delivery vehicles) and the negotiation of and withdrawal from treaties, in the book these things just happen. (Charles Fort would be proud.)
Numerous errors, minor and not-so-minor, plague the text. Admiral Arleigh Burke was known as “31-knot Burke,” not “30-knots Burke.” (p 85) B-36 bombers had just entered operational service in January 1949, so most of the bombers involved in the disasterous “mock attack” on Dayton Ohio were older types. [Of six Bombardment Wings ultimately equipped with the B-36, only one or maybe two had B-36s operational in January 1949.] (p 14) Bombadiers drop bombs, not gunners. (p. 14) West Germany was NOT “constitutionally barred from building a large military” (p. 127); in 1979 (the time under discussion) they had the largest army in Europe among all NATO partners, twice the size of the US deployment, and 5000 tanks (Nazi Germany had invaded the USSR with less than 4000 tanks). National Security Advisor HR McMaster is depicted compelling the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mattis to draw up war plans for an attack on North Korea. McMaster “felt an obligation to salute the president's orders” (p 268) - with no mention that McMaster made his reputation writing “Dereliction of Duty” which had argued exactly the opposite course for military advisors. The book cites the movies The Day After (1983) and The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951) as having influenced Reagan's approach to nuclear weapons and international security. Some scant reference is made to Dr Strangelove (1964) as a touchstone (“a Strangelovian idea”), but none to its cultural impact or that of Fail-Safe (1964) or On the Beach (1959). “Negative Security Assurances” were NOT invented by Obama, or Carter's ACDA, and NSAs did not “go nowhere.” (p 230-1) NSAs – a legally-binding promise by a nuclear weapon state that it will not use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against those states that don't have recourse to nukes, dates back to adoption of the NPT in 1968, and the US has ratified such a promise to Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1968 Treaty of Tlatelolco. And so on.
For whom can this book be recommended: No one. Experts will be frustrated by the superficial discussion of how the nuclear war plans (SIOP) came to be and prospered. Novices will be lost by the “inside-baseball” tone of the treatment.
Nine countries currently have nuclear weapons. Most of those barely get mentioned in this book; there is no definitive statement that three of them – Israel, India, and Pakistan in fact have The Bomb (there is reference to “Israel having enough plutonium for a bomb” - but not that they have one (or more) and to Pakistan's uranium enrichment program – but while that facilitates having The Bomb, it is not dispositively equivalent). No mention is made of the states having The Bomb and giving it up – Ukraine, Kazahstan, Belarus, South Africa (the last three not even name-checked for any reason). Nor of states that started a nuclear weapons program and ended it short of building The Bomb, to include Sweden, Germany, and South Korea (per a 2022 study by Vipen Narang, “At least 29 countries have made efforts to become nuclear; 19 have specifically tried to develop nuclear bombs, and 10 have succeeded”). The other “Nuclear Weapon States” - NWS, as defined by the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) also get short shrift. No, this is a book about the American Bomb.
Narrowing his topic further, Kaplan spends little time on the US Navy, and that almost exclusively on the ballistic missiles carried by submarines; no discussion of nuclear weapons carried by aircraft or sea-launched cruise missiles, the barest mention of nuclear weapons for the war at sea. The US Army also gets little attention, even though its Davy Crockett (extremely-) short-range rockets (not mentioned at all) and nuclear artillery rounds posed an extremely high risk of rapid escalation to nuclear war if the USSR and Warsaw Pact had invaded West Germany in the 1960s. Nor is General MacArthur ever mentioned, despite his fervent desire to expend most of the US nuclear arsenal on China after its intervention in Korea in 1950. Also missing in action is Barry Goldwater – a nuclear hawk defanged by a daisy.
The focus here is Presidents (some of them), and Air Force generals, particularly those with Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha, Nebraska. Kaplan spends little to no time on FDR, LBJ, or Ford. As to the latter, he invests nuclear civilian policy with McNamara and Kissinger, as if their Presidential bosses had little influence or control. For the others, the Presidents are shown as attempting to control how a nuclear war will be fought, only to be thwarted by USAF/SAC operational planners, who always find one more target to hit with two or three more weapons, compiling their list in their ever-so-secret, close-hold, “don't show this to the civilians” Blue Book. This is a point that is stressed, underscored, and emphasized, again and again. So much so, that by the time civilian control is finally asserted over the nuclear war plans at SAC, and the number of nuclear weapons cut drastically (and SAC disestablished), the reader is left wondering what just happened, and why now, not earlier or later. But as with the introduction of new weapon systems (especially delivery vehicles) and the negotiation of and withdrawal from treaties, in the book these things just happen. (Charles Fort would be proud.)
Numerous errors, minor and not-so-minor, plague the text. Admiral Arleigh Burke was known as “31-knot Burke,” not “30-knots Burke.” (p 85) B-36 bombers had just entered operational service in January 1949, so most of the bombers involved in the disasterous “mock attack” on Dayton Ohio were older types. [Of six Bombardment Wings ultimately equipped with the B-36, only one or maybe two had B-36s operational in January 1949.] (p 14) Bombadiers drop bombs, not gunners. (p. 14) West Germany was NOT “constitutionally barred from building a large military” (p. 127); in 1979 (the time under discussion) they had the largest army in Europe among all NATO partners, twice the size of the US deployment, and 5000 tanks (Nazi Germany had invaded the USSR with less than 4000 tanks). National Security Advisor HR McMaster is depicted compelling the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mattis to draw up war plans for an attack on North Korea. McMaster “felt an obligation to salute the president's orders” (p 268) - with no mention that McMaster made his reputation writing “Dereliction of Duty” which had argued exactly the opposite course for military advisors. The book cites the movies The Day After (1983) and The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951) as having influenced Reagan's approach to nuclear weapons and international security. Some scant reference is made to Dr Strangelove (1964) as a touchstone (“a Strangelovian idea”), but none to its cultural impact or that of Fail-Safe (1964) or On the Beach (1959). “Negative Security Assurances” were NOT invented by Obama, or Carter's ACDA, and NSAs did not “go nowhere.” (p 230-1) NSAs – a legally-binding promise by a nuclear weapon state that it will not use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against those states that don't have recourse to nukes, dates back to adoption of the NPT in 1968, and the US has ratified such a promise to Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1968 Treaty of Tlatelolco. And so on.
For whom can this book be recommended: No one. Experts will be frustrated by the superficial discussion of how the nuclear war plans (SIOP) came to be and prospered. Novices will be lost by the “inside-baseball” tone of the treatment.
July 26, 2023
Starts off with a little bit of a dry history lesson, but that turns out to be necessary to find context. Made me re-examine the role of Gen Curtis LeMay as even more of a ghoulish figure who cares nothing for civilian lives. His legacy of tactical global destruction lived decades after he left the stage. I learned a ton, not just about history and nuclear posture, but about leadership and politics.
March 23, 2020
The author reviews the history of nuclear weapons strategy and its evolution from the Truman administration to current times. He describes the key participants in the process, including military commanders and their staff, civilian contractors, academic advisors , and Presidents and legislators. Every nuclear-age President faced strategic military and diplomatic issues that arose from the Cold War and subsequent conflicts that involved the question of whether to use nuclear weapons. These included the Cuban Missile Crisis, the USSR's occupation of Eastern Europe, and the Korean, Vietnamese and Gulf wars. Not surprisingly, the U.S. military argued for maintaining high levels of nuclear weapons in the Triad of land, sea and air platforms throughout this era as a deterrent to our enemies, and , in some cases favoring a first strike strategy. General Curtis LeMay took this view ,and had he prevailed we would have dropped atom bombs on the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries in the Cold War. Fortunately, every President who received first-strike recommendations from his advisors declined the advice and there has been no nuclear weapons used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The author reviews the various philosophies that have been developed regarding the use of the Bomb over the years such as mutual assured destruction, counter-force strategy, escalation spectrum, and treaties to reduce the number and proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world.
I found two sections of the book to be particularly interesting. The first was the review in the late 80's by Franklin Miller of the U.S. nuclear policy. He found huge discrepancies between the written policies developed over the years, and the military's actual plans for delivering weapons to the adversary. The SAC command, then in charge of the delivery systems, had grossly over-estimated the numbers of weapons required to fulfill its mission, with the actual number being less than half of that.
The second section of interest relates to our current President. Early in his administration, in a review of the nation's nuclear policy , Trump wondered why we only had 2,500 nuclear weapons, when the number had reached 32,000 at its peak in 1969, Why couldn't he have that many? Despite the efforts of his staff to convince him that the 2,500 number had been judged to be adequate for deterrence and compliance with treaties in force, he continued to ask why he couldn't have what previous presidents had.
His threats against North Korea in response to their testing of bombs and ICBM's prompted a legislative review of the decision-making process for first-strikes, and whether the military commanders could override a presidential decision that was clearly irrational. Scary stuff.
This is a well-written book that provides a level of detail adequate for the reader to understand the various issues that are involved with nuclear strategy.
The author reviews the various philosophies that have been developed regarding the use of the Bomb over the years such as mutual assured destruction, counter-force strategy, escalation spectrum, and treaties to reduce the number and proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world.
I found two sections of the book to be particularly interesting. The first was the review in the late 80's by Franklin Miller of the U.S. nuclear policy. He found huge discrepancies between the written policies developed over the years, and the military's actual plans for delivering weapons to the adversary. The SAC command, then in charge of the delivery systems, had grossly over-estimated the numbers of weapons required to fulfill its mission, with the actual number being less than half of that.
The second section of interest relates to our current President. Early in his administration, in a review of the nation's nuclear policy , Trump wondered why we only had 2,500 nuclear weapons, when the number had reached 32,000 at its peak in 1969, Why couldn't he have that many? Despite the efforts of his staff to convince him that the 2,500 number had been judged to be adequate for deterrence and compliance with treaties in force, he continued to ask why he couldn't have what previous presidents had.
His threats against North Korea in response to their testing of bombs and ICBM's prompted a legislative review of the decision-making process for first-strikes, and whether the military commanders could override a presidential decision that was clearly irrational. Scary stuff.
This is a well-written book that provides a level of detail adequate for the reader to understand the various issues that are involved with nuclear strategy.
May 20, 2020
Goodness--sometimes I think it's better that you don't know what you don't know, or haven't been told. The Bomb--nuclear/hydrogen/atomic--has been around for 70+ years now, and it's really a miracle that it hasn't been used since its first two uses over Hiroshima & Nagasaki, which brought WWII to an end. There have been plenty of opportunities for it to be deployed again--and, for sure, after reading this insightful & truly, in some ways, frightening book--plenty of back door nuclear weapons discussions & strategy plans devised/revised for its use.
One's mind is boggled by the actual plans that the US government has had over these years for deploying these weapons of mass destruction. As if these generals and political figures could even comprehend the devastation their deployment--in the numbers they planned for--would have caused; horrific, unspeakable. Yet, they seem to have routinely tossed these numbers of missiles and plans for mass destruction around like talking about dropping off newspapers on a doorstep. This account of the secret history of nuclear war goes right up into the Trump administration of recent days--and the sabre-rattling between the US/Trump & N. Korea/Jonu-un. And it's scary; it's maddening. It's inhumane. It's downright frightening.
The latest high-level US government/military discussions were regarding updating/upgrading the deployment & use of "low yield" Trident II nuclear missiles aboard US subs. These missiles **each** carry a nuclear payload of 8 kilotons...OK, what does that mean? "The conventional bombs that leveled buildings in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the first two decades of the twenty-first century had the explosive power of 2,000 pounds of TNT. The low-yield Trident II warhead would explode with the blast power of 8 kilotons—meaning 8,000 tons, or 16,000,000 pounds—plus the heat, smoke, and radiation that would spread like toxic wildfire." Yes, one of them would release the power/destruction of 16 million pounds of TNT. Unimaginable. That conversations about these kinds of destructive powers have been *routine* up till today--and over the past 75 years--is simply incomprehensible in many ways. Madness and madmen, methinks. The consequences of what President Eisenhower warned would would result from the "military-industrial complex." Each service fighting for its share and influence; each congressman/woman & senator fighting for their part of the pie...
Borrowed from the library; read on my iPad.
One's mind is boggled by the actual plans that the US government has had over these years for deploying these weapons of mass destruction. As if these generals and political figures could even comprehend the devastation their deployment--in the numbers they planned for--would have caused; horrific, unspeakable. Yet, they seem to have routinely tossed these numbers of missiles and plans for mass destruction around like talking about dropping off newspapers on a doorstep. This account of the secret history of nuclear war goes right up into the Trump administration of recent days--and the sabre-rattling between the US/Trump & N. Korea/Jonu-un. And it's scary; it's maddening. It's inhumane. It's downright frightening.
The latest high-level US government/military discussions were regarding updating/upgrading the deployment & use of "low yield" Trident II nuclear missiles aboard US subs. These missiles **each** carry a nuclear payload of 8 kilotons...OK, what does that mean? "The conventional bombs that leveled buildings in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the first two decades of the twenty-first century had the explosive power of 2,000 pounds of TNT. The low-yield Trident II warhead would explode with the blast power of 8 kilotons—meaning 8,000 tons, or 16,000,000 pounds—plus the heat, smoke, and radiation that would spread like toxic wildfire." Yes, one of them would release the power/destruction of 16 million pounds of TNT. Unimaginable. That conversations about these kinds of destructive powers have been *routine* up till today--and over the past 75 years--is simply incomprehensible in many ways. Madness and madmen, methinks. The consequences of what President Eisenhower warned would would result from the "military-industrial complex." Each service fighting for its share and influence; each congressman/woman & senator fighting for their part of the pie...
Borrowed from the library; read on my iPad.
May 20, 2022
A Good Introduction
Probably as good a history of the role of nuclear weapons in national security as you are likely to find that is accessible to the general reader. Having read Michael Sherwin’s excellent and frightening “Gambling with Armageddon,” Kaplan’s coverage of the Cuban missile crisis seemed a bit shallow, suggesting the same for the rest of book, but that is probably inescapable when attempting to cover over seven decades of history in just under 300 pages.
Other reviewers have been put off by the author’s treatment of Donald Trump. I agree, Kaplan makes almost no effort to disguise his disdain for the former President. This could legitimately call into question the integrity of the book. But the Trump presidency is recent history. We don’t have to trust the author here. We were all there. We lived through it. Trump was nothing if not very vocal. His statements were all captured and reported. His impulsiveness, childishness, and almost total disinterest in anything other than how someone or something makes him feel in any given moment are well documented. Thus, while I wish Kaplan had kept a more objective tone and let the history speak for itself, his judgments are still well founded.
Interesting to me especially was Kaplan’s discussion of the “clever briefer” threat. I had never heard of it. A “clever briefer” being an advocate of nuclear war fighting who has access to a less informed / ambivalent / impressionable nuclear decision maker (typically the head of state in countries possessing nukes). There are serious people who are convinced limited use of low-yield nukes are a viable and desirable option in some circumstances (preventing escalation to a high-yield end of civilization apparently being a matter of hope?). Trump’s well-established reputation for being easily swayed by whoever is in front of him is now, literally, historic. How do we, and other nuclear weapons states, guard against this? A good question.
Even for those whose rapturous love for President Trump knows no bounds, I would encourage picking up the book (or checking it out from the library), especially if this is likely to be the only book you read on this subject. Just skip the introduction and the last chapter and you will come away knowing more than most folks about the nuclear sword of Damocles we all still live under.
Probably as good a history of the role of nuclear weapons in national security as you are likely to find that is accessible to the general reader. Having read Michael Sherwin’s excellent and frightening “Gambling with Armageddon,” Kaplan’s coverage of the Cuban missile crisis seemed a bit shallow, suggesting the same for the rest of book, but that is probably inescapable when attempting to cover over seven decades of history in just under 300 pages.
Other reviewers have been put off by the author’s treatment of Donald Trump. I agree, Kaplan makes almost no effort to disguise his disdain for the former President. This could legitimately call into question the integrity of the book. But the Trump presidency is recent history. We don’t have to trust the author here. We were all there. We lived through it. Trump was nothing if not very vocal. His statements were all captured and reported. His impulsiveness, childishness, and almost total disinterest in anything other than how someone or something makes him feel in any given moment are well documented. Thus, while I wish Kaplan had kept a more objective tone and let the history speak for itself, his judgments are still well founded.
Interesting to me especially was Kaplan’s discussion of the “clever briefer” threat. I had never heard of it. A “clever briefer” being an advocate of nuclear war fighting who has access to a less informed / ambivalent / impressionable nuclear decision maker (typically the head of state in countries possessing nukes). There are serious people who are convinced limited use of low-yield nukes are a viable and desirable option in some circumstances (preventing escalation to a high-yield end of civilization apparently being a matter of hope?). Trump’s well-established reputation for being easily swayed by whoever is in front of him is now, literally, historic. How do we, and other nuclear weapons states, guard against this? A good question.
Even for those whose rapturous love for President Trump knows no bounds, I would encourage picking up the book (or checking it out from the library), especially if this is likely to be the only book you read on this subject. Just skip the introduction and the last chapter and you will come away knowing more than most folks about the nuclear sword of Damocles we all still live under.
October 14, 2023
I never really understood the military industrial complex until reading this book.
Much of the nuclear arms build-up by the US was driven by competition between branches of the armed forces. the Air Force became independent after WW2, and wanted to be the most relevant and most powerful branch of the military. Best way to do that was to have bombs.
The war plan of the US during the cold war was to wipe dozens of cities off the map. Killing hundreds of millions of civilians in both the USSR and China - EVEN IF THE US WASN'T AT WAR WITH CHINA. It was assumed that if we fought the USSR, China would be involved, so the only maneuvers planned for were those that attacked both countries.
The Strategic Air Command was able to create military plans with incredibly little oversight from the president. Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Carter all tried to get more sensible plans in place, but they weren't able to because of the political power of the military. The military would hide the full extent of the war plan from the presidents so that they would be left alone.
My favorite anecdote was when Kennedy wanted to read the US's nuclear war plan, the Air Force wouldn't let him. Someone - the secretary of State or something - requested to some officer for the report to be shared and they had an exchange like this:
Secretary: Please share the nuclear war plan. The president would like to read it
officer: I can't do that
Secretary: I think you didn't understand. The PRESIDENT is personally requesting the war plan
Officer: Maybe we can have a meeting to brief him on it
Secretary: He would prefer to read it. He is a very good reader
Officer: I will have to check with my boss
In the end Kennedy was not given the war plan, and was instead given a briefing where the officers could massage the messaging to obfuscate how insane the war plan was.
Thank goodness the cold war is over now and nobody has to worry about nuclear weapons ever again
Much of the nuclear arms build-up by the US was driven by competition between branches of the armed forces. the Air Force became independent after WW2, and wanted to be the most relevant and most powerful branch of the military. Best way to do that was to have bombs.
The war plan of the US during the cold war was to wipe dozens of cities off the map. Killing hundreds of millions of civilians in both the USSR and China - EVEN IF THE US WASN'T AT WAR WITH CHINA. It was assumed that if we fought the USSR, China would be involved, so the only maneuvers planned for were those that attacked both countries.
The Strategic Air Command was able to create military plans with incredibly little oversight from the president. Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Carter all tried to get more sensible plans in place, but they weren't able to because of the political power of the military. The military would hide the full extent of the war plan from the presidents so that they would be left alone.
My favorite anecdote was when Kennedy wanted to read the US's nuclear war plan, the Air Force wouldn't let him. Someone - the secretary of State or something - requested to some officer for the report to be shared and they had an exchange like this:
Secretary: Please share the nuclear war plan. The president would like to read it
officer: I can't do that
Secretary: I think you didn't understand. The PRESIDENT is personally requesting the war plan
Officer: Maybe we can have a meeting to brief him on it
Secretary: He would prefer to read it. He is a very good reader
Officer: I will have to check with my boss
In the end Kennedy was not given the war plan, and was instead given a briefing where the officers could massage the messaging to obfuscate how insane the war plan was.
Thank goodness the cold war is over now and nobody has to worry about nuclear weapons ever again
August 11, 2021
This book does, as they say, “exactly what it says on the tin”. It is a detailed overview of the United States approach, policies and strategy in regard to nuclear weapons and their use in armed conflicts. Starting with Truman and ending with Trump, the author disects each presidential administration and its "performance" in this specific area on two fronts, domestic and foreign.
The analysis of interaction of United States with "outside world" is of course primarily the story of Cold War and nuclear arms race with Soviet Union. In regard of that part of the story, "The Bomb" doesn't really provide much new information to those already familiar with the events. The real 'powder keg' in this book is Kaplan's tale of relationship between successive presidential administrations and the military organizations responsible for actual planning and waging of nuclear war, SAC and STRATCOM. If one is to believe the author, the highest leadership of U.S. military did its own thing for duration of 20th century with little regard for wishes and directives from its commander in chief sitting in the White House.
The narrative itself consists primarily of studies of key people in each consecutive White House administration. Analysis of their views, ideas, agendas and what impact they managed to have on the overall situation, provide the bulk of the content of this book. I wouldn't describe the “final product” as a riveting read, but it does render an in-depth, thought-provoking and ever so often utterly disturbing analysis of the subject matter.
A word of warning though… Anyone picking up this book needs to accept the fact that its scope is limited almost exclusively to the American point of view. Personally, as I read it, I found myself constantly frustrated over lack of information about the “other side of the hill”; a contrast and comparison of thoughts and ideas in White House and Kremlin would have made this excellent book into something extraordinary.
The analysis of interaction of United States with "outside world" is of course primarily the story of Cold War and nuclear arms race with Soviet Union. In regard of that part of the story, "The Bomb" doesn't really provide much new information to those already familiar with the events. The real 'powder keg' in this book is Kaplan's tale of relationship between successive presidential administrations and the military organizations responsible for actual planning and waging of nuclear war, SAC and STRATCOM. If one is to believe the author, the highest leadership of U.S. military did its own thing for duration of 20th century with little regard for wishes and directives from its commander in chief sitting in the White House.
The narrative itself consists primarily of studies of key people in each consecutive White House administration. Analysis of their views, ideas, agendas and what impact they managed to have on the overall situation, provide the bulk of the content of this book. I wouldn't describe the “final product” as a riveting read, but it does render an in-depth, thought-provoking and ever so often utterly disturbing analysis of the subject matter.
A word of warning though… Anyone picking up this book needs to accept the fact that its scope is limited almost exclusively to the American point of view. Personally, as I read it, I found myself constantly frustrated over lack of information about the “other side of the hill”; a contrast and comparison of thoughts and ideas in White House and Kremlin would have made this excellent book into something extraordinary.
March 13, 2020
I enjoy Fred Kaplan's short form writing for Slate, and I thought his previous book on cyberwarfare gave a great overview of how that field of conflict has come into being in the last generation. The Bomb originally started as an update of Kaplan's 1983 The Wizards of Armaggeddon, which covered the development of nuclear strategy by the Strategic Air Command and various think tanks during the early nuclear age. It eventually evolved into a focus on the policy-making side of nuclear strategy: how do political leaders grapple with the awesome responsibility of nuclear weapons strategy?
Unfortunately, Kaplan never lays out any kind of broad thesis. The first chapter plunges right into decisions around the use of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of WWII, and the rest of the book lays out the litany of government, military, and academic types who have argued over when and how the US should use nuclear weapons. It's a comprehensive history, but without a larger contextual framework, the significance of the facts isn't immediately clear. It's not until the final chapter that Kaplan finally explains what he sees as the recurring conflict of nuclear strategic thinking, that the type of nuclear posture that deters a nuclear war is not the kind of nuclear posture that would most effectively fight a nuclear war. So all the history just feels like a tug-of-war between those who think massive overkill is the right solution, versus those who think a smaller number of weapons (maybe none) is the only sane alternative.
It's a shame. The book is full of facts, but I don't know if I gained any new insights from reading it.
Unfortunately, Kaplan never lays out any kind of broad thesis. The first chapter plunges right into decisions around the use of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of WWII, and the rest of the book lays out the litany of government, military, and academic types who have argued over when and how the US should use nuclear weapons. It's a comprehensive history, but without a larger contextual framework, the significance of the facts isn't immediately clear. It's not until the final chapter that Kaplan finally explains what he sees as the recurring conflict of nuclear strategic thinking, that the type of nuclear posture that deters a nuclear war is not the kind of nuclear posture that would most effectively fight a nuclear war. So all the history just feels like a tug-of-war between those who think massive overkill is the right solution, versus those who think a smaller number of weapons (maybe none) is the only sane alternative.
It's a shame. The book is full of facts, but I don't know if I gained any new insights from reading it.
August 1, 2022
This book shares how American Presidents and American military leaders have approached nuclear war, from the original rationale to dropping the bombs in Japan through Trump’s handling of North Korean saber rattling.
Some parts of this book are brilliant, explaining very technical things in accessible language. It also manages to cover a lot of history without getting bogged down. I was surprised how fast paced the book felt, almost more like a novel than a history book. The ridiculous overkill and power grab that the first wave of a military leaders did is mind boggling. At times they had a plan called for 67 nukes to hit single target, just in case. They planned to bomb empty fields, because those fields might be used as back up their fields after they bombed the original airfields. It was sobering and fascinating.
However, book stumbled at the end when the author revealed a strong bias against Bush and Trump and for Clinton and Obama. He went from a nuanced discussion of Presidents to very partisan language. He had nothing good to say about Bush or Trump, and a lot of dramatic, and speculative statements about them as poor humans. And he had nothing but noble things to say about the two most recent Democratic presidents. So, the end of the book had a very different feel the rest of it. I think it’s still worth reading, even with this turn at the end. Just be forewarned of his inability to see both sides for modern Presidents.
Some parts of this book are brilliant, explaining very technical things in accessible language. It also manages to cover a lot of history without getting bogged down. I was surprised how fast paced the book felt, almost more like a novel than a history book. The ridiculous overkill and power grab that the first wave of a military leaders did is mind boggling. At times they had a plan called for 67 nukes to hit single target, just in case. They planned to bomb empty fields, because those fields might be used as back up their fields after they bombed the original airfields. It was sobering and fascinating.
However, book stumbled at the end when the author revealed a strong bias against Bush and Trump and for Clinton and Obama. He went from a nuanced discussion of Presidents to very partisan language. He had nothing good to say about Bush or Trump, and a lot of dramatic, and speculative statements about them as poor humans. And he had nothing but noble things to say about the two most recent Democratic presidents. So, the end of the book had a very different feel the rest of it. I think it’s still worth reading, even with this turn at the end. Just be forewarned of his inability to see both sides for modern Presidents.
February 21, 2023
I found Fred Kaplan's book, The Bomb, to be a fascinating exploration of the psychological and social factors that have shaped the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. Kaplan provides a comprehensive history of the bomb, from its origins in the Manhattan Project to its use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and beyond.
One of the key themes of the book is the role of decision-making in the development and use of nuclear weapons. Kaplan delves into the cognitive biases and heuristics that have influenced policymakers and military leaders throughout history, from overconfidence in the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence to the belief in the "nuclear taboo" that has prevented their use since World War II.
Kaplan also explores the complex interplay between nuclear weapons and international relations, highlighting the ways in which the possession of nuclear weapons has shaped power dynamics and influenced the behavior of states. He provides a nuanced analysis of the various strategies that states have employed to manage the risks of nuclear proliferation and deter potential adversaries.
Overall, I highly recommend The Bomb to anyone interested in the psychological and social dimensions of nuclear weapons. Kaplan's writing is clear and engaging, and his insights into the complex dynamics of nuclear decision-making are both thought-provoking and highly relevant to the challenges we face in the contemporary world.
One of the key themes of the book is the role of decision-making in the development and use of nuclear weapons. Kaplan delves into the cognitive biases and heuristics that have influenced policymakers and military leaders throughout history, from overconfidence in the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence to the belief in the "nuclear taboo" that has prevented their use since World War II.
Kaplan also explores the complex interplay between nuclear weapons and international relations, highlighting the ways in which the possession of nuclear weapons has shaped power dynamics and influenced the behavior of states. He provides a nuanced analysis of the various strategies that states have employed to manage the risks of nuclear proliferation and deter potential adversaries.
Overall, I highly recommend The Bomb to anyone interested in the psychological and social dimensions of nuclear weapons. Kaplan's writing is clear and engaging, and his insights into the complex dynamics of nuclear decision-making are both thought-provoking and highly relevant to the challenges we face in the contemporary world.
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