IS ISLAMIC ‘NEOFUNDAMENTALISM’ INCAPABLE OF CREATING A SOCIETY?
Author Oliver Roy wrote in the Preface to this 1992 book, “This book is neither about Islam in general nor about the place of politics in Islamic culture. It is about contemporary Islamist movements---the activist groups who see in Islam as much a political ideology as a religion, and who are therefore breaking with a certain tradition themselves. These are the movements that … have mounted challenges against both the West and the regimes in place in the Middle East. Does contemporary political Islam offer an alternative to Muslim societies? This is the subject of the pages that follow.” (Pg. vii)
He continues, “I will refer to the contemporary movement that conceives of Islam as a political ideology as ‘Islamism.’ … from Pakistan to Algeria it is spreading… being integrated into politics, leaving its mark on more and conflicts… But it has lost its original impetus. It has ‘social-democratized’ itself. It no longer offers a model for a different society or a brighter future. Today, any Islamist political victory in a Muslim country would produce only superficial changes in customs and law. Islamism has been transformed into a type of neofundamentalism concerned solely with reestablishing Islamic law, the sharia, without inventing new political forms …
“Why didn’t it succeed? The failure is primarily an intellectual one. Islamic thought rests on an initial premise that destroys its own innovative elements… In short, the development of Islamist thought … ends up dissociating itself from the very components of politics (institutions, authorities, an autonomous sphere separate from the private realm), seeing them as mere instruments for raising moral standards and thereby returning, by a different route, to the traditional perception of a ulamas and the reformists… Secon, Islamism is a failure historically: neither in Iran nor in liberated Afghanistan has a new society been established…. Throughout the Muslim world, nation-states are easily resisting the calls for the unity and reforging of the Islamist community… the Islamic revolution is behind us. Yet the crisis still remains… It is manifest in the permanence of autocratic regimes and the influence of tribal, ethnic, and religious segmentation… Islam is not a ‘cause.’ Could it have been a cure? I believe that the Islamist movement closed a door: that of revolution and the Islamic state. Only the rhetoric remains.” (Pg. ix-xi)
In the Introduction, he outlines, “The Muslim responses to the ‘Orientalist’ discourse are often stereotypical and can be sorted into three categories: (1) the nostalgia argument [‘it was Islam that brought civilization to the West’]; (2) rejection of the hypothesis [‘in what way are Western values superior?’]… (3) the apologia for Islam [‘everything is in the Quran and the Sunna, and Islam is the best religion’]. The first two … evade the question while accepting as fact that there is a modernity that produces its own values. The third constitutes the topic of this book.” (Pg. 11)
He states, “the Islamist movement is in keeping with two preexisting tendencies. One, of course, is the call to fundamentalism… The other tendency… is that of anticolonialism, of anti-imperialism, which today has become simply anti-Westernism… The targets are the same: foreign banks, night clubs, local governments accused of complacency toward the West.” (Pg. 4)
He summarizes, “it appears that the political action of the Islamists… falls in either with the logic of the state (Iran), or with traditional, if reconfigured segmentation (Afghanistan)… any political action amounts to the automatic creation of a secular space or a return to traditional segmentation. Herein lies the limit of the politicization of a region, of any religion. Our problem, then, is … to study a coherent ensemble… of texts, practices, and political organizations that deeply marked the political life of Muslim countries and their relationships with the countries of the North, while tending to alter the Muslims’ perception of Islam in a stricter moral direction.” (Pg. 23-24)
He notes, “The Islamists reproach the ulamas for two things. One is their servility to the powers in place, which leads them to accept a secular government and laws that do not conform to the sharia. The other is their compromise with Western modernity; the ulamas shave accepted modernity where the Islamists reject it (acceptance of the separation of religion and politics, which necessarily leads to secularization) and maintained the tradition where the Islamists reject it (indifference to modern science, rigid and casuistic teachings, rejection of political and social action).” (Pg. 37)
He asserts, “There is no true Islamist political thought, because Islamism rejects political philosophy and the human sciences as such. The magical appeal to virtue masks the impossibility of defining the Islamist political program in terms of the social reality.” (Pg. 71)
He points out, “One of the most striking differences between Islamism and neofundamentalism is the status of women… Islamist politicization allowed women access to the public sphere, which the neofundamentalists are taking away… The question of personal status (wives, family, divorce) is becoming the principal area of neofundamentalist assertions, which brutally reestablish the letter of the sharia without the social and educational measures that the Iranian or Egyptian Islamists favored.” (Pg. 83)
He summarizes, “Thus the impact of Islamism, aside from the parentheses of the Iranian revolution and the war in Afghanistan, is essentially sociocultural: it marks the streets and customs but has no power relationship in the Middle East. It does not influence either state borders of interests. It has not created a ‘third force’ in the world. It has not even been able to offer the Muslim masses a concrete expression for their anticolonialism. Can it offer an economic alternative or deeply transform a society? The answer seems to be no.” (Pg. 131)
He concludes, “Islamism now faded into neofundamentalism, is not a geostrategic factor: it will neither unify the Muslim world nor change the balance of power in the Middle East… the Islamists have molded themselves into the framework of existing states, adopting their modes of exercising power, their strategic demands, and their nationalism… Islamism is above all a sociocultural movement embodying the protest and frustration of a generation of youth that has not been integrated socially or politically.” (Pg. 194)
He argues, “The politics in which contemporary Islamist movements operates is thus a consequence of a new world-space and not of the return to a traditional cultural space. The triumphant neofundamentalism will be incapable of ensuring the insularity of Islamic societies; it depends economically on the world-space in the very exercise of its power; its society is too permeated with Western models, and no one can stop radio, television, cassettes, and travelers.” (Pg. 202)
He continues, “The culture that threatens Muslim society is neither Jewish nor Christian; it is a world culture of consumption and communication, a culture that is secular, atheist, and ultimately empty; it has no values or strategies, but it is already here, in the cassette and the transistor, present in the most remote village. This culture can withstand any reappropriation and reading. It is a code and not a civilization.” (Pg. 203)
This book will interest those studying contemporary Islamic politics and society.