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Reason in Human Affairs
What can reason (or more broadly, thinking) do for us and what can't it do? This is the question examined by the author, who received the 1978 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences "for his pioneering work on decision-making processes in economic organizations."
128 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 1983
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December 2, 2017
This book, the published version of a set of lectures originally given at Stanford, gives the reader a synthesis of Simon's varied insights. I will first discuss several highlights of this short text before noting several limitations. First the sketch of a "behavioral model of bounded rationality" (p. 19) in the first chapter, does an excellent job of explaining why rational choice theory is severely limited in its ability to explain the behavior of most decision makers most of the time. Simon rightly notes that human beings lack complete and consistent preferences, rarely understand more than a few of the available options, and in many cases cannot predict the outcomes of choices with any degree of reliability. The behavioral model that Simon puts forth in the place of the rational choice model, we are all, of course, familiar with. This is an approach where decisions are somewhat myopically focused on pressing problems, aiming to satisfice rather than optimize, to attain a sufficient outcome rather than the best possible outcome. But Simon's claim that what facilitates this form of choice is the fact that most decision problems are disconnected from other decision problems, or 'nearly decomposable,' to use a term that Simon used on another occasion is particularly noteworthy. It would be interesting to try to make this claim more rigorously in order to determine (a) to what extent it is true, (b) to what extent it is relative to one's intellectual and moral tradition(s), and (c) whether and to what degree the extent of decomposability has changed throughout the course of history.
The claims in chapter 2 concerning evolution are quite fascinating, with Simon becoming almost poetic at times. The upshot of this discussion is that the evolutionary process is not capable of reaching a global optimum both because there are too many potential genetic combinations such that many will never be actualized and that the environment to which organisms adapt is itself changing since it is in large part constituted by other organisms. The discussion of the evolutionary origins of altruism provides a nice introduction to topics often treated through the lens of evolutionary game theory though Simon's discussion is less than clear at one key point, which I will discuss at greater length below. Simon rightly highlights the fact that altruists may have fitness advantages insofar as they are part of a group composed of altruists who prefer interacting with other altruists. (This seems to be an accurate if only partial description of human life.) This point should go some way toward dispelling the facile claim that evolution obviously selects for egotism.
The final chapters discusses political institutions in the light of Simon's earlier claims about bounded rationality. Discussing the problems of climate change and populism in 1983, Simon sounds like something of a prophet. Unfortunately, this means that his insights have not been taken seriously. These insights involve a recognition of the limitations of political institutions, limitations largely derived from human cognitive limitations; and a realization that despite these limitations these institutions accomplish very real objectives. These insights should be obvious but they are all too easily forgotten.
One limitation of the text is Simon's trite acceptance of A.J. Ayer's emotivism. This is probably a text that he read while still a student but unfortunately Ayer's emotivism is no longer viable (see Peter Geach's critique). And not withstanding the existence of more sophisticated 'expressivist' versions of this position, it is unnecessary and adds nothing to his claims. A second limitation concerns Simon's failure to distinguish between evolutionary altruism and psychological altruism. The former involves fitness-reducing, other-directed behavior. The latter concerns the agent's reasons for action, where an agent acts in order to benefit others. This latter notion says nothing about fitness or the fitness implications of this behavior. Simon conflates these notions and because of this he claims that organisms that engage in other-directed behavior that is fitness-enhancing, exercise enlightened self-interest. But as this latter notion is normally used, it typically means something like engaging in cooperative behavior because it will be beneficial in the long-term. But Simon had already shown that psychological altruism may be fitness enhancing when altruists are part of a group composed of altruists who prefer interacting with other altruists. Thus, there is no need to to appeal self-interest, enlightened or otherwise to explain the fitness-enhancing nature of altruism under the conditions described. This is a really thought-provoking text that should be read widely if only to remind of things that we have already learned from Simon in other contexts.
The claims in chapter 2 concerning evolution are quite fascinating, with Simon becoming almost poetic at times. The upshot of this discussion is that the evolutionary process is not capable of reaching a global optimum both because there are too many potential genetic combinations such that many will never be actualized and that the environment to which organisms adapt is itself changing since it is in large part constituted by other organisms. The discussion of the evolutionary origins of altruism provides a nice introduction to topics often treated through the lens of evolutionary game theory though Simon's discussion is less than clear at one key point, which I will discuss at greater length below. Simon rightly highlights the fact that altruists may have fitness advantages insofar as they are part of a group composed of altruists who prefer interacting with other altruists. (This seems to be an accurate if only partial description of human life.) This point should go some way toward dispelling the facile claim that evolution obviously selects for egotism.
The final chapters discusses political institutions in the light of Simon's earlier claims about bounded rationality. Discussing the problems of climate change and populism in 1983, Simon sounds like something of a prophet. Unfortunately, this means that his insights have not been taken seriously. These insights involve a recognition of the limitations of political institutions, limitations largely derived from human cognitive limitations; and a realization that despite these limitations these institutions accomplish very real objectives. These insights should be obvious but they are all too easily forgotten.
One limitation of the text is Simon's trite acceptance of A.J. Ayer's emotivism. This is probably a text that he read while still a student but unfortunately Ayer's emotivism is no longer viable (see Peter Geach's critique). And not withstanding the existence of more sophisticated 'expressivist' versions of this position, it is unnecessary and adds nothing to his claims. A second limitation concerns Simon's failure to distinguish between evolutionary altruism and psychological altruism. The former involves fitness-reducing, other-directed behavior. The latter concerns the agent's reasons for action, where an agent acts in order to benefit others. This latter notion says nothing about fitness or the fitness implications of this behavior. Simon conflates these notions and because of this he claims that organisms that engage in other-directed behavior that is fitness-enhancing, exercise enlightened self-interest. But as this latter notion is normally used, it typically means something like engaging in cooperative behavior because it will be beneficial in the long-term. But Simon had already shown that psychological altruism may be fitness enhancing when altruists are part of a group composed of altruists who prefer interacting with other altruists. Thus, there is no need to to appeal self-interest, enlightened or otherwise to explain the fitness-enhancing nature of altruism under the conditions described. This is a really thought-provoking text that should be read widely if only to remind of things that we have already learned from Simon in other contexts.
January 19, 2026
This was a title that was an intense read despite its slim size.
It took me a long time to get to the end because of work obligations and writing as well as the density of the prose.
Simon won the 1978 Nobel Prize for his theory of bounded rationality and his approach to organizational decision-making, both of which he reintroduces in this later effort. This was when the Nobel Prize was awarded for actual achievements rather than potential future actions, as seen in the case of Obama.
His writing is quite obtuse at times, though well grounded. This is primarily an intellectual pursuit rather than an enjoyable read, yet it maintains a high level of intellectual honesty.
The man is a hard scientist, and his style makes him both a bit pedantic and quasi-religious. There were a few instances where I had to disagree with his take, sometimes on semantic grounds.
It might be useful (or perhaps not) to compare the vision of David Hume to that of our esteemed friend Simon. Hume identifies a barrier between facts and norms, whereas Simon generalizes this barrier into a theory of rational action, which extends Hume's perspective by asserting that both values and facts must be "presupposed" for reasoning to begin, and that neither can be justified by logic alone.
There are a few places in the text that are decidedly uncomfortable for the uninitiated reader, who may assume that Simon is advocating for eugenics-based evolutionary theory when, in fact, nothing could be further from the truth. The fact is that Simon does not sugarcoat his nuances, and only later can one begin to connect the dots and admire his profound insights.
Semantically, while acceptable, Simon practices a bit of contortionist tautological pleonism using the term "close propinquity," which roughly translates to near-nearness. To his credit, this is sometimes used to emphasize excessive proximity.
P.85 Simon makes the error of generalizing by stating, "None of us like war." This is intellectual overreach, for if nobody liked war, it probably would not exist. Saying they are inevitable is a cheap cop-out.
P.33. A questionable analysis: Who decides who will be the censor? There is much to learn from previous and outdated thinking despite the author's assertions to the contrary.
It took me a long time to get to the end because of work obligations and writing as well as the density of the prose.
Simon won the 1978 Nobel Prize for his theory of bounded rationality and his approach to organizational decision-making, both of which he reintroduces in this later effort. This was when the Nobel Prize was awarded for actual achievements rather than potential future actions, as seen in the case of Obama.
His writing is quite obtuse at times, though well grounded. This is primarily an intellectual pursuit rather than an enjoyable read, yet it maintains a high level of intellectual honesty.
The man is a hard scientist, and his style makes him both a bit pedantic and quasi-religious. There were a few instances where I had to disagree with his take, sometimes on semantic grounds.
It might be useful (or perhaps not) to compare the vision of David Hume to that of our esteemed friend Simon. Hume identifies a barrier between facts and norms, whereas Simon generalizes this barrier into a theory of rational action, which extends Hume's perspective by asserting that both values and facts must be "presupposed" for reasoning to begin, and that neither can be justified by logic alone.
There are a few places in the text that are decidedly uncomfortable for the uninitiated reader, who may assume that Simon is advocating for eugenics-based evolutionary theory when, in fact, nothing could be further from the truth. The fact is that Simon does not sugarcoat his nuances, and only later can one begin to connect the dots and admire his profound insights.
Semantically, while acceptable, Simon practices a bit of contortionist tautological pleonism using the term "close propinquity," which roughly translates to near-nearness. To his credit, this is sometimes used to emphasize excessive proximity.
P.85 Simon makes the error of generalizing by stating, "None of us like war." This is intellectual overreach, for if nobody liked war, it probably would not exist. Saying they are inevitable is a cheap cop-out.
P.33. A questionable analysis: Who decides who will be the censor? There is much to learn from previous and outdated thinking despite the author's assertions to the contrary.
October 3, 2023
单句话、某段落，都已经可以劲烧CPU，啃完第一遍后回去看目录小结，发觉如果能把诺奖大师的思路串起来形成系统性理解，就已经算完成小目标了。
读前没想到此书背后的很多思考和理念可说是AI的奠基石。别看今年chatGPT爆发，其实西方对AI的深入研究已有几十年历史。人类活动的模型、局限、可行性、逻辑、理性、进化、意义，就是人工智能建立的核心问题。我相信，Open AI正是因为把训练建立在这些思考者的理论框架之上，才能通过大数据收集，最终形成类似人类思维模式、同时符合社会操作需求的智能系统，并快步向前超越人类因生命局限带来的低效进化。很喜欢他提到的“寂寥世界(a nearly empty world)” 的概念。拜这个因素，人类世界才可能从数百万个变量中实现模型化。
抛开碳基到硅基，书中另一个概念也很有意思，利他主义（Altruism)。Simon说，“生活在拥有大量利他主义者的特性群体中的利他主义者，将比那些生活在拥有大量非利他主义者的特性群体中的非利他主义者，有着更高的适合度。” 适合度的提升可以理解为促进族群的繁衍兴盛。生活过在中西方社会，我深切体会到在拥有大量利他主义群体的环境中，个人的舒适和平衡感，和社会中更积极的正向演进态势。反之，非利他族群里，个人压抑、社会缺乏活力，进步明显迟滞不前。
读书组小伙伴有点忙，但是随便开聊我都受益良多，喜欢触类旁通过来的很多新鲜知识。对于本源的哲思，当其时一定显得枯燥且无现实意义。但是几十年后显像，看到在理论上发展或分化出来的不同实例呈现眼前，才能领会抽象思维的力量。期待慢慢讨论，此书值得多遍反复斟酌。
读前没想到此书背后的很多思考和理念可说是AI的奠基石。别看今年chatGPT爆发，其实西方对AI的深入研究已有几十年历史。人类活动的模型、局限、可行性、逻辑、理性、进化、意义，就是人工智能建立的核心问题。我相信，Open AI正是因为把训练建立在这些思考者的理论框架之上，才能通过大数据收集，最终形成类似人类思维模式、同时符合社会操作需求的智能系统，并快步向前超越人类因生命局限带来的低效进化。很喜欢他提到的“寂寥世界(a nearly empty world)” 的概念。拜这个因素，人类世界才可能从数百万个变量中实现模型化。
抛开碳基到硅基，书中另一个概念也很有意思，利他主义（Altruism)。Simon说，“生活在拥有大量利他主义者的特性群体中的利他主义者，将比那些生活在拥有大量非利他主义者的特性群体中的非利他主义者，有着更高的适合度。” 适合度的提升可以理解为促进族群的繁衍兴盛。生活过在中西方社会，我深切体会到在拥有大量利他主义群体的环境中，个人的舒适和平衡感，和社会中更积极的正向演进态势。反之，非利他族群里，个人压抑、社会缺乏活力，进步明显迟滞不前。
读书组小伙伴有点忙，但是随便开聊我都受益良多，喜欢触类旁通过来的很多新鲜知识。对于本源的哲思，当其时一定显得枯燥且无现实意义。但是几十年后显像，看到在理论上发展或分化出来的不同实例呈现眼前，才能领会抽象思维的力量。期待慢慢讨论，此书值得多遍反复斟酌。
December 30, 2021
MUST READ! It is rare for a 40+ year old economics book to not only age gracefully but gain authority from its prescience and applicability to today’s political situation. But then this is definitely more of a philosophy book than practical economics book. Simon’s discussion of the importance of reading, institution building, and politics role in society was so up to date.
November 21, 2025
A short little book that serves, I believe, as an introduction to the topic of bounded rationality. The discussion on evolutionary theory is a bit surprising. Overall, personally I think all 3 parts were a bit too introductory for me to obtain a satisfactory understanding of any topic discussed. Thus the 3 stars. However, it will not stop me from reading other Herbert A. Simon books.
August 20, 2024
Boken diskuterer relasjonen mellom intuisjon og følelser, og "bounded rationality" i sosiale og politiske institusjoner. Inusisjon bruker kunnskapen vi har fått fra tidligere erfaring og søk. Simon diskuterer 3 teorier (olympian, behavior og intuitive model) - hvor han trekker fram at de organismene som tilpasser seg, oppfører seg som OM de var rasjonelle overlever. Videre snakkes det om hvordan folks manglende evne til å tenke på flere ting samtidig skaper problemer i ett-problems politikken.
Oppsummert: vi mennesker har begrenset rasjonalitet og klarer ikke å ta komplette og konsekvente valg med for mange valg tilgjengelig og vi er ikke så rasjonelle som vi tror vi er.
The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool - Feynman
Favorite quotes
- Reconciling alternative points of view and different weightings of values becomes somewhat easier if we adopt a satificing point of view: if we look for good enough solutions rather than insiting that only the best solutions will do.
- Human being don't see the whole world; they see the little part of it they live in, and they aee capable of making up all sorts of rationalizations about that parts of the world, mostly in the direction og aggrandizing its importance.
- The activities we call "political" are simply another manifestation of the prosperity of human beings to identify with personal goals and to attempt to realize these goals in a lawful matter.
- People will act from self-interest. Hence a major task of any society is to create a social environment in which self-interest has reason to be enlightened.
- Regonize that our fate is bound up with the fate of the whole world, that there is no enlightened or even viable self-interest that does not look to our living in a harmonious way with our total environment.
Oppsummert: vi mennesker har begrenset rasjonalitet og klarer ikke å ta komplette og konsekvente valg med for mange valg tilgjengelig og vi er ikke så rasjonelle som vi tror vi er.
The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool - Feynman
Favorite quotes
- Reconciling alternative points of view and different weightings of values becomes somewhat easier if we adopt a satificing point of view: if we look for good enough solutions rather than insiting that only the best solutions will do.
- Human being don't see the whole world; they see the little part of it they live in, and they aee capable of making up all sorts of rationalizations about that parts of the world, mostly in the direction og aggrandizing its importance.
- The activities we call "political" are simply another manifestation of the prosperity of human beings to identify with personal goals and to attempt to realize these goals in a lawful matter.
- People will act from self-interest. Hence a major task of any society is to create a social environment in which self-interest has reason to be enlightened.
- Regonize that our fate is bound up with the fate of the whole world, that there is no enlightened or even viable self-interest that does not look to our living in a harmonious way with our total environment.
November 22, 2022
An interesting read with plenty of implications and fruit for thought today particularly with regards to the public information base (mass media, experts, knowledge of political institutions) and AI/data-driven modelling
The author outlines three visions of rationality/decision making before, leaning on evolutionary biology, presenting a case for the evolutionary model
The third chapter then presents what bounded human rationality can contribute to choice and planning in a complex world as well as limits of institutional rationality such as limits of attention and uncertainty and technical tools for decision
The author outlines three visions of rationality/decision making before, leaning on evolutionary biology, presenting a case for the evolutionary model
The third chapter then presents what bounded human rationality can contribute to choice and planning in a complex world as well as limits of institutional rationality such as limits of attention and uncertainty and technical tools for decision
January 13, 2016
Great, short introduction to Simon's thought. The third section is still highly relevant, if a little dated in particulars (such as the discussion of computers).
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