On getting Heinrich's book I was immediately struck by how clear
and well written it was, and it could be very useful to people
who come to read Capital for the first time. But at the same
time, the reader has to be aware that Heinrich is presenting a
special and somewhat controversial interpretation of Marx. I soon
saw that many of the issues that have been discussed at length by
Marx scholars on the OPE-L list are addressed here, and that in
addressing these Heinrich very definitely situates himself within
one particular school of interpretation of Marx. One might pass
over this, after all, why bother neophytes with the arcana of
scholars, were it not for the fact that Heinrich himself
emphasises this particular interpretation of Marx as being a
matter of great import.
In a nutshell my objection to Heinrich's interpretation is that
if we follow it, we end up with something which is no longer a
scientific theory of capitalism, whereas a slightly different
interpretation gives a strong and testable scientific theory.
Heinrich claims that from the late 19th century until the 1960s
understanding of Marx was dominated by what he terms a 'world
view' interpretation which he sees as having been an essentially
apologetic adaptation to the needs of political parties. In the
60s
Now a far-reaching discussion of Marx’s critique of political
economy emerged. The writings of Louis Althusser and his
associates were very influential in this regard (Althusser 1965,
Althusser/Balibar 1965)[footnote:
Heinrich, Michael; Locascio, Alex (2012-06-01). An Introduction
to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx's Capital (Kindle Locations
367-368). NYU Press. Kindle Edition.
].
I concur with Heinrich in his assessment of much of the study of
Capital during the first half of the 20th century, and with his
point about the importance of Althusser in starting a more
detailed and critical engagement with Capital. However there is a
big difference between the approach of Althusser and that of
Heinrich. Althusser both in Reading Capital[althusser70] and in
his more recent writings[althusser2006philosophy] was concerned
to perform a critical analysis that distinguished between Marx's
scientific discoveries and the relicts of idealist philosophical
language within which these were at times expressed. Althusser
was willing to interrogate the silences and ambiguities that
occur in parts of Marx's writing, ambiguities and silences that,
he claims, originate in the very real difficulty that Marx
experienced in breaking with pre-existing theoretical systems:
classical political economy, Hegelian and Feuerbachian
philosophy. This means that within Capital there are different
conceptual systems that do not entirely mesh. There are,
Althusser says, concepts expressed that remain idealist and
teleological.
1 Teleology
Heinrich is less critically incisive than Althusser and when he
is faced with texts in Capital, that modern science tells us are
teleological nonsense, Heinrich tends to accept them at face
value. This is particularly clear when we look what Heinrich says
about the role of history in the order of exposition of Capital.
The notion that one must know history in order to understand the
present has a certain justification when applied to the history
of events, but not for the structural history of a society.
Rather, the opposite is the case: to examine the constitution of
a particular social and economic structure, one has to be already
familiar with the completed structure. Only then will one know
what to look for in history. Marx formulated this idea with the
help of a metaphor:
“The anatomy of man is a key to the anatomy of the ape. On the
other hand, indications of higher forms in the lower species of
animals can only be understood when the higher forms themselves
are already known.” (MECW, 28:42)
For this reason, the “historical” passages in Capital come after
the (theoretical) depictions of the corresponding categories and
not before...[footnote:
Heinrich, Michael; Locascio, Alex (2012-06-01). An Introduction
to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx's Capital (Kindle Locations
416-423). NYU Press. Kindle Edition.
]
It staggers me that anyone writing recently so long after
Darwin's great work on human origins[darwin1871descent] could
quote that passage from Marx in such an uncritical way. What on
earth does it mean to say that you can only understand 'lower'
forms of animal if you already understand 'higher' forms?
Biologists now don't accept the idea of higher and lower forms,
the whole notion is part of a mix of anthropocentric and racist
19th century ideas according to which there is a great chain of
being[gould1983bound] going from protozoans at the lowest link to
white men at the highest link. It is inherently teleological
since it only makes sense if you think that the world is imbued
with some divine purpose whose end is to produce humanity. That
Marx, who admired Darwin should have written such teleological
nonsense is, I was going to say inexcusable, but it would be
better to say it is a testament to the enduring strength of an
idealist ideological upbringing. It completely reverses the real
causal relation in evolution. Evolution works by the inheritance
and modification of acquired characteristics. That humans give
birth to live young rather than lay eggs has to be understood in
terms of the split between our ancestors (Theria) and the
ancestors of the Platypus (Prototheria)[macfarland1985vertebrate, Chapter 18.]
. The key to our bearing live young, is this retained character.
The primal therian did not acquire this trait in order to
ultimately give rise to humans but because of unknown selective
pressures in the distant past.
If Marx's aphorism is evolutionary nonsense what is the
justification for Heinrich taking it as a good guide to
understand history?
He is concerned that we shall 'know what to look for in history',
but this is to write history in what Althusser called the future
anterior tense: to read back onto the past a purpose, the
creation of the world as we know it today.
Heinrich quotes with approval Marx's letter to Kugelmann to the
effect that it is not necessary to give a proof of the labour
theory of value. Given the historical context, which Heinrich
points out, one in which the labour theory of value was generally
accepted by political economists, Marx's assumption was probably
justified back then. But for Heinrich's present readers the
situation is very different.
After Marx published Capital, the labour theory of value became a
political hot potato, something that the working class movement
was using to justify its demands for a socialist economy. In the
years that followed there was a radical rewriting of economic
theory which effectively eliminated the labour theory of value
from most economic text books. Among orthodox economists, the
labour theory of value is now regarded as something totally
archaic and discredited, so a contemporary reader of Capital can
not rely on a general and tacit acceptance that values were
regulated by labour time. The question: 'how do we know that
labour is really the source of value' is now much more relevant.
In the light of modern skepticism, how adequate is the argument
advanced in the letter to Kugelmann?
The chatter about the need to prove the concept of value arises
only from complete ignorance both of the subject under discussion
and of the method of science. Every child knows that any nation
that stopped working, not for a year, but let us say, just for a
few weeks, would perish. And every child knows, too, that the
amounts of products corresponding to the differing amounts of
needs demand differing and quantitatively determined amounts of
society’s aggregate labour. It is self-evident that this
necessity of the distribution of social labour in specific
proportions is certainly not abolished by the specific form of
social production; it can only change its form of manifestation.
Natural laws cannot be abolished at all. The only thing that can
change, under historically differing conditions, is the form in
which those laws assert themselves. And the form in which this
proportional distribution of labour asserts itself in a state of
society in which the interconnection of social labour expresses
itself as the private exchange of the individual products of
labour, is precisely the exchange value of these products. (MECW,
43:68)
Now this little passage is very interesting, and later on I will
argue that it casts doubt on Heinrich's own theory of value, but
for now I am going to concentrate on whether this is really an
adequate defense of the labour theory of value.
How do we know that it is labour that regulates exchange value
rather than something else?
Heinrich reproduces Adam Smith's argument that usefulness can not
be the basis of value, but usefulness is not the only candidate.
How can we tell that it is not some other input to the production
process that is key?
If we restrict ourselves, as Heinrich does, to considering prices
in a capitalist economy there are other possible value
substances.
The establishment of capitalist industry went hand in hand with
the development of artificial sources of power: coal then oil. We
also all know that in today's world the owners of oilfields are
fabulously wealthy, so might energy not be the source of value?
This is not an arbitrary selection on my part. The Technocracy
Movement advocated what was essentially an energy theory of
value.
One could go through the passage from Marx above and wherever
there is a reference to labour substitute energy or power and the
essence of the argument would be unchanged. Any society deprived
of energy sources would certainly perish. The available energy
supply must be distributed between different potential uses
whatever the social organisation. The dependence of humanity on
energy is a natural law that can not be altered, etc.
But if that is the case how can we be sure that Marx is right and
the technocracy theorists are wrong?
If one adopts the normal method of science, the answer is simple.
You see what price structure would be predicted by the labour
theory of value, what price structure would be predicted by the
energy theory of value, and see which theory gives the better
predictions. Such tests have been done[cockshott], and they show
that actual prices correspond much more closely to what the
labour theory of value predicts than to what the energy theory
predicts. But as we will see in the next section Heinrich's
approach prohibits this sort of scientific test.
It is common ground to all Marxist economists that Marx held
abstract socially necessary labour to be the source of value. But
what is abstract labour?
Is it the simple expenditure of human physiological energy?
Marx uses this formulation when trying to explain abstract
labour:
Tailoring and weaving, though qualitatively different productive
activities, are each a productive expenditure of human brains,
nerves, and muscles, and in this sense are human labour. They are
but two different modes of expending human labour-power. Of
course, this labour-power, which remains the same under all its
modifications, must have attained a certain pitch of development
before it can be expended in a multiplicity of modes. But the
value of a commodity represents human labour in the abstract, the
expenditure of human labour in general. (Capital Vol 1, page 12
of the Marxist Internet Archive pdf file)
On the one hand all labour is, speaking physiologically, an
expenditure of human labour-power, and in its character of
identical abstract human labour, it creates and forms the value
of commodities. On the other hand, all labour is the expenditure
of human labour-power in a special form and with a definite aim,
and in this, its character of concrete useful labour, it produces
use-values. (Capital Vol 1, page 12 of the Marxist Internet
Archive pdf file)
Heinrich rejects this formulation because :
The reduction of various types of labor to labor in a
physiological sense, however, is a purely mental abstraction, to
which any kind of labor can be subjected, regardless of whether
it produces a commodity. Furthermore, this formulation suggests
that abstract labor has a completely non-social, natural
foundation, and has therefore accordingly provoked “naturalistic”
interpretations of abstract labor.
Well that is begging the question. It is only an objection if you
assume from the start that abstract labour does not exist except
in capitalist society.
But Marx has another explanation for what abstract labour is,
based on the division of labour.
So far as they are values, the coat and the linen are things of a
like substance, objective expressions of essentially identical
labour. But tailoring and weaving are, qualitatively, different
kinds of labour. There are, however, states of society in which
one and the same man does tailoring and weaving alternately, in
which case these two forms of labour are mere modifications of
the labour of the same individual, and no special and fixed
functions of different persons, just as the coat which our tailor
makes one day, and the trousers which he makes another day, imply
only a variation in the labour of one and the same individual.
Moreover, we see at a glance that, in our capitalist society, a
given portion of human labour is, in accordance with the varying
demand, at one time supplied in the form of tailoring, at another
in the form of weaving. This change may possibly not take place
without friction, but take place it must.(Capital Vol 1, page 12
of the Marxist Internet Archive pdf file)
In this formulation - which Heinrich ignores - labour is abstract
as part of the pool of human labour available to society. Workers
can change occupation, either from day to day, or at different
points in their life time. Insofar as they can potentially move
from one activity to another their ability to work is abstract.
This is most obvious with an unemployed person. They have an
abstract ability to work in a variety of different jobs, until
they get a job, this abstract ability to work does not take a
concrete form.
Go back to the quote from Marx's letter to Kugelmann where he
says “It is self-evident that this necessity of the distribution
of social labour in specific proportions is certainly not
abolished by the specific form of social production; it can only
change its form of manifestation.” What is the social labour that
is being distributed?
Clearly it is abstract labour. It is only after social labour has
been distributed into different activities that it takes on a
concrete form.
So abstract labour is the abstract expenditure of human
physiological effort and society has only a certain amount of
this effort available to it which can be expended in different
concrete forms.
This concept is indeed 'naturalistic' and 'a-historical'. It is
naturalistic in that it depends on our adaptability as a species,
our ability to turn our hand to any task. It is a-historical in
that any society with a division of labour has abstract labour.
Back to the letter to Kugelmann : “It is self-evident that this
necessity of the distribution of social labour in specific
proportions is certainly not abolished by the specific form of
social production; it can only change its form of manifestation.
Natural laws cannot be abolished at all. The only thing that can
change, under historically differing conditions, is the form in
which those laws assert themselves.” One can scarcely have a more
explicit assertion of the natural and a-historical basis of
abstract labour than that.
Heinrich however presents a quite different interpretation of
abstract labour one that he founds on his concept of real as
opposed to mental abstractions.
Let us deal with abstract labor in more detail. Abstract labor is
not visible, only a particular concrete labor is visible, just as
the concept of “tree” isn’t visible: I’m only capable of
perceiving a concrete botanical plant. As with the term “tree,”
abstract labor is an abstraction, but a completely different kind
of abstraction. Normally, abstractions are constituted in human
thought. We refer to the commonalities among individual examples
and then establish an abstract category, such as “tree.” But in
the case of abstract labor, we are not dealing with such a
“mental abstraction” but with a “real abstraction,” by which we
mean an abstraction that is carried out in the actual behavior of
humans, regardless of whether they are aware of it[footnote:
Heinrich, Michael; Locascio, Alex (2012-06-01). An Introduction
to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx's Capital (Kindle Locations
730-735). NYU Press. Kindle Edition.
].
Heinrich here shows a rather archaic understanding of abstraction
in biology. Biology is well aware of the difference between
conventional and real abstract categories. Taxonomy attempts to
discover the real abstract categories into which organisms are
organised. Let us consider plant categories. Initially the
gymnosperms and angiosperms were categorised just on the basis of
a common traits in seed morphology. Subsequently after the
development of evolutionary theory and genetics it came to be
realised that these are actually real categories based on common
descent and shared genes.
According to Heinrich abstract labour is a real abstraction. That
is not a problem, if we take the physiological approach to
abstract labour. The expenditure of human physiological energy is
real. We can measure it by monitoring a person's oxygen
consumption whilst they perform different tasks. Nor is the
insistence on real abstraction a problem if we take Marx's other
explanation of abstract labour - that abstract labour is a
property of the division of labour, since real people do move
between concrete jobs. A person's ability to change jobs is not a
mere mental abstraction.
But for Heinrich the 'real abstraction' is what occurs when
commodities are exchanged.