What do you think?
Rate this book
Russia Without Putin: Money, Power and the Myths of the New Cold War
How the West's obsession with Vladimir Putin prevents it from understanding Russia
It is impossible to think of Russia today without thinking of Vladimir Putin. More than any other major national leader, he personifies his country in the eyes of the outside world, and dominates Western media coverage of it to an extraordinary extent. In Russia itself, he is likewise the centre of attention for detractors and supporters alike. But as Tony Wood argues, this overwhelming focus on the president and his personality means that we understand Russia less than we ever did before. Too much attention is paid to the man, and not enough to the country outside the Kremlin's walls.
In this timely and provocative analysis, Wood looks beyond Putin to explore the profound changes Russia has undergone since 1991. In the process, he challenges many of the common assumptions made about contemporary Russia. Though commonly viewed as an ominous return to Soviet authoritarianism, Putin's rule should instead be seen as a direct continuation of Yeltsin's in the 1990s. And though many of Russia's problems today are blamed on legacies of the Soviet past, Wood argues that the core features of Putinism--a predatory, authoritarian elite presiding over a vastly unequal society--are integral to the system set in place after the fall of Communism.
What kind of country has emerged from Russia's post-Soviet transformations, and where might it go in future? Russia Without Putin culminates in an arresting analysis of the country's foreign policy--identifying the real power dynamics behind its escalating clashes with the West--and with reflections on the paths Russia might take in the 21st century.
It is impossible to think of Russia today without thinking of Vladimir Putin. More than any other major national leader, he personifies his country in the eyes of the outside world, and dominates Western media coverage of it to an extraordinary extent. In Russia itself, he is likewise the centre of attention for detractors and supporters alike. But as Tony Wood argues, this overwhelming focus on the president and his personality means that we understand Russia less than we ever did before. Too much attention is paid to the man, and not enough to the country outside the Kremlin's walls.
In this timely and provocative analysis, Wood looks beyond Putin to explore the profound changes Russia has undergone since 1991. In the process, he challenges many of the common assumptions made about contemporary Russia. Though commonly viewed as an ominous return to Soviet authoritarianism, Putin's rule should instead be seen as a direct continuation of Yeltsin's in the 1990s. And though many of Russia's problems today are blamed on legacies of the Soviet past, Wood argues that the core features of Putinism--a predatory, authoritarian elite presiding over a vastly unequal society--are integral to the system set in place after the fall of Communism.
What kind of country has emerged from Russia's post-Soviet transformations, and where might it go in future? Russia Without Putin culminates in an arresting analysis of the country's foreign policy--identifying the real power dynamics behind its escalating clashes with the West--and with reflections on the paths Russia might take in the 21st century.
210 pages, Paperback
First published November 13, 2018
56 people are currently reading
877 people want to read
About the author
Tony Wood
68 books17 followersTony Wood lives in New York and writes on Russia and Latin America. He is a member of the editorial board of New Left Review. His writing has appeared in the London Review of Books, the Guardian, n+1 and the Nation, among other publications.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 69 reviews
March 21, 2022
This is one of 3 4-5 recent-ish books on contemporary Russia that I'm reading to try to put some context on my continual WTF-ing of the present moment, and I hope to write a blog post on the three together, but for now I'll just say it was quite informative, suitably detailed in its analysis, always measured in its conclusions, and mostly quite engaging (even if I felt I was in a Russian novel in one or two of its chapters, trying to digest all the names that were coming at me at 100 km/hr).
Its strength will also be its weakness, I expect: to see Russia as a system is to downplay the role of individual agency in statecraft, and while the rise of and pressures on and context within which Putin does act may have continuities with the neoliberal madness of the post-Soviet 1990s, surely his, erm, most recent activities involve a certain amount of personal, shall we say miscalculating, stubbornness and sociopathy? Even if the asymmetrical nature of Russia's relations with NATO and the EU brought on the tensions that resulted in Ukraine '04, Georgia '08, Ukraine '14 and Syria '15, surely structural pressures alone cannot account for the sheer scale of the insanity of Ukraine '22...
Its strength will also be its weakness, I expect: to see Russia as a system is to downplay the role of individual agency in statecraft, and while the rise of and pressures on and context within which Putin does act may have continuities with the neoliberal madness of the post-Soviet 1990s, surely his, erm, most recent activities involve a certain amount of personal, shall we say miscalculating, stubbornness and sociopathy? Even if the asymmetrical nature of Russia's relations with NATO and the EU brought on the tensions that resulted in Ukraine '04, Georgia '08, Ukraine '14 and Syria '15, surely structural pressures alone cannot account for the sheer scale of the insanity of Ukraine '22...
March 13, 2019
In his new book, Russia Without Putin, Tony Wood tries to make the case that "too much attention has been paid to the man, and not enough to the system over which he presides." It's an intriguing claim, but Wood doesn't quite pull it off. The book consists of six chapters and an epilogue. And Putin stars in every one of those chapters. Apparently, it's difficult not to pay the man "too much attention." He implies, instead, that the question we should be asking is, "Why is the Russian oligarchy hostile to the West?" And his answer will surprise many observers in the US.
Vladimir Putin and the Russian oligarchy are misunderstood
Nonetheless, Russia Without Putin does contribute to our understanding of the Russian leader and of recent Russian history. Here are a few of the author's principal observations about the character of leadership in Russia today:It is a myth that Putin's "imitation democracy" represents a throwback to the Soviet era. Wood insists "there is the widespread notion that Putin has overseen a nostalgic return to Soviet times, reversing the market reforms and democratization carried out by Yeltsin in the 1990s." But that notion is false.
Putin's policies represent a continuation of Yeltsin's, not a radical departure from them:
** "The defining characteristic of the Putin system has been its commitment to defending the capitalist model put in place during the 1990s." Similarly, the kleptocracy Westerners see in Russia today is nothing new, "nor is it confined to a small clique. . . The cronyism attributed to the Putin years was central to the making of Russian capitalism long before Putin took the stage." However, "[t]hough nepotism was far from unknown under Soviet rule, its scale never came close to that reached in the Putin era.
** "Viewing Russia today as an oligarchy is fair, but Westerners tend to mischaracterize the wealthy and powerful men around Putin as "mafia." The Russian oligarchy is not a criminal gang. Wood writes, "The history of post-Soviet capitalism should be understood . . . as a series of struggles for power and profit within a single elite that spanned the worlds of government and private business." In other words, though many, perhaps all of these men may be criminals, they're government officials and businessmen first, not mafia dons. Essentially, Wood explains that the Russian oligarchy's hostility has come about because the US and its allies are making it more difficult for them to get really, really rich.
Russia's rivalry with the West is a recent development
When Putin ascended to the presidency in 1999, and for several years after that, his principal foreign policy aim and that of those around him was to join the West. He was even open to NATO membership. But, again and again, under Clinton, Bush, and Obama, Russia's attempts to cozy up to the US and the nations of Western Europe were rebuffed. Continuing NATO expansion placed the final nail in that coffin. And, given the investigations swirling around Donald Trump's ties to Russia, there is little chance that will change even under the current administration.
Putin and his colleagues now understand all this clearly, and Wood regards the development as historically significant. "The downfall of the pro-Western idea in Russia represents a major geopolitical watershed," he writes. And that turnabout has come, he insists, because the West has been unwilling to deal with Russia on an equal basis.Why the Russian oligarchy is hostile to the WestPutin's aggressive military moves in the Caucasus, Ukraine, and Syria are grounded in his country's weakness, not its strength. They represent, above all, Russia's quest to be treated as an equal. "For all the concern about the tentacular spread of Putin's influence," Wood notes, "its actual capacity to shape political outcomes has proved negligible to non-existent—the 2016 US elections very much included." Wood argues, then, that the West, and the US in particular, has little to fear from Russia. But that assertion is a little hard to accept, when government-controlled Russian hackers hold the capacity to cripple the North American electrical grid.
A perspective on Russia from the Left
Russia Without Putin is also strong in its discussion of the class structure in Russian society today and the growing inequality that threatens the country's future. Tony Wood is a member of the editorial board of the socialist journal, New Left Review. The Marxist influence is apparent.
There is no new Cold War, Wood insists. That period in history was characterized by profound ideological differences. Since Russia is now firmly in the capitalist camp (even if its "democracy" is a sham), the differences are situational, not inevitable. But that begs the question we started with: why is the Russian oligarchy hostile to the nations of the West? Apparently, in Wood's view, it all boils down to "bizness."
How another critic views Russia Without Putin
For a somewhat different treatment of the book, see British journalist Jonathan Steele's review in The Guardian (December 27, 2018). Steele comments on several aspects of the author's views that I didn't cover above. For example, he writes, it's a myth "that where there were negative distortions in Russia’s transition to capitalism it was because of the legacy of the Soviet past with an authoritarian ruling class and a population made passive by decades of submission to power."Steele also remarks that "It was the second Ukrainian crisis of 2014 that sealed the divorce" between Russia and the West, "though Wood believes Putin’s hostile reactions smacked of tactical improvisation rather than a carefully planned anti-western strategy. Interference in western elections is the Russian answer to the earlier and still continuing efforts by the US and EU to help civil society groups and local media to campaign for anti-Kremlin changes within what used to be the Soviet camp.
Vladimir Putin and the Russian oligarchy are misunderstood
Nonetheless, Russia Without Putin does contribute to our understanding of the Russian leader and of recent Russian history. Here are a few of the author's principal observations about the character of leadership in Russia today:It is a myth that Putin's "imitation democracy" represents a throwback to the Soviet era. Wood insists "there is the widespread notion that Putin has overseen a nostalgic return to Soviet times, reversing the market reforms and democratization carried out by Yeltsin in the 1990s." But that notion is false.
Putin's policies represent a continuation of Yeltsin's, not a radical departure from them:
** "The defining characteristic of the Putin system has been its commitment to defending the capitalist model put in place during the 1990s." Similarly, the kleptocracy Westerners see in Russia today is nothing new, "nor is it confined to a small clique. . . The cronyism attributed to the Putin years was central to the making of Russian capitalism long before Putin took the stage." However, "[t]hough nepotism was far from unknown under Soviet rule, its scale never came close to that reached in the Putin era.
** "Viewing Russia today as an oligarchy is fair, but Westerners tend to mischaracterize the wealthy and powerful men around Putin as "mafia." The Russian oligarchy is not a criminal gang. Wood writes, "The history of post-Soviet capitalism should be understood . . . as a series of struggles for power and profit within a single elite that spanned the worlds of government and private business." In other words, though many, perhaps all of these men may be criminals, they're government officials and businessmen first, not mafia dons. Essentially, Wood explains that the Russian oligarchy's hostility has come about because the US and its allies are making it more difficult for them to get really, really rich.
Russia's rivalry with the West is a recent development
When Putin ascended to the presidency in 1999, and for several years after that, his principal foreign policy aim and that of those around him was to join the West. He was even open to NATO membership. But, again and again, under Clinton, Bush, and Obama, Russia's attempts to cozy up to the US and the nations of Western Europe were rebuffed. Continuing NATO expansion placed the final nail in that coffin. And, given the investigations swirling around Donald Trump's ties to Russia, there is little chance that will change even under the current administration.
Putin and his colleagues now understand all this clearly, and Wood regards the development as historically significant. "The downfall of the pro-Western idea in Russia represents a major geopolitical watershed," he writes. And that turnabout has come, he insists, because the West has been unwilling to deal with Russia on an equal basis.Why the Russian oligarchy is hostile to the WestPutin's aggressive military moves in the Caucasus, Ukraine, and Syria are grounded in his country's weakness, not its strength. They represent, above all, Russia's quest to be treated as an equal. "For all the concern about the tentacular spread of Putin's influence," Wood notes, "its actual capacity to shape political outcomes has proved negligible to non-existent—the 2016 US elections very much included." Wood argues, then, that the West, and the US in particular, has little to fear from Russia. But that assertion is a little hard to accept, when government-controlled Russian hackers hold the capacity to cripple the North American electrical grid.
A perspective on Russia from the Left
Russia Without Putin is also strong in its discussion of the class structure in Russian society today and the growing inequality that threatens the country's future. Tony Wood is a member of the editorial board of the socialist journal, New Left Review. The Marxist influence is apparent.
There is no new Cold War, Wood insists. That period in history was characterized by profound ideological differences. Since Russia is now firmly in the capitalist camp (even if its "democracy" is a sham), the differences are situational, not inevitable. But that begs the question we started with: why is the Russian oligarchy hostile to the nations of the West? Apparently, in Wood's view, it all boils down to "bizness."
How another critic views Russia Without Putin
For a somewhat different treatment of the book, see British journalist Jonathan Steele's review in The Guardian (December 27, 2018). Steele comments on several aspects of the author's views that I didn't cover above. For example, he writes, it's a myth "that where there were negative distortions in Russia’s transition to capitalism it was because of the legacy of the Soviet past with an authoritarian ruling class and a population made passive by decades of submission to power."Steele also remarks that "It was the second Ukrainian crisis of 2014 that sealed the divorce" between Russia and the West, "though Wood believes Putin’s hostile reactions smacked of tactical improvisation rather than a carefully planned anti-western strategy. Interference in western elections is the Russian answer to the earlier and still continuing efforts by the US and EU to help civil society groups and local media to campaign for anti-Kremlin changes within what used to be the Soviet camp.
June 9, 2019
This book sets out to give the reader background and context to the political and economic movement of Russia in the last 25 years in order to dispell some prominent myths we have about Russia.
Myth 1 - Putin is a one-man machine steering Russia to his will.
In fact, Putin has not changed the initial commitment of the first leaders of post-Soviet Russia. Russia's leaders have for three decades been committed to pursuing capitalism, including Putin. He is following the same policies set by Yeltsin. The creation of an oligarchy and a huge widening of income between rich and poor were initiated under Yeltsin. Again, the West needs to stop focusing on Putin as the creator of what is happening in Russia or we will overlook important aspects developing in Russia and be sorry for it.
Myth 2 - there is a long-held belief by both West and Russian scholars, that the reason why Russia's implementation of capitalism and democracy isn't effective is because of the baggage of the Soviet apparatus. Once they get a few generations removed from it, there will be improvements. Woods says not so, in fact, that old Soviet apparatus is keeping it all afloat, and once that is removed, there will be nothing to sustain the current system. In other words, the old Soviet apparatus is what is helping the people of Russia survive right now.
Myth 3 - The most interesting part was regarding foreign policy and the worsening relations between the West and Russia. There is a huge imbalance of power and money between the West and Russia. Because of this imbalance in power, the West has been very successful at expanding NATO. Wood maintains that Russia, who had previously seen itself as part of the West, no longer thinks of itself as part of the West. And this is a major departure from Russia's foreign policy beginning in 2014. It is in part due to the West's policy on aggressively trying and succeeding on getting the former USSR satellite countries in NATO, meanwhile, rejecting Russia's bid to enter NATO. It was the Ukraine crisis in 2014 that severely worsened relations since it brought NATO into the Russian heartland. Russia's tactics on dealing with this have been horrible, and also not effective which has increased tensions.
The last chapter spells out some scenarios in the future, and it doesn't look good for Russia. Because Russia's economy is so dependant on raw material exports, there is a real concern that if Russia doesn't move to a different economic model, an economic collapse is likely.
Even though I know a lot about Russia and Ukraine, I still get hoodwinked by our crappy media in my weak moments, and fall for the, "Russia is powerful and we should be afraid" idea. In truth, Russia's GDP is in the tank and Russia has dropped from a superpower to a regional power. What we should be scared of is Russia imploding.
Myth 1 - Putin is a one-man machine steering Russia to his will.
In fact, Putin has not changed the initial commitment of the first leaders of post-Soviet Russia. Russia's leaders have for three decades been committed to pursuing capitalism, including Putin. He is following the same policies set by Yeltsin. The creation of an oligarchy and a huge widening of income between rich and poor were initiated under Yeltsin. Again, the West needs to stop focusing on Putin as the creator of what is happening in Russia or we will overlook important aspects developing in Russia and be sorry for it.
Myth 2 - there is a long-held belief by both West and Russian scholars, that the reason why Russia's implementation of capitalism and democracy isn't effective is because of the baggage of the Soviet apparatus. Once they get a few generations removed from it, there will be improvements. Woods says not so, in fact, that old Soviet apparatus is keeping it all afloat, and once that is removed, there will be nothing to sustain the current system. In other words, the old Soviet apparatus is what is helping the people of Russia survive right now.
Myth 3 - The most interesting part was regarding foreign policy and the worsening relations between the West and Russia. There is a huge imbalance of power and money between the West and Russia. Because of this imbalance in power, the West has been very successful at expanding NATO. Wood maintains that Russia, who had previously seen itself as part of the West, no longer thinks of itself as part of the West. And this is a major departure from Russia's foreign policy beginning in 2014. It is in part due to the West's policy on aggressively trying and succeeding on getting the former USSR satellite countries in NATO, meanwhile, rejecting Russia's bid to enter NATO. It was the Ukraine crisis in 2014 that severely worsened relations since it brought NATO into the Russian heartland. Russia's tactics on dealing with this have been horrible, and also not effective which has increased tensions.
The last chapter spells out some scenarios in the future, and it doesn't look good for Russia. Because Russia's economy is so dependant on raw material exports, there is a real concern that if Russia doesn't move to a different economic model, an economic collapse is likely.
Even though I know a lot about Russia and Ukraine, I still get hoodwinked by our crappy media in my weak moments, and fall for the, "Russia is powerful and we should be afraid" idea. In truth, Russia's GDP is in the tank and Russia has dropped from a superpower to a regional power. What we should be scared of is Russia imploding.
March 13, 2022
Wood offers a reprise from the dominant Putin-centric critique of post Soviet Russia with his analysis on the effects of fall of the USSR and its sociopolitical repercussions on current Russia U.S. relations. A very timely read, as Wood explains the events and agendas that lead to the current war in Ukraine.
February 3, 2019
Amazing read on the entire post-Soviet era without the (Western) paranoid obsession with the personality of Putin. It's a fairly concise read to understand the deep social, economic and political transformations Russia has undergone over the past 30 years. It also shows - yet again - what a missed opportunity the 90s and 2000s were re integrating Russia into NATO/ creating a post cold war world order without NATO rather than expanding NATO to Russia's western border. Very interesting analysis on how NATO and the EU - end of history's winners -form a united political project of expanding the free market, liberal democracy and NATO/western alliance into Eastern Europe.
As I more and more begim to look back on the 90s and 2000s, I realize just how many opportunities there were post Cold War to 'get it right'. Instead, the winners dictated the terms of global exploitation and endless wars, sugar coated in a universal human rights language. The profit doctrine has essentially obliterated democracy, in the West as much as Russia, both countries run by oligarchs, ironically, probably more so in Russia than the US.
As I more and more begim to look back on the 90s and 2000s, I realize just how many opportunities there were post Cold War to 'get it right'. Instead, the winners dictated the terms of global exploitation and endless wars, sugar coated in a universal human rights language. The profit doctrine has essentially obliterated democracy, in the West as much as Russia, both countries run by oligarchs, ironically, probably more so in Russia than the US.
October 5, 2022
Very good. Among the very silly liberal myths this book debunks are:
1. Everything Russia does is because of Putin
2. Russia has always been an aggressor and enemy of the west
3. Putin is really the embodiment of the USSR coming back to life
4. Putin’s policies are a reversal of Yeltsin’s
5. Navalny is a superhero who will “save” Russia
I think this is an essential read to understanding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Other essentials are:
this Richard Wolff/Michael Hudson interview: https://youtu.be/RunVU7rFQdE
Anything by David Harvey: https://youtu.be/0SzdiwuRpvc
This establishment outsider’s takes on the issue: https://youtu.be/JrMiSQAGOS4
Anything from Michael Robert’s blog: https://thenextrecession.wordpress.co...
1. Everything Russia does is because of Putin
2. Russia has always been an aggressor and enemy of the west
3. Putin is really the embodiment of the USSR coming back to life
4. Putin’s policies are a reversal of Yeltsin’s
5. Navalny is a superhero who will “save” Russia
I think this is an essential read to understanding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Other essentials are:
this Richard Wolff/Michael Hudson interview: https://youtu.be/RunVU7rFQdE
Anything by David Harvey: https://youtu.be/0SzdiwuRpvc
This establishment outsider’s takes on the issue: https://youtu.be/JrMiSQAGOS4
Anything from Michael Robert’s blog: https://thenextrecession.wordpress.co...
April 12, 2021
Wood mostly succeeds in his stated goal of writing about the system that underpins Russia today without focusing on the one person who embodies it most purely. Highly recommended and a great corrective to quite a few western accounts rehashing the same clichés.
December 23, 2018
Great analysis of the past 25 years in Russian political history. However, it lacks some detail and the argument lacks some specificity and structure. 3,5 stars actually, if Goodreads would allow it.
June 27, 2021
Clear, concise, and delivering on what it promised: a look behind the ubiquitous face of Putin, at Russia's economic and political structures and their history, shaping the complexity of the country's contemporary system.
February 2, 2024
An interesting summary of Russia/the USSR’s modern history and political climate with very light focus on Putin, but definitely needs updating by now considering it was published in 2018
June 29, 2019
This is a good book aimed at a general audience without much knowledge of Russia since the end of the Cold War. It's structured as a series of chapters each dedicated to rebutting one of the most common 'myths of the New Cold War', moving from Putin and the Russian political regime, through economy and society, to foreign policy and possible future trajectories. Where it succeeds is, first, in being a readable and concise overview which doesn't require much background knowledge of Russia. Second, Wood backs up his case with good, often eyebrow-raising statistics, and displays a deep familiarity with Russian culture and history. Third, Wood mostly takes down the 'myths' he targets effectively, and his positions seem pretty reasonable.
Where it slightly falls down for me is in not going into more depth about the fascinating story of the USSR's collapse and the way the oligarchs made their money. The individual stories of people like Berezovsky, Khodorkovsky and Abramovich could have been delved into more, I thought, and that might have lent more texture to the book's portrait of modern Russia. I wanted more depth on the post-Soviet transition and the Yeltsin regime, delving more into the precise mechanisms through which fortunes were made and state assets appropriated: Wood slightly rushed his account of that process, I thought, with the result that he didn't fully explain some of the key practices, or illustrate them with detailed examples. He also doesn't really delve into the relationship between business elites and the political system today, as opposed to fifteen or twenty years ago. All told, the book is sometimes briefer than it really needs to be: it's a quick read, when given the level of knowledge and research on display it probably could've been a bit longer.
One more thing: though Wood makes useful recommendations in the footnotes, I thought that given its intentions as a fairly introductory book for a general readership, it could have done with a consolidated 'guide to further reading' at the end.
Where it slightly falls down for me is in not going into more depth about the fascinating story of the USSR's collapse and the way the oligarchs made their money. The individual stories of people like Berezovsky, Khodorkovsky and Abramovich could have been delved into more, I thought, and that might have lent more texture to the book's portrait of modern Russia. I wanted more depth on the post-Soviet transition and the Yeltsin regime, delving more into the precise mechanisms through which fortunes were made and state assets appropriated: Wood slightly rushed his account of that process, I thought, with the result that he didn't fully explain some of the key practices, or illustrate them with detailed examples. He also doesn't really delve into the relationship between business elites and the political system today, as opposed to fifteen or twenty years ago. All told, the book is sometimes briefer than it really needs to be: it's a quick read, when given the level of knowledge and research on display it probably could've been a bit longer.
One more thing: though Wood makes useful recommendations in the footnotes, I thought that given its intentions as a fairly introductory book for a general readership, it could have done with a consolidated 'guide to further reading' at the end.
December 29, 2025
Russia without Putin, Tony Wood, 2018, 210 pages, ISBN 9781788731249, Dewey 947.086
Take this with several pinches of salt.
The title means only that Russia's situation owes more to the systems Putin inherited than to his personality.
Writing in 2018, Wood thought Putin might step down in 2024 as the Russian Constitution required. p. 175.
REALLY?
This author wants us to believe, "The interests of Russia and the West remain fundamentally incompatible." p. 171. I would say rather that the interests of the robber barons and those of the people are incompatible, in Russia as they are in the West.
DOWNSIZE
Russia cut military spending by 95% in the 1990s. p. 116.
Russia's economy crashed in the 1990s, except minerals extraction. p. 70. As of 2018, 3/4 of Russia's exports are natural resources. p. 160.
Russia's Gross Domestic Product was about the size of Turkey's, by 2000. p. 116. In 1990, the GDP of the Russian part of the USSR had been 1.5 times that of China. p. 116.
INEQUALITY
The financial wealth of a handful of Russians living abroad equalled the wealth of all Russians living in Russia, by 2014. pp. 77, 162.
More than 40% of Russians, 60 million, were living on less than $4/day in 1996, up from 2 million in 1989. p. 64. 85% of Russians were poor in 1992, according to the International Labor Organization. (Yeltsin then adopted a different measure of poverty, making it 36% poor.) p. 64.
In 2009, 20% of Russians had incomes below the official subsistence level. p. 94.
Russia's Gini coefficient was about .32 in 1991, .64 in 1996. (0 = everyone has equal income; 1 = one person has all income, everyone else has nothing. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_co... )
AUSTERITY
The (USA-controlled) International Monetary Fund demanded 30%-to-50% cuts to real government spending. Education and healthcare suffered. Schools charged unaffordable fees. 20% of 16-to-17-year-olds were not in school by 2000. Mortality from infectious and parasitic diseases doubled; tuberculosis cases multiplied. pp. 65, 86, 176. Male life expectancy dropped 5 years. p. 64. Pensioners and invalids starved. p. 67. Government spending on science was one-thirtieth in 2000 what it had been in 1990. pp. 71-72.
BANKRUPTCY
The author tells us that the rouble's 1998 collapse was due to "financial contagion from the Asian Crisis." p. 17. He fails to mention Russian oligarchs depositing government funds in private accounts, government bonds paying 60% interest, borrowing from the IMF to pay the interest. /From Vladimir Lenin to Vladimir Putin/, Vladimir Brovkin, 2024, p. 247: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... .
HEGEMON [BANKRUPT]
The U.S. had 40% of world military spending, 25% of world GDP, 20% of world manufacturing, with 5% of world population, in 1996. p. 120. The author fails to say that it's on borrowed money. The U.S. is in debt to the world; the debt is too big to ever be repaid; it's only the world's fear of a global depression that keeps it lending the U.S. money, used to finance wars. See Michael Hudson, /And Forgive Them Their Debts/, https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... .
CRIMEA
This author says only, "Russia annexed Crimea" in 2014. pp. 29, 133, 136, 167, 169. No mention that the overwhelmingly-Russian-speaking Crimean people voted to shift back from Ukraine to Russia, after only 60 years within Ukraine. See Medea Benjamin, /War in Ukraine/, 2022, p. 26: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... .
UKRAINE
Tells us that Ukrainian president Yanukovych rejected the European Union's Association Agreement, which angered western Ukrainians hoping to work in western Europe. pp. 135, 154. Fails to say how lopsided the offer was, demanding full access of the EU to Ukrainian markets, offering Ukraine only partial access to EU markets. See Medea Benjamin.
ORGANIZED CRIME
Nearly all post-Soviet businesses had to pay "protection" or extortion to organized crime. Many of the thugs were former members of the armed forces or police. p. 67.
SAME HERE
The dominant political form is imitation democracy: a formal commitment to democratic norms and procedures, with a total absence of actual alternatives to the current regime. p. 26. ["If you could get to the point where a reformist candidate had a chance, you’d already have won; you’d already have done the main thing—build mass support. Noam Chomsky, /Understanding Power/, 2002, p. 139. https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
The Democratic Party /would rather lose/ with Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, or Kamala Harris than win with Bernie Sanders, as Bernie’s social democratic agenda poses an economic threat to the donor class. https://www.currentaffairs.org/news/t...
]
"Those who own the country ought to govern it." --U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay (1745-1829).
The less the politician committed himself to particular positions, the more the public could project onto him their own assumptions and desires. p. 20.
KLEPTOCRATS
There were 96 billionaires in Russia in 2017, up from zero in 2000. (Yep: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/archiv... ) All from plundering state assets. Some Yeltsin-era billionaires had fled with their loot. The 1998 devaluation and debt default reduced some fortunes. p. 44-45, 77.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privati...
https://www.npr.org/sections/money/20...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of...
OIL
Urals crude sold for $9/barrel in mid-1998, $138/barrel in mid-2008. p. 21. Back to $40/barrel in December 2008. p. 94.
JEWS
0.16% of Russians identified as Jews in 2002. 14% of the new financial elite in the 1990s were Jews. pp. 38-39.
Take this with several pinches of salt.
The title means only that Russia's situation owes more to the systems Putin inherited than to his personality.
Writing in 2018, Wood thought Putin might step down in 2024 as the Russian Constitution required. p. 175.
REALLY?
This author wants us to believe, "The interests of Russia and the West remain fundamentally incompatible." p. 171. I would say rather that the interests of the robber barons and those of the people are incompatible, in Russia as they are in the West.
DOWNSIZE
Russia cut military spending by 95% in the 1990s. p. 116.
Russia's economy crashed in the 1990s, except minerals extraction. p. 70. As of 2018, 3/4 of Russia's exports are natural resources. p. 160.
Russia's Gross Domestic Product was about the size of Turkey's, by 2000. p. 116. In 1990, the GDP of the Russian part of the USSR had been 1.5 times that of China. p. 116.
INEQUALITY
The financial wealth of a handful of Russians living abroad equalled the wealth of all Russians living in Russia, by 2014. pp. 77, 162.
More than 40% of Russians, 60 million, were living on less than $4/day in 1996, up from 2 million in 1989. p. 64. 85% of Russians were poor in 1992, according to the International Labor Organization. (Yeltsin then adopted a different measure of poverty, making it 36% poor.) p. 64.
In 2009, 20% of Russians had incomes below the official subsistence level. p. 94.
Russia's Gini coefficient was about .32 in 1991, .64 in 1996. (0 = everyone has equal income; 1 = one person has all income, everyone else has nothing. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_co... )
AUSTERITY
The (USA-controlled) International Monetary Fund demanded 30%-to-50% cuts to real government spending. Education and healthcare suffered. Schools charged unaffordable fees. 20% of 16-to-17-year-olds were not in school by 2000. Mortality from infectious and parasitic diseases doubled; tuberculosis cases multiplied. pp. 65, 86, 176. Male life expectancy dropped 5 years. p. 64. Pensioners and invalids starved. p. 67. Government spending on science was one-thirtieth in 2000 what it had been in 1990. pp. 71-72.
BANKRUPTCY
The author tells us that the rouble's 1998 collapse was due to "financial contagion from the Asian Crisis." p. 17. He fails to mention Russian oligarchs depositing government funds in private accounts, government bonds paying 60% interest, borrowing from the IMF to pay the interest. /From Vladimir Lenin to Vladimir Putin/, Vladimir Brovkin, 2024, p. 247: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... .
HEGEMON [BANKRUPT]
The U.S. had 40% of world military spending, 25% of world GDP, 20% of world manufacturing, with 5% of world population, in 1996. p. 120. The author fails to say that it's on borrowed money. The U.S. is in debt to the world; the debt is too big to ever be repaid; it's only the world's fear of a global depression that keeps it lending the U.S. money, used to finance wars. See Michael Hudson, /And Forgive Them Their Debts/, https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... .
CRIMEA
This author says only, "Russia annexed Crimea" in 2014. pp. 29, 133, 136, 167, 169. No mention that the overwhelmingly-Russian-speaking Crimean people voted to shift back from Ukraine to Russia, after only 60 years within Ukraine. See Medea Benjamin, /War in Ukraine/, 2022, p. 26: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... .
UKRAINE
Tells us that Ukrainian president Yanukovych rejected the European Union's Association Agreement, which angered western Ukrainians hoping to work in western Europe. pp. 135, 154. Fails to say how lopsided the offer was, demanding full access of the EU to Ukrainian markets, offering Ukraine only partial access to EU markets. See Medea Benjamin.
ORGANIZED CRIME
Nearly all post-Soviet businesses had to pay "protection" or extortion to organized crime. Many of the thugs were former members of the armed forces or police. p. 67.
SAME HERE
The dominant political form is imitation democracy: a formal commitment to democratic norms and procedures, with a total absence of actual alternatives to the current regime. p. 26. ["If you could get to the point where a reformist candidate had a chance, you’d already have won; you’d already have done the main thing—build mass support. Noam Chomsky, /Understanding Power/, 2002, p. 139. https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
The Democratic Party /would rather lose/ with Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, or Kamala Harris than win with Bernie Sanders, as Bernie’s social democratic agenda poses an economic threat to the donor class. https://www.currentaffairs.org/news/t...
]"Those who own the country ought to govern it." --U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay (1745-1829).
The less the politician committed himself to particular positions, the more the public could project onto him their own assumptions and desires. p. 20.
KLEPTOCRATS
There were 96 billionaires in Russia in 2017, up from zero in 2000. (Yep: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/archiv... ) All from plundering state assets. Some Yeltsin-era billionaires had fled with their loot. The 1998 devaluation and debt default reduced some fortunes. p. 44-45, 77.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privati...
https://www.npr.org/sections/money/20...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of...
OIL
Urals crude sold for $9/barrel in mid-1998, $138/barrel in mid-2008. p. 21. Back to $40/barrel in December 2008. p. 94.
JEWS
0.16% of Russians identified as Jews in 2002. 14% of the new financial elite in the 1990s were Jews. pp. 38-39.
November 29, 2018
This book draws some good context but fails to arrive at a conclusion. Russia can't find a place in the Western world and gets angry? Oh my, what a load of ice-cream.
Read
February 25, 2022A good short primer on what has happened in Russia between the fall of the Soviet Union and now.
June 3, 2022
Having read Tony Wood's useful work on Russia in New Left Review, I anticipated a grounded analysis free of the usual Western cliches, and indeed Russia Without Putin delivers. A key point is that Putin is not a sole dictator who somehow seized the reigns of power and rules above his country. The author demonstrates well that Putin's rule is in large part a continuation of the Yeltsin era, that corruption is endemic among Russian elites and that Putin is at the apex of a system that predates him.
The author argues that too much attention is focused on Putin and "not enough on the system over which he presides," distracting from the "broader structural forces" that have shaped Russia over the past few decades. Far from being forged in the KGB, as Western tropes would have it, Putin was shaped in the massive corruption of the post-Soviet 1990s and the Yeltsin régime. Putin was brought into the St. Petersburg city government in 1990 and become a functionary in the Yeltsin national government in the mid-1990s. Loyalty to superiors and to Yeltsin enabled him to swiftly rise, and he became Yeltsin's self-designated successor at the end of 1999 because of that loyalty and his willingness to issue a blanket pardon to Yeltsin upon taking office.
A rise in oil prices drove an economic recovery after the chaos of the Yeltsin years; the stability that Putin represented did much to ensure his early popularity among Russians. That Yeltsin was able to serve a second term was due to massive cheating, augmented by the oligarchs to whom Yeltsin handed the Russian economy. The kleptocratic, autocratic variety of Russian capitalism was well established before Putin's assent to power.
After setting the stage, Russia Without Putin fills in the details of Putin's rule, the system in which he operates, the social forces within Russia, the divisions (and state repressions) that keep opposition weak and the gradual drift of Putin's government from seeking cooperation with the West to dogged opposition, a change cemented by the 2014 overthrow of the Ukrainian government and the U.S. hand-picking the new prime minister for Kiev. Unrelenting hostility from the U.S. despite Russian overtures, and NATO expansion as the U.S. pressed its strength over Russian weaknesses, played a significant role in this evolution.
By no means is this book an apology for Putin. A reader can be a long-standing, very strong critic of Putin, as I have long been, and get much from it. Those who uncritically accept the overwhelmingly propagated narrative of Putin would also benefit from this book to gain a much more sophisticated understanding of Putin. The brutal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (occurring after the publication of this book) does not change these dynamics. Perhaps more than ever, a nuanced understanding, shorn of ideological tropes, is necessary.
The author argues that too much attention is focused on Putin and "not enough on the system over which he presides," distracting from the "broader structural forces" that have shaped Russia over the past few decades. Far from being forged in the KGB, as Western tropes would have it, Putin was shaped in the massive corruption of the post-Soviet 1990s and the Yeltsin régime. Putin was brought into the St. Petersburg city government in 1990 and become a functionary in the Yeltsin national government in the mid-1990s. Loyalty to superiors and to Yeltsin enabled him to swiftly rise, and he became Yeltsin's self-designated successor at the end of 1999 because of that loyalty and his willingness to issue a blanket pardon to Yeltsin upon taking office.
A rise in oil prices drove an economic recovery after the chaos of the Yeltsin years; the stability that Putin represented did much to ensure his early popularity among Russians. That Yeltsin was able to serve a second term was due to massive cheating, augmented by the oligarchs to whom Yeltsin handed the Russian economy. The kleptocratic, autocratic variety of Russian capitalism was well established before Putin's assent to power.
After setting the stage, Russia Without Putin fills in the details of Putin's rule, the system in which he operates, the social forces within Russia, the divisions (and state repressions) that keep opposition weak and the gradual drift of Putin's government from seeking cooperation with the West to dogged opposition, a change cemented by the 2014 overthrow of the Ukrainian government and the U.S. hand-picking the new prime minister for Kiev. Unrelenting hostility from the U.S. despite Russian overtures, and NATO expansion as the U.S. pressed its strength over Russian weaknesses, played a significant role in this evolution.
By no means is this book an apology for Putin. A reader can be a long-standing, very strong critic of Putin, as I have long been, and get much from it. Those who uncritically accept the overwhelmingly propagated narrative of Putin would also benefit from this book to gain a much more sophisticated understanding of Putin. The brutal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (occurring after the publication of this book) does not change these dynamics. Perhaps more than ever, a nuanced understanding, shorn of ideological tropes, is necessary.
August 15, 2022
Written before Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the book is a sober look at Putin’s regime.
The author is a British Marxist international relations analysist whose work has focused on Russia and Latin America. He has long been associated with such publications as New Left Review and the London Review of Books.
This edition of this book—published in early 2020--provides an impressive analysis of Putin’s regime. It includes analysis of Russian social movements and a summary of certain aspects of the post-Soviet economy, including comparisons with Soviet era employment patterns. It is written in a simple, clear style. The book’s tone is notable for its lack of stridency.
Wood argues that while it is not unfair to call Putin an autocrat and kleptocrat, it is mistaken to assume—as Western establishment politicians and commentators do--that he and the people around him are at the root of his regime’s abuses. Rather, Putin and his friends are the symptoms of a political and economic system that has functioned under Putin with little substantive difference from how it functioned under Boris Yeltsin. Post-Soviet Russia was founded on a highly corrupt process of Soviet apparatchiks and others close to power grabbing bits and pieces of the Soviet command economy for their own enrichment. Boris Yeltsin privatized state run companies with secret decrees. Wood refers to the “loans for shares” scandal of late 1995 where Yeltsin gave out shares as collateral—including 78 percent of Yukos to Mikhail Khodorkovsky—in state owned companies in return for “loans” to his 1996 re-election campaign. The oligarchs who benefited from loans for shares made sure to give Yeltsin hugely positive coverage in their media enterprises in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election. The author also notes that Putin was apparently involved in graft in the early 90’s as a senior official in the St. Petersburg city government: he oversaw a public-private partnership with Petersburg’s casinos where millions of dollars meant for the city ended up in private hands and a scheme to trade Petersburg’s natural resources for food supplies which produced no food but millions of dollars in kickbacks. Putin was protected from serious investigations by his patron, St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak.
Backed by the West, Yeltsin bombed the democratically elected parliament in 1993 and imposed a constitution in a rigged referendum giving Russia’s presidency markedly authoritarian powers. Such autocracy was necessary to impose the unpopular neoliberal restructuring on Russia’s people. The West aided Yeltsin in his rigged re-election of 1996. Wood argues that the old Soviet labor unions and sporadic welfare services available through the barely surviving remaining state-owned enterprises played a role in minimizing unrest among Russians during the Shock Therapy of the 90’s.
The aftermath of the Soviet break-up in the 90’s was hellish. Russia’s public health infrastructure collapsed: the author observes that the country’s male life expectancy dropped five years from 1991 to 1994. Violence against women, crime and economic inequality increased dramatically.
Wood states that prolonging Russia’s economic struggles during the 90’s was the continuing low price of oil internationally. The Brezhnev stagnation of the 70’s and early 80’s was prevented from becoming a deeper economic downturn by high prices for Russian oil exports. However, oil prices began plunging downward in the mid-80’s (around the time Gorbachev and his reforms came onto the scene).
An economic upturn for Russia began on the eve of Putin’s ascension to power with the ruble crisis of 1998. The ruble was devalued, making Russia’s exports more competitive on the world market. Increased international prices for oil was a boon to Russia in the 2000’s, before the international economic downturn of 2008 disrupted the country’s economic growth as did the sanctions the west slapped on the country after the 2014 Ukraine episode. The most visible signs of the social decay that had wracked the country in the 90’s went away. The nation’s poverty rate declined from 30 percent in 2000 to 18 percent in 2004.
The author argues that Putin has done nothing significant to disrupt the foundations for Russia’s economy laid during the Yeltsin years. It is a great exaggeration to say that Putin has moved away from the liberal capitalism of Yeltsin. The versions of capitalism and politics existing in Russia under Putin and Yeltsin are not significantly dissimilar, although Putin is obviously more repressive. State owned companies remain under Putin but they are run like private companies. The author observes that although Putin seized control of the Yukos oil company from Khodorkovsky, several other state oil companies were privatized around the same time. Economic inequality remains high and big business representatives are heavily represented in governmental positions at all levels.
The author spends a significant amount of time exploring the grievances that motivate Russian actions on the international stage. Wood argues that Russian actions in Ukraine, Syria and whatever it was they did during the 2016 US presidential election are not evidence of a plan for world domination. They are rather improvisational attempts to assert to assert international prestige in the face of humiliation at the hands of the US led West. Russia’s leading grievance is that NATO has expanded into eastern Europe right up to Russia’s borders—despite apparent promises made to Gorbachev on the eve of the Soviet breakup by western officials like US Secretary of State James Baker that NATO would not expand eastward. However, NATO has freely expanded eastward, and Russian complaints have done nothing to stop it.
Also, in many ways Russia clearly has lost the struggle for power in its own backyard with the west. In Ukraine, the Maidan revolution of 2013-14 was a struggle for the future direction of the country: many in the country’s west wanted opportunities for labor migration that European Union membership would bring while manufacturing industries in the country’s east feared destruction if forced to submit to EU free trade policies. The western backed forces prevailed, and Russia ended up annexing Crimea and backing separatist rebels in Ukraine’s Donbass region in retaliation. The author doubts that Putin really wants to annex Donbass to Russia; anti-oligarchic beliefs have been strong among the Donbass rebels—thus Putin wouldn’t want to encourage such beliefs in his own country.
A big portion of the book explores the opposition to Putin. The author sees Russia’s opposition as splintered between those who want to see relatively deep progressive economic and social change and those who think that merely getting rid of Putin and his gang will solve all of Russia’s problems. Alexei Navalny, the Russian opposition’s de facto leader, represents the latter tendency. His position has been that Russia needs to be cleansed of Putinism and all its corruption and replaced by an honest free market system and accountable democratic system. Navalny has advocated Thatcher style economic policies though in recent years he has made a few noises about the problem of economic inequality and the need for more government spending on health and education. Navalny has also been anti-immigrant and something of a great Russian chauvinist.
The author is a British Marxist international relations analysist whose work has focused on Russia and Latin America. He has long been associated with such publications as New Left Review and the London Review of Books.
This edition of this book—published in early 2020--provides an impressive analysis of Putin’s regime. It includes analysis of Russian social movements and a summary of certain aspects of the post-Soviet economy, including comparisons with Soviet era employment patterns. It is written in a simple, clear style. The book’s tone is notable for its lack of stridency.
Wood argues that while it is not unfair to call Putin an autocrat and kleptocrat, it is mistaken to assume—as Western establishment politicians and commentators do--that he and the people around him are at the root of his regime’s abuses. Rather, Putin and his friends are the symptoms of a political and economic system that has functioned under Putin with little substantive difference from how it functioned under Boris Yeltsin. Post-Soviet Russia was founded on a highly corrupt process of Soviet apparatchiks and others close to power grabbing bits and pieces of the Soviet command economy for their own enrichment. Boris Yeltsin privatized state run companies with secret decrees. Wood refers to the “loans for shares” scandal of late 1995 where Yeltsin gave out shares as collateral—including 78 percent of Yukos to Mikhail Khodorkovsky—in state owned companies in return for “loans” to his 1996 re-election campaign. The oligarchs who benefited from loans for shares made sure to give Yeltsin hugely positive coverage in their media enterprises in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election. The author also notes that Putin was apparently involved in graft in the early 90’s as a senior official in the St. Petersburg city government: he oversaw a public-private partnership with Petersburg’s casinos where millions of dollars meant for the city ended up in private hands and a scheme to trade Petersburg’s natural resources for food supplies which produced no food but millions of dollars in kickbacks. Putin was protected from serious investigations by his patron, St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak.
Backed by the West, Yeltsin bombed the democratically elected parliament in 1993 and imposed a constitution in a rigged referendum giving Russia’s presidency markedly authoritarian powers. Such autocracy was necessary to impose the unpopular neoliberal restructuring on Russia’s people. The West aided Yeltsin in his rigged re-election of 1996. Wood argues that the old Soviet labor unions and sporadic welfare services available through the barely surviving remaining state-owned enterprises played a role in minimizing unrest among Russians during the Shock Therapy of the 90’s.
The aftermath of the Soviet break-up in the 90’s was hellish. Russia’s public health infrastructure collapsed: the author observes that the country’s male life expectancy dropped five years from 1991 to 1994. Violence against women, crime and economic inequality increased dramatically.
Wood states that prolonging Russia’s economic struggles during the 90’s was the continuing low price of oil internationally. The Brezhnev stagnation of the 70’s and early 80’s was prevented from becoming a deeper economic downturn by high prices for Russian oil exports. However, oil prices began plunging downward in the mid-80’s (around the time Gorbachev and his reforms came onto the scene).
An economic upturn for Russia began on the eve of Putin’s ascension to power with the ruble crisis of 1998. The ruble was devalued, making Russia’s exports more competitive on the world market. Increased international prices for oil was a boon to Russia in the 2000’s, before the international economic downturn of 2008 disrupted the country’s economic growth as did the sanctions the west slapped on the country after the 2014 Ukraine episode. The most visible signs of the social decay that had wracked the country in the 90’s went away. The nation’s poverty rate declined from 30 percent in 2000 to 18 percent in 2004.
The author argues that Putin has done nothing significant to disrupt the foundations for Russia’s economy laid during the Yeltsin years. It is a great exaggeration to say that Putin has moved away from the liberal capitalism of Yeltsin. The versions of capitalism and politics existing in Russia under Putin and Yeltsin are not significantly dissimilar, although Putin is obviously more repressive. State owned companies remain under Putin but they are run like private companies. The author observes that although Putin seized control of the Yukos oil company from Khodorkovsky, several other state oil companies were privatized around the same time. Economic inequality remains high and big business representatives are heavily represented in governmental positions at all levels.
The author spends a significant amount of time exploring the grievances that motivate Russian actions on the international stage. Wood argues that Russian actions in Ukraine, Syria and whatever it was they did during the 2016 US presidential election are not evidence of a plan for world domination. They are rather improvisational attempts to assert to assert international prestige in the face of humiliation at the hands of the US led West. Russia’s leading grievance is that NATO has expanded into eastern Europe right up to Russia’s borders—despite apparent promises made to Gorbachev on the eve of the Soviet breakup by western officials like US Secretary of State James Baker that NATO would not expand eastward. However, NATO has freely expanded eastward, and Russian complaints have done nothing to stop it.
Also, in many ways Russia clearly has lost the struggle for power in its own backyard with the west. In Ukraine, the Maidan revolution of 2013-14 was a struggle for the future direction of the country: many in the country’s west wanted opportunities for labor migration that European Union membership would bring while manufacturing industries in the country’s east feared destruction if forced to submit to EU free trade policies. The western backed forces prevailed, and Russia ended up annexing Crimea and backing separatist rebels in Ukraine’s Donbass region in retaliation. The author doubts that Putin really wants to annex Donbass to Russia; anti-oligarchic beliefs have been strong among the Donbass rebels—thus Putin wouldn’t want to encourage such beliefs in his own country.
A big portion of the book explores the opposition to Putin. The author sees Russia’s opposition as splintered between those who want to see relatively deep progressive economic and social change and those who think that merely getting rid of Putin and his gang will solve all of Russia’s problems. Alexei Navalny, the Russian opposition’s de facto leader, represents the latter tendency. His position has been that Russia needs to be cleansed of Putinism and all its corruption and replaced by an honest free market system and accountable democratic system. Navalny has advocated Thatcher style economic policies though in recent years he has made a few noises about the problem of economic inequality and the need for more government spending on health and education. Navalny has also been anti-immigrant and something of a great Russian chauvinist.
March 26, 2019
A really lovely book -- beautiful writing and densely packed with ideas. Even at only 177 pages I found myself plowing through with great effort. The idea is that we in the West blame Putin for everything Russia does but he is not only not completely in control, but anyone occupying his position would be roughly the same -- that the wealthy corporate (corrupt) elites really control the government. Favorite new phrase: imitative democracy. I don't know if he created it, but I really like it.
There were moments in the book where Russia's attempts to almost woo the West, especially the United States, sounded like a tragic love story. Like the Little Mermaid where she will expire unless the prince recognizes her and gives her a kiss, but she ultimately fails and dissolves into foam. The saddest moment was when Hillary Clinton gave the Russian ambassador a "tacky" gift of a box with a red button inside that was supposed to say reset in Russian but because of an error said overload instead. And you do feel that the deceit of luring the former Soviet countries into NATO all the while first saying that that wouldn't happen and then saying that maybe Russia could join too was pathetically hamhanded. The argument that the United States was going to do what we wanted to do and there was nothing Russia could do about it came across as incredibly and unnecessarily hurtful.
Russia is a country whose glory days are behind her. Her population is shrinking. The economy is cratering. The military is weak. The wealthy shield and invest their money overseas. Corruption is rife. Social and economic inequities are crippling. And the sanctions are not helping. So Wood asks where will they go from here? And it will be interesting to watch.
There were moments in the book where Russia's attempts to almost woo the West, especially the United States, sounded like a tragic love story. Like the Little Mermaid where she will expire unless the prince recognizes her and gives her a kiss, but she ultimately fails and dissolves into foam. The saddest moment was when Hillary Clinton gave the Russian ambassador a "tacky" gift of a box with a red button inside that was supposed to say reset in Russian but because of an error said overload instead. And you do feel that the deceit of luring the former Soviet countries into NATO all the while first saying that that wouldn't happen and then saying that maybe Russia could join too was pathetically hamhanded. The argument that the United States was going to do what we wanted to do and there was nothing Russia could do about it came across as incredibly and unnecessarily hurtful.
Russia is a country whose glory days are behind her. Her population is shrinking. The economy is cratering. The military is weak. The wealthy shield and invest their money overseas. Corruption is rife. Social and economic inequities are crippling. And the sanctions are not helping. So Wood asks where will they go from here? And it will be interesting to watch.
September 23, 2019
Russia Without Putin is, I am comfortable to say without hesitancy, a great book.
Wood has a direct and easy-to-understand approach to the history of Putin’s takeover, the communist regime before that and even the influence of the Tsars before that.
That being said, whilst I thoroughly enjoyed his argument, and in the case of the Economics of Russia I quite agree with it, it did not persuade me that Putin does not hold the reins of Russia.
He makes excellent points regarding the nature of Yeltsin’s policies prior to Putin and the structure of government (nominally a Strongman) perceived as necessary to rule Russia which were not instituted by Putin. And, granted, these topics do need to given more weight in the consideration of modern Russia.
I personally feel that to discount the power of Putin is naive, however Wood makes other compelling points that make this an excellent book to read!
Wood has a direct and easy-to-understand approach to the history of Putin’s takeover, the communist regime before that and even the influence of the Tsars before that.
That being said, whilst I thoroughly enjoyed his argument, and in the case of the Economics of Russia I quite agree with it, it did not persuade me that Putin does not hold the reins of Russia.
He makes excellent points regarding the nature of Yeltsin’s policies prior to Putin and the structure of government (nominally a Strongman) perceived as necessary to rule Russia which were not instituted by Putin. And, granted, these topics do need to given more weight in the consideration of modern Russia.
I personally feel that to discount the power of Putin is naive, however Wood makes other compelling points that make this an excellent book to read!
May 8, 2023
Wood builds his argument; over the first half of the book is stuff that I've read elsewhere.
It's a good book if you are looking for a starting place to understand how Russia and the US got here.
I enjoyed hearing his perspective once he got to it.
It's a good book if you are looking for a starting place to understand how Russia and the US got here.
I enjoyed hearing his perspective once he got to it.
May 10, 2022
Jumps around a bit, but offered a fresh perspective.
July 28, 2025
Great for a post-cold war look at Russia and how putin came to power. Not greta for much else.
June 6, 2020
It is definitely a must read for anyone who is interested in learning more about contemporary Russia. The author goes through modern Russian history in order to explain why the existing regime thrives in the country. His analysis is so deep that some of the information and explanation of the known facts became a revelation for me, despite that I was living them through in Russia. In my case, although I had a chance to read this book through my local library, I am ordering a copy for myself for future references.
October 10, 2022
Not quite what I was expecting from the title, but this is a very interesting and informative look into the mindset of Russian power at the moment. Although it's a little dated now (the Crimea anexation was the most recent event under discussion) it still feels pretty relevant to the current situation with the invasion of Ukraine.
June 4, 2022
Too much attention is paid to Putin and not enough on the system over which he presides.
The fixation on Putin's personality is understandable as power in Russia has historically been concentrated through the preferences of a small number of individuals and often one individual...However it is not a helpful as it narrows the frame of reference used to analyse Russia.
At its worst focusing just on Putin supports the notion that a removal of a leader will rectify all problems...which it does not
The post-Soviet system is intangled in the contradiction of free market capitalism as and a 'managed democracy' (imitation democracy), where power remains concentrated. This was the story of both the Yeltsin and Putin era. Russias politics has been characterised by:
- Suppression of dissent and authoritarianism
- A democracy empty of actual democratic content
- Manipulation of appearances through media control
Putin was a maturation of the Yeltsin era not a step backwards to Soviet Union systems
The Yeltsin era was corrupt, and chaotic, filled with erratic improvisation...he applied 'shock therapy' to Russia as it transitioned to capitalism
1990s privatisation took 3 forms under Yeltsin:
1. Popular Privatisation via Vouchers
Citizens were entitled to purchasing shares in enterprises going private, in an attempt to spread the benefits of privatisation. In practice however most citizens sold their vouchers to raise cash during the economic downturn. Moreover, the scheme was not linked to inflation and undervalued businesses...
Gazproms implied valuation was $225mn
All of Russian industry was valued at $12bn...
The main beneficiaries of this were therefore the 'red directors' (Soviet nomenklatura) and wealthier segments of society
2. Privatisation by Executive Decree
Yeltsin enabled the red directors to earn shareholdings in the heavy industry they had run under the Soviet system as the enterprises became stock companies:
Gazprom - Natural gas
Norilsk Nickel - Nickel
Yukos, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz - Oil & Gas
Rosugol - Coal
3. Plenipotentiary Banking
Several financiers became defacto intermediaries to manage budgetary flows of governmental ministries
The new Russian elite could be split into 'insiders' made up of the Soviet nomenklatura and red directors as well as 'outsiders' made up of entrepreneurs often taking advantage of import export arbitrage and state inefficiencies
The insiders largely controlled natural resources and heavy industry while the outsiders controlled banking, media a d consumer goods...
The economic conditions of the 1990s benefited the outsiders industries leading them to use their wealth to gain political influence through bribes, kick backs etc..
Yeltsin formalised this corruption in 1995 with the loans-for-shares programme, rigging auctions that enabled existing outsider oligarchs to gain large shareholdings in heavy industry through loans and supporting Yeltsins election campaigns
E.g. Vladimir Potanin paid $170mn for Norilsk Nickel which had $1.2bn in profit
In 1996 the term oligarchy was popularised to describe the new breed of elite with both capital wealth and political power
Privatisation ultimately caused a massive reallocation of resources, such as a contraction in the manufacturing and heavy industries as they were a symbolically bloated part of the Soviet economy (45% of GDP)...this led to a contraction in overall GDP
The agricultural elite avoided privatisation, in agriculture effectively land reform was not achieved under Yeltsin as there was no definitive definition for private land and the only authorised seller of agricultural land was the state, as such the Soviet maintained control of the agricultural sector, although the state lifted food price controls, leading to rapid food inflation due to inefficiencies in the Soviet system
Municipalities largely mismanaged the sale of housing to individuals and in many cases like the voucher system, transferring the property to cash was required for those in poverty
Some in the intelligentsia supported this rapid 'shock therapy' transition but the free market equally dismantled their status too as the market was intended to be opened to allocate resources not the intelligentsia run planned economics for the people...
However, the shock therapy in reality was chaotic, placing resources into a select few resources but operating in a flux of competition and collaboration with few democratic institutions to regulate, legislate or adjudicate...
Stabilisation was a key theme of Putins policies, he introduced a Stabalisation Fund which would use the inflows from oil and gas to backstop struggling industries, regions and peoples
When Putin came into power economic conditions began favouring the heavy industries and natural resources during a commodity price boom and a rouble devaulation making these commodities more competitive to export, Putin sought to increase top-down control by reducing the government largesse, corruption and inefficiencies...
Putin increased pension payments, one reason for broad based support and made possible via oil and gas revenues...
...he spelled out the new rules of the game to the oligarchs, some were arrested or fled but many were willing to work with Putin...
The state increased ownership in strategic businesses, a greater number of state representatives sat on company boards but despite this there was no turn away from the pursuit of private profit...
Business and politics was progressively interwoven, with representatives moving in both directions, under Putin this system simply became more mature but was still a continuation of the Yeltsin era and USSR days.
In the early 2000s Putin sought to reassert the Kremlins top-down authority while continuing to support free market reforms (flat income tax, reducing corporate tax) he created a vertical power channel where the state controlled strategic businesses (oil & gas). Putin simply consolidated and organised what is a system that blurs the lines between state and business.
This is not very different to how society was structured in the USSR...(it simply had a capitalist twist, which has been maintained ever since!!!)
The USSR class system was declared in the 1936 Soviet constitution to be made up of 'peasant and workers' with a layer of intelligentsia...in reality these groups were broken out in many compartments by income levels, education and gender.
Industrial workers were viewed with symbolic importance and thus typically paid more, workers in agriculture were paid less, those in cities were paid more, women were overwhelmingly paid less...
Party membership grew substantially and was beneficial for income and status, with informal advantages to...this applied especially to the nomenklatura which consisted of a class in itself...
Party membership and the nomenklatura came from all parts of society and was not a closed off group, it was recruited, dedicated to preserving its collective power, it did not technically own property but would soon seek to acquire it
Within the Kremlin a desire to come into closer collaboration with the West began in the 1960s under detente, under Gorbachev in the late1980s this intensified and integration with the West was viewed as good by the intelligentsia
However, the execution of this under Yeltsins shock therapy was terrible, in 1992 Russian foreign minister could not identify their countrys strategic priorities when asked by Nixon...very quickly nationalists and communists regained more political klout by 1996, the new foreign minister decided that rekindling integration and collaboration with East Asia, ex USSR states and India/Middle East was necessary...however this relied on the West to treat Russia as an equal on the world stage, which it was not
After 1990 Russia saw a deep contraction not just in its economy but also its geopolitical klout, spending on military dropped by 95% and the army was pulled out of all foreign regions etc...The US took advantage of the growing imbalance between itself and Russia...
...NATO expansion was a clear strategic goal of the West after Yeltsins re-election the US made clear that the intention was to expand NATO, both Yeltsin and Putin even floated the idea of Russia joining NATO...
...in 2005 Putin spoke of shared ideals with the West of freedom, human rights, justice and democracy but also that Russia was a sovereign state which will set its own timeframe and conditions on its path to freedom and democracy...this was an inherently incompatible mix...
Within the West, Russia was viewed as too backwards/different yet too large an entity that would wield equivalent influence to Germany or France...The West had a willingness for the integration of weaker ex-USSR republics but not Russia itself...
The NATO-Russia council was established but these were always just artificial substitutes to NATO membership...Russia struggled to gain access to EU markets, which were becomjng the dominant trading bloc for ex-USSR republics
Russia felt like it was being treated as an outside threat, still being treated as an enemy and felt isolated under what some commentators warned could create a post-Soviet Versailles backlash...
When the EU supported Kosovo independence in 2008 and floated the idea of Geeorgian and Ukranian memvership into NATO...this pushed Russia further into isolation and into a reaction that kicked off the invasion of Northern Georgia
In 2009 the Obama administration attempted to reconcile relations with a token gift of a button (which looked like a gimmic nuclear war button) saying 'reset' in english but the translation to Russian was wrong what should have been 'perezagrukza' it read 'peregruzka' which meand 'overload' (a Freudian summary of the relations)
Putin's actions in Georgia, Crimea and the rest of Ukraine stem from weakness, anxiety and apprehension...made progressively worse in the context of the power imbalances and actions of the West
This anxiety is also internal, Russia cast size creates an anxiety of whether it's regions, borders, people remain stable, Russia is made up of over 150 ethnic groups, many of them scattered centrally around the country. Originally Yeltsin suggested federal regions should have devolved powers, however, when they overreached he slowly clawed this back with the exception of Chechnya which required a war...
Putin was more successful in centralising power over time, or as he called it a 'vertical of power'...
However, this concern of federal regions is largely unfounded as most regions are majority ethnic Russian. One possible explanation is to limit the development of democratic institutions locally and thus a centralised clamp down can limit democracy nationally. This is true because federal systems can often support democracy, electing local individuals that are more representative and open to local issues...
One significant demographic trend is that ethnic Russian birth rates have fallen substantially, while minority ethnicities have high birth rates, this will slowly result in a population dominated less by ethnic Russians
Putin's ideology is very much nationalism not for the purpose of a political project but to maintain the rationale of authoritarianism...
Opposition in Russia is very fragmented and poorly organised, Navalnyi is viewed by some as Russias Trump, despite being anti corruption he has strong right wing social rhetoric around migrants and Georgians/Chechnians during conflicts and neoliberal economics...this does not sit well with other smaller groups of Putin's opposition...
Ultimately how Russian relations with the West develop will depend on its political system
The fixation on Putin's personality is understandable as power in Russia has historically been concentrated through the preferences of a small number of individuals and often one individual...However it is not a helpful as it narrows the frame of reference used to analyse Russia.
At its worst focusing just on Putin supports the notion that a removal of a leader will rectify all problems...which it does not
The post-Soviet system is intangled in the contradiction of free market capitalism as and a 'managed democracy' (imitation democracy), where power remains concentrated. This was the story of both the Yeltsin and Putin era. Russias politics has been characterised by:
- Suppression of dissent and authoritarianism
- A democracy empty of actual democratic content
- Manipulation of appearances through media control
Putin was a maturation of the Yeltsin era not a step backwards to Soviet Union systems
The Yeltsin era was corrupt, and chaotic, filled with erratic improvisation...he applied 'shock therapy' to Russia as it transitioned to capitalism
1990s privatisation took 3 forms under Yeltsin:
1. Popular Privatisation via Vouchers
Citizens were entitled to purchasing shares in enterprises going private, in an attempt to spread the benefits of privatisation. In practice however most citizens sold their vouchers to raise cash during the economic downturn. Moreover, the scheme was not linked to inflation and undervalued businesses...
Gazproms implied valuation was $225mn
All of Russian industry was valued at $12bn...
The main beneficiaries of this were therefore the 'red directors' (Soviet nomenklatura) and wealthier segments of society
2. Privatisation by Executive Decree
Yeltsin enabled the red directors to earn shareholdings in the heavy industry they had run under the Soviet system as the enterprises became stock companies:
Gazprom - Natural gas
Norilsk Nickel - Nickel
Yukos, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz - Oil & Gas
Rosugol - Coal
3. Plenipotentiary Banking
Several financiers became defacto intermediaries to manage budgetary flows of governmental ministries
The new Russian elite could be split into 'insiders' made up of the Soviet nomenklatura and red directors as well as 'outsiders' made up of entrepreneurs often taking advantage of import export arbitrage and state inefficiencies
The insiders largely controlled natural resources and heavy industry while the outsiders controlled banking, media a d consumer goods...
The economic conditions of the 1990s benefited the outsiders industries leading them to use their wealth to gain political influence through bribes, kick backs etc..
Yeltsin formalised this corruption in 1995 with the loans-for-shares programme, rigging auctions that enabled existing outsider oligarchs to gain large shareholdings in heavy industry through loans and supporting Yeltsins election campaigns
E.g. Vladimir Potanin paid $170mn for Norilsk Nickel which had $1.2bn in profit
In 1996 the term oligarchy was popularised to describe the new breed of elite with both capital wealth and political power
Privatisation ultimately caused a massive reallocation of resources, such as a contraction in the manufacturing and heavy industries as they were a symbolically bloated part of the Soviet economy (45% of GDP)...this led to a contraction in overall GDP
The agricultural elite avoided privatisation, in agriculture effectively land reform was not achieved under Yeltsin as there was no definitive definition for private land and the only authorised seller of agricultural land was the state, as such the Soviet maintained control of the agricultural sector, although the state lifted food price controls, leading to rapid food inflation due to inefficiencies in the Soviet system
Municipalities largely mismanaged the sale of housing to individuals and in many cases like the voucher system, transferring the property to cash was required for those in poverty
Some in the intelligentsia supported this rapid 'shock therapy' transition but the free market equally dismantled their status too as the market was intended to be opened to allocate resources not the intelligentsia run planned economics for the people...
However, the shock therapy in reality was chaotic, placing resources into a select few resources but operating in a flux of competition and collaboration with few democratic institutions to regulate, legislate or adjudicate...
Stabilisation was a key theme of Putins policies, he introduced a Stabalisation Fund which would use the inflows from oil and gas to backstop struggling industries, regions and peoples
When Putin came into power economic conditions began favouring the heavy industries and natural resources during a commodity price boom and a rouble devaulation making these commodities more competitive to export, Putin sought to increase top-down control by reducing the government largesse, corruption and inefficiencies...
Putin increased pension payments, one reason for broad based support and made possible via oil and gas revenues...
...he spelled out the new rules of the game to the oligarchs, some were arrested or fled but many were willing to work with Putin...
The state increased ownership in strategic businesses, a greater number of state representatives sat on company boards but despite this there was no turn away from the pursuit of private profit...
Business and politics was progressively interwoven, with representatives moving in both directions, under Putin this system simply became more mature but was still a continuation of the Yeltsin era and USSR days.
In the early 2000s Putin sought to reassert the Kremlins top-down authority while continuing to support free market reforms (flat income tax, reducing corporate tax) he created a vertical power channel where the state controlled strategic businesses (oil & gas). Putin simply consolidated and organised what is a system that blurs the lines between state and business.
This is not very different to how society was structured in the USSR...(it simply had a capitalist twist, which has been maintained ever since!!!)
The USSR class system was declared in the 1936 Soviet constitution to be made up of 'peasant and workers' with a layer of intelligentsia...in reality these groups were broken out in many compartments by income levels, education and gender.
Industrial workers were viewed with symbolic importance and thus typically paid more, workers in agriculture were paid less, those in cities were paid more, women were overwhelmingly paid less...
Party membership grew substantially and was beneficial for income and status, with informal advantages to...this applied especially to the nomenklatura which consisted of a class in itself...
Party membership and the nomenklatura came from all parts of society and was not a closed off group, it was recruited, dedicated to preserving its collective power, it did not technically own property but would soon seek to acquire it
Within the Kremlin a desire to come into closer collaboration with the West began in the 1960s under detente, under Gorbachev in the late1980s this intensified and integration with the West was viewed as good by the intelligentsia
However, the execution of this under Yeltsins shock therapy was terrible, in 1992 Russian foreign minister could not identify their countrys strategic priorities when asked by Nixon...very quickly nationalists and communists regained more political klout by 1996, the new foreign minister decided that rekindling integration and collaboration with East Asia, ex USSR states and India/Middle East was necessary...however this relied on the West to treat Russia as an equal on the world stage, which it was not
After 1990 Russia saw a deep contraction not just in its economy but also its geopolitical klout, spending on military dropped by 95% and the army was pulled out of all foreign regions etc...The US took advantage of the growing imbalance between itself and Russia...
...NATO expansion was a clear strategic goal of the West after Yeltsins re-election the US made clear that the intention was to expand NATO, both Yeltsin and Putin even floated the idea of Russia joining NATO...
...in 2005 Putin spoke of shared ideals with the West of freedom, human rights, justice and democracy but also that Russia was a sovereign state which will set its own timeframe and conditions on its path to freedom and democracy...this was an inherently incompatible mix...
Within the West, Russia was viewed as too backwards/different yet too large an entity that would wield equivalent influence to Germany or France...The West had a willingness for the integration of weaker ex-USSR republics but not Russia itself...
The NATO-Russia council was established but these were always just artificial substitutes to NATO membership...Russia struggled to gain access to EU markets, which were becomjng the dominant trading bloc for ex-USSR republics
Russia felt like it was being treated as an outside threat, still being treated as an enemy and felt isolated under what some commentators warned could create a post-Soviet Versailles backlash...
When the EU supported Kosovo independence in 2008 and floated the idea of Geeorgian and Ukranian memvership into NATO...this pushed Russia further into isolation and into a reaction that kicked off the invasion of Northern Georgia
In 2009 the Obama administration attempted to reconcile relations with a token gift of a button (which looked like a gimmic nuclear war button) saying 'reset' in english but the translation to Russian was wrong what should have been 'perezagrukza' it read 'peregruzka' which meand 'overload' (a Freudian summary of the relations)
Putin's actions in Georgia, Crimea and the rest of Ukraine stem from weakness, anxiety and apprehension...made progressively worse in the context of the power imbalances and actions of the West
This anxiety is also internal, Russia cast size creates an anxiety of whether it's regions, borders, people remain stable, Russia is made up of over 150 ethnic groups, many of them scattered centrally around the country. Originally Yeltsin suggested federal regions should have devolved powers, however, when they overreached he slowly clawed this back with the exception of Chechnya which required a war...
Putin was more successful in centralising power over time, or as he called it a 'vertical of power'...
However, this concern of federal regions is largely unfounded as most regions are majority ethnic Russian. One possible explanation is to limit the development of democratic institutions locally and thus a centralised clamp down can limit democracy nationally. This is true because federal systems can often support democracy, electing local individuals that are more representative and open to local issues...
One significant demographic trend is that ethnic Russian birth rates have fallen substantially, while minority ethnicities have high birth rates, this will slowly result in a population dominated less by ethnic Russians
Putin's ideology is very much nationalism not for the purpose of a political project but to maintain the rationale of authoritarianism...
Opposition in Russia is very fragmented and poorly organised, Navalnyi is viewed by some as Russias Trump, despite being anti corruption he has strong right wing social rhetoric around migrants and Georgians/Chechnians during conflicts and neoliberal economics...this does not sit well with other smaller groups of Putin's opposition...
Ultimately how Russian relations with the West develop will depend on its political system
August 13, 2024
The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 brought forth a new era of geopolitics, one marked by a profound sense of potential coupled with uncertainty. Russia could’ve gone the route of broader democracy and human rights, and initially many thought this would be the case. Unfortunately, the Russia of today has devolved into a kleptocratic society with much less democracy than even under the Soviet system. The emblematic figure who represents this trend of counterrevolution and autocracy is Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, and many blame Russia’s problems almost exclusively on him. But, as historian and political scientist Tony Wood argues, the crises within Russia go far deeper than Putin’s stranglehold on the country.
In Russia Without Putin: Money, Power and the Myths of the New Cold War (2018), Wood unravels many of the common misconceptions about Putin’s rise to power and the Russian government that have accumulated over the last three decades, showing that Putin is merely a symptom of a broader dysfunction in the paths of governmental and economic reform that post-Soviet Russia implemented.
Starting in the 1990s, the “shock treatment” of neoliberal reform left the Russian people with fewer opportunities and increasingly precarious social services, rapidly lowering the standard of living and creating the conditions for a swift backlash. This came in the form of a virulent and reactionary nationalism which rejected democracy in favor of economic centralization and political authoritarianism, which fueled Putin’s rise to power. However, it would be a mistake to say that his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, was the defender of democracy. In fact, his shuttering of the Duma in 1993 presaged the autocratic rule of Putin, who undermined the legislature even more and solidified power in the presidency.
Wood illustrates how Putin’s crackdown on dissent, scapegoating of marginalized peoples, and his disastrous policies in Ukraine are only a logical outgrowth of the gangster government forged in the collapse of the Soviet system, of which many actors were to blame. All of this makes Russia Without Putin a vital book to understand Russia’s place in the world today.
In Russia Without Putin: Money, Power and the Myths of the New Cold War (2018), Wood unravels many of the common misconceptions about Putin’s rise to power and the Russian government that have accumulated over the last three decades, showing that Putin is merely a symptom of a broader dysfunction in the paths of governmental and economic reform that post-Soviet Russia implemented.
Starting in the 1990s, the “shock treatment” of neoliberal reform left the Russian people with fewer opportunities and increasingly precarious social services, rapidly lowering the standard of living and creating the conditions for a swift backlash. This came in the form of a virulent and reactionary nationalism which rejected democracy in favor of economic centralization and political authoritarianism, which fueled Putin’s rise to power. However, it would be a mistake to say that his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, was the defender of democracy. In fact, his shuttering of the Duma in 1993 presaged the autocratic rule of Putin, who undermined the legislature even more and solidified power in the presidency.
Wood illustrates how Putin’s crackdown on dissent, scapegoating of marginalized peoples, and his disastrous policies in Ukraine are only a logical outgrowth of the gangster government forged in the collapse of the Soviet system, of which many actors were to blame. All of this makes Russia Without Putin a vital book to understand Russia’s place in the world today.
July 20, 2022
Not at all the book it promised to be — there's good stuff in here, lots of sharp analysis and detailed info, especially in the first couple of chapters and the chapter on the Russian opposition/left in the early 2010s. But it's a significantly weaker left-wing analysis of Russia than Simon Pirani's book, which I read just before it. Some of the differences are down to political differences between me and the author which is no sin on his part, but I do still think it's somewhat bizarre, in an analysis of how the modern Russian government functions, to spend an entire chapter steadfastly focused on the US and NATO, taking lots of Putin quotes about American threats entirely at face value when so much of the book has been aimed at dispelling myths around Putin's persona and looking at the function of the state around him.
I suppose from the marketing around it I had an image of what I wanted this book to be — taking apart the weird web of govt officials, secret services, businesses and organised crime in modern Russia, trying to pry apart what makes the engine 'tick' in areas like the judicial system and political repression. If that book hasn't been written yet it still needs to be, and if it has I need to find it. I was hoping this would fulfil that function, but it's unfortunately still quite a surface-level analysis. Tony Wood is absolutely right to avoid the cult of hyper-focus on Putin's every whim and characteristic, but all he's replaced it with is a fairly bog-standard, quite shallow left-wing analysis of the country.
I suppose from the marketing around it I had an image of what I wanted this book to be — taking apart the weird web of govt officials, secret services, businesses and organised crime in modern Russia, trying to pry apart what makes the engine 'tick' in areas like the judicial system and political repression. If that book hasn't been written yet it still needs to be, and if it has I need to find it. I was hoping this would fulfil that function, but it's unfortunately still quite a surface-level analysis. Tony Wood is absolutely right to avoid the cult of hyper-focus on Putin's every whim and characteristic, but all he's replaced it with is a fairly bog-standard, quite shallow left-wing analysis of the country.
March 15, 2021
"The imitation-democratic system has indeed functioned much to the satisfaction of Russia's elite with Putin in charge. But it is fundamentally a system - that is, a set of power structures and political practices that has enabled Russia's particular, post-Soviet, form of capitalism to thrive."
Tony Wood starts from the premise that much of what we think we know about Russia and the country's leadership under Putin is wrong, or at least we are confusing symptoms of a problem for the cause.
Key among the arguments presented in this excellent, modest book is that capitalism has "predominated in Russia for the past three decades" and that "what many Russian oppositionists see as symptoms of its absence are, instead, structural features of the kind of capitalism the country has". A capitalism which extracts from the country and puts little back with much of the wealth fleeing Russian borders along with many of its jetset global new elite.
Indeed one of Russia's problems was the chaotic free for all that accompanied the "transition" from the tired state system to what now exists. With western support and enthusiasm the entire country, which had nominally been held in trust of the Soviet people, was divested from them with those best placed to grab all that was offered in the firesale for free or next to nothing. As the author notes, the voucher system that was presented as giving citizens a stake in the booming new capitalist economy actually facilitated, for the most part, the concentration of resources and industry to the new elite. Wood identifies two types of winners in the power and wealth grab, insiders (members of the old ruling elite, primarily managers of industry with political connections) and outsiders (the newcomers in the financial services sector outside the traditional structures, primarily banking and literal casino industry, who funded their own political representation). In both cases the services of those able to apply pressure was retained. Wood places the time of the outsiders up until the economic crash of the late 90's followed by the rise of the insiders as productive and extractive industries rose again.
Throughout these economic struggles the state was influenced and managed by the money which "had severe consequences for the rest of the population" as "the elite could deploy the formal power of the state for personal ends. State functionaries used entirely legal means - tax inspections, bankruptcy laws and property transfer documents - to gain control of companies, banks, oil fields". Wood argues that the "...idea that Putin and his circle are somehow unusually crooked requires us to overlook the extent to which the entire Russian elite ... is driven by the same motives, and skilled use of predatory techniques. More importantly, it asks us to ignore the wider realities of profit-making in Russia, which are "rooted in a system that was imposed in the 1990s..." with enthusiastic support from the West.
Throughout all this Russia has experienced a particularly gleeful form of Schadenfreunde from other global powers, particularly the USA and increasingly the European Union. Russia has retained inwardly many of the trappings of its Soviet heyday when it was a force to be reckoned with and it could present an image of strength which was sufficient to project itself above its ability on the world stage and it was taken seriously as a global power. Its inability to any longer back up its continued belief in its place as a global power has left Russia impotent as its borders, spheres of influence and ability to convincingly project power have been hacked back. This has happened despite the promises of the West to respect Russia's concerns and not to expand NATO into the former Soviet bloc. Yet now what Russia faces is a fait accompli in which NATO is encroaching its borders and the EU seduces ever more states to its club, both institutions from which Russia has been pointedly excluded. Wood notes US concerns about the ability of Russia in either organisation to threaten US hegemony. Efforts over the years of Russia to seek closer cooperation and integration in the Western sphere have been cold shouldered from the start despite early rhetoric embracing Russia's entry into the sunlit uplands of capitalism. It is this rejection, argues Wood, which has led Russia to pursue an increasingly anti-Western line although he suggests this is best understood as "tactical improvisations rather than moves in any alternative grand strategy" which remains lacking.
In such a situation as Russia now is it is often questioned why social unrest has remained so marginal. On the one hand, in the 1990s especially, people could be said to have been trying too hard just to survive to protest. However, a key reason presented here, ironically, is that rather than a hindrance "the remnants of the Soviet past have been a massive boon for post-Soviet Russia" where "coexistence of old and new structures provided a stabalising subsidy", a welfare system, that while threadbare, provided a safetynet through the 1990s. Coupled to this was the joint interest of factory owners and employees in keeping workplaces - which provided housing and welfare as well as sometimes a wage - operational. Ensuring a steady flow of crumbs that a briefly healthy oil economy offered and capitalising on freshly reignited ideas of tradition and Russian values has, as it does in most places, helped buy breathing space with a population that has remained generally not opposed to Putin's rule (compared with what preceded him he has presented a more sober and statesmanlike face to the world if nothing else).
With all this in mind changing the leadership or the party is going to make very little impact on the overall system and its inequalities. Putin or Navalyni as the ringmaster of the circus, its paymasters and its beneficiaries remain unchanged like their needs and demands which any potential leader needs to satisfy. Personally I don't see the Russian political and economic system being that much different from much of the rest of the world, it is just more advanced in its inequality and cruder in implementation of politics but reading this book I got more a feeling that we are all heading the same direction rather than there being a bright happy liberal future for Russia simply by replacing Putin.
Tony Wood starts from the premise that much of what we think we know about Russia and the country's leadership under Putin is wrong, or at least we are confusing symptoms of a problem for the cause.
Key among the arguments presented in this excellent, modest book is that capitalism has "predominated in Russia for the past three decades" and that "what many Russian oppositionists see as symptoms of its absence are, instead, structural features of the kind of capitalism the country has". A capitalism which extracts from the country and puts little back with much of the wealth fleeing Russian borders along with many of its jetset global new elite.
Indeed one of Russia's problems was the chaotic free for all that accompanied the "transition" from the tired state system to what now exists. With western support and enthusiasm the entire country, which had nominally been held in trust of the Soviet people, was divested from them with those best placed to grab all that was offered in the firesale for free or next to nothing. As the author notes, the voucher system that was presented as giving citizens a stake in the booming new capitalist economy actually facilitated, for the most part, the concentration of resources and industry to the new elite. Wood identifies two types of winners in the power and wealth grab, insiders (members of the old ruling elite, primarily managers of industry with political connections) and outsiders (the newcomers in the financial services sector outside the traditional structures, primarily banking and literal casino industry, who funded their own political representation). In both cases the services of those able to apply pressure was retained. Wood places the time of the outsiders up until the economic crash of the late 90's followed by the rise of the insiders as productive and extractive industries rose again.
Throughout these economic struggles the state was influenced and managed by the money which "had severe consequences for the rest of the population" as "the elite could deploy the formal power of the state for personal ends. State functionaries used entirely legal means - tax inspections, bankruptcy laws and property transfer documents - to gain control of companies, banks, oil fields". Wood argues that the "...idea that Putin and his circle are somehow unusually crooked requires us to overlook the extent to which the entire Russian elite ... is driven by the same motives, and skilled use of predatory techniques. More importantly, it asks us to ignore the wider realities of profit-making in Russia, which are "rooted in a system that was imposed in the 1990s..." with enthusiastic support from the West.
Throughout all this Russia has experienced a particularly gleeful form of Schadenfreunde from other global powers, particularly the USA and increasingly the European Union. Russia has retained inwardly many of the trappings of its Soviet heyday when it was a force to be reckoned with and it could present an image of strength which was sufficient to project itself above its ability on the world stage and it was taken seriously as a global power. Its inability to any longer back up its continued belief in its place as a global power has left Russia impotent as its borders, spheres of influence and ability to convincingly project power have been hacked back. This has happened despite the promises of the West to respect Russia's concerns and not to expand NATO into the former Soviet bloc. Yet now what Russia faces is a fait accompli in which NATO is encroaching its borders and the EU seduces ever more states to its club, both institutions from which Russia has been pointedly excluded. Wood notes US concerns about the ability of Russia in either organisation to threaten US hegemony. Efforts over the years of Russia to seek closer cooperation and integration in the Western sphere have been cold shouldered from the start despite early rhetoric embracing Russia's entry into the sunlit uplands of capitalism. It is this rejection, argues Wood, which has led Russia to pursue an increasingly anti-Western line although he suggests this is best understood as "tactical improvisations rather than moves in any alternative grand strategy" which remains lacking.
In such a situation as Russia now is it is often questioned why social unrest has remained so marginal. On the one hand, in the 1990s especially, people could be said to have been trying too hard just to survive to protest. However, a key reason presented here, ironically, is that rather than a hindrance "the remnants of the Soviet past have been a massive boon for post-Soviet Russia" where "coexistence of old and new structures provided a stabalising subsidy", a welfare system, that while threadbare, provided a safetynet through the 1990s. Coupled to this was the joint interest of factory owners and employees in keeping workplaces - which provided housing and welfare as well as sometimes a wage - operational. Ensuring a steady flow of crumbs that a briefly healthy oil economy offered and capitalising on freshly reignited ideas of tradition and Russian values has, as it does in most places, helped buy breathing space with a population that has remained generally not opposed to Putin's rule (compared with what preceded him he has presented a more sober and statesmanlike face to the world if nothing else).
With all this in mind changing the leadership or the party is going to make very little impact on the overall system and its inequalities. Putin or Navalyni as the ringmaster of the circus, its paymasters and its beneficiaries remain unchanged like their needs and demands which any potential leader needs to satisfy. Personally I don't see the Russian political and economic system being that much different from much of the rest of the world, it is just more advanced in its inequality and cruder in implementation of politics but reading this book I got more a feeling that we are all heading the same direction rather than there being a bright happy liberal future for Russia simply by replacing Putin.
February 28, 2022
Well. We already knew Russia was corrupt and driven by power obsessed men but this gives us a little more insight into how the wealth came about and it started with Gorbachev (after the fall of the Union etc etc).
This book didn’t age too good. The author challenges the common view that Putin wants to return to Soviet times and well, what can I say.
To be fair, prior to Putin invading Ukraine, prior to Trump’s terrible reign and poking his nose in absolutely everywhere, the author was trying to make us see Russia for Russia as a whole and not Russia as Putin.
Unfortunately current events make this book practically redundant as Putin as well and truly made his mark now and it’s not a nice one.
This book didn’t age too good. The author challenges the common view that Putin wants to return to Soviet times and well, what can I say.
To be fair, prior to Putin invading Ukraine, prior to Trump’s terrible reign and poking his nose in absolutely everywhere, the author was trying to make us see Russia for Russia as a whole and not Russia as Putin.
Unfortunately current events make this book practically redundant as Putin as well and truly made his mark now and it’s not a nice one.
October 23, 2019
An interesting read though feeling like it lacks specificity. Great overviews of recent history of Russia's demographics, class, economy, the opposition and international outlook. Drawbacks are it excludes the judicial and legal systems, doesn't really cover anyone other than Putin in some chapters, and, while usefully disambiguating "the West" in some sections, lazily rests on this loose concept in later chapters. It is well written and persuasive, though. Worth a read!
Mal Warwick has a great review on this.
Mal Warwick has a great review on this.
April 8, 2022
This is an extraordinary book. Written in 2018, it's probably the most predictive work I've ever read on any topic. Wood, before the invasion of Ukraine, before the poisoning and imprisonment of Navalny, sets the scene for both, with a brilliant, modest prescience that is kind of awe-inpsiring. I'll write something a bit longer when I've had time to think. Meanwhile, if you're interested in the causes of the Ukraine crisis, in Putin's path from cold warrior to nationalist authoritarian, in the impossibility of opposition in Russia and in the delusions of the USA and NATO, this is the book.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 69 reviews