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The Machinery of Government: Public Administration and the Liberal State
In political theory, the traditional model of state power was that elected officials make policy decisions which are then faithfully executed by a lower cadre of public servants. The complexity of the modern state, however, leaves this model outdated. The vast number of economic and social problems it confronts is such that a great deal of rule-making power is now delegated to a class of civil servants. Yet many political philosophers have not taken this model up, and the field has ignored the important role played by the class of "permanent" state officials--the "deep state" as some call it--in liberal states.
In most liberal democracies for example, the central bank is as independent as the supreme court, yet deals with a wide range of economic, social, and political issues. How do these public servants make these policy decisions? What normative principles inform their judgments? In The Machinery of Government , Joseph Heath attempts to answer these questions. He looks to the actual practice of public administration to see how normative questions are addressed. More broadly, he attempts to provide the outlines of a "philosophy of the executive" by taking seriously the claim to political authority of the most neglected of the three branches of the state. Heath both provides a corrective to the prevailing tendency to underestimate the contribution of civil servants to the success of liberal-democratic welfare states, and suggests a more satisfactory account of the principles implicit in public administration.
In most liberal democracies for example, the central bank is as independent as the supreme court, yet deals with a wide range of economic, social, and political issues. How do these public servants make these policy decisions? What normative principles inform their judgments? In The Machinery of Government , Joseph Heath attempts to answer these questions. He looks to the actual practice of public administration to see how normative questions are addressed. More broadly, he attempts to provide the outlines of a "philosophy of the executive" by taking seriously the claim to political authority of the most neglected of the three branches of the state. Heath both provides a corrective to the prevailing tendency to underestimate the contribution of civil servants to the success of liberal-democratic welfare states, and suggests a more satisfactory account of the principles implicit in public administration.
440 pages, Hardcover
Published September 1, 2020
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About the author
Joseph Heath
30 books93 followersJoseph Heath (born 1967) is a professor of philosophy at the University of Toronto. He also teaches at the School of Public Policy and Governance. He received his bachelor of arts from McGill University, where his teachers included Charles Taylor, and his master of arts and doctor of philosophy degrees are from Northwestern University, where he studied under Thomas A. McCarthy and Jürgen Habermas. He has published both academic and popular writings, including the bestselling The Rebel Sell. His philosophical work includes papers and books in political philosophy, business ethics, rational choice theory, action theory, and critical theory.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
April 9, 2022
I came at this book as a traditionally trained political philosopher, and perhaps the best compliment that I can pay it is that it enlarged my conception of what political philosophy might be. Academic political philosophy traditionally focuses on the legislative branch of government, while the neighbouring philosophy of law focuses on the judicial branch, leaving the executive branch sorely undertheorized. Heath successfully makes the case that there are interesting questions about the executive branch that don't simply reduce to questions about legislative and judicial government. I skipped chapter 5 and 7, but here are some quick remarks about the remaining chapters:
Chapter 1 ("taking public administration seriously") draws on a number of examples - radon regulation, the FDA in the United States, the organization of the military, the TV show "yes minister" - to show that the executive branch has far greater power and discretion than it is usually credited to possess. Here, Heath argues that any picture which imagines these powers as exercised directly or indirectly by the legislature is sorely mistaken (even if the legislature ultimately has some sort of veto power over it).
Chapter 2 ("a framework for ethics of public administration") raises the question "to whom is the public service is accountable?", and pokes holes in the obvious answer - that it is accountable to the elected government. It describes, in useful and critical detail that sheds light on many familiar but seldom-mentioned mechanisms in liberal democratic states, a liberal and conservative account of how the civil service might be thought accountable to the people. Finally, it makes the case that ultimately the public service is accountable to a set of principles that are latent in any liberal state.
Chapter 3 ("liberalism: from classical to modern") provides one of the best historical introductions to liberalism that I've read - it's a remarkably successful explanation of what many different features of liberalism ultimately have in common with one another. Heath's main argument is (a) that classical liberalism is ultimately an answer to the Hobbesian problem of disagreement, and (b) modern liberalism emerged somewhat inevitably from the problems that classical liberalism itself generated. Even if I don't reread the whole book again, I foresee rereading this chapter.
Chapter 4 ("efficiency and the rise of the welfare state") brings in themes from much of Heath's earlier work to emphasize the (generally underappreciated) role of efficiency in liberal theory. (Here I'm not sure I'm fully persuaded. My main issue is that Heath's sense of efficiency is closely linked to Pareto efficiency. But I'm somewhat skeptical that opportunities to maximize Pareto efficiency, in its strict technical sense, occur anywhere as often as Heath and others claim.)
Chapter 6 ("administrative discretion and the rule of law") makes the case that administrative officials should be allowed to exercise discretion, criticizing political arrangements (particularly in the United States) where that discretion is stymied.
Chapter 1 ("taking public administration seriously") draws on a number of examples - radon regulation, the FDA in the United States, the organization of the military, the TV show "yes minister" - to show that the executive branch has far greater power and discretion than it is usually credited to possess. Here, Heath argues that any picture which imagines these powers as exercised directly or indirectly by the legislature is sorely mistaken (even if the legislature ultimately has some sort of veto power over it).
Chapter 2 ("a framework for ethics of public administration") raises the question "to whom is the public service is accountable?", and pokes holes in the obvious answer - that it is accountable to the elected government. It describes, in useful and critical detail that sheds light on many familiar but seldom-mentioned mechanisms in liberal democratic states, a liberal and conservative account of how the civil service might be thought accountable to the people. Finally, it makes the case that ultimately the public service is accountable to a set of principles that are latent in any liberal state.
Chapter 3 ("liberalism: from classical to modern") provides one of the best historical introductions to liberalism that I've read - it's a remarkably successful explanation of what many different features of liberalism ultimately have in common with one another. Heath's main argument is (a) that classical liberalism is ultimately an answer to the Hobbesian problem of disagreement, and (b) modern liberalism emerged somewhat inevitably from the problems that classical liberalism itself generated. Even if I don't reread the whole book again, I foresee rereading this chapter.
Chapter 4 ("efficiency and the rise of the welfare state") brings in themes from much of Heath's earlier work to emphasize the (generally underappreciated) role of efficiency in liberal theory. (Here I'm not sure I'm fully persuaded. My main issue is that Heath's sense of efficiency is closely linked to Pareto efficiency. But I'm somewhat skeptical that opportunities to maximize Pareto efficiency, in its strict technical sense, occur anywhere as often as Heath and others claim.)
Chapter 6 ("administrative discretion and the rule of law") makes the case that administrative officials should be allowed to exercise discretion, criticizing political arrangements (particularly in the United States) where that discretion is stymied.
October 24, 2024
Joseph Heath begins this book by observing that 'it is possible to go a long way in political philosophy without actually knowing very much about how the state works'. Decades ago I did not complete a political theory PhD, mainly because I picked a topic that didn't suit my strengths at the time, but also because academic political theory lacked the tools to engage in detail with how things worked in practice or why they were done the way they were.
But I still see value in Heath's philosophical approach, which is less about applying high-level principles than making more explicit - and evaluating - the principles implicit in practice.
There is a lot to like about this book, but I would highlight:
* A chapter called 'efficiency and the rise of the welfare state', seeking to explain the character of Western welfare states. He notes that political philosophers tend to see the welfare state as primarily an egalitarian institution (concerned with redistribution and equality) or communitarian (limiting the scope of the market in distributing key social services). Heath argues instead for what he calls a 'public-economic model' of welfare states primarily concerned with solving collective action problems - providing social insurance programs, providing or funding services that not be satisfactorily delivered by the market alone, and controlling monopolies and other market imperfections.
* A chapter on 'administrative discretion and the rule of law' - which somewhat went against my priors that discretion is to be minimised. Heath gives examples of how strict following of rules can be unsuited to the variety of fact situations decision-makers face. A rule of law culture in the workplace can retain flexibility lost through complex rules designed to cover multiple contingencies.
* A defence of cost-benefit analysis.
* A chapter titled 'liberalism from classical to modern', which probably wasn't essential to the book but is nevertheless a very interesting account of the rise and evolution of liberalism.
But I still see value in Heath's philosophical approach, which is less about applying high-level principles than making more explicit - and evaluating - the principles implicit in practice.
There is a lot to like about this book, but I would highlight:
* A chapter called 'efficiency and the rise of the welfare state', seeking to explain the character of Western welfare states. He notes that political philosophers tend to see the welfare state as primarily an egalitarian institution (concerned with redistribution and equality) or communitarian (limiting the scope of the market in distributing key social services). Heath argues instead for what he calls a 'public-economic model' of welfare states primarily concerned with solving collective action problems - providing social insurance programs, providing or funding services that not be satisfactorily delivered by the market alone, and controlling monopolies and other market imperfections.
* A chapter on 'administrative discretion and the rule of law' - which somewhat went against my priors that discretion is to be minimised. Heath gives examples of how strict following of rules can be unsuited to the variety of fact situations decision-makers face. A rule of law culture in the workplace can retain flexibility lost through complex rules designed to cover multiple contingencies.
* A defence of cost-benefit analysis.
* A chapter titled 'liberalism from classical to modern', which probably wasn't essential to the book but is nevertheless a very interesting account of the rise and evolution of liberalism.
June 6, 2025
Uma análise filosófica sobre o papel da administração pública no contexto do Estado liberal-democrático. Heath argumenta que os funcionários públicos não são meros executores neutros de políticas, exercem autoridade discricionária legítima, fundamentada em princípios normativos como eficiência, igualdade e liberdade, e propõe uma reavaliação do papel da administração pública, defendendo que os funcionários públicos devem exercer a sua autoridade com base em princípios normativos sólidos. É uma abordagem filosófica e normativa rara no campo da administração pública, que geralmente é dominado por perspectivas empíricas, organizacionais ou instrumentais. A principal inovação reside articulação de princípios morais (eficiência, igualdade e liberdade) com a prática concreta da administração pública; revaloriza o papel dos funcionários públicos como agentes morais e decisores razoáveis, e não meros executores técnicos; promove uma defesa robusta da análise custo-benefício como instrumento racional de governação, desafiando leituras redutivamente utilitaristas; amplia o entendimento da burocracia estatal e combate a visão tecnocrática ou exclusivamente instrumental que ainda predomina em muitos contextos.
May 30, 2025
This book takes a very heady interpretation of bureaucracy primarily from a Canadian lens. It covers not quite politics or even policy outright but more of the implementation of government. This means how do bureaucrats work and yes it can definitely be dry. The author does their best to make the work accessible to a wider audience but even I found it a bit tedious. At the same time, I think the discussions were quite intriguing.
May 4, 2022
Erudite and dense. The bureaucratic fiasco related to street vendors though was quite entertaining.
October 23, 2024
Heath lost me on some of his arguments, sometimes due to the density of his writing rather than his viewpoints.
November 21, 2024
Dense, informative, funny at times. The structure and clarity of Heath's writing make for a phenomenal introduction and exploration of liberal political theory AND the practice of public administration. The Canadian and British examples peppered throughout are of particular worth in a field that is mostly focused on the US. I'll be recommending this book to peers for the foreseeable future, and am looking forward to picking it up again.
August 5, 2021
This is an outstanding book. Its goal is “reconciling the tension between the traditional commitment to political neutrality on the part of the public service with the fact that administrative discretion inevitably involves making normative judgments.” Although a department will often attempt to justify itself by stressing its deference to the Minister, or to the public directly (via, for example, consultation and representative hiring policies), neither of these explain the distinctive agenda the public sector often pursues. Instead the legitimacy of the public sector comes from its ability to solve complex collective action problems and do so in a way that is consistent with liberal principals of efficiency, equality, and liberty. This positions the role of the public service in the executive alongside the judiciary in legitimately exercising non-elected power. Just as doctors act on the basis of professional judgement and so must be held accountable to their peers via a distinctively medical ethics, so too public servants are accountable to their peers via a distinctive liberal ethics.
Chapter 3 explains the rise of classical liberalism and how its failure to solve pressing collective action problems gave rise to the welfare state with its massive capacity and capability for solving problems. Like classical liberalism, the welfare state (read modern liberal state) is committed to a neutral conception of the good. If classical liberalism showed that enforcing a system of contracts is good for everyone, Heath shows that modern state programs such as state funded health care also makes us all better off by our own lights. Thus Heath challenges the idea that the central task of the welfare state is redistribution although certain policies may also have this effect.
In the second half of the book, Heath shows how the commitment to liberal ideals is inherent in the way the public service operates: its use of cost-benefit analysis, its commitment to the rule of law, and its commitment not to use policy to coerce a particular way of life.
Chapter 3 explains the rise of classical liberalism and how its failure to solve pressing collective action problems gave rise to the welfare state with its massive capacity and capability for solving problems. Like classical liberalism, the welfare state (read modern liberal state) is committed to a neutral conception of the good. If classical liberalism showed that enforcing a system of contracts is good for everyone, Heath shows that modern state programs such as state funded health care also makes us all better off by our own lights. Thus Heath challenges the idea that the central task of the welfare state is redistribution although certain policies may also have this effect.
In the second half of the book, Heath shows how the commitment to liberal ideals is inherent in the way the public service operates: its use of cost-benefit analysis, its commitment to the rule of law, and its commitment not to use policy to coerce a particular way of life.
June 3, 2023
Great discussion, that is very original to me. At times the chapters were not as well connected
January 13, 2025
Very good philosophy, thank you sir.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews