What do you think?
Rate this book
From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1891-1949: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1891-1949
From Coexistence to Conquest seeks to explain how the Arab-Israeli conflict developed by looking beyond strict legalism to the men behind the policies adopted by the Great Powers at the dawn of the twentieth century. It controversially argues that Zionism was adopted by the British Government in its 1917 Balfour Declaration primarily as an immigration device and that it can be traced back to the 1903 Royal Commission on Alien Immigration and the Alien’s Act 1905.
The book contains the most detailed legal analysis of the 1915-6 Hussein-McMahon correspondence, as well as the Balfour Declaration, and takes a closer look at the travaux préparatoires that formed the British Mandate of Palestine. It places the violent reaction of the Palestine Arabs to mass Jewish immigration in the context of Zionism, highlighting the findings of several British commissions of inquiry which recommended that Britain abandon its policy. The book also revisits the controversies over the question of self-determination, and the partition of Palestine.
The Chapter on the 1948 conflict seeks to update international lawyers on the scholarship of Israel’s ‘new’ historians and reproduces some of the horrific accounts of the atrocities that took place from newspaper reports, UN documents, and personal accounts, which saw the expulsion and exodus of almost an entire people from their homeland. The penultimate chapter argues that Israel was created through an act of conquest or subjugation. The book concludes with a sobering analysis of the conflict arguing that neither Jews nor Arabs were to blame for starting it.
The book contains the most detailed legal analysis of the 1915-6 Hussein-McMahon correspondence, as well as the Balfour Declaration, and takes a closer look at the travaux préparatoires that formed the British Mandate of Palestine. It places the violent reaction of the Palestine Arabs to mass Jewish immigration in the context of Zionism, highlighting the findings of several British commissions of inquiry which recommended that Britain abandon its policy. The book also revisits the controversies over the question of self-determination, and the partition of Palestine.
The Chapter on the 1948 conflict seeks to update international lawyers on the scholarship of Israel’s ‘new’ historians and reproduces some of the horrific accounts of the atrocities that took place from newspaper reports, UN documents, and personal accounts, which saw the expulsion and exodus of almost an entire people from their homeland. The penultimate chapter argues that Israel was created through an act of conquest or subjugation. The book concludes with a sobering analysis of the conflict arguing that neither Jews nor Arabs were to blame for starting it.
456 pages, Paperback
First published December 28, 2008
7 people are currently reading
239 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
September 15, 2014
This is a well-written account of the historical realities behind the legalities of the Arab-Israeli conflict, told from a pro-Palestinian viewpoint. While I disagree with some of his reasoning, this book is a very informative and thoughtprovoking discussion of its subject matter. While as both a history major and a lawyer I applaud this author's historical approach, some of the history he cites, while interesting, is of dubious legal import. But many of the facts he brings forth have a direct bearing on any fair resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
SPOILERS BELOW
Whether the British were motivated by anti-Semitism to support the Zionist project (to deflect Jewish immigration from their shores) is legally irrelevant. The only important fact is that they did, indeed, support Jewish immigration to Palestine and that that support was enshrined in the agreements that ended WWI.
I certainly agree with this author that biblical claims to Palestine have no relevance under international law. But I think he makes a very serious error of reasoning on page 79. "The Zionists", as such, could never gain sovereignty over Palestine, any more than "the Palestinians" could, since neither were subjects of international law. Only states can have sovereignty. The ONLY measures of whether a state is legitimate is whether another state recognizes it, and the number and importance of the states that do, and secondarily, membership in international organizations such as the UN. In '48, the State if Israel was declared, it was recognized by a number of states, including a number of the "great powers", and was subsequently admitted to the UN. Therefore, it is legitimate (at least in the eyes of the states that recognize it). Legally, the analysis ends there.
Similarly, while he establishes what I think should be beyond question, that the Palestinians had and have a right to self-determination both before and after the Mandate, I also think he errs on Pages 137-138 when he says that sovereignty was vested in the Palestinian people at the end of the mandate. Again, no "people" is sovereign, only states. Both of the peoples inhabiting Palestine at the end of the mandate enjoyed self-determination. He engages in similarly mushy reasoning on pages 187-89. I cannot see how a "people" could possibly exercise "title" or "sovereignty" over anything. These are all legal concepts, which imply a system of law, which imply a state. Without a state, there is no way for a people to exercise any of the rights to which it may be entitled.
The Hussein-McMahon correspondence is largely irrelevant. It certainly shows that that the British were guilty of bad faith in negotiation, but at the time the correspondence was made, Britain did not have effective control over Palestine, and it was not within its power to grant it to the Sharif or to anyone. And in any case, the only entity that would have had standing to argue the case, the Kingdom of the Hijaz, was soon conquered by the Sa'udis and ceased to exist. The British could have claimed sovereignty over Palestine by right of conquest, but they did not, and instead consented to have Palestine granted to them as a Mandate. Within the terms of the mandate itself, the British were committed to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. Therefore, Jewish immigration into Palestine was lawful. When the British unilaterally ended their mandate, that left a vacuum that was filled by the declaration of the State of Israel, and after the failure of the Palestinian Arabs to declare a state of their own, the subsequent occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Jordan and Egypt. The state of affairs that existed after the end of the British mandate has no historical parallel. Never before had the international community created something like a "mandate", and never before had any state unilaterally ended it. So there was and is a lack of legal concepts to characterize that state of affairs. Palestine was rendered something akin to a terra nullius, in which, I would argue, any of the peoples legally present within Palestine had a right to organize themselves and struggle for sovereignty.
I also find his statement on page 141 that self-determination does not give a minority a right of secession dubious. The recognition of the states established by the various national minorities within Austria-Hungary at the end of WWI was based on the very idea that a national minority within a state can have a right to self-determination and independence from that state. Likewise, the decision quoted on 241-42 reeks of hypocrisy. History is replete with examples of states recognized out of parts of other states, when the interests of great powers or the international community require it. Again, the whole idea of self-determination is based on the notion that national minorities can have the right to secession and nationhood. But self-determination as a concept is meaningless unless the international community is willing to back it up with recognition. And this has far more to do with perceptions and politics than with law.
The chapters on the partition plan and the '48 war are quite strong. They establish what I think now cannot be seriously doubted: the the Israelis actively cleared Palestinian Arabs from territory that would be included in the State of Israel. These facts must have bearing on the question of the right of return a/o compensation for Palestinian refugees. But, while if these facts had been publicly known in '48, it might have affected international opinion toward the recognition of Israel, these facts still do not call into question the legitimacy of Israel as a state, which again is based on the fact of its recognition and admission to the UN. Palestine at the time belonged to no state, but was a territory whose status was disputed between two communities, in which force was the final arbiter. I have to take issue with the author's statement on page 183 questioning whether Israel had the right to use armed force to establish itself. In Weber's classic definition, states are defined by the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Any such monopoly can only be established by the use of force. Similarly, virtually all states, including the US itself, are based on the violent appropriation of land. But in order for that appropriation to be legitimated in the long run, it must be embedded in a system of law that routinizes the use of force and places limits on it that meet the fairness expectations of the community, both domestic and international.
The descriptions of atrocities committed by the Israelis during the war of independence echo those of contemporary Israeli historians such as Benny Morris. These atrocities cannot be justified. But they should be understood in the context of the times. American scholars such as Stephen Ambrose have documented how, during WWII, American troops routinely executed German prisoners. The US also used air power indiscriminately, even over towns inhabited by friendly Allied civilians. Evils committed in the heat of the moment, at a time when a people believes their very existence is at stake can be understood in a way that other evils committed at a time that their state is well-established cannot.
The sections on the refugee issue and the creation of the israeli state are perhaps the strongest in the book. He brings to light a wealth of facts I was unaware of, even in outline. I found particularly valuable and convincing his counterargument against the thesis comparing the expulsion of the Palestinians with the expulsion of the East Prussians, Silesians and Pomeranians at the end of WWII, a thesis i had previously found convincing. He finally builds to his ultimate punchline, that Israel is based on nothing more or less than conquest, with a slow and convincing surehandedness. But then, for reasons I have already discussed, I think he goes to far when he likens Israels conquest of parts of Arab Palestine with the Nazi conquests of WWII (p 243-44). "The Hashemites" are perhaps to blame for the preventing the creation of a Palestinian Arab state, but the fact still remains, no state was declared at the time, and the sovereignty over the areas seized by Israel was at best up for grabs. Also his arguments that the 1947 UN Partition plan was prescriptive about the territorial extent of Israel (pp. 244, 246-47) seem to contradict the convincing arguments he himself raised earlier (pp. 154-55) that the Partition Plan was merely a recommendation that the mandatory power failed to put into effect.
The U.S. has never recognized Israeli sovereignty (nor do I believe has any other state) over the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza, and these areas are legally occupied territory pending a final peace treaty (or territory of the State of Palestine (declared in 1988) for those counties recognizing that state). That's where we (still) stand today.
Any resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict will have more to do with practicalities than legalities. Israel needs peace as much as do the Palestinians. The ugliness of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank (which no state recognizes as legitimate) undermines the legitimacy of Israel in the eyes of the world. The current Israeli government is not negotiating in good faith, and seems to be biding its time, all the while committing what amounts to ethnic cleansing in slow motion. This cannot continue indefinitely without eroding the relationship with the U.S, which is the bedrock of Israeli security.
SPOILERS BELOW
Whether the British were motivated by anti-Semitism to support the Zionist project (to deflect Jewish immigration from their shores) is legally irrelevant. The only important fact is that they did, indeed, support Jewish immigration to Palestine and that that support was enshrined in the agreements that ended WWI.
I certainly agree with this author that biblical claims to Palestine have no relevance under international law. But I think he makes a very serious error of reasoning on page 79. "The Zionists", as such, could never gain sovereignty over Palestine, any more than "the Palestinians" could, since neither were subjects of international law. Only states can have sovereignty. The ONLY measures of whether a state is legitimate is whether another state recognizes it, and the number and importance of the states that do, and secondarily, membership in international organizations such as the UN. In '48, the State if Israel was declared, it was recognized by a number of states, including a number of the "great powers", and was subsequently admitted to the UN. Therefore, it is legitimate (at least in the eyes of the states that recognize it). Legally, the analysis ends there.
Similarly, while he establishes what I think should be beyond question, that the Palestinians had and have a right to self-determination both before and after the Mandate, I also think he errs on Pages 137-138 when he says that sovereignty was vested in the Palestinian people at the end of the mandate. Again, no "people" is sovereign, only states. Both of the peoples inhabiting Palestine at the end of the mandate enjoyed self-determination. He engages in similarly mushy reasoning on pages 187-89. I cannot see how a "people" could possibly exercise "title" or "sovereignty" over anything. These are all legal concepts, which imply a system of law, which imply a state. Without a state, there is no way for a people to exercise any of the rights to which it may be entitled.
The Hussein-McMahon correspondence is largely irrelevant. It certainly shows that that the British were guilty of bad faith in negotiation, but at the time the correspondence was made, Britain did not have effective control over Palestine, and it was not within its power to grant it to the Sharif or to anyone. And in any case, the only entity that would have had standing to argue the case, the Kingdom of the Hijaz, was soon conquered by the Sa'udis and ceased to exist. The British could have claimed sovereignty over Palestine by right of conquest, but they did not, and instead consented to have Palestine granted to them as a Mandate. Within the terms of the mandate itself, the British were committed to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. Therefore, Jewish immigration into Palestine was lawful. When the British unilaterally ended their mandate, that left a vacuum that was filled by the declaration of the State of Israel, and after the failure of the Palestinian Arabs to declare a state of their own, the subsequent occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Jordan and Egypt. The state of affairs that existed after the end of the British mandate has no historical parallel. Never before had the international community created something like a "mandate", and never before had any state unilaterally ended it. So there was and is a lack of legal concepts to characterize that state of affairs. Palestine was rendered something akin to a terra nullius, in which, I would argue, any of the peoples legally present within Palestine had a right to organize themselves and struggle for sovereignty.
I also find his statement on page 141 that self-determination does not give a minority a right of secession dubious. The recognition of the states established by the various national minorities within Austria-Hungary at the end of WWI was based on the very idea that a national minority within a state can have a right to self-determination and independence from that state. Likewise, the decision quoted on 241-42 reeks of hypocrisy. History is replete with examples of states recognized out of parts of other states, when the interests of great powers or the international community require it. Again, the whole idea of self-determination is based on the notion that national minorities can have the right to secession and nationhood. But self-determination as a concept is meaningless unless the international community is willing to back it up with recognition. And this has far more to do with perceptions and politics than with law.
The chapters on the partition plan and the '48 war are quite strong. They establish what I think now cannot be seriously doubted: the the Israelis actively cleared Palestinian Arabs from territory that would be included in the State of Israel. These facts must have bearing on the question of the right of return a/o compensation for Palestinian refugees. But, while if these facts had been publicly known in '48, it might have affected international opinion toward the recognition of Israel, these facts still do not call into question the legitimacy of Israel as a state, which again is based on the fact of its recognition and admission to the UN. Palestine at the time belonged to no state, but was a territory whose status was disputed between two communities, in which force was the final arbiter. I have to take issue with the author's statement on page 183 questioning whether Israel had the right to use armed force to establish itself. In Weber's classic definition, states are defined by the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Any such monopoly can only be established by the use of force. Similarly, virtually all states, including the US itself, are based on the violent appropriation of land. But in order for that appropriation to be legitimated in the long run, it must be embedded in a system of law that routinizes the use of force and places limits on it that meet the fairness expectations of the community, both domestic and international.
The descriptions of atrocities committed by the Israelis during the war of independence echo those of contemporary Israeli historians such as Benny Morris. These atrocities cannot be justified. But they should be understood in the context of the times. American scholars such as Stephen Ambrose have documented how, during WWII, American troops routinely executed German prisoners. The US also used air power indiscriminately, even over towns inhabited by friendly Allied civilians. Evils committed in the heat of the moment, at a time when a people believes their very existence is at stake can be understood in a way that other evils committed at a time that their state is well-established cannot.
The sections on the refugee issue and the creation of the israeli state are perhaps the strongest in the book. He brings to light a wealth of facts I was unaware of, even in outline. I found particularly valuable and convincing his counterargument against the thesis comparing the expulsion of the Palestinians with the expulsion of the East Prussians, Silesians and Pomeranians at the end of WWII, a thesis i had previously found convincing. He finally builds to his ultimate punchline, that Israel is based on nothing more or less than conquest, with a slow and convincing surehandedness. But then, for reasons I have already discussed, I think he goes to far when he likens Israels conquest of parts of Arab Palestine with the Nazi conquests of WWII (p 243-44). "The Hashemites" are perhaps to blame for the preventing the creation of a Palestinian Arab state, but the fact still remains, no state was declared at the time, and the sovereignty over the areas seized by Israel was at best up for grabs. Also his arguments that the 1947 UN Partition plan was prescriptive about the territorial extent of Israel (pp. 244, 246-47) seem to contradict the convincing arguments he himself raised earlier (pp. 154-55) that the Partition Plan was merely a recommendation that the mandatory power failed to put into effect.
The U.S. has never recognized Israeli sovereignty (nor do I believe has any other state) over the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza, and these areas are legally occupied territory pending a final peace treaty (or territory of the State of Palestine (declared in 1988) for those counties recognizing that state). That's where we (still) stand today.
Any resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict will have more to do with practicalities than legalities. Israel needs peace as much as do the Palestinians. The ugliness of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank (which no state recognizes as legitimate) undermines the legitimacy of Israel in the eyes of the world. The current Israeli government is not negotiating in good faith, and seems to be biding its time, all the while committing what amounts to ethnic cleansing in slow motion. This cannot continue indefinitely without eroding the relationship with the U.S, which is the bedrock of Israeli security.
December 19, 2023
I was just finishing up my lengthy review before the app crashed. So here it is in short.
Best book I’ve read on the conflict. Uncovers the ridiculous propaganda I hear all the time about Israel being uninhabited and uncontested before the Jews came in. Shows how Zionism allied with anti-semites and actually fueled prejudice. Shows how the Jews instituted their own Holocaust against Palestinians.
Best book I’ve read on the conflict. Uncovers the ridiculous propaganda I hear all the time about Israel being uninhabited and uncontested before the Jews came in. Shows how Zionism allied with anti-semites and actually fueled prejudice. Shows how the Jews instituted their own Holocaust against Palestinians.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews