Hong Kong in Revolt: The Protest Movement and the Future of China

by Au Loong-Yu

Hong Kong is in turmoil, with a new generation of young and politically active citizens shaking the regime. From the Umbrella Movement in 2014 to the defeat of the Extradition Bill and beyond, the protestors' demands have become more radical, and their actions more drastic. Their bravery emboldened the labor movement and launched the first successful political strike in half a century, followed by the broadening of the democratic movement as a whole. The book also sets the new protest movements within the context of the colonization, revolution and modernization of China. Au Loong-Yu explores Hong Kong's unique position in this history and the reaction the protests have generated on the Mainland. But the new generation's aspiration goes far beyond the political. It is a generation that strongly associates itself with a Hong Kong identity, with inclusivity and openness. Looking deeper into the roots and intricacies of the movement, the role of 'Western Values' vs 'Communism' and 'Hong Kongness' vs 'Chineseness', the cultural and political battles are understood through a broader geopolitical history. For good or for bad, Hong Kong has become one of the battle fields of the great historic contest between the US, the UK and China.

Genres: China, Politics

224 pages, Paperback

Published August 20, 2020

Reviews

[xkdlaej · Rating 2 out of 5]

There are many mistakes and poor editing. The translations and writing contain a lot of Chinglish, making it difficult to read. The author also likes to put separate incidents with no direct correlation together, which sometimes twist the logic behind these incidents.

The author also injects his own agenda in the book, at times it feels forced. It is fine to criticize the movement not openly addressing problems of capitalism or left-wing concerns, but the author should not mention this when discussing matters with no connection to this criticism.

IMO, this book should not be read as an overview of the 2019 protests, as many important things are lacking, and some trivial matters are elaborated disproportionately. The author put a lot of emphasis on the general strike attempts and unionisation development. However, that is not the main focus when looking at the big picture. The author did not mention much about the other aspects of the protests: such as the localisation of protests, how weekly protests combine different community concerns (for example in the 光復行動s, protestors address local problems; and in the Kwun Tong protests, protestors raised concern about the surveillance lamp posts, these developments are crucial yet omitted by the author). The significance of several symbols, such as the anthem (and phenomenon of) "Glory to Hong Kong", as well as the scene where protesters form human chains on the Lion Rock Mountain with flashlights and laser pointers, are downplayed and largely omitted. The author did not trace very clearly how the movement evolved throughout the six-months, and only present a very shallow recap mainly dominated by how the author himself view this movement.It is a rather personal account of how the author himself perceive and think of the 2019 protests, rather than providing a detailed and all-rounded account of the movement.

[Young radicals and their slogan]

His account also failed to mention many mainstream discourses and memories of the 2019 protests. For example, a main theme throughout the movement is "sacrifice". From the very beginning of the protests when Leung Ling-Kit fell to his death, the movement was marked with despair and gloom. Young protestors (especially the radicals which the author likes to criticize) are prepared to die for their cause. This heavy mental and emotional toll persists throughout the course of the six-month-long revolt, and continued throughout 2020. Protestors also need to face high risk just for marching and organizing. Telegram channel admins are arrested, student organizations were targeted, KOLs who support the cause by fundraising for protestors in exile or facing prosecution are detained... All these were not mentioned by the author.

Putting these into account, perhaps the author can have more sympathy for those who call for a general strike using, as the author stated, "distasteful" discourse of "If we shield you from bullets, can't you go on strike?" The context of this slogan, is that the young had already sacrificed so much: their youth, their health (either due to police brutality or tear gas, which caused problems to protestors' respiratory systems), their future prospects, and even their lives. Many radicals who fought on the frontline are students, many are underage. They choose to fight because they, as the Chief Executive puts it, have "no stake in the society". They don't have the option to go to strike and disrupt the economy, thus don't have leverage. But the general strikes attempts failed them.

One can argue that the call for a general strike in June was too abrupt and there was little time for preparation, but for this movement, protestors have limited time, the Extradition Bill will be passed very quickly if there was no immediate action. The institutional design of the LegCo ensured that. The first 1 million march on June 9 was faced with contempt from the administration, which released a statement that night stating that all legislation procedures will continue as planned. Given the CE's past record, the public does not accept any alternative other than the complete withdrawal of the bill (and to use those exact wordings, neither does "suspending" nor stating that "the bill is dead" as a figurative speech equal withdrawal). By August, the pressure is immense as stakes for protesting on the streets are increasing. The level of violence the police use continues to escalate, with seemingly no repercussions for violating guidelines. Wo lei fei were attacked by pro-government supporters at Lennon Walls. Rubber bullets, sponge grenades and tear gas were deployed increasingly. Police were seen aiming at protesters' heads (which was definitely against protocols). Protesting on the streets are increasingly life-threatening.

Under these circumstances, the young called for the older generation to act, by participating in the general strike. The underlying logic is that, if more people participated in the strike, which can generate immense pressure by paralysing the city, the young do not need to risk their lives protesting (and face bullets).

The young are not oblivious to the difficulties faced by the working class. However compared to the sacrifices they and their contemporaries made, how much risk are the older generation willing to take? How much are other protestors willing to sacrifice? Behind the slogan of "If we shield you from bullets, can't you go on strike?", is the question of how determined and devoted the others are to this cause. The underlying question is: I am ready to sacrifice my life for democracy and freedom, are you willing to go to strike for a day for this cause?

As many commentators have mentioned, this may be a naive way of conceiving the world, which lacks consideration and calculation of realpolitik. The concerns the author mentioned are also true, that revolting against the government cannot solve all problems, and that the working class need to earn a living. I am not trying to denounce the concerns raised by the author, but the disregard of radicals' opinions (and unwillingness to try to understand their concerns), as well as the arbitrary comments of nativists are quite rude imo.

[Organization and 無大台]

The author repeatedly mentioned how the protestors detest organization, and criticized the movement for this reason. However, this is not the truth. The protestors are against hierarchy rather than organization, with the 大台 ("the stage") perceived as an organization that can override others' decisions and impose a set of rules that others may not accept. In fact, organization can be seen in different parts of the movement: student concern groups at schools (sometimes more than one per school), organization groups for protest events, promotion teams (文宣組), Lennon Wall teams, direct action teams (勇武小隊)... are formulated during the protests. During election campaigns for the District Council elections in 2019 November, and especially the pre-election of LegCo in 2020 July, many student organizations helped to campaign for localist independent candidates. Aren't these all organisations?

Besides, after the failure of the general strike attempts, protesters realised the importance of a centralised organisation to call for a strike. Thus people are more active in forming and joining unions. Hong Kong unions have a poor track record of achieving anything substantial, thus the public is not enthusiastic about unions. The new unionisation wave the author elaborated a lot about is highly political. The most prominent example being the HA Employees Alliance. Formed in 2019 December, it experienced a huge surge of members from 6000 on Jan 27 to 15000 on Jan 28, after announcing plans for launching a strike to pressure the government for a full border closure. This shows that the protestors understand, or even agree with the need for organisations. This contradicts with the author's claim.

The author also claimed that protestors are atomised, and have excluded voting and holding an assembly. The reason for this is that it is simply impossible for such things. Of course the protestors will discuss the details of their plans and strategize online, there are thousands of posts on LIHKG discussing tactics and reviewing previous attempts. There are polls on telegram channels for different kinds of things: decision making, to calculate how many will turn up, for asking how long till people will arrive at the meeting point to strategize... There are countless examples. However, the reason there was no public assemblies (I guess the author meant something like 全民大會 here?) is due to realistic problems. The movement emphasized anonymity, so having to meet up face to face with strangers may deter many protestors from joining. It may also risk police crackdown, as assemblies without police permission are unlawful, this poses a great risk for protestors. Also, there are problems such as: Who gets to join the decision-making process? How is the decision made? Who gets to vote? How can those present at the assembly represent those absent? What happens if the decisions are not followed? These are all questions that need answering.

The conclusion will be, assemblies are not efficient. It cannot adapt to the rapid-evolving pace of the protests. The inability to include all protesters also mean that some opinions cannot be heard. In a movement emphasizing the fight for self-determination, the existence of such assemblies and votes (which can easily be rigged) seemed like the opposite of self-determination.

It is due to the leaderless nature, that each person needs to take up the responsibility to make decisions for themselves, and put thoughts into actions. As they take up a bigger role in these protests, they feel a sense of ownership and empowerment. This motivates people to think of ways each individual can contribute to the movement, thus allowing people to explore different ways of protesting. This is one of the reasons why the 2019 protests were able to last so long.


p.s. I already typed too much. Although I have much more criticisms of this book, I desperately need to sleep as it's already 7am.

[Localism / Nativism]

So, continue. The author criticized nativism, which in the context of Hong Kong, equals localists. There is no denying that there are far-right nativists, and those issues the author mentioned in his lengthy criticisms (more like biased attack) do exist. However, localists have evolved. It is not without reason localists (here meaning 抗爭派) garnered a total of 54.6% popular votes, and an overwhelming 70% in New Territories West district. Their discourses are much well established. Looking at their campaigns, they try to reaffirm the value of election, and thus democracy, at times when the public (especially localist camp) lost faith in elections due to the past procedural injustices and defective institutional designs. In order to promote the primary elections, they urge the public to value their votes, as this may be "the first and last true election with no political screening", and may be the last election Hongkongers can vote in (looking back, this is especially true). It is partly due to their campaigning that boosted the voting rate in such a short promotion period.

From my own observation, localists are far more active than traditional democrats in all actions, and far more devoted. They also encouraged Hongkongers to care about grassroot protests worldwide, especially those in Thailand and Belarus. The #MilkTeaAlliance, although not quite substantial, is a huge step forward for Hongkongers in terms of understanding and connecting with protests abroad. The online media DB Channel, established by a localist, also stationed a team in Belarus to cover the protests there. Localist influencers and politicians voiced vocal support of both protests, and is partly why the two protests gained so much attention in Hong Kong.

Prior to the 2019 protests, localists who support independence have been developing theories and researching if Hong Kong can achieve independence. Water, electricity, and food supply have already been solved. As for the other aspects, different persons have raised different ideas, which can be found in their publications. The localist discourses were also evolving, and developed into a rough blueprint about how Hong Kong should be after liberation. This includes distributive justice, regeneration of local industries, supporting local modernized agricultural industry, empowerment of district and legislative councils, check and balance of power, reforming the education system... (Not just one candidate, multiple localist candidates have raised such concerns).

Instead of simply criticizing (or attacking) the localist camp, perhaps the author should try to understand why the surge of support for localism increased, and this support does not only come from the lower classes, "being fooled" as the author claimed. There are also support from a highly educated new generation. Not only is the influential theory 香港民族論 originated from a Hong Kong University publication, but many well-known localists are university graduates, studying political science.

When the author emphasized the importance of uniting forces, I feel quite offended. On one hand the author claimed to want to unify the pro-democracy camp, on the other hand the author continuously denounced the localist camp, which by extension refers to many of the young generation and braves. I am not sure how should I respond to that :/

p.p.s. Originally 3 stars. But after thinking twice:
-0.5 for the poor presentation of his ideas and poor logic in some paragraphs
-0.25 for the poor English translation of concepts and terms (eg. new hand, 大台 as "the stage", 結界師 as "roadblock builder", rubbish government, "speaker" of LegCo (what even does that mean?)... etc.)

p.p.p.s. I was probably too mean on this as I read it directly after reading Ma Ngok's 反抗的共同體， the comparison is too obvious that I had a really bad impression with this book. After consideration, though, I think it probably still deserves 3 stars.

[Don · Rating 5 out of 5]

Au Loong-Yu’s book provides proof of the fact that history does not move in straight lines, but zigs and zags around on a trajectory that could only be determined if you had perfect knowledge of all the complex, interacting factors involved.

A great deal of this unpredictability comes from the ambiguities of what is meant by democracy in Hong Kong’s postcolonial setup. Au’s review of the contending parties allows its meaning to be considered from the standpoint of the rightist tendencies represented in the Localist camp; the resentful youth mobilised by the student federations; and the sudden flourishing of a trade union movement which focussed on what Beijing’s rule would mean for the Hong Kong working class.

The book reviews the interactions between these currents across a period extending from 2014, when the Umbrella Movement arrived on the scene through to the events still occurring in 2020, the date of the book’s publication. Right at the start of this period Hong Kong was disturbed by the realisation that Beijing was altering the balance between the political and economic systems of the ‘East’ and ‘West’ which was embodied in the idea of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ in favour of its own authoritarian system of rule. The reaction to this sparked the ‘Occupy Central’ movement which brought the Hong Kong Federation of Students to the fore. Their confrontations with the authorities consolidated support more widely across the population and encouraged the trade unions to attempt a general strike against the political system’s repression of ‘the demands grassroots labour’ which made ‘the potential to improve people’s livelihoods more difficult.’ However the call was scarcely heeded by the rank-and-file members of the 25 unions involved.

In Au’s account, this failure crystalised differences within the democratic camp between ‘localists’, who adopted a xenophobic language directed against mainline Chinese to rouse opposition to Beijing, and the supporters of the trade unions, who they began to denounce as ‘left pricks’. The occupation movement was eventually defeated and the five years that followed are seen as a period of reaction in which the democracy movement was deeply split into a pro- Umbrella Movement yellow camp, and its opponents in a blue camp.

These currents sniped at each other whilst the pro-Beijing administration under Carrie Lam prepared the way for the introduction of an extradition bill which would allow people allegedly in breach of Hong Kong law to be removed to the mainland to be dealt with by the PRC justice system. When this move became public in early 2019 a Civil Human Rights Front reacted with a call for silent protests which, by early June, was drawing crowds of over one million people. A young cohort of protesters at this point began to take more militant steps and on 12 June they laid siege to the Legislative Council (LegCo) building in an effort to prevent the tabling of the bill. Open battles with the police followed, with opinion polls suggested brought the majority of the population onto the side of the protesters. In the face of the evidence of its unpopularity Lam announced that efforts to get the bill though LegCo would be suspended.

The demands of the protesters were not satisfied by mere suspension of the bill and their demands escalated to a full programme calling for its complete withdrawal and the implementation of ‘genuine’ universal suffrage for all Hong Kong elections. The climax of the movement was reached in August when the street demonstrations were joined by a general strike of the unions which this time managed to mobilise over 350,000 workers, with the transport system and the airport being at the epicentre of union action.

But by the beginning of September there was mounting fear of retaliation from Beijing. Calls for further strike action from the unions at that time were less successful, though this was somewhat compensated for by an increase in the boycott of class in the schools and universities. The authorities firmed up with refusals to approve demonstrations on the traditional sites of protest which meant that more of the action switched to the local level. The sense that Hong Kong was becoming a patchwork of ‘yellow’ and ‘blue’ districts increased during this time.

As baton charges, teargassing and rubber bullets became the standard response of the police to all protests took the form of overt battles between them and the youth who took on the mantle of ‘Braves’. Heroic though they were, they were also easier to pick off and by October there was a period of stalemate began to prevail. Further people were prepared to join demonstrations but the district council election in November provided another opportunity to register opposition to the direction of the Hong Kong government was taking. The yellow camp supporters came out on top, winning 57 percent of the popular vote as opposed to 41 percent for the pro-Beijing blues.

Au sees the New Year’s Day march at the beginning of 2020 as the finale of the drama that had been acted out over the course of the previous year. From the standpoint of the democracy camp the trade union movement had been revitalised and young people retained their organisational strength on their student movements. But the Covid-19 pandemic became a factor in the life of the territory from this point onwards, affecting the ability to mount large-scale street protests. At the same time Beijing has become more proactive in showing its frustrations with the work of its puppets in the Hong Kong executive, setting a stronger course for the subordination of the territory to its rule in the immediate period ahead.

The book is more than a commentary on the events as they unfolded across time. Au has important things to say about the people and movements he designates as the actors driving the confrontations. The stereotype of the Hong Konger as a busy materialist working to accumulate as much stuff as possible and indifferent to such values as democracy and public accountability no longer squares with the hyper-politicisation of the population as it battled through the issues pertinent to its future as a community. Au sees this change coming from the late arrival of education up to university level for the mass of young people, which had only begun during the final years of colonial rule. But the circumstances in which it was presented to youth provided numerous reasons to register dissatisfaction – including poorly funded courses, insufficient dormitories on campus, and poor job prospects at the end of their studies. He insists that this gives a class dimension to the protests as they emerged against the imposition of Beijing edicts, even if they came to be associated with the ‘values’ issues associated with their putative identity as Hong Kongers.

The youthful protesters who made up the contingent of ‘braves’ is looked at in detail with particular attention to the spontaneous adoption of roles which matched personality types to the task of confronting the police goon squads. ‘Shield soldiers’, ‘fire magicians’, ‘water magicians’, ‘roadblock builders’, ‘dog killers’ (who were the ones who actually confronted the police, rather than murdered dumb animals), and ‘renovation technicians’ conjured themselves into existence and assumed their functions in the battles that ensued. Tactics were decided on the hoof, in democratic online fora which reached decisions which, although not binding, provided the shape of the strategy which all the participants at least respected, if not obeyed in every detail.

Outside the heat of the battles the politics of the yellow camp is described as being the opposite of unifying. Localists began to explore the idea of Hong Kong independence. An influential member of this current attempted to break with the xenophobia which had tainted it by organising what turned out to be a massive march – over 230,000 – with the purpose of explaining the wish of Hong Kongers to retain their autonomy in a friendly way to mainlanders. One gets from Au’s narrative the sense that, outside the extreme viewpoints, for the majority of yellow camp participants very little was fixed by rigid ideologies. As the movement ebbed and flowed opportunities were presented for both localists and internationalists – a term that best describes the democrats who framed their agitation as a springboard for a revival of a pro-democracy movement across the whole of China – to take leadership positions.

The account considers the work of the trade unions in particular detail, reflecting Au’s own commitment to democratic struggle sustained by the material force of organised labour. Carol Ng, chairperson of the Confederation of Trade Unions, emerges as the key person here. Her work saw the unions recover from the disappointment of its failed call for a general strike in 2014, achieving success in the same endeavour in August 2019. In the weeks that followed tension developed with a wing of the radical youth who believed that the disruption of public transports and roadblocks to prevent people from going to work was a justified tactic. This failed and threatened a reduction in sympathy for the idea of strike action. But others saw the need to resist this by surging forward with a new unionism, organising more workers, in order to ensure democratic consent for the withdrawal of labour. Au reports that 42 new unions came into existence during this time, though the purpose of their work became the subject of fresh debates. Some saw union organising as the way to build support for a mass general strike; others had the more modest intention of bolstering the size of the trade union vote in elections for the territory’s chief executive.

The viewpoints of civil servants legally obliged to carry out the policies that emanated from the LegCo and chief executive are discussed, and also those of mainlanders, both in China and the many thousands who live in work in Hong Kong as migrants. Among the former there is evidence of widespread dissent, extending even to judges who had their own reasons for disliking the extradition law. Even the police force was split, with a current of ‘white’ officers – meant in the sense of being sympathetic to the protesters – registering their disapproval of orders coming down to them to use brutal tactics in confronting demonstrators.

Among the mainlanders, Au reports dissent against Beijing’s stance which showed up in adverse comments on news reports, typically criticising accounts for failing to mention what it was that Hong Kongers were actually demanding. The attitude, ‘tell us what they want so we can make up our own mind whether it is justified or not’ was common. For the mainlanders in Hong Kong, opinion polls showed their opinions on the protests as being split at around 11 percent being pro-Beijing and 27% pro-democrats, with the remainder being either neutral or uncertain.

The book moves towards its conclusion by discussing the issues that the protest events have posed for the future of the democracy movement in Hong Kong. Among the questions considered are what was the purpose of the upsurge of protest? For some, the right wing localists in particular, it was simply to keep Hong Kong as it was, with no greater capacity or desire to address the many social issues that were not related to Beijing and its efforts to assert greater influence. The downside of this was a ‘scorched earth’ tendency, which plotted the destruction of the territory’s links with the global capitalist economy, which had functioned as a milch cow for the Communist Party’s billionaire elite, in order to prevent them continuing to benefit after its absorption into the PRC.

There is also the matter of the privileging of the confrontational actions of the braves over any capacity to reflect on what was being learned from the struggle and how tactics and strategy might be adapted to meet new conditions. Au sees the very considerable positive side to the spontaneity of the movement and views it as being essential for any social movement pressing for radical change. But in Hong Kong this led to open hostility to what came to be called ‘the stage’ – inherited from the Umbrella Movement’s revulsion to the purposeless manoeuvrings of the pan-democratic official opposition in the LegCo. But Au views as crucial the need to strengthen “the collective will of the multitude by forming assemblies and implementing democratic decision-making.” Without this it is difficult to move on from the invigorating tumult of the mass protests and militant confrontations, with the effect that the whole movement comes to an end when the energy and commitment to fight endless street battles finally runs out of steam.

Though the revolt was energised by the dimension of class-based material deprivation, Au argues that this never developed into a more open class consciousness which linked democracy to the plight of youth and the working population. An attempt to place the position of local tycoons – pro-Beijing to a man and woman – as an issue to be taken up in the democracy struggle received only a feeble response. The standpoint of the larger business class that stood below the level of the billionaire tycoons, whose activities and connections with global capitalism were a cause of the poverty of the youth and workers, was never taken on at all.
The following seems to summarise Au’s views on what needs to happen if the democracy movement is to go forward:

“What is important for the four million working people of Hong Kong is that their fight – be it for Hong Kong’s autonomy, self-determination, or to free the ‘Hong Kong nation’ – they should not allow the upper classes to rule them anymore. To achieve this, they need to consciously look for their real allies – small shop owners, the lower-middle class, poor mainland immigrants, and last but not least, working people in mainland China. But this also implies that they replace the political spectrum of ‘democracy versus autocracy’ with a ‘right or left’ vision. Fundamentally speaking, if Beijing is to be seen as the enemy it should be because its regime is a capitalist one.”

There are times when this book reaches the exhilaration of John Reed’s ‘Ten Days That Shook the World’ or Victor Serge’s ‘Memoirs of a Revolutionary’. It convers much of the same ground in its concern to get to the dynamic of a potentially revolutionary movement – to enquire what is bringing these people to the barricades and why are they prepared to risk their lives and liberties in a struggle for change? It asks how do people change when they are caught up in these moments, perhaps moving from a position of xenophobic and racist reaction to the ‘outsiders’ who are burdening their lives, to one which is open to participation in struggles that bring them alongside the foreigner and the migrant. The only thing that alters the tone of the narrative is that Au ultimately has no storming of the Winter Palace to report on, and instead leaves behind a text that is destined to by of use to those who one day will.

[First name Last name (optional) · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book offers a compelling and innovative examination of Hong Kong's issues, with a particular focus on the 2019 revolt, through a leftist lens. The author's unique perspective and insightful analysis provide a fresh understanding of these complex events. However, it may pose a challenge for readers who are not already versed in the intricacies of Hong Kong's history and the specific details of the 2019 revolt. As someone familiar with these topics, I found the book particularly engaging. Additionally, the author's use of 'Chinglish' enhances the reading experience for Chinese readers, offering an added layer of accessibility and cultural relevance.

[Grant · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very solid analysis of the 2019 Hong Kong revolt and the surrounding political context from a socialist perspective. Au Loong-Yu provides both praise and criticism, assessing the movement as he really sees it. Invaluable for anyone seeking to understand the political currents active in Hong Kong today as the struggle against Beijing continues.

[hannah♡ · Rating 4 out of 5]

was a good source for a paper I have to write

[Thomas Kingston · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is an interesting read that sheds light on the organisation and dynamics of a pivotal moment/movement in HK history. Crucially it offers a leftist perspective on an issue that is far too often turned into a binary issue.

However the flow of the book is frustrating, at times reading like an academic paper and at other times reading like a blog post. There is also repetition without acknowledging a previous mention which makes the patchwork appearance/style all the more obvious.

For someone new to the matter looking to learn more this could offer some great insight if they can wade through it. But if you're more familiar I suspect you can get a decent understanding from the author's online writing and works by groups like Lausan.