نظرية الفعل التواصلي - المجلد الثاني: في نقد العقل الوظيفي

The Theory of Communicative Action

by Jürgen Habermas, فتحي المسكيني (مترجم)

تغيير البراديغم لدى ميد ودوركهايم
يتألف المجلد الثاني (663 صفحة، موثقًا ومفهرسًا) من أربعة أبواب، ويبدأ تعداده بالباب الخامس بعد أربعة أبواب في المجلد الأول. ففي الباب الخامس، "تغيير البراديغم لدى ميد ودوركهايم: من النشاط بمقتضى غاية إلى الفعل التواصلي"، ملاحظة تمهيدية وثلاثة فصول. في الفصل الأول، "في تأسيس العلوم الاجتماعية على نظرية التواصل"، يبحث هبرماس في استشكال نظرية التواصل لدى ميد، والانتقال من لغة الإيماءات تحت البشرية إلى التفاعل بتوسط الرموز، والتدقيق في نظرية الدلالة لدى ميد بالاستعانة بمفهوم فتغنشتاين عن اتباع قاعدة ما، والانتقال من التفاعل بتوسط الرموز إلى التفاعل المسترشد بمعايير، والبناء التكميلي للعالم الاجتماعي والعالم الذاتي.

أما في الفصل الثاني، "في سلطة المقدس والخلفية المعيارية للفعل التواصلي"، فيتناول هبرماس دوركهايم والجذور المقدّسة للأخلاق، ومواطن الضعف في نظرية دوركهايم مستطردًا في الجذور الثلاثة للفعل التواصلي: المكوّن القضوي، والمكوّن الإفصاحي، والمكوّن المتضمّن - في- القول. كما يتناول الشكل التفكُّري للفعل الموجّه نحو التفاهم والعلاقة الانعكاسية بالذات.

ويعالج هبرماس في الفصل الثالث، "البنية العقلانية للتحويل اللغوي للمقدس"، تطوّر القانون وتغير شكل الإدماج الاجتماعي انطلاقًا من الأسس غير التعاقدية للعقد، ومن الانتقال من التضامن الآلي إلى التضامن العضوي. ويبحث في منطق هذا التحوّل موضحًا بحسب الحالة الحدّية الخيالية لمجتمع مدمَج في شكل شامل، وفي التعليل الذي قدّمه ميد عن أخلاق الخطاب، مستطردًا في شأن الهوية والتفرّد؛ التحديد الرقمي والعام والكيفي لهوية شخص ما (هاينريش، توغندهات).

المنظومة وعالم الحياة
يشمل الباب السادس، "الفاصل التأملي الثاني: المنظومة وعالم الحياة"، مقدمة بعنوان "ملاحظة تمهيدية عن الإدماج الاجتماعي والإدماج المنظوماتي بالاستناد إلى نظرية دوركهايم عن تقسيم العمل"، وفصلين.

في الفصل الأول، "في تصور عالم الحياة والمثالية الهرمينوطيقية للسوسيولوجيا الفاهمة"، يبحث هبرماس في عالم الحياة بوصفه أفق الفعل التواصلي وخلفيته، وفي المفهوم الاجتماعي - الفينومينولوجي عن عالم الحياة في ضوء نظرية التواصل، والانتقال من المفهوم الصوري - التداولي إلى المفهوم السوسيولوجي لعالم الحياة من خلال المفهوم السردي، ووظائف الفعل الموجّه نحو التفاهم بالنسبة إلى إعادة إنتاج عالم الحياة، وحدود السوسيولوجيا الفاهمة التي تماهي بين عالم الحياة والمجتمع.

ويتحدث الفصل الثاني، "فك الارتباط بين المنظومة وعالم الحياة"، عن المجتمعات القبلية بوصفها عوالمَ حياةٍ اجتماعية – ثقافية، وعن المجتمعات القبلية بوصفها منظومات محكومة ذاتيًا، عارضًا آليات التمايز المنظوماتي، والترسيخ المؤسساتي لآليات الإدماج المنظوماتي في عالم الحياة، وعقلنة عالم الحياة في مقابل تقننته، في تخفيف العبء عن وسط اللغة المتداولة من طريق وسائط تواصلية منزوعة اللغة، وفكّ الارتباط بين المنظومة وعالم الحياة وإعادة صياغة أطروحة التشيؤ.

تطوير نظرية المنظومة
في الباب السابع، "تالكوت بارسونز: المشاكل التي تعترض بناء نظرية في المجتمع"، مقدمة بعنوان "تأمل تمهيدي في موقع بارسونز ضمن تاريخ النظرية"، وثلاثة فصول.

يتكلم هابرماس في الفصل الأول، "من النظرية المعياروية عن الفعل إلى النظرية المنظوماتية عن المجتمع"، على مشروع عام 1937 عن نظرية الفعل، متناولًا المفهوم الإرادوي عن الفعل، والمفهوم المعياروي عن النظام، والمعضلة النفعانية، ومشكل التنسيق بين الأفعال تحت شروط العرَضية المزدوجة. كما يتكلم على نظرية الفعل في الحقبة الوسطى المبكّرة متناولًا الربط بين التحفيزات وتوجيهات القيم، وبأي وجه تقوم الثقافة والمجتمع والشخصية بتعيين توجيهات القيم، وإدخال "المتغيرات النمطية". ويختم بتدقيق مفهوم المنظومة والتنازل عن أولوية نظرية الفعل.

وفي الفصل الثاني، "في تطوير نظرية المنظومة"، يبحث هبرماس في تطوّر النظرية منذ "ورقات عمل"، متناولًا إزالة الفرق بين الإدماج الاجتماعي والإدماج الوظيفي، وخطاطة الوظائف الأربع وسيرورة تكوّن المنظومة، وتعديل المتغيرات النمطية بحسب خطاطة الوظائف الأربع، وإعادة تأويل القيم الثقافية في قيم اسمية سيبرانية، والحتمية الثقافية. كما يتحدث عن الفلسفة الأنثروبولوجية المتأخرة وهشاشة التسوية بين نظرية المنظومة ونظرية الفعل، ونظرية وسائط التحكّم.

ويدرس هبرماس في الفصل الثالث، "في نظرية الحداثة"، عقلنة عالم الحياة وزيادة تعقّد المنظومة وقد أُزيل التمايز بينهما، مستطردًا بشأن محاولة إعادة "كنْطَنة".

بارسونز.. فيبر.. ماركس
يتضمن الباب الثامن، "تأمل ختامي: من بارسونز، عبر فيبر، إلى ماركس"، ملاحظة تمهيدية وثلاثة فصول.

في الفصل الأول، "عودة إلى نظرية الحداثة لدى ماكس فيبر"، يتكلم هبرماس على أطروحة فيبر عن البَرَقرَطة وقد أُعيدت صياغتها في مصطلحات المنظومة وعالم الحياة، وعلى إعادة بناء تفسير فيبر عن نشأة الرأسمالية، واستعمار عالم الحياة: استئناف تشخيص فيبر العصر الحديث من خلال علاقات التبادل بين المنظومة وعالم الحياة في المجتمعات الحديثة، والأسلوب الموحّد للسلوك في الحياة والتجفيف البيروقراطي للفضاء العمومي السياسي.

ويبحث الفصل الثاني، "ماركس وأطروحة الاستعمار الداخلي"، في التجريد الواقعي أو تشييء روابط الفعل المتعلقة بالإدماج الاجتماعي، وذلك في أداء نظرية القيمة، وبعض مواطن الضعف في هذه النظرية. كما يتناول أنموذج علاقات التبادل بين المنظومة وعالم الحياة بدراسة تدخّل الدولة وديمقراطية الجماهير ودولة الرفاه، والتسوية التي تقدّمها الدولة الاجتماعية، وانحلال الأيديولوجيات والوعي اليومي المجزَّأ. ويختم بدراسة نزعات القوْنَنة، خصوصًا القوْننة في ظلّ تدخّل الدولة، أي التضارب بين ضمان الحرية والحرمان من الحرية.

أما في الفصل الثالث، "مهمات نظريةٍ نقدية في المجتمع"، فيعالج هبرماس طيف الموضوعات التي عالجتها النظرية النق...

Genres: Philosophy, Sociology, Nonfiction, Politics, Theory, Social Science, Academic

663 pages, Unknown Binding

First published January 1, 1981

About the author

Jürgen Habermas is a German sociologist and philosopher in the tradition of critical theory and American pragmatism. He is perhaps best known for his work on the concept of the public sphere, the topic of his first book entitled The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. His work focuses on the foundations of social theory and epistemology, the analysis of advanced capitalistic societies and democracy, the rule of law in a critical social-evolutionary context, and contemporary politics—particularly German politics. Habermas's theoretical system is devoted to revealing the possibility of reason, emancipation, and rational-critical communication latent in modern institutions and in the human capacity to deliberate and pursue rational interests.

Reviews

[Beauregard Bottomley · Rating 1 out of 5]

An incredibly dangerous and naïve deconstructionist approach to dialectally building an even more chaotic world than the one we currently have with a world view based on nothing but the author’s feelings of that’s the way he thinks it should be.

The mob not only rejects science, morality and art as worthy of consideration they are the ones who want to colonize the tribes and enslave them. Habermas just doesn’t get that the world is just one Donald Trump or MAGA hat moron from ‘stop thinking and follow me’ leader who has only ever read one book, and that book is not this one but is The Speeches of Adolph Hitler. Habermas uses the word colonize frequently in this book in the Marxist sense, but also for when functionalist reason gets sublimated by the process of living in the lifeworld.

Habermas separates science, morality and art but that’s not the real issue, the public sphere and pragmatism (two fundamental approaches approvingly used in this book) aren’t the key to societal communications, nor is the creation of make-believe origin stories for societal realities of which this book is full of. And besides, I think Stephen J. Gould was wrong and misguided when he believes there are two separate but equal magisterial: Science and Religion. I live in only one world and as far as I know science is the best way to approach truth.

Habermas and now days Stephen Pinker, Jordan Peterson, and Yuval Harari create fictional worlds in order to describe reality while forgetting the real world has context, history and perspective in order to actually be. The book The Dawn of Everything understands the danger and the whimsy when authors ignore the way the world really is. That book warns against the kind of approach Habermas uses and also called out Pinker, Peterson and Harari for playing fast and loose with reality.

Habermas cries out for having a greater reverence for the reverence of culture, tradition and the used to be even when that is nothing more than his fictional spin on what was, and it’s as if he wants to return to a mythical garden of Eden before dealing with the way things really are.

I really don’t think there was anything of substance that was in this book. The author thinks he’s resolved the paradox between the rational (Weber) and the universal abstract (Marx) and that his reconstruction really matters, and mostly wants to replace reason with his favorite history, culture, and traditions (Edmund Burkean bells go off when I see that kind of formation as in this book).

The author’s approach is a danger to the world and MAGA hat morons are as real today as they were in his day and his approach opens the door to climate deniers, election deniers, and vaccine deniers and those who don’t really care about science, morality or art unless it means they can control a women’s body or make the use of pronouns the most important issue ever. The world is not rational, stop pretending that it is.

[Justin Evans · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is a difficult book to rate, since it's obviously very important/influential. And the horrific style could bias anyone against it. But I finally settled on two stars. Why?

* Habermas' theory is meant to be an advance beyond previous critical theories. He argues that their focus on consciousness philosophy (broadly speaking, an individualist approach to social theory, which assumes that individuals are the primary bearers of meaning) leads them into all sorts of problems. But his interpretations of those previous critical theories are, not to put too fine a point on it, appalling. He misreads Hegel; he misreads Marx to such a great extent that one might almost believe he'd never even read *Capital*; and his take on earlier critical theorists is more or less limited to Horkheimer's 'Eclipse of Reason.' Habermas' main criticism of Adorno is that Adorno seeks a solution to the problems of modern societies in a kind of irrationalist mysticism. It is no surprise that almost all of his evidence for this is taken from books *about*, rather than *by* Adorno. (Good rebuttals of Habermas' readings of Hegel and Marx can be found in Pippin's 'Idealism as Modernism,' and Postone's 'Time, Labor and Social Domination' respectively.)
* For Habermas, the main problem with previous critical theories is that they don't seem to be grounded. Habermas sees a strict dichotomy here. Either you ground your theory by taking on a universalist perspective, or you lapse into relativism. Because critical theory has tended to avoid universalism, it must be relativistic. This is tied to his failure to understand Hegel's work. Hegel shows that the dichotomy between universalism and relativism is flawed; that something can be grounding without being universal. On this approach, critical theory is right to find its foundation only in an immanent critique of the present, without a universalist standpoint.
* Habermas claims to find his universalist standpoint in language. He argues that any any speech act assumes the possibility of rational agreement, and that this can be a basis of a critical theory. Language becomes the inalienable repository of freedom and reconciliation. This is where Habermas' rejection of 'consciousness philosophy' hurts him most. Why is it that language can remain more or less pure? He has no answer for this question. 'Consciousness philosophy,' of course, would argue that since language is bound up with consciousness; and since consciousness somewhat obviously cannot remain 'pure' in an impure world; then language itself cannot remain pure, and cannot be the universal standpoint Habermas seeks.
* Finally, Habermas tries to combine two sociological approaches: systems theory and action theory. He never asks, however, if these theories themselves might be reflections of actual social problems which cannot be merely 'combined' at the theoretical level. A critical theory will show the problems with these theories, and explain how to move past them. Habermas does not do this, because he accepts Daniel Bell's thesis of 'end of ideology.' Theories are now just different standpoints from which we view the same content, not reflections of that content itself. Again, a bit more 'consciousness philosophy' would have led Habermas to see that this separation of form and content - which he sees as a key moment of modernism - is theoretically untenable.
* On a somewhat more obvious level, this was a theory designed for a welfare-state world. This world collapsed just as these volumes were being published in German. Habermas himself said, in an interview around the time they were being published, that this work assumed such a welfare state world ("The Dialectics of Rationalization," in 'Telos'). The disappearance of that world made it clear that 'power' was no more than a handmaiden to 'money.' The best recent work of critical theory, Postone's book mentioned above, makes this argument very well.

That's all substantive stuff. On a less high-falutin' level, this book is horrifically written, spends far too much time summarizing previous sociological theories, and shows a frankly bizarre addiction to unnecessary, quasi-scholastic hair-splitting. For those interested in critical theory, I recommend reading the 'intermediate reflections' and 'concluding reflections.' Otherwise, it's like reading a freshman-comp paper written by a staggering genius.

[Anna · Rating 4 out of 5]

This took me forever. I want to say that the reason for this was the group I was reading it with - sometimes it seemed impossible to find a date for meeting - but if I am honest, I would never have finished on my own.

This is not a commentary on the importance of this work. It's very clear to me why it inhabits its place in most german social theories. It takes apart the classics that came before, shows what works and what needs adjustment, all the while following a very stringent argument. It has a clear point of view, and much that seems banal today is common knowledge thanks to Habermas.

But it's very long. And repetitive. And sometimes the premises of the book, the democratic theory that heavily influences the argument just seemed a bit naive. I wasn't always sure if Habermas misread the texts he criticized - or if his criticism made them re-evaluate and develope their ideas. Sometimes he seemed to dumb down Marx, but that also served to underscore the point he was making.

Overall, I think it's worth reading - but if reading theory isn't a hobby of yours, simply getting a solid introduction or commentary can be just as good. The basic argument of the book is easy to follow, and only some of the 1200 pages are really necessary to get it. The rest is not quite exemplary enough to warrant all that time spent if the process itself doesn't spark joy in you.

[Stefan Szczelkun · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was more interesting and radical than Volume 1. Used as my main theory in my 2002 PhD and critiqued using Foucault and also from the aesthetic weakness of TCA, as I saw it. My summary is here:
https://stefan-szczelkun.blogspot.com...

There are links at the end to my critiques.

[Mary · Rating 3 out of 5]

What's not to love? The man has "Figure 36. The human condition."

[Caroline Loftus · Rating 2 out of 5]

Habermas is the philosophical equivalent of eating plain oatmeal mixed with sawdust. Still important though I guess, especially if one is interested in studying German Idealism.

[John · Rating 2 out of 5]

I was actually surprised by how thoughtless Habermas’ critique of Marx was, relying as it does on the Weber/Lukacs reading, and the whole base/superstructure trope. For those of you who heard about this famous duality and want to critique Marx based on it: Marx said this ONCE, and with contextual specificity. He didn’t really believe you could just dump the social on top of some stool called “economy” (this is an economist reading).
Habermas also seems to think Marxism can’t account for the welfare state, or the other somewhat underhanded tactics Capitalism has used to keep itself afloat through ever worsening financial crisis. I think he would be hard pressed to find a Marxist economist who isn’t dealing with this currently, not to mention Marx himself being relatively clear on how capitalism won’t abide a barrier, and has historically come up with extremely remarkable ways to keep moving. Habermas doesn’t deal with the core of Marx’s real addendum to the political economic discourse of the time, namely that its core isn’t just the commodity relation, but surplus-value. While scooting around Marx’s ideas about value in general, he never actually gets at the core factor, which is that the surplus-value relationship which is inherent to Capitalism is inherently exploitative, and no amount of restructuring will cure this fundamental ailment. There is no real “pacification” of class antagonism, and we are beginning to see Marx’s foresight on this matter now. Habermas posses another fundamentally poorly framed question when he wonders why modern resistance is declassed in a way (as in coming from students rather than workers). Firstly I don’t think anyone looking at the conflicts happening around the world in the 60’s could be so deluded as to not understand the class interaction of situations like Vietnam, and secondly he perhaps should relook at the class positions of many students.
Not to mention his claim that Marx somehow ignores or subsumes culture in this severe way…

A few other problems with Habermas:

-The idea that we have to work from the assumption that language has an inherent drive toward consensus/understanding (and that somehow this is not teleological in a hard sense because its merely “goal-oriented”). The abstract theory of language that serves as the foundation of his entire method is simply terrible. His system falls apart without its fallacious starting point being assumed.
-Economy and State are considered in isolation from culture, those making the problem remarkably similar to a bad reading of Marx in that his problem is these “systems” (economy, state) invading the “lifeworld” (culture, language). How economy is not a cultural and linguistic practice is totally beyond my comprehension. It seems like there is just some mystical assumption about how economy just flows on its own, and any mention of the ruling classes and their historical and current role in shaping that interaction are ignored (what about imperialism!?)
-The appeal to general political “legitimacy”, which eliminates all forms of political struggle save communicative action. The assumption that we can rationally talk out our problems and thus solve any dispute, and that this is the only legitimate way to do so, leaves a great deal to be desired.
-In his theory of communicative action, regulative validity claims are subject to acceptance (in the Yes or No dichotomy of responses to validity claims) based on their normativeness, which seems problematic if this is the type of speech act which we use to request or regulate others.
-An inability to fold art/poetry into his proceduralist account of communicative action towards satisfying reason leads him to put it wholly outside the world. The autonomous realm of art is just a mythology, whether from those who wish to validate it, or from those who say it is not reasonable enough.
-Linguistic Kantianism based on “regulatory ideals” is a one way ticket back to Hegel’s critique of universal morality. How can Habermas claim to have an intersubjective account with this monstrous presupposition looming all of our discourse? (I understand the attempted tripartite of objective, inter-subjective, and subjective, I just think it fails to come through.)
-The problem of “social order” and its explanation has never been a satisfying frame for my understanding of social systems (stemming from Parson’s social integration theory). Marx describes our economic condition as anarchic, and I tend to agree. Phrasing the problem in such a way as to assume that there is a relative degree of social equilibrium really misses the power relationships at the bottom of even the most basic agreements (though I generally sympathize with Habermas in that he is responding to post-structuralist power analysis). I think Parson’s critique of Hobbes is missing the main thrust of the Hobbsian argument, which is that fear of violent death accounts for “social order”— this is lurking closer to the surface than we often realize. This is the difference between a “crises” model that recognizes the internal contradictions of the capitalist system, and a “consensus” model; one wonders if Parson’s had a window in his ivory tower. Habermas at least tries to explain why our society is in perpetual crisis (“systems” invading “life-world”), but that our “natural culture and language” is bent towards rejection of systems seems more than arbitrary, it is down right anti-dialectic.
-ANTHROPOCENTRISM, only humans have language, the environment and the animals are just going to have to deal with our decision.
-ETHNOCENTRISM, being situated in and being the self-proclaimed heir to western philosophical/linguistic thought, the backwards cultures that have yet to evolve to western standards of rationality are just waiting to be subsumed, and receive this prescriptive division from immediate mythological binding ( ala Durkheim).

[A YOGAM · Rating 4 out of 5]

Der Begriff der Kolonialisierung in Habermas’ Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns
Bei der Lektüre von Habermas’ „Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns“ hat mich insbesondere der Begriff der „Kolonialisierung“ fasziniert, sodass ich mich in meiner Rezension ausschließlich auf diesen Aspekt konzentriere.
Der Begriff der Kolonialisierung bildet einen zentralen Pfeiler in Habermas’ Theorie der Moderne. Er dient dazu, Sozialpathologien zu erklären, die in hochentwickelten kapitalistischen Gesellschaften auftreten. Seine systematische Ausarbeitung findet sich im zweiten Band der „Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns“, insbesondere in der „Zweiten Zwischenbetrachtung“, die das Verhältnis von Lebenswelt und System entfaltet. Bereits im ersten Band ist diese Unterscheidung jedoch angelegt, sodass der Begriff dort vorbereitend eingeführt wird. Im Schlussteil des Werkes gewinnt das Konzept in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem westlichen Marxismus zusätzliche Bedeutung, was sich im Titel des Abschnitts „Marx und die These der inneren Kolonialisierung“ spiegelt. Habermas’ Theorie zielt darauf ab, den gesellschaftlichen Lebenszusammenhang so zu konzeptualisieren, dass die Paradoxien der Moderne in ihrer inneren Logik verständlich werden.
Die Kolonialisierung beschreibt jenen Mechanismus, durch den Systeme zweckrationalen Handelns in die Lebenswelt eindringen und deren kommunikative Strukturen deformieren. Das zentrale Problem besteht darin, dass „die kommunikativ strukturierten Lebensbereiche den Imperativen verselbständigter, formal organisierter Handlungssysteme unterworfen werden“. Die formal organisierten Subsysteme der kapitalistischen Wirtschaft und der modernen Staatsverwaltung koordinieren Handlungen über entsprachlichte Steuerungsmedien wie Geld und Macht. Diese folgen der Logik einer zweckrationalen Funktionalität und geraten dadurch in Konkurrenz mit dem Prinzip der sozialen Integration der Lebenswelt, das auf kommunikativ erzielter Verständigung beruht.
Die Rationalisierung der Lebenswelt schafft zwar erst die Voraussetzungen für die Herausbildung dieser zweckrationalen Subsysteme, doch ihre Entkoppelung von der Lebenswelt führt dazu, dass die Logik der Systemerhaltung desintegrierend auf die kommunikative Lebenspraxis zurückwirkt. Die „Erfahrungen mit der Kolonialisierung der Lebenswelt“ werden für Habermas zu einer zentralen Quelle gesellschaftlicher Krisen und „radikaler Opposition“.
In der Kolonialisierungsthese greift Habermas die Verdinglichungsproblematik der Kritischen Theorie auf, wie sie von Lukács, Horkheimer und Adorno in Auseinandersetzung mit Webers Rationalisierungsthese entwickelt wurde. Die These der inneren Kolonialisierung formuliert diese Problemstellung neu: Sie soll die „Paradoxie der Rationalisierung“ erfassen, bei der eine Form der Systemintegration, die durch die Rationalisierung der Lebenswelt selbst erst ermöglicht wurde, mit dem Prinzip der Verständigung in Konkurrenz tritt und unter bestimmten Bedingungen desintegrierend auf die Lebenswelt zurückwirkt.
Habermas versteht den Begriff der Kolonialisierung dabei nicht moralisch, sondern analytisch. Er beschreibt keine bloße Überwältigung der Lebenswelt durch äußere Mächte, sondern strukturelle Mechanismen moderner Gesellschaften, durch die funktionale Rationalität kommunikative Rationalität verdrängt. Das Konzept steht somit im Zentrum der kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie, die Habermas im zweiten Band seiner „Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns“ präzisiert: Es soll die Pathologien moderner Rationalität nicht von außen kritisieren, sondern aus den inneren Widersprüchen der Moderne selbst heraus erklären.

Um die Stellung des Begriffs der Kolonialisierung innerhalb der „Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns“ genauer zu verorten, lohnt sich ein Blick auf die Struktur des zweiten Bandes, in dem Habermas seine Gesellschaftstheorie systematisch entfaltet. Der Aufbau des Bandes zeigt, wie der Gedanke der Kolonialisierung aus einer breiteren Auseinandersetzung mit handlungstheoretischen, systemtheoretischen und gesellschaftskritischen Fragestellungen hervorgeht. Die folgenden Kapitelüberschriften verdeutlichen den argumentativen Weg, auf dem Habermas von der kommunikationstheoretischen Grundlegung über die Analyse von System und Lebenswelt bis zur kritischen Reinterpretation von Weber, Parsons und Marx gelangt.
In Band 2 der „Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns“ entwickelt Jürgen Habermas seine Gesellschaftstheorie weiter, indem er die Grundlagen der Sozialwissenschaften einer kommunikationstheoretischen Rekonstruktion unterzieht. Das Werk gliedert sich in vier große Teile (V–VIII), die einen argumentativen Bogen von der Handlungstheorie über die Systemtheorie bis zur kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie schlagen.
Im fünften Kapitel („Der Paradigmenwechsel bei Mead und Durkheim“) rekonstruiert Habermas den Übergang von der zweckrationalen Handlungstheorie zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Anhand von G. H. Mead und Émile Durkheim zeigt er, wie soziale Ordnung nicht durch strategisches Handeln, sondern durch Verständigung und geteilte Normen entsteht. Dabei spielt die Entstehung rationaler Kommunikation aus religiös-sakralen Bindungen eine zentrale Rolle.
Die zweite Zwischenbetrachtung (Kapitel VI) führt die fundamentale Unterscheidung zwischen Systemund Lebenswelt ein. Habermas bestimmt die Lebenswelt als den durch Sprache und kulturelle Deutung reproduzierten Horizont gemeinsamer Verständigung, dem gegenüber die Systeme von Wirtschaft und Verwaltung zunehmend verselbständigt auftreten. Diese Entkoppelung von System und Lebenswelt markiert den Ausgangspunkt seiner Diagnose moderner Gesellschaften.
Im siebten Kapitel („Talcott Parsons: Konstruktionsprobleme der Gesellschaftstheorie“) setzt sich Habermas kritisch mit der Systemtheorie auseinander. Er würdigt Parsons’ Versuch, gesellschaftliche Ordnung funktional zu erklären, zeigt aber, dass eine rein funktionalistische Vernunft den kommunikativen Kern sozialer Integration verfehlt. Damit bereitet er den Übergang zu einer kritischen Revision der Systemtheorie vor.
Die Schlussbetrachtung (Kapitel VIII) schließt den Band mit einer Auseinandersetzung mit Weber, Parsons und Marx. Habermas diskutiert Webers Rationalisierungsthese, entwickelt die berühmte These der inneren Kolonialisierung der Lebenswelt und bestimmt die Aufgabe einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie als Rekonstruktion der emanzipativen Potenziale kommunikativer Vernunft.
So vollzieht Band 2 den theoretischen Kern von Habermas’ Projekt: die Vermittlung zwischen Systemtheorie und Handlungstheorie, um die Pathologien moderner Gesellschaften aus der Entfremdung von System und Lebenswelt heraus zu erklären.

[Josh · Rating 5 out of 5]

God this thing is dense. I only read about a quarter of both volumes for school but one day I will read the whole thing and then I will be a TRUE GENIUS.

[Thomas · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is comically dense. I felt like a tool reading it. But it does the trick.

[Bengjaw · Rating 3 out of 5]

non-dominating interaction/cammunication can be a cure for our sick society

[Kevin Fitzpatrick · Rating 4 out of 5]

The second volume in a series, Jurgen Habermas' "The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason" is a magisterial masterpiece that cogently links together the traditional social theories of modernity, those of H. Mead, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, and others, in a mostly successful effort to assert a new paradigm of theory, that of the theory of communicative action. Beginning, as much sociological theory does, with the developments of traditional rational paradigms of thought and society in the early pre-modern period, what Habermas calls the "linguistification of the sacred," Habermas goes on the delineate how earlier theorists attempted to reconcile an "actions" orientated theory with a "systems" based theory. So early thinkers such as H. Mead, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim, outlined how the development of the Occidental world from feudalism, to mercantilism, to corporate capitalism led to greater differentiation and complexity in the forms of society and in the "symbolism of the Lifeworld," or the mental referents in individuals of the strictures and structures of the society that forms them. These earlier, classical thinkers of the tradition were, in turn, modified by that giant of the field, Talcott Parsons, whose work, both early and late, attempted to reconcile the contradictions of these precursors and also tried to better represent the social and personal world in all its complexity. As the reader is led through this purview of what is truly dense theoretical material, he/she is exposed to digressions on the verbal hierarchy of etiquette on a job site of construction workers in Germany and an equally accurate description of verbal interchanges where the parties utterances are based on a rational and intuitive knowledge of how the alter, or other, will react, which preconditions what will be said. (This latter point is not only a good description not only of love but is also the foundation of the theory of communicative action, where the interchange of words, by its very nature, presupposes a shared rationality. Habermas bases his renewed attempt at establishing reason, devoid of a failed philosophy of history, on this tenuous if ingeniously formulated concept.) Towards the end of the book, Habermas critiques Marxism's failed attempt to establish a rational foundation for rebellion. He also serves the reader an excellent critique of the juridification of education whose conclusions against the state's intrusion into the communicative-based world of education could surprise those readers more familiar with a bureaucratized response to educational reform. Profoundly enmeshed with the thinkers who are ground-breakers in their fields, "The Theory of Communicative Action," and this volume in particular, offers detailed explications of difficult theoretical fields couched in prose that delineates concepts in a clear, non-opaque manner. Finally, when all is said and done, Habermas' theory offers hope for the human project in our terribly fraught (post)-modern times, and he does this by establishing a new hope for reason, which has been so deeply damaged by the failed theories of the past. And this hope is based on that most ubiquitous of phenomena, language itself. So, like the theory he asserts, Habermas' effort here exhibits a rationality that is both truthful and compassionate, two worthwhile theoretical ends, certainly.

[Kristupas Čeilutka · Rating 4 out of 5]

With all its limitations, this book remains amazing.

[Olivia · Rating 2 out of 5]

LAME

[Lorin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excerpt from my book, Dynamic Markets Leadership, all rights reserved:
Where people are not yet altruistic and creative enough, there will be powerful pressures to keep up with those advanced competitors that have already made the transformations needed for high performance in dynamic markets. That is, the drive toward creative cooperation within the organization does not come from the warm, fuzzy values of religion or philosophical idealism; it comes from the cold, hard need to keep up with competition among organizations in highly dynamic and sometimes chaotic markets. The mission of the NPC is to take the mystery out of these processes and make both these harsh market demands and our required (now seemingly impossible or paranormal) transformations intelligible and therefore also reasonable. Habermas said,
“…political domination has socially integrating power only insofar as disposition over means of sanction does not rest on naked repression, but on the authority of an office anchored in turn in a legal order. For this reason laws need to be intersubjectively recognized by citizens; they have to be legitimated as right and proper. This leaves culture with the task of supplying reasons why an existing political order deserves to be recognized.” (p. 188)
So culture is a lot more than arts, crafts, and values. What is happening at the business level of society is that the reasons a political (or executive) order deserves to be recognized are no longer tied to their top-down, unilateral, often vicious chain of command. Instead, a transformational leader serves those affected by his or her work and therefore can demonstrate that good reasons are involved with our mutual participation in distributed leadership through new structures of consciousness

[Iamthesword · Rating 4 out of 5]

Jürgen Habermas is a household name not only in German social sciences, but he's also one of the most influental political intellectuals of the Federal Republic. And his opus magnum shows why: Habermas blends Weber, Marx, Parsons, Critical Theory and newer approaches to a unique theory of society, focussing on communication as its fundamental fabric. But it's not science just for the sake of science: He's a fervent democrat and his contemplations are always aimed at the preservation and evolution of democracy - and I can't say that those questions have lost any relevance lately. There are some points where you can see that it's a book from the 1980s and where the course of events don't fit exactely into his theory, but that doesn't disprove his basic ideas (and he has published many more books since then to adapt his theory).

His argumentations are complex, BUT they stay understandable - at least for someone with basic skills in scientific reading. Considering the range of disciplines and theories in this book - and the fact that it's 1200 pages of scientific literature - it was quite readable.

It's no Sunday read for sure, but if you like to reflect on society and democracy, it's definitively worth your time.

[samoht99 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Der Meister der Paraphrase.