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The Theory of Communicative Action
نظرية الفعل التواصلي - المجلد الأول: عقلانية الفعل والعقلانية الاجتماعية
يرى هبرماس أنّ غرض نظرية الفعل التواصلي هو إيضاح الأسس التي تقوم عليها نظرية نقدية في المجتمع؛ ذلك أنّ المفهوم الأساسي للفعل التواصلي إنّما يفتح السبيل إلى مركّب من ثلاثة موضوعات متشابكة بعضها مع بعض: يتعلق الأمر بدايةً ببلورةِ مفهومٍ عن العقلانية التواصلية يصمد أمام الاختصارات العرفانية - الأداتية للعقل، ثمّ بتصوّرٍ عن المجتمع من درجتين، من شأنه أن يربط براديغم عالم الحياة وبراديغم المنظومة بطريقة لا تكون خطابية فحسب، وأخيرًا، بنظرية في الحداثة، تفسّر نمط الباثولوجيا الاجتماعية التي ما فتئت تبرز اليوم على نحو منظور، على فرضِ أنّ ميادين الحياة المهيكَلة على نحو تواصلي باتت خاضعة للأوامر الصادرة عن منظومات الفعل المستقلة والمهيكَلة على نحو صوري.
624 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1981
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2518 people want to read
About the author
Jürgen Habermas
378 books696 followersJürgen Habermas is a German sociologist and philosopher in the tradition of critical theory and American pragmatism. He is perhaps best known for his work on the concept of the public sphere, the topic of his first book entitled The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. His work focuses on the foundations of social theory and epistemology, the analysis of advanced capitalistic societies and democracy, the rule of law in a critical social-evolutionary context, and contemporary politics—particularly German politics. Habermas's theoretical system is devoted to revealing the possibility of reason, emancipation, and rational-critical communication latent in modern institutions and in the human capacity to deliberate and pursue rational interests.
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Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews
August 6, 2009
This is a difficult book to rate, since it's obviously very important/influential. And the horrific style could bias anyone against it. But I finally settled on two stars. Why?
* Habermas' theory is meant to be an advance beyond previous critical theories. He argues that their focus on consciousness philosophy (broadly speaking, an individualist approach to social theory, which assumes that individuals are the primary bearers of meaning) leads them into all sorts of problems. But his interpretations of those previous critical theories are, not to put too fine a point on it, appalling. He misreads Hegel; he misreads Marx to such a great extent that one might almost believe he'd never even read *Capital*; and his take on earlier critical theorists is more or less limited to Horkheimer's 'Eclipse of Reason.' Habermas' main criticism of Adorno is that Adorno seeks a solution to the problems of modern societies in a kind of irrationalist mysticism. It is no surprise that almost all of his evidence for this is taken from books *about*, rather than *by* Adorno. (Good rebuttals of Habermas' readings of Hegel and Marx can be found in Pippin's 'Idealism as Modernism,' and Postone's 'Time, Labor and Social Domination' respectively.)
* For Habermas, the main problem with previous critical theories is that they don't seem to be grounded. Habermas sees a strict dichotomy here. Either you ground your theory by taking on a universalist perspective, or you lapse into relativism. Because critical theory has tended to avoid universalism, it must be relativistic. This is tied to his failure to understand Hegel's work. Hegel shows that the dichotomy between universalism and relativism is flawed; that something can be grounding without being universal. On this approach, critical theory is right to find its foundation only in an immanent critique of the present, without a universalist standpoint.
* Habermas claims to find his universalist standpoint in language. He argues that any any speech act assumes the possibility of rational agreement, and that this can be a basis of a critical theory. Language becomes the inalienable repository of freedom and reconciliation. This is where Habermas' rejection of 'consciousness philosophy' hurts him most. Why is it that language can remain more or less pure? He has no answer for this question. 'Consciousness philosophy,' of course, would argue that since language is bound up with consciousness; and since consciousness somewhat obviously cannot remain 'pure' in an impure world; then language itself cannot remain pure, and cannot be the universal standpoint Habermas seeks.
* Finally, Habermas tries to combine two sociological approaches: systems theory and action theory. He never asks, however, if these theories themselves might be reflections of actual social problems which cannot be merely 'combined' at the theoretical level. A critical theory will show the problems with these theories, and explain how to move past them. Habermas does not do this, because he accepts Daniel Bell's thesis of 'end of ideology.' Theories are now just different standpoints from which we view the same content, not reflections of that content itself. Again, a bit more 'consciousness philosophy' would have led Habermas to see that this separation of form and content - which he sees as a key moment of modernism - is theoretically untenable.
* On a somewhat more obvious level, this was a theory designed for a welfare-state world. This world collapsed just as these volumes were being published in German. Habermas himself said, in an interview around the time they were being published, that this work assumed such a welfare state world ("The Dialectics of Rationalization," in 'Telos'). The disappearance of that world made it clear that 'power' was no more than a handmaiden to 'money.' The best recent work of critical theory, Postone's book mentioned above, makes this argument very well.
That's all substantive stuff. On a less high-falutin' level, this book is horrifically written, spends far too much time summarizing previous sociological theories, and shows a frankly bizarre addiction to unnecessary, quasi-scholastic hair-splitting. For those interested in critical theory, I recommend reading the 'intermediate reflections' and 'concluding reflections.' Otherwise, it's like reading a freshman-comp paper written by a staggering genius.
* Habermas' theory is meant to be an advance beyond previous critical theories. He argues that their focus on consciousness philosophy (broadly speaking, an individualist approach to social theory, which assumes that individuals are the primary bearers of meaning) leads them into all sorts of problems. But his interpretations of those previous critical theories are, not to put too fine a point on it, appalling. He misreads Hegel; he misreads Marx to such a great extent that one might almost believe he'd never even read *Capital*; and his take on earlier critical theorists is more or less limited to Horkheimer's 'Eclipse of Reason.' Habermas' main criticism of Adorno is that Adorno seeks a solution to the problems of modern societies in a kind of irrationalist mysticism. It is no surprise that almost all of his evidence for this is taken from books *about*, rather than *by* Adorno. (Good rebuttals of Habermas' readings of Hegel and Marx can be found in Pippin's 'Idealism as Modernism,' and Postone's 'Time, Labor and Social Domination' respectively.)
* For Habermas, the main problem with previous critical theories is that they don't seem to be grounded. Habermas sees a strict dichotomy here. Either you ground your theory by taking on a universalist perspective, or you lapse into relativism. Because critical theory has tended to avoid universalism, it must be relativistic. This is tied to his failure to understand Hegel's work. Hegel shows that the dichotomy between universalism and relativism is flawed; that something can be grounding without being universal. On this approach, critical theory is right to find its foundation only in an immanent critique of the present, without a universalist standpoint.
* Habermas claims to find his universalist standpoint in language. He argues that any any speech act assumes the possibility of rational agreement, and that this can be a basis of a critical theory. Language becomes the inalienable repository of freedom and reconciliation. This is where Habermas' rejection of 'consciousness philosophy' hurts him most. Why is it that language can remain more or less pure? He has no answer for this question. 'Consciousness philosophy,' of course, would argue that since language is bound up with consciousness; and since consciousness somewhat obviously cannot remain 'pure' in an impure world; then language itself cannot remain pure, and cannot be the universal standpoint Habermas seeks.
* Finally, Habermas tries to combine two sociological approaches: systems theory and action theory. He never asks, however, if these theories themselves might be reflections of actual social problems which cannot be merely 'combined' at the theoretical level. A critical theory will show the problems with these theories, and explain how to move past them. Habermas does not do this, because he accepts Daniel Bell's thesis of 'end of ideology.' Theories are now just different standpoints from which we view the same content, not reflections of that content itself. Again, a bit more 'consciousness philosophy' would have led Habermas to see that this separation of form and content - which he sees as a key moment of modernism - is theoretically untenable.
* On a somewhat more obvious level, this was a theory designed for a welfare-state world. This world collapsed just as these volumes were being published in German. Habermas himself said, in an interview around the time they were being published, that this work assumed such a welfare state world ("The Dialectics of Rationalization," in 'Telos'). The disappearance of that world made it clear that 'power' was no more than a handmaiden to 'money.' The best recent work of critical theory, Postone's book mentioned above, makes this argument very well.
That's all substantive stuff. On a less high-falutin' level, this book is horrifically written, spends far too much time summarizing previous sociological theories, and shows a frankly bizarre addiction to unnecessary, quasi-scholastic hair-splitting. For those interested in critical theory, I recommend reading the 'intermediate reflections' and 'concluding reflections.' Otherwise, it's like reading a freshman-comp paper written by a staggering genius.
December 29, 2015
I was actually surprised by how thoughtless Habermas’ critique of Marx was, relying as it does on the Weber reading, and the whole base/superstructure trope. For those of you who heard about this famous duality and want to critique Marx based on it: Marx said this ONCE, and with contextual specificity. He didn’t really believe you could just dump the social on top of some stool called “economy” (this is an economist reading).
Habermas also seems to think Marxism can’t account for the welfare state, or the other somewhat underhanded tactics Capitalism has used to keep itself afloat through ever worsening financial crisis. I think he would be hard pressed to find a Marxist economist who isn’t dealing with this currently, not to mention Marx himself being relatively clear on how capitalism won’t abide a barrier, and has historically come up with extremely remarkable ways to keep moving. Habermas doesn’t deal with the core of Marx’s real addendum to the political economic discourse of the time, namely that its core isn’t just the commodity relation, but surplus-value. While scooting around Marx’s ideas about value in general, he never actually gets at the core factor, which is that the surplus-value relationship which is inherent to Capitalism is inherently exploitative, and no amount of restructuring will cure this fundamental ailment. There is no real “pacification” of class antagonism, and we are beginning to see Marx’s foresight on this matter now. Habermas posses another fundamentally poorly framed question when he wonders why modern resistance is declassed in a way (as in coming from students rather than workers). Firstly I don’t think anyone looking at the conflicts happening around the world in the 60’s could be so deluded as to not understand the class interaction of situations like Vietnam, and secondly he perhaps should relook at the class positions of many students.
Not to mention his claim that Marx somehow ignores or subsumes culture in this severe way…
A few other problems with Habermas:
-The idea that we have to work from the assumption that language has an inherent drive toward consensus/understanding (and that somehow this is not teleological in a hard sense because its merely “goal-oriented”). The abstract theory of language that serves as the foundation of his entire method is simply terrible. His system falls apart without its fallacious starting point being assumed.
-Economy and State are considered in isolation from culture, those making the problem remarkably similar to a bad reading of Marx in that his problem is these “systems” (economy, state) invading the “lifeworld” (culture, language). How economy is not a cultural and linguistic practice is totally beyond my comprehension. It seems like there is just some mystical assumption about how economy just flows on its own, and any mention of the ruling classes and their historical and current role in shaping that interaction are ignored (what about imperialism!?)
-The appeal to general political “legitimacy”, which eliminates all forms of political struggle save communicative action. The assumption that we can rationally talk out our problems and thus solve any dispute, and that this is the only legitimate way to do so, leaves a great deal to be desired.
-In his theory of communicative action, regulative validity claims are subject to acceptance (in the Yes or No dichotomy of responses to validity claims) based on their normativeness, which seems problematic if this is the type of speech act which we use to request or regulate others.
-An inability to fold art/poetry into his proceduralist account of communicative action towards satisfying reason leads him to put it wholly outside the world. The autonomous realm of art is just a mythology, whether from those who wish to validate it, or from those who say it is not reasonable enough.
-Linguistic Kantianism based on “regulatory ideals” is a one way ticket back to Hegel’s critique of universal morality. How can Habermas claim to have an intersubjective account with this monstrous presupposition looming all of our discourse? (I understand the attempted tripartite of objective, inter-subjective, and subjective, I just think it fails to come through.)
-The problem of “social order” and its explanation has never been a satisfying frame for my understanding of social systems (stemming from Parson’s social integration theory). Marx describes our economic condition as anarchic, and I tend to agree. Phrasing the problem in such a way as to assume that there is a relative degree of social equilibrium really misses the power relationships at the bottom of even the most basic agreements (though I generally sympathize with Habermas in that he is responding to post-structuralist power analysis). I think Parson’s critique of Hobbes is missing the main thrust of the Hobbsian argument, which is that fear of violent death accounts for “social order”— this is lurking closer to the surface than we often realize. This is the difference between a “crises” model that recognizes the internal contradictions of the capitalist system, and a “consensus” model; one wonders if Parson’s had a window in his ivory tower. Habermas at least tries to explain why our society is in perpetual crisis (“systems” invading “life-world”), but that our “natural culture and language” is bent towards rejection of systems seems more than arbitrary, it is down right anti-dialectic.
-ANTHROPOCENTRISM, only humans have language, the environment and the animals are just going to have to deal with our decision.
-ETHNOCENTRISM, being situated in and being the self-proclaimed heir to western philosophical/linguistic thought, the backwards cultures that have yet to evolve to western standards of rationality are just waiting to be subsumed, and receive this prescriptive division from immediate mythological binding ( ala Durkheim).
Habermas also seems to think Marxism can’t account for the welfare state, or the other somewhat underhanded tactics Capitalism has used to keep itself afloat through ever worsening financial crisis. I think he would be hard pressed to find a Marxist economist who isn’t dealing with this currently, not to mention Marx himself being relatively clear on how capitalism won’t abide a barrier, and has historically come up with extremely remarkable ways to keep moving. Habermas doesn’t deal with the core of Marx’s real addendum to the political economic discourse of the time, namely that its core isn’t just the commodity relation, but surplus-value. While scooting around Marx’s ideas about value in general, he never actually gets at the core factor, which is that the surplus-value relationship which is inherent to Capitalism is inherently exploitative, and no amount of restructuring will cure this fundamental ailment. There is no real “pacification” of class antagonism, and we are beginning to see Marx’s foresight on this matter now. Habermas posses another fundamentally poorly framed question when he wonders why modern resistance is declassed in a way (as in coming from students rather than workers). Firstly I don’t think anyone looking at the conflicts happening around the world in the 60’s could be so deluded as to not understand the class interaction of situations like Vietnam, and secondly he perhaps should relook at the class positions of many students.
Not to mention his claim that Marx somehow ignores or subsumes culture in this severe way…
A few other problems with Habermas:
-The idea that we have to work from the assumption that language has an inherent drive toward consensus/understanding (and that somehow this is not teleological in a hard sense because its merely “goal-oriented”). The abstract theory of language that serves as the foundation of his entire method is simply terrible. His system falls apart without its fallacious starting point being assumed.
-Economy and State are considered in isolation from culture, those making the problem remarkably similar to a bad reading of Marx in that his problem is these “systems” (economy, state) invading the “lifeworld” (culture, language). How economy is not a cultural and linguistic practice is totally beyond my comprehension. It seems like there is just some mystical assumption about how economy just flows on its own, and any mention of the ruling classes and their historical and current role in shaping that interaction are ignored (what about imperialism!?)
-The appeal to general political “legitimacy”, which eliminates all forms of political struggle save communicative action. The assumption that we can rationally talk out our problems and thus solve any dispute, and that this is the only legitimate way to do so, leaves a great deal to be desired.
-In his theory of communicative action, regulative validity claims are subject to acceptance (in the Yes or No dichotomy of responses to validity claims) based on their normativeness, which seems problematic if this is the type of speech act which we use to request or regulate others.
-An inability to fold art/poetry into his proceduralist account of communicative action towards satisfying reason leads him to put it wholly outside the world. The autonomous realm of art is just a mythology, whether from those who wish to validate it, or from those who say it is not reasonable enough.
-Linguistic Kantianism based on “regulatory ideals” is a one way ticket back to Hegel’s critique of universal morality. How can Habermas claim to have an intersubjective account with this monstrous presupposition looming all of our discourse? (I understand the attempted tripartite of objective, inter-subjective, and subjective, I just think it fails to come through.)
-The problem of “social order” and its explanation has never been a satisfying frame for my understanding of social systems (stemming from Parson’s social integration theory). Marx describes our economic condition as anarchic, and I tend to agree. Phrasing the problem in such a way as to assume that there is a relative degree of social equilibrium really misses the power relationships at the bottom of even the most basic agreements (though I generally sympathize with Habermas in that he is responding to post-structuralist power analysis). I think Parson’s critique of Hobbes is missing the main thrust of the Hobbsian argument, which is that fear of violent death accounts for “social order”— this is lurking closer to the surface than we often realize. This is the difference between a “crises” model that recognizes the internal contradictions of the capitalist system, and a “consensus” model; one wonders if Parson’s had a window in his ivory tower. Habermas at least tries to explain why our society is in perpetual crisis (“systems” invading “life-world”), but that our “natural culture and language” is bent towards rejection of systems seems more than arbitrary, it is down right anti-dialectic.
-ANTHROPOCENTRISM, only humans have language, the environment and the animals are just going to have to deal with our decision.
-ETHNOCENTRISM, being situated in and being the self-proclaimed heir to western philosophical/linguistic thought, the backwards cultures that have yet to evolve to western standards of rationality are just waiting to be subsumed, and receive this prescriptive division from immediate mythological binding ( ala Durkheim).
July 14, 2022
Habermas’ approach for understanding communication is a danger to a functioning society and ignores the reality of the world we live in.
Habermas believes as a given, the sincerity of the speaker, the presumption of authenticity of one’s own subjective experiences and a coherent mythos of their own world view. By doing that, it will bound to lead to a fantasy where both sides have legitimate life-worlds to advocate. They do not. One side has their truths come from the comment sections of the Wall Street Journal (Breitbart News, Fox News, ….) assuaging their feelings of hate while the other side tackles real life problems beyond just the anecdotal and rely on science to inform and direct and base their actions on.
Habermas wants to use Enlightenment concepts to save the Enlightenment from its own process and try to safe Reason from its dichotomy inherent between the subjective and objective nature within Reason. At least that’s what he tries to do. Husserl in Crisis of European Sciences tried to do a similar thing but he did it phenomenologically and would appeal more directly to Descartes’ cogito, and by the way, Husserl’s book is a better book.
Habermas has an assumption that truth comports to reality while believing that truth is out there and even obtainable. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment (a book frequently cited by the author) they thought the same thing, but those authors believed the myths the Nazi’s had had been just the wrong myths, just as I believe the myths that the MAGA hat morons have today are the wrong myths. Habermas thinks truth through comportment to reality is near at hand, and that social interactions presume reasonableness except maybe for savages (remember this book was written in 1981).
Each are featured in this book: Popper, Wittgenstein, Adorno, Horkheimer, Macintyre, as well as deep dives into Weber and Marx. What Habermas is doing is arguing for a pragmatic approach to the world with a bit of Hegelian dialectics to reconcile the dichotomies around Reason.
Habermas does at times distinctly analyze the problem of societal communications as for within the individual and its creation of consciousness, the communication between individuals, and then at the social level between social groups. My reading of Hegel saw Hegel do the same thing, and for Hegel the spirit becomes aware of itself within each stage of development.
Habermas is trying to reconstitute the objective and subjective divisions of Reason that’s been torn apart by the rationalization described by Weber as applied mostly to institutions and the reification warned at by Marx instrumentally between social classes.
Postmodernism is the belief that there is no narrative about the overriding narrative (see Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition for amplification). By no means is Habermas a postmodern, but what he does do is allow the ultimate postmodernist such as the MAGA hat morons and their leader to twist reality such that anything they say is the truth and is worthy of being considered. BOTH SIDES DON’T ALWAYS HAVE GOOD POINTS. (Climate deniers, vaccine deniers, election deniers, and evolution deniers are not worthy of consideration). That reminds me, Habermas had lots of hints of evo-devo nonsense floating around before it became fashionable, and also some psychoanalysis mumbo-jumbo.
The danger I see from this book is when your only standard for truth is comportment to reality through pragmatism that precludes allowing coherence to be a standard, and as Hume would say (and he too is quoted frequently in this book), Reason is that which coheres. By reassessing the Enlightenment Project one risk giving credence to fascist whose truths come from their feelings alone, and the comment sections of the Wall Street Journal become valid.
Habermas believes as a given, the sincerity of the speaker, the presumption of authenticity of one’s own subjective experiences and a coherent mythos of their own world view. By doing that, it will bound to lead to a fantasy where both sides have legitimate life-worlds to advocate. They do not. One side has their truths come from the comment sections of the Wall Street Journal (Breitbart News, Fox News, ….) assuaging their feelings of hate while the other side tackles real life problems beyond just the anecdotal and rely on science to inform and direct and base their actions on.
Habermas wants to use Enlightenment concepts to save the Enlightenment from its own process and try to safe Reason from its dichotomy inherent between the subjective and objective nature within Reason. At least that’s what he tries to do. Husserl in Crisis of European Sciences tried to do a similar thing but he did it phenomenologically and would appeal more directly to Descartes’ cogito, and by the way, Husserl’s book is a better book.
Habermas has an assumption that truth comports to reality while believing that truth is out there and even obtainable. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment (a book frequently cited by the author) they thought the same thing, but those authors believed the myths the Nazi’s had had been just the wrong myths, just as I believe the myths that the MAGA hat morons have today are the wrong myths. Habermas thinks truth through comportment to reality is near at hand, and that social interactions presume reasonableness except maybe for savages (remember this book was written in 1981).
Each are featured in this book: Popper, Wittgenstein, Adorno, Horkheimer, Macintyre, as well as deep dives into Weber and Marx. What Habermas is doing is arguing for a pragmatic approach to the world with a bit of Hegelian dialectics to reconcile the dichotomies around Reason.
Habermas does at times distinctly analyze the problem of societal communications as for within the individual and its creation of consciousness, the communication between individuals, and then at the social level between social groups. My reading of Hegel saw Hegel do the same thing, and for Hegel the spirit becomes aware of itself within each stage of development.
Habermas is trying to reconstitute the objective and subjective divisions of Reason that’s been torn apart by the rationalization described by Weber as applied mostly to institutions and the reification warned at by Marx instrumentally between social classes.
Postmodernism is the belief that there is no narrative about the overriding narrative (see Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition for amplification). By no means is Habermas a postmodern, but what he does do is allow the ultimate postmodernist such as the MAGA hat morons and their leader to twist reality such that anything they say is the truth and is worthy of being considered. BOTH SIDES DON’T ALWAYS HAVE GOOD POINTS. (Climate deniers, vaccine deniers, election deniers, and evolution deniers are not worthy of consideration). That reminds me, Habermas had lots of hints of evo-devo nonsense floating around before it became fashionable, and also some psychoanalysis mumbo-jumbo.
The danger I see from this book is when your only standard for truth is comportment to reality through pragmatism that precludes allowing coherence to be a standard, and as Hume would say (and he too is quoted frequently in this book), Reason is that which coheres. By reassessing the Enlightenment Project one risk giving credence to fascist whose truths come from their feelings alone, and the comment sections of the Wall Street Journal become valid.
May 29, 2008
An interesting read, incredibly illuminating for those trying to understand the theoretical underpinnings of Habermas' overall project. However, much like other modern magnum opuses (i.e. Rawls’ Theory of Justice) the work could have been considerably more succinct. The expansive re-hashs and expositions on modern sociology that makes up the majority of the work, while interesting, was far less interesting then the far too brief analysis of the critique of rationalization as part of an emancipatory social theory, as well as Habermas’ reformation of the task of critical theory.
December 9, 2008
Including vol. 2 as well, Habermas re-conceives the rational society as based not on some abstract ideal, but in the rationality of everyday discourse.
November 14, 2015
These ideas need to be considered more - if we want real democracy to flourish we need to implement some of them. We do not talk about important things anymore... We ought to.
November 30, 2024
يقول هابرماس: "إذا انطلقنا من أن حفظ النوع البشري يقوم على نشاطات أعضائه، من جهة ما يتم التنسيق بينها على صعيد المجتمع، وأن هذا التنسيق بينها ينبغي أن يتم إرساؤه عبر التواصل، وفي المجالات المركزية عبر تواصل هادف إلى توافق ما، فإن إعادة إنتاج النوع توجب أيضًا على وجه التدقيق استيفاء الشروط التي من شأن عقلانية ثاوية في الفعل التواصلي هذه الشروط أصبحت ملموسة في نطاق الحداثة - مع نزع المركزية عن فهم العالم وتمايز ادعاءات الصلاحية الكونية المختلفة. يكتسب مفهوم المحافظة على النفس توجها ذا منحى كوني وفردانيا في الوقت ذاته. إن مسارًا من المحافظة على النفس، ينبغي أن يلبي شروط العقلانية الخاصة بالفعل التواصلي، إنما يصبح متوقفًا على الأعمال التأويلية للذوات التي تنسق بين أفعالها عبر ادعاءات صلاحية قابلة للنقد. ولهذا السبب، فإن ما هو مميز بالنسبة إلى موقف الوعي الحديث ليس وحدة المحافظة على النفس والوعي بالنفس بمقدار ما هو على الأرجح تلك العلاقة التي عبرت عنها فلسفة الاجتماع وفلسفة التاريخ البرجوازية: ألا وهي أن رابطة الحياة المجتمعية إنما تعيد إنتاج نفسها عبر الأفعال العقلانية بمقتضى غاية، تحت رقابة الوسائط، التي يقوم بها أعضاؤها، كما عبر الإرادة المشتركة التي تحدوهم، المترسخة في الممارسة التواصلية لكل الأفراد ... صار واضحًا من تلقي نظرية فيبر عن العقلنة من لوكاتش إلى أدورنو، أن العقلنة الاجتماعية هي مفكر فيها على الدوام باعتبارها ضربا من تشيو الوعي. بيد أن المفارقات التي يقود إليها هذا الأمر إنما تبين أن هذا المبحث لا يمكن أن يُعالج معالجة كافية بالوسائل المفهومية لفلسفة الوعي … إن المنظور الطوباوي للمصالحة والحرية هو متأصل في الشروط اللازمة من أجل تنشئة اجتماعية تواصلية للأفراد، إنه متضمن في صلب الآلية اللغوية لإعادة إنتاج النوع".
لكن تايلور سريعا ما ينبه إلى أن نظرية هبر ماس لا تخلو أيضًا من ضعف . ويتمثل هذا الضعف ضمن نواة إشكاله في أن مفهوم التفاهم العقلاني تمّ تطويره على أساس مجرّد إتيقا صورية للعقلانية. إن عقلانيته مهدّدة بأن تبقى مجرّد عقلانية إجرائية. ويبدو أن هبرماس يعتقد أنه وحدها إتيقا صورية يمكن أن تتخلص من كل أشكال الحياة الجزئية أو الفردية. وحتى لو سلمنا أن التفاهم العقلاني هو أنسب الطرق لحل النزاعات على الأرضية المشتركة لـ النحن، فإن الذات ليست مجبرة على اتباع هذه الطريقة، فيمكن أن تكون لها، بحسب تايلور، اهتمامات أخرى؛ إذ سوف يبقى التفاهم العقلاني مجرد غاية من بين غايات أخرى كثيرة، ولن يمكنه أن يدعي أي أولوية.
ما فعله هابراماس هو نقل السؤال من المستوى الإبستيمولوجي اللغوي إلى المستوى اللغوي الجماعي، لكن يظل السؤال كما هو بدون إجابة. فقد حاجج هابرماس بأن وحدة العقل تكمن في تنوع أصواته، لكن السؤال الحقيقي هو كيف يمكن الوصول للحالة التواصلية العقلانية من الأساس بشكل يجعل جميع الأصوات المتعارضة تحافظ على وجوده؟ أو بتعبير راولز "كيف يمكن للمتدينين، وغير المتدينين، أن يؤيدوا نظامًا علمانيًا حتى عندما لا تزدهر عقائدهم الشاملة في ظله؟".
ومن ثم أخذ يبحث هابرماس عن هوية جامعة يمكن أن يؤسس عليها مشروعه. ولكن بالطبع لأن الهوية الجامعة التي يمكن أن تؤسس عليها العقلانية الموضوعية لابد وأن تكون عقلانية بين-ذاتية لدرجة تكاد تكون غير عقلانية، فلم ينتبه هابرماس إلى أن مسعاه هذا أعاده لبعض منطلقات شميت وهايدجر مرة أخرى "سردية تاريخية مشتركة، ومشاعر وطنية قوية، وقيم البطولة والتضحية، تراث الثورة الفرنسية، التراث المسيحي ... الخ" مع اختلاف النتائج التي يسعى كلٌ منهم إليها. المعضلة بسيطة، لا توجد عقلانية موضوعية خالصة لدى البشر، وإنما عقلانيات تجمع بين الذاتي والموضوعي بنسب مختلفة، والتي يلزم أن يتم استيعابها داخل إطار وعلى أرضية العقلانية التواصلية الجامعة. لكن الأخيرة يلزم أن تستند إلى عقلانية بين-ذاتية تكاد تكون لاعقلانية تتمثل في قرار وجودي يؤسس لكل البنيان السابق.
لكن تايلور سريعا ما ينبه إلى أن نظرية هبر ماس لا تخلو أيضًا من ضعف . ويتمثل هذا الضعف ضمن نواة إشكاله في أن مفهوم التفاهم العقلاني تمّ تطويره على أساس مجرّد إتيقا صورية للعقلانية. إن عقلانيته مهدّدة بأن تبقى مجرّد عقلانية إجرائية. ويبدو أن هبرماس يعتقد أنه وحدها إتيقا صورية يمكن أن تتخلص من كل أشكال الحياة الجزئية أو الفردية. وحتى لو سلمنا أن التفاهم العقلاني هو أنسب الطرق لحل النزاعات على الأرضية المشتركة لـ النحن، فإن الذات ليست مجبرة على اتباع هذه الطريقة، فيمكن أن تكون لها، بحسب تايلور، اهتمامات أخرى؛ إذ سوف يبقى التفاهم العقلاني مجرد غاية من بين غايات أخرى كثيرة، ولن يمكنه أن يدعي أي أولوية.
ما فعله هابراماس هو نقل السؤال من المستوى الإبستيمولوجي اللغوي إلى المستوى اللغوي الجماعي، لكن يظل السؤال كما هو بدون إجابة. فقد حاجج هابرماس بأن وحدة العقل تكمن في تنوع أصواته، لكن السؤال الحقيقي هو كيف يمكن الوصول للحالة التواصلية العقلانية من الأساس بشكل يجعل جميع الأصوات المتعارضة تحافظ على وجوده؟ أو بتعبير راولز "كيف يمكن للمتدينين، وغير المتدينين، أن يؤيدوا نظامًا علمانيًا حتى عندما لا تزدهر عقائدهم الشاملة في ظله؟".
ومن ثم أخذ يبحث هابرماس عن هوية جامعة يمكن أن يؤسس عليها مشروعه. ولكن بالطبع لأن الهوية الجامعة التي يمكن أن تؤسس عليها العقلانية الموضوعية لابد وأن تكون عقلانية بين-ذاتية لدرجة تكاد تكون غير عقلانية، فلم ينتبه هابرماس إلى أن مسعاه هذا أعاده لبعض منطلقات شميت وهايدجر مرة أخرى "سردية تاريخية مشتركة، ومشاعر وطنية قوية، وقيم البطولة والتضحية، تراث الثورة الفرنسية، التراث المسيحي ... الخ" مع اختلاف النتائج التي يسعى كلٌ منهم إليها. المعضلة بسيطة، لا توجد عقلانية موضوعية خالصة لدى البشر، وإنما عقلانيات تجمع بين الذاتي والموضوعي بنسب مختلفة، والتي يلزم أن يتم استيعابها داخل إطار وعلى أرضية العقلانية التواصلية الجامعة. لكن الأخيرة يلزم أن تستند إلى عقلانية بين-ذاتية تكاد تكون لاعقلانية تتمثل في قرار وجودي يؤسس لكل البنيان السابق.
January 21, 2008
The problem that most adults face in Modern society is that they have almost no ideas with which to formulate an understanding of how they can transform again. Most assume that they will learn more things that are learnable just as other things were in the past. Habermas (1984, p. 68), however, described the difference well:
"With the transition to a new stage the interpretations of the superseded stage are, no matter what their content, categorically devalued. It is not this or that reason, but the kind of reason, which is no longer convincing."
People incapable of imagining transformation no longer can conceive of new kinds of reasons…they can only conceive of “more” reasons that are simply more of the same kind. Looking at stage theories with advances well beyond that of the most advanced adults gives us a sense of humility to at least know that we do not know.
"With the transition to a new stage the interpretations of the superseded stage are, no matter what their content, categorically devalued. It is not this or that reason, but the kind of reason, which is no longer convincing."
People incapable of imagining transformation no longer can conceive of new kinds of reasons…they can only conceive of “more” reasons that are simply more of the same kind. Looking at stage theories with advances well beyond that of the most advanced adults gives us a sense of humility to at least know that we do not know.
September 16, 2011
Habermas intimidated me quite a deal, I admit, but the thing about analytical philosophers is that while their texts are lengthy and detailed in their proofs, they make for good skimming. In fact, Jeff Walker giving me permission not to worry about focusing on every page was a big part of the best day of my life. The ideas here are remarkably interesting and tie in dreadfully with Burke, I think.
September 19, 2007
Mr. Habermas, couldn't you write it in a simpler way? Your book is hard to read :))
March 28, 2008
How we communicate determines the structure of our lives.
February 24, 2015
This book forced me to go back and read German and Western philosophy, when I came back to read it again I realized what a breakthrough in Western thought it was!
May 31, 2023
Rewriting of older theories, nothing that we didn't already know
March 6, 2019
I'm a big fan of the ideas in this book and the clarity with which they are expressed. It might not be the most engaging way of writing, but it really worked for me and I got a lot out of it. I rather liked his diagrams and tables too.
March 14, 2009
seminal stuff
March 1, 2014
challenging but brilliant.
October 10, 2024
THE FIRST VOLUME OF ONE OF HABERMAS'S MOST IMPORTANT WORKS
Jürgen Habermas (born 1929) is a German philosopher and sociologist who is one of the leading figures of the Frankfurt School. The companion volume to this book is 'The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason,' but Habermas wrote many other books, such as' The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,' 'Truth and Justification,' 'The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,' 'Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1981 book, "More than a decade ago... I held out the prospect of a theory of communicative action... The theory of communicative action is not a metatheory but the beginning of a social theory concerned to validate its own critical standards. I do not conceive of my analysis of the general structures of action oriented to reaching understanding as a continuation of the theory of knowledge with other means... the theory of communicative action is intended to make possible the conceptualization of the social-life concept that it tailored to the paradoxes of modernity." (Pg. xli-xlii) He adds, "I have written this book for those who have a professional interest in the foundations of social theory." (Pg. xliv)
He outlines, "I shall first inquire into the conditions that the structures of action-orienting worldviews must satisfy if a rational conduct of life is to be possible for those who share such a worldview. This way of proceeding... forces us to turn from conceptual to empirical analysis and to seek out the rationality structures embodies in worldviews; and... it keeps us from supposing without further ado that the rationality structures specific to the modern understanding of the world are generally valid and forces us instead to consider them in an historical perspective." (Pg. 44)
He suggests, "A complementary error of modernity is the UTOPIANISM which thinks it possible to derive the `ideal of a completely rational form of life' directly from the concepts of a decentered world understanding and of procedural rationality." (Pg. 73)
He clarifies, "the communicative model of action does not equate action with communication. Language is a medium of communication that serves understanding, whereas actors, in coming to an understanding with one another so as to coordinate their actions, pursue their particular aims. In this respect the teleological structure is fundamental to ALL concepts of action." (Pg. 101)
He observes, "modern structures of consciousness emerged from the universal-historical process of worldview rationalization, that is, from the disenchantment of religious-metaphysical worldviews. These structures were present in a certain way at the level of cultural tradition; but in the feudal society of the European High Middle Ages they penetrated only a relatively small carrier stratum of religious virtuosos, partly within the Church, above all in monastic orders, and later also in the universities. The structures of consciousness locked up in the cloisters needed to be implemented in broader strata before the new ideas could bind, reorient, permeate social interests, and rationalize the profane orders of life." (Pg. 220)
He summarizes, "It is only at this stage of development that modern structures of consciousness can be embodied in a legal system... which is distinguished primarily by three formal properties; positivity, legalism, and formality. POSITIVITY: Modern law ... expresses the will of a sovereign lawgiver who regulates social states of affairs conventionally with juridical means of organization. LEGALISM: ... modern law does not attribute to legal subjects any moral motives... It is ... behavior deviating from norms (presupposing accountability and guilt). FORMALITY: Modern law defines domains in which private individuals may legitimately exercise free choice... In this domain, anything that is not legally forbidden is allowed." (Pg. 259)
He states, "For a theory of communicative action only those analytic theories of meaning are instructive that start from the structure of linguistic expressions rather than from speakers' intentions. And the theory will have to keep in view the problem of how the actions of several actors are linked to one another by means of the mechanism of reaching understanding..." (Pg. 274)
Later, he adds, "I shall speak of COMMUNICATIVE action whenever the actions of the agents involved are coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of reaching understanding. In communicative action participants are not primarily oriented to their own individual successes; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect the negotiation of definitions of the situation is an essential element of the interpretive accomplishments required for communicative action." (Pg. 285-286)
This 2-book series is important reading for anyone studying Habermas or the Frankfurt School.
Jürgen Habermas (born 1929) is a German philosopher and sociologist who is one of the leading figures of the Frankfurt School. The companion volume to this book is 'The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason,' but Habermas wrote many other books, such as' The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,' 'Truth and Justification,' 'The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,' 'Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1981 book, "More than a decade ago... I held out the prospect of a theory of communicative action... The theory of communicative action is not a metatheory but the beginning of a social theory concerned to validate its own critical standards. I do not conceive of my analysis of the general structures of action oriented to reaching understanding as a continuation of the theory of knowledge with other means... the theory of communicative action is intended to make possible the conceptualization of the social-life concept that it tailored to the paradoxes of modernity." (Pg. xli-xlii) He adds, "I have written this book for those who have a professional interest in the foundations of social theory." (Pg. xliv)
He outlines, "I shall first inquire into the conditions that the structures of action-orienting worldviews must satisfy if a rational conduct of life is to be possible for those who share such a worldview. This way of proceeding... forces us to turn from conceptual to empirical analysis and to seek out the rationality structures embodies in worldviews; and... it keeps us from supposing without further ado that the rationality structures specific to the modern understanding of the world are generally valid and forces us instead to consider them in an historical perspective." (Pg. 44)
He suggests, "A complementary error of modernity is the UTOPIANISM which thinks it possible to derive the `ideal of a completely rational form of life' directly from the concepts of a decentered world understanding and of procedural rationality." (Pg. 73)
He clarifies, "the communicative model of action does not equate action with communication. Language is a medium of communication that serves understanding, whereas actors, in coming to an understanding with one another so as to coordinate their actions, pursue their particular aims. In this respect the teleological structure is fundamental to ALL concepts of action." (Pg. 101)
He observes, "modern structures of consciousness emerged from the universal-historical process of worldview rationalization, that is, from the disenchantment of religious-metaphysical worldviews. These structures were present in a certain way at the level of cultural tradition; but in the feudal society of the European High Middle Ages they penetrated only a relatively small carrier stratum of religious virtuosos, partly within the Church, above all in monastic orders, and later also in the universities. The structures of consciousness locked up in the cloisters needed to be implemented in broader strata before the new ideas could bind, reorient, permeate social interests, and rationalize the profane orders of life." (Pg. 220)
He summarizes, "It is only at this stage of development that modern structures of consciousness can be embodied in a legal system... which is distinguished primarily by three formal properties; positivity, legalism, and formality. POSITIVITY: Modern law ... expresses the will of a sovereign lawgiver who regulates social states of affairs conventionally with juridical means of organization. LEGALISM: ... modern law does not attribute to legal subjects any moral motives... It is ... behavior deviating from norms (presupposing accountability and guilt). FORMALITY: Modern law defines domains in which private individuals may legitimately exercise free choice... In this domain, anything that is not legally forbidden is allowed." (Pg. 259)
He states, "For a theory of communicative action only those analytic theories of meaning are instructive that start from the structure of linguistic expressions rather than from speakers' intentions. And the theory will have to keep in view the problem of how the actions of several actors are linked to one another by means of the mechanism of reaching understanding..." (Pg. 274)
Later, he adds, "I shall speak of COMMUNICATIVE action whenever the actions of the agents involved are coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of reaching understanding. In communicative action participants are not primarily oriented to their own individual successes; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect the negotiation of definitions of the situation is an essential element of the interpretive accomplishments required for communicative action." (Pg. 285-286)
This 2-book series is important reading for anyone studying Habermas or the Frankfurt School.
May 3, 2021
One of the best book I've ever read. Not only because his views and his theory is part of my research topic but the ides he particularly describe almost change my perception of reality and espesially international relations which I currently studying. Highly recommend.
December 16, 2023
Weird book. Not sure how this are why this is still considered something to be seriously engaged with. There are for sure some really great stuff scattered about, but ultimately not what I am looking for.
May 16, 2019
Such awful writing style but I still want him to come to my graduation party
March 25, 2022
"See the Marxists and other critical theorists are wrong cuz they think production relations are basic, but, in fact, linguistic relations are basic" is probably the only agreeable proposition I found here. JL Austin has been found rolling in his grave for decades.
to-keep-reference
October 18, 2016Si la comunicación es uno de los sectores hegemónicos de la producción y actúa sobre todo el campo biopolítico, entonces debemos considerar a la comunicación coexistente con el contexto biopolítico. Esto nos lleva mucho más allá del viejo terreno, como fue descrito por Jürgen Habermas, por ejemplo. De hecho, cuando Habermas desarrolló el concepto de acción comunicativa, demostrando tan fuertemente su forma productiva y las consecuencias ontológicas derivadas de ello, él se basó todavía en un punto de vista exterior a estos efectos de la globalización, un punto de vista de la vida y la verdad que podía oponerse a la colonización informacional del ser.
Imperio Pág.32-33
El Toyotismo se basa en una inversión de la estructura Fordista de comunicación entre la producción y el consumo. Idealmente, según este modelo, la planificación de la producción se comunicará constante e inmediatamente con los mercados. Las fábricas mantendrán un stock cero, y las mercancías serán producidas justo a tiempo, de acuerdo a la demanda actual de los mercados existentes. De este modo el modelo no implica simplemente un circuito de retroalimentación más veloz sino una inversión de la relación porque, al menos en teoría, la decisión de producción ocurre después y como reacción a la decisión del mercado. En los casos más extremos la mercancía no es producida hasta que el consumidor ya la haya elegido y comprado. Pero en general es más exacto concebir al modelo como empeñado en una rápida comunicación o continua interactividad entre la producción y el consumo. El contexto industrial provee un primer sentido en el que la comunicación y la información han llegado a cumplir un papel central en la producción. Podríamos afirmar que la acción instrumental y la acción comunicativa se han entrelazado íntimamente en el proceso industrial informacionalizado, pero debemos apresurarnos a agregar que esta es una noción empobrecida de la comunicación en cuanto mera transmisión de los datos del mercado.
Pensamos principalmente en la división conceptual de Jürgen Habermas entre acción comunicativa y acción instrumental, en obras tales como The Theory of Communicative Action.
Imperio Pág.219
Imperio Pág.32-33
El Toyotismo se basa en una inversión de la estructura Fordista de comunicación entre la producción y el consumo. Idealmente, según este modelo, la planificación de la producción se comunicará constante e inmediatamente con los mercados. Las fábricas mantendrán un stock cero, y las mercancías serán producidas justo a tiempo, de acuerdo a la demanda actual de los mercados existentes. De este modo el modelo no implica simplemente un circuito de retroalimentación más veloz sino una inversión de la relación porque, al menos en teoría, la decisión de producción ocurre después y como reacción a la decisión del mercado. En los casos más extremos la mercancía no es producida hasta que el consumidor ya la haya elegido y comprado. Pero en general es más exacto concebir al modelo como empeñado en una rápida comunicación o continua interactividad entre la producción y el consumo. El contexto industrial provee un primer sentido en el que la comunicación y la información han llegado a cumplir un papel central en la producción. Podríamos afirmar que la acción instrumental y la acción comunicativa se han entrelazado íntimamente en el proceso industrial informacionalizado, pero debemos apresurarnos a agregar que esta es una noción empobrecida de la comunicación en cuanto mera transmisión de los datos del mercado.
Pensamos principalmente en la división conceptual de Jürgen Habermas entre acción comunicativa y acción instrumental, en obras tales como The Theory of Communicative Action.
Imperio Pág.219
January 22, 2023
I read this important book closely as the main theoretical work for my PhD. My summary is here: https://stefan-szczelkun.blogspot.com...
On that page you will find links to two critiques I made. One, a power critique using my knowledge of Foucault and the other an aesthetic judgement critique.
The other thing to say here is that volume 2 is more radical and interesting than Volume 1 and few people seem to get through to it! Habermas has a pedantic point by point style that can exhaust the reader that needs a bit more pezazz.
On that page you will find links to two critiques I made. One, a power critique using my knowledge of Foucault and the other an aesthetic judgement critique.
The other thing to say here is that volume 2 is more radical and interesting than Volume 1 and few people seem to get through to it! Habermas has a pedantic point by point style that can exhaust the reader that needs a bit more pezazz.
March 29, 2025
This is by far the hardest book I’ve ever finished. Habermas is supremely knowledgeable and is not the most clear of writers, but this book and the second volume are a tour de force. I particularly liked how Habermas relies on an action-based framework to base his whole philosophic construct on. Leveraging Rawls and other analytical philosophers to update his Marxian-influenced theories was refreshing (not to mention the addition of Luhmann’s system theory).
Overall, I certainly felt very convinced at the end but would struggle to articulate clearly what Habermas theory is
Overall, I certainly felt very convinced at the end but would struggle to articulate clearly what Habermas theory is
April 7, 2011
Equalitative Deliberalism?
October 30, 2015
Difícil compreender. Precisa releitura.
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