Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places

by Paul Collier

Wars, Guns, and Votes, Paul Collier investigates the violence and poverty in the small, remote countries at the lowest level of the world economy. An esteemed economist and a foremost authority on developing countries, Collier argues that the spread of elections and peace settlements in the world's most dangerous countries may lead to a brave new democratic world. In the meantime, though, nasty and long civil wars, military coups, and failing economies are the order of the day—for now and into the foreseeable future.

Through innovative research and astute analysis, Collier gives an eye-opening assessment of the ethnic divisions and insecurites in the developing countries of Africa, Latin America, and Asia, where corruption is often firmly rooted in the body politic. There have been many policy failures by the United States and other developed countries since the end of the Cold War, especially the reliance on preemptive military intervention. But Collier insists that these problems can and will be rectified. He persuasively outlines what must be done to bring peace and stability: the international community must intervene through aid, democracy building, and a very limited amount of force.

Groundbreaking and provocative, Wars, Guns, and Votes is a passionate and convincing argument for the peaceful development of the most volatile places on earth.

Genres: Politics, Nonfiction, Economics, Africa, International Development, War, International Relations

272 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2009

About the author

Paul Collier, CBE is a Professor of Economics, Director for the Centre for the Study of African Economies at the University of Oxford and Fellow of St Antony's College. He is the author of The Plundered Planet; Wars, Guns, and Votes; and The Bottom Billion, winner of Estoril Distinguished Book Prize, the Arthur Ross Book Award, and the Lionel Gelber Prize.

Reviews

[Theres · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent until the recommendation section where Collier seems to ignore how he's set out politician's motivations and makes suggestions that don't quite add up in my opinion

[Praj · Rating 3 out of 5]

Paul Collier asserts the 21st century being the era of civil wars. If the claim is practically solidified, the peaceful restoration of a world community will be a far-fetched dream. Civil wars are detrimental to political and state progression, let alone humanity. A volatile umbrella sheltering ethnic discrepancies, power-related violence, abusive exploitation of developmental funds, brutality, genocide and the biggest scare of all thriving of terrorists pockets. Collier, an expert in developmental predicaments of impoverished economies focuses on the African panorama of political violence and power struggle under the façade of democracy submitting numerous ingenious resolutions of policy changes, military budgets cuts to minimize the conflict risk, holding fair and free elections, reforming economic policies and providing governmental aid supervised by designated financial peacemaker.

I have always maintained the fact of democracy being a farce in a place where power and money rules above the nominal populace enhancement. How can one exercise free will when egalitarianism is either strictly communal or a moneyed privilege? Why is nation-building essential yet highly impossible in various third-world countries?

Democracy the magical word for a sovereign nation; amusing how it differs in the bottom billion (countries accounting for more than a billion of the world’s poorest populace).So, how can one dissect democracy or rather what does it stand for in the bottom billion.
D - Dais for several deluded notions of freedom and justice
propagandas.
E - Electoral sham, exhibiting every aspect of dreadful hostility ranging from bribery, intimidation, manipulating ballots and deceitful garnering of votes.
M - Mishandling of international and developmental funds fulfilling egotistical power-hungry motives and illegal arms dealings.
O - Omitting the prospect of Human Rights and at times overlooking educational and health upgrading. In some rural pockets illiteracy is preferred as no questions will be raised against criminal political and insurgent activities.
C - Chucking the concept of national identity whilst enhancing the prospects of varied ethnic liberalizations demarcating class, religious segregations and social order in state communities.
R – Rebellious onset of civil wars surfacing volatile situations between the governing assemblies and private rebel armies.
A -Accountability and security of public good for state development are offered minimalist efforts.
C -Corruption thriving within the walls of nationalized infrastructure, disposing patronage and ultimately becoming a benign part of a dysfunctional organization.
Y -Yielding a landscape fertile for proliferating embryonic terror cults and collective bedlam.

Assemble an autonomous nation-state on this pandemonium! And, to think elections and liberty of exercising the right to vote sums up the foundation to constructing a sovereign third world nation-state. Is it a fundamental naivety or a deficient study of a greatly diverse unrevealed world? A nation can be busted within a span of days or even hours but to construct a secure democratic sanctuary it takes decades of combating revolutionary upheavals and understanding the extant intricacies.

Michael Clemems rightly estimates the epochal tasks of development in the billion-bottom countries stating,"Helping the bottom billion will be a very slow job for generations, not the product of media- or summit-friendly plans to end poverty in ten or 20 years. It will require long-term, opportunistic, and humble engagement, much of it through public action -- built on a willingness to let ineffective interventions die and on a sophisticated appreciation of the stupendous complexity of functioning economies. The grievous truth is that although a range of public actions can and should help many people, most of the bottom billion will not -- and cannot -- be freed from poverty in our lifetimes."(Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct.2007)

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/article...?

I agree.

[Kariuki Njiru · Rating 3 out of 5]

As someone from a bottom billion country, I wanted to hate this book. I also wanted to learn from this book. I did learn something, but I doubt I loved the book.

The research is well-founded but the ideas and suggestions do not take into account the grim reality of these countries. The idea that coups are better than civil wars is easy to appreciate. The idea that coups are better than an autocratic leader is downright dangerous.

The suggestion that democracy does not help improve the countries economic status could be very true. To infer that this means that democracy is not that important to a country is to fail to appreciate the benefits of a weak democracy compared to the other options out there.

The truth is that most African countries have a long way to go. Even worse some seem to be heading in the wrong direction. With time, some of these issues will resolve themselves. The past decade saw fewer successful coups(3) than the one before that (6) compared with (7) in the '90s for Africa. In the long run, Africa will get better, not worse. Some of the ideas in this book would help, some would definitely make the continent worse off.

[Doron · Rating 3 out of 5]

Response to both Amy Chua in ‘World On Fire’ and Paul Collier in ‘War, Guns and Votes’ - my views on their criticism of how the developed world has tried to build democracies in failed and fragile states, how their opinions agree, how they differ.

Amy Chua and Paul Collier share some penetrating insights into the problems associated with the spread of democracy since the early 1990s in their respective works, ‘World on Fire’ and ‘War, Guns and Votes’. At the forefront of their analyses is the contention that launching a process of democratization unhinged from the constitutional checks and balances in place in the developed world is a recipe for political violence and instability. This flawed approach characterizes the way the developed world has gone about building democracies in failed and fragile states during the last half century, and consequently (illiberal) democratization has counter intuitively planted seeds of more violence and chaos in these states, not less. Ethnic identity constitutes the major determinant of group allegiance in developing societies rather than shared national identity, further exacerbating the potential for political violence in such societies, and is recognized by both authors as a significant destabilizing factor in the face of rapid democratization.

Where these writers tend to differ is not so much in the nature of the problem – excessively rapid and illiberal democratization executed in an environment of intense Western pressure across the developing world is more likely to increase than decrease political violence, at least in the short-term - but in their views of its underlying and intermediate causes and potential remedies. For Collier, the problem of democratization leading to more violence for the world’s the “bottom billion” derives primarily from a lack of accountability and legitimacy in their state leaders and governments, and the need to cultivate a shared sense of national identity to trump and subsume sub-national ethnic identities. Chua, however, emphasizes the role of markets alongside rapid democratization as a catalyst for political violence and internal conflict by amplifying the economic (and indirectly, in some cases, the political) power of ethnic “market dominant” minorities. For Chua, the basic incongruity between the political empowerment of the previously disenfranchised majority and the market driven concentration of wealth among ethnic minorities through the process of democratization is a dangerous destabilizing force in fragile and failed states.

The keen observation that Western liberal democracies were not created in the blink of an eye but rather evolved gradually over time in incremental fashion is crucial to the criticism leveled by these authors at the way the developed world has tried to democratize the bottom billion. Both Chua and Collier share the view that the pace of recent democratization in developing countries is not simply unrealistic to effect positive change there, but fundamentally flawed and potentially quite dangerous since other critical components of liberal democracies are yet to be established these countries. Collier in particular stresses the historical importance of inter-state warfare and ethnic conflict in shaping state boundaries and forging national identities in Europe over the course of several centuries, and how these shared national identities have contributed to collective efforts to produce public goods, namely security and government accountability. Developing states have not followed the same path of war and conflict to reach independence, and therefore have not fashioned the same sense of shared identity and patriotic citizenship, impeding collective efforts to create public goods. There are therefore structural impediments to achieving strong democracies in developing states highlighted by these authors, such as the lack of government accountability, the weak rule of law, the absence of shared identity and few or no constitutional protections for the human rights of minorities. Given the deep ethnic divisions common to many developing societies, and the long legacy of autocratic rule and frequent coup d’états since independence characterizing to the politics of developing countries, the potential for political violence is considerable in the face of elections without economic, legal or institutional reforms. Chua and Collier share this core sentiment about the dangers of overly rapid democratization in the developing world before these structural obstacles and poor provision of public goods remain unaltered.

Both writers appreciate there is an important economic dimension to this problem of rapid democratization, although they do not describe the economic dimension in similar terms or lend equal weight to it in their analyses. Collier develops a fairly subtle argument in this respect around the evidence he has gathered showing that democracy is likely to reduce political violence provided a certain level of average income in society is met (i.e. the middle-income level), but likely to increase it if average incomes fall short of that level. But for Collier this evidence confirms that the underlying causes of the problem are not so much economic as political: that in countries where governments lack accountability and legitimacy (typically low-income states), democracy increases the prospects of violence. Middle-income countries tend to already be on the path to political and economic reform, with higher levels of government accountability and legitimacy, so democracy serves to further enforce those trends, undermining the basis for group grievances and thus reducing prospects of violence.

In contrast to Collier’s analysis, Chua attributes the relationship between political violence and democratization to economic factors, particularly the role of markets that often accompany the democratization process in the form exported by Western nations to fragile and failed states. Chua argues that extreme economic disparities apparent in developing countries lie at the heart of the potential for political conflict due to the way wealth is concentrated among the political elites and market-dominant minorities, fueling envy, resentment and fear among the poverty stricken majority. In her view globalization has only exacerbated these extremes of wealth in the developing world and heightened the economic dominance of a small minority in these states. Chua places particular emphasis on the ethnic makeup of market-dominant minorities in developing societies as a pivotal factor in creating this volatile mix of a politically empowered but economically deprived majority by way of rapid free-market democratization (in this analysis the United States is also guilty of being a market dominant minority to the rest of the world as the economic engine of global capitalism, spurring anti-Americanism from friends, foes and competitors alike). The consequent potential for violence is seen to be more severe where ethnic market-dominant minorities exist, causing a backlash against either markets, democracy, the market-dominant minorities themselves, or some combination among them. This argument bears some similarity to Collier’s focus on the detrimental and divisive effects of ethnically based loyalties in developing countries preceding national identity, but Chua elevates the importance of the economic power of these minorities and their alienation from wider society to a far greater degree than Collier. Consequently her criticism of the efforts of the developed world to democratize fragile and failed states is decidedly more Marxian (and controversial) in nature than Collier, and seeks to disentangle the positive political potential of democracy as a force of freedom from what she sees as the negative economic downside of globalization and free markets that have spread alongside democracy to developing countries in the past thirty years.

The prescriptions offered by Collier and Chua to address the problem of democratization fueling further political violence and instability vary considerably. In Chua’s case part of the solution rests in finding ways to allow poor majorities in developing states to participate in the wealth effects of markets and to reduce income disparities. Chua focuses on ameliorating the economic and political dominance of minorities by extending education and employment opportunities to the uneducated and dirt poor majorities. She also advocates wealth redistribution through tax reforms, titling programs to spread land ownership across the population, shares in the ownership of state companies and markets for the poor, and government interventions to rebalance wealth across ethnic groups; a form of affirmative action for repressed, indigenous majorities in developing states. Finally, Chua is confident in the power of market-dominant minorities (including the US vis-a-vis the rest of the world) to change their negative image by providing public goods like healthcare, education and charity to society and the potency of symbolic acts by leaders of state to bridge ethnic divides, such as Nelson Mandela’s support for South Africa’s white rugby team in 1995. Recognizing and addressing group grievances for Chua is very much the name of the game: the onus is on prevention by tackling the causes of political violence. This approach therefore inevitably leads to the suggestion that the process of democratization itself must be reexamined and alternative versions of democracy explored beyond free-market democracy. But at no point in ‘World on Fire’ does Chua see reason to abandon democracy promotion in failed and fragile states, and on this she shares common ground with the optimism of Larry Diamond, as does her contention that alternative available models of democracy lend support to calls for the spread of democracy in the world.

Unlike Amy Chua, Paul Collier is of the view that political violence cannot be prevented by addressing group grievances. Instead, Collier advocates harnessing such grievances where possible to bring about positive social and political change. One intriguing proposal he offers along these lines is to harness the power of political coups in developing states rather than seeking to eliminate them since the very threat of a coup can serve to discipline governments and force them to embrace the democratic process. This thoughtful argument approaches some of the logical thinking behind Diamond’s optimism about the future prospects for democracy in the world based on internal factors and the recognition among autocratic leaders since the early 1990s that their political survival cannot be sustained through endless violence, that they are increasingly threatened by regime fractures, and that they therefore have no option but to embrace the democratic process. Collier also shares Diamond’s optimism around external factors and the ability of the international community to foster democratic change in developing states through a variety of mechanisms: foreign aid conditioning to direct the flow of funds towards those most in need based on verification of public spending, introducing international standards of conduct to elections to stamp out sham elections and vote rigging, and the supply of security through international military bodies who abide by a set of clear guidelines for action. Collier’s prescriptions are therefore anchored in the notion that political violence is best addressed through measures that make violence more difficult, rather than in attempting to eradicate the grievances that give rise to political violence.

[Nicholas Whyte · Rating 5 out of 5]

http://nwhyte.livejournal.com/1447888.html

Wars, Guns and Votes is a lucidly written analysis of the effects and causes of democracy and good governance in the poorest countries of the world, whose inhabitants Collier describes in a previous book as "the bottom billion". Collier's findings are disturbing and provocative, but based on good hard research. He states that:
1. democratic poor countries are more at risk of violence than non-democratic poor countries (for rich countries, the opposite is the case)
2. This is because holding elections in poor and repressive states does nothing to improve the chances of good governance and incentivises violent behaviour from both government and opposition (and reinforces habits of bad governance, whoever wins)
3. Ethnically diverse poor countries are more at risk of violence - though the key finding here is that ethnic diversity makes it more difficult to run a state but usually helps the private sector to develop more rapidly
4. Post-conflict settlements are more durable in repressive states than democratic ones (Angola vs Sri Lanka)
5. UN peacekeeping, or any international security guarantee of intervention against potential spoilers, is by far the most cost-effective short-term means of preserving peace agreements
6. Though in the long term, economic development is the only real guarantee of peace
7. Post-conflict aid also helps to restore financial and human capital, though perhaps 11% (a surprisingly precise figure) gets diverted to military expenditure
8. Guns in Africa are very cheap, and international arms embargoes ignored by non-OECD countries
9. Civil wars are more likely in countries which
9.1. have low per capita income
9.2. have a low or negative rate of economic growth
9.3. are dependent on exporting natural resources
9.4. have more ethnic and religious diversity
9.5. have more young men aged between 15 and 29
9.6. are smaller
9.7. have mountains
9.8. are poor and democratic, or rich and repressive
9.9. have already had a civil war
10. A very few coups are good, but all civil wars are bad; and there is no way to tell if a particular coup will be good or bad.
11. coups are
11.1. no less likely in democracies than in repressive states, unless the state is very efficient in its repression
11.2. likely to lead to further coups
11.3. more likely in poor states and states with low or negative economic growth
11.4. less common than they used to be
11.5. less likely if the president adopts a term limit for himself, especially if he then sticks to it
11.6. not especially affected in likelihood by the level of military spending
12. Small states, especially poor small states, will find it particularly difficult to provide adequate internal security (here he sneers at several small states which I know)
I must say that I am not happy with his findings that small states and diverse states are less secure. It seems to me a bit contradictory anyway; a Serbia trying to hand onto Kosovo, or a Sudan trying to hang onto its southern parts, doesn't look all that viable to me. On the other hand, one obvious solution that leaps to mind for me which Collier doesn't mention is that African countries should start negotiating regional security guarantees à la OSCE, in order to drive down military spending and boost disarmament.

Collier does have four provocative policy prescriptions, all of which should be seen in the context of his finding that democracies are fragile in poor countries, so the answer is to stabilise them until they are economically stable (at per capita income of $2700, which again seems remarkably precise):
1. The international community should offer a military guarantee against internal civil rebellion to governments which are prepared to hold elections that meet international standards and stick by the result. If the government rigs the elections, the guarantee is withdrawn, and potential coup leaders will take note.
2. A slightly incomprehensible proposal which seems to amount to more anti-corruption consultants and international aid funding non-state-run schools and hospitals
3. Aid should be negatively correlated with military expenditure
4. Post-conflict states should be prepared to share sovereignty with the international community in appropriate ad-hoc arrangements.
Apart from the second proposal, which I didn't understand, the rest all seems sensible to me; there is more to be said on post-conflict protectorates, of which Bosnia, which I know best, developed in its own very peculiar way and is now finding it difficult to wind down, but has at least played an important role in preventing a further outbreak of war.

Anyway, a fascinating and thought-provoking book.

[Ted Tyler · Rating 4 out of 5]

The first of many books that I had to read for graduate school. Collier mostly looks at the failure to state build inside Mainland Africa. As an economist, he walks you through not only the stats and simulations he ran, but he teaches basic game theory and guides you through the decision-making processes. Summary of his ideas: 1) Freely-held, competitive elections should not be the first priority in state-building. Instead, build the economy first and raise up the incomes levels. 2) Over-the-horizon security guarantees should be provided in exchange for higher government accountability. 3) Coups are generally not ideal, but civil wars should be feared above all else. 4) Ethnic diversity that is not countered by a strong, forged national identity can cause all sorts of conflicts. Too much diversity with no unifying overarching identity as a nation is super dangerous. 5) States take decades to build, but can fall apart in a couple of years. I'll be excited to talk about his assertions and conclusion once classes start.

[Geourska · Rating 4 out of 5]

A really interesting and surprisingly readable book. Paul Collier has a delightful way of expressing ideas so that they are witty and comprehensible at the same time. He makes reference to a lot of the research that he has done, without overloading us with unreadable academic jargon. I suppose this might frustrate a more serious reader, but it made the book accessible for me. I do not know about economics or politics to be able to judge whether his ideas are reasonable or not, but in any case, they provide an interesting perspective on how to solve some of the problems of the bottom billion.

[Mandy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Paul Collier begins his book Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places by noting that the next generation might live see the eradication of war or they might die in one.  Each is a distinct possibility but he states that the face of warfare has changed.  The wars of the future, he asserts, will no longer be about invasions, values and the movement of international borders; wars will be on a much smaller scale and are likely to be civil wars that affect the poorest countries on earth.  It is a chilling prediction and far from believing that the atrocities of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia are firmly in the past, Collier predicts more genocides and ethnic warfare as the governments of what he calls the “bottom billion” remain unaccountable and illegitimate.

In Wars, Guns and Votes, Paul Collier seeks to challenge some of the more popular and enduring beliefs about the politics of the “bottom billion”.  He begins by dissecting the role of democracy and the effects of ethnicity and then follows this with a section dedicated to guns, wars and coups with a case study of Cote d’Ivoire. The final section of the book focuses on Collier’s recommendations for policy changes and his suggestions for steps that the developed world can take to ensure the development of proper governance and accountability in the countries of the bottom billion in the future. 

Part 1: Denying Reality: Democrazy
In the first part of the book “Denying Reality: Democrazy” Collier debunks the notion that the revered democratic election should be the end point in the political process.  Citing research and case history, he asserts that democracy does not enhance prospects of internal peace but rather increases political violence. This is because democracy has not produced accountable and legitimate governments and the way that elections are won means that bad governance and a lack of accountability is inevitable. Quite simply, it is too easy to rig elections, pick on scapegoats and minorities or lie to voters in order to win elections and once elections have been won on that basis, what incentive is there to govern properly?  A government would need to continue these tactics in order to stay in power as long as possible. 

Collier continues with a look at the effects of ethnicity in developing countries and observes that public services tend to be worse in ethnically diverse countries where politicians plundered the economy and transferred the proceeds to their own ethnic groups. Citing the case of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Collier notes how the construction of a national identity can help to overcome such effects of ethnicity.

In the final section of part one, Collier notes that peacekeeping does in fact work and that while it is expensive, it costs a mere fraction of the cost of conflict.  He asserts that there is a level at which the benefits of peacekeeping missions seem to even out (approximately $100 million a year) and that the aim should be to pull out eventually and phase in an over-the-horizon guarantee with the promise of a rapid response.  He cites the British ten-year undertaking to fly troops into Sierra Leone should the need arise as an example. 

Part 2: Facing Reality: Nasty, Brutish and Long
Part two of the book is entitled “Facing Reality: Nasty, Brutish and Long”.  In a discussion on guns, Collier notes that aid is leaking into military spending.  As post-conflict military spending increases, there is a risk of reversion to war and thus aid is a two-edged sword. Collier states that the developed nations have a responsibility to police arms embargoes and make them more effective or that they need to be more responsible with the provision of aid and to link aid allocations to a chosen level of military spending.

In “Wars”, Collier quite succinctly notes that armed struggle is development in reverse. He expands on his claim in the opening paragraphs of the book and notes that we are moving away from invasions towards an increase in rebels, insurgents and civil wars. Collier discusses several issues such as the economy, history, structure, geography and politics of a country and notes that all of these factors might be correlated with warfare but that it might be inaccurate to talk of causality. Collier warns of the dangers of reverse causality and states that it is perhaps not relevant to look at why wars happen in the developed countries but how they are allowed to happen at all.  Recognising that the legacy of a civil war is another civil war, Collier states simply that we need to make civil wars more difficult.

The section entitled “Coups” is difficult in that the author obviously has a point of view that he would like to express but in the end, it is supported neither by case histories nor research data. Collier states that coups might be the only method of removing a troublesome dictator and that perhaps they should be harnessed, not eliminated.  He notes that a coup is a surgical strike and is not nearly as devastating as a civil war.  The problem is that coup leaders often get a taste for power and don’t deliver elections as promised or they may be greedy and power hungry and not necessarily seeking better governance. In fact, Collier notes, from a statistical point of view, coups are at least as likely to occur in democracies as they are in autocracies and therefore, they are less likely to throw out a truly bad government than they are to oust an acceptable, functioning regime. Despite this grim outlook, Collier maintains that the threat of a coup can keep a government in check and that coups do have a role in maintaining good governance.

Collier then presents a case study of Cote D’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) which encountered a severe economic shock which lead to the development of anti-immigrant sentiment and identity polarization in the country. In a very short period of time, the country experienced two military coups, a sham election and a rebel uprising which saw civil war erupt to devastating consequences. Collier asks the question as to whether this catastrophe could have been averted.

Part 3: Changing Reality: Accountability and Security
The final part of the book is entitled “Changing Reality: Accountability and Security”.  Collier insists that the answer lies in nation building and the adoption of global norms of accountability. Once again he refers to the case of President Nyerere of Tanzania and how he built a strong national identity in a previously fractured country.  Collier asserts once again that only once petty ethnic divisions are neutralised within a country, can public goods be supplied on a national scale.  Embarking on elections before national identity and accountability are in place is and will remain to be disastrous.

In “Better Dead Than Fed” Collier lists his three-part manifesto for ensuring accountability and security in the developing world.  He states that sovereignty has been shown to be disastrous in the past (when America refused to join the League of Nations) and he argues that the time has come to join together in assisting the developing world rather than leaving such countries to their own devices.  Collier states that we need to harness the threat of violence in order to ensure democracy. This means that a voluntary international standard for the conduct of elections must be developed whereby the international community will assist countries in ensuring free and fair elections but will leave a country to the threat of a coup if the elections are not fair.  This must be complemented by enforcing probity in public spending.  Collier argues that donor countries have an obligation to their own tax payers to ensure that money is used in the manner in which it was intended. Therefore, Collier calls for “governance conditionality” which would be based on capacity and verification. It might be the least favourable kind of aid but Collier calls for technical assistance whereby donor countries supplied skilled people to verify that the capacity they are providing is actually being used to enforce probity in public spending.

Finally, Collier calls for an international supply of security. Collier insists once again that donor countries have an obligation to link aid to the level of military spending to ensure that they are not subsidising the provision of guns and arms in countries at risk of civil war.  In addition, Collier suggests that sovereignty be shared and that the international community rise to provide security to post-conflict countries. Collier states that “Some governments should provide or finance peacekeepers; some governments should provide aid; and the post-conflict government should reform economic policy, cut its military spending, and, if it chooses to hold elections, let them be free and fair”.  In order to be effective, these provisions need to be in place for about a decade to ensure that there is no reversion to civil war.

It is clear that Collier’s views will not be welcome or popular amongst the people that already think that developed countries are already doing too much in the developing world and that taxpayers’ money would be better used in domestic arenas.  In the classic parlance of the economist, Collier reminds us that ignoring our responsibilities at this stage will lead to greater devastation in the future and indeed, a greater financial outlay.  At times his arguments seem so simple that it is surprising that they have not been implemented previously; how is it possible, for example, that donors supplied aid without ensuring that it was not used to fuel greater war and suffering?  At other times his arguments seem impossibly liberal and idealistic but the point is this: we fought two major world wars to protect freedom, sovereignty and values; why are we not prepared to act in order to ensure this for the countries of the “bottom billion”?  

There does seem to be some movement in the direction that Paul Collier proposes. Collier is a professor of economics at Oxford University and is quite respected in his field. He certainly has an expanding sphere of influence and has talked at the Aspen Institute and the TED Conference. In addition, there are several organisations and initiatives hard at work to introduce notions of governance and accountability to the governments of developing countries through, for example, the Public Expenditure & Financial Accountability (PEFA) programme. 

The ideas that Collier proposes in Wars, Guns and Votes are not simply theories but are based on research conducted by his own academic team and by other researchers. Collier has made a fine effort in attempting to bring complex economic issues to a mass market through books such as this and The Bottom Billion but his references to data collection and analysis might prove too technical for much of this market. There is also the ever present problem of reverse causality and a lack of reliable data to test.  Collier notes that the application of statistical research is a pretty new addition in the field of economics which means that as impressive as some of the hypotheses in this book might be, they may be somewhat limited until a greater body of research can be analysed and compared.  The problem is that this issue is far more urgent than that and requires decisive action.

Nevertheless, Collier has raised some intriguing points in this book and I am sure he will continue to champion the plight of the “bottom billion”.  It will be interesting to see how international relations and policies shift in the future and whether any of his ideas do come to fruition. This book is certainly recommended for anyone seeking an introduction to democracy and post-conflict development in developing countries and such readers would benefit from reading his previous work The Bottom Billion too.

[Lisa Powell · Rating 5 out of 5]

Outstanding as a book, outstanding as a thesis.

The only caveat would be that the solutions portion is necessarily based on speculation and, as with all other speculation, the danger is not knowing what you don't know. The author's humility would prevent an entrenched policy based on his ideas from being disastrous, but once the ideas began to belong to policy-makers and implementers I would have much less confidence about that.

That's not a criticism of the book, though, but of the standard of historical behavior. In other words, it can't be helped, we have to try anyway.

Brilliantly written, brilliantly exposited, clever and thoughtful. The crediting of colleagues and the humanity of the discussion, the extra-political narrative, the occasional surprises of fun turns of phrases -- this is a great book.

[WaldenOgre · Rating 4 out of 5]

保罗·科利尔的这本书是针对“最底层10亿人的国家”而书写的，但其中的观察和分析的价值又远远超出了这个范畴。

他认为：

1. 在有效建立问责制政府或广泛的国民身份认同之前，匆忙引入选举制度是错误的，甚至也是危险的。因为身份政治会开启激进螺旋，而不受权力制衡的总统们又尤其擅于“赢得竞选”。

2. 对内没有实行问责制的政府，也很难胜任区域的或国际的合作，因为他们自身既没有合法性，也缺乏一种受激励的行事动机。

3. “国家主权”这个概念被高估了，它阻碍了严肃的思考。最底层10亿人的失败国家事实上并不存在国家主权（national sovereignty），他们有的只是总统的主权（presidential sovereignty）。因为“主权并不是用来展示总统们的硬汉气概，好让他们在国际舞台上昂首阔步的；主权是政府构建当中的一部分：其标准是人民的需求。”

4. 因此，想要挣脱“最底层10亿人的国家”的失败陷阱，最有成功希望的方法是引进国际社会的外力，为赢得干净选举的民主政府提供安全保证——对内防止军事政变，对外提供安全防御，并帮助建立问责制政府。在必要的情况下，也可以采取军事干预。

5. 而要做到上一点，必须战胜“殖民主义”的罪恶感。因为“如果‘滚出非洲’导致这片大陆被不负责任的政府所把控，那么这句口号本身就是不负责任的。”对此，右翼需要承认，我们应该拿出一个远比伊拉克战争更好的解决方案；而左翼需要承认，面对政治暴力无动于衷，其实就是在逃避责任。

可以想见，这本书中的分析和洞察或许会受到大多数人的称赞，但其中提出的解决方案一定会被很多人骂得狗血喷头。然而，不管可行性究竟有多高，它们都值得我们认真思考。

[Patricia Caetano · Rating 5 out of 5]

“I recalled my friend Ngozi Nkonjo-Iweala telling me when she became Nigeria's finance minister that although the government was at the start of a four-year term, she had been given only three years for reform.
"The last year will be politics," the president had explained to her, and, as I have just described, so it had proved.”

“Taken together, the results on elections and democratization are consistent: if democracy means little more than elections, it is damaging to the reform process.”

“The now-successful states were built through a painfully slow and circuitous process of formation that turned them into nations with which their citizens identified. This enabled them to undertake the collective action that is vital for the provision of public goods.”

[Meir Brooks · Rating 3 out of 5]

A decent economics books for the general audience on an important set of topics, but one that is outdated and uneven in its quality. Like many books in the genre, its main purpose is to succinctly convey insights from a wide stretch of research, peppered with anecdotes from history and current events. The anecdotes can be interesting but are mostly forgettable, and the research is wide enough that it is hard to emerge from the book with anything like a particular thesis or approach to the questions it deals with. Still, it is interesting and for people unaccustomed to a political economist's approach to conflict, it can be illuminating. Mostly, the feeling is that one can do better with a more up-to-date and focused book.

[F. Rafael · Rating 3 out of 5]

An easy to read book with clear main ideas: Democracy not always means development, upheaval can result from populations where power is exercised by the few, but elections take place with little or no effect. Elections don't solve the main issues of countries with problems coming from ethnical conflict, concentration of power, or extraction of natural resources. For these economies, coups produce less losses than civil wars.

The whole book seemed to rely to much on opinion and models with no rigor; which is understandable for the sample size of countries that can be analyzed. I found it too long for the ideas provided.

[Peter Stuart · Rating 4 out of 5]

Economic researcher meets social commentator and produces a 2009 published work of wonderful theory as to why democracy fails for the bottom billion economically placed people of the world. Read with a mindset of when it was published it is a riveting read and journey through the authors reasoning for the theories presented and conclusions drawn. As he says himself, past theories he once positioned he has now moved on, which would make an assessment and modern day addition to this book an equally fascinating read.

[Coffee & books · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the 3rd book I read by Paul Collier. I like his style a lot and this book didn't disappoint.

There are three parts in the book: Denying Reality, Facing Reality, and Changing Reality. I found the details about aid very interesting, also about how important is a war in a neighbouring country. The chapter about Cote d’Ivoire was another highlight for me.

When it comes to the proposal that Collier makes in the last part, I think the first one could work. I don't want to reveal too much from the book on goodreads though. If you want to read more, my full review is on my blog: Coffee & Books

[Arne · Rating 4 out of 5]

Challenging some really big, deeply help beliefs about the role of democracy. Short answer is that it isn't always the answer. Classic result of "It Depends".

This was part of a greater piece of research into whether our company should or shouldn't get involved in the advocacy of democracy. We decided not to. Not only because of the findings from this book making it hard to tell whether we would be "on the right side of history" but this certainly played a part.

Fascinating read and time well spent.

[Gavin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Economist slices through much bullshit in the course of identifying empirical handles on democracy in the extremely-poor world. His work is deadly serious, innovative and data-rich; but this book is chatty and low on representations of his mostly unprecedented, mostly persuasive data.

How much does an A-K cost in different parts of the world? Are peacekeepers worth it? Does democracy promote civil war in the absence of wealth? and such vital things.

[Relstuart · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very interesting though just a tad dated.

Ultimately the author argues democracy doesn't work in every situation and discusses some baseline economic thresholds that need to be in place for democracy to work. Otherwise, an effort towards democracy results in a very violent and unstable society.

[Zhijing Jin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Many African countries are constantly in war. And simple democracy cannot help states whose governments keep being replaced by violence. There is also more reward for using evil ways to grab power than doing real good for the people.

The suggested action plan is to ask international community (e.g., UN or the previous colonizer) to interfere and regulate the government.

[Seamus Fahey · Rating 4 out of 5]

Gives interesting insight as to why what Collier terms “the bottom billion” of nations cannot develop proper infrastructure over the last number of decades. Despite being an interesting read for development economics as a field, I would not recommend it as an introduction since it’s particularly focused rather than general.

[Richard Marney · Rating 4 out of 5]

The link between weak institutions (most notably w.r.t. the rule of law), economic underperformance, and the higher incidence of civil unrest/violence is a sad reality of society throughout recorded history. This insightful book written by one of the foremost development economists of his generation brings enormous insight to this fraught nexus.

[Carolanna · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting, but very mass appeal instead of in depth. Doesn't talk about democracy as much as it talks about dictatorships and instability. But if you want a starting point for African state building (mainly), it's an easy read.

[IGA · Rating 5 out of 5]

Bellissimo e concreto; i numeri esposti sono molto interessanti; Collier dà una chiara idea di cosa significa intervenire e che conseguenze comportano vuoti di potere, guerre civili, ribellioni e una democrazia senza controllo. Un libro intellettualmente onesto.

[Anthony · Rating 3 out of 5]

Grim and depressing, but important reading.

[Matt · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a fascinating take. I would highly encourage it to anyone who wants to know why democracies in developing countries are so fragile.

[Paul Frederick · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent Book for Africa.

[Xiang Li · Rating 5 out of 5]

正视那些被大部分人嗤之以鼻的观念 有的时候 人还是太理想 他们对这个世界真是满满的善意啊

[Eliza Marin · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read this book while I was in my master's and it changed my perception of the political system fundamentally. Mainly because it confirmed the intuitive suspicions of people's experiences from underdeveloped countries like mine. It is so reassuring that someone can grasp and voice out such complex themes that affect us every day.

According to Collier, democracy is related not only to the competition of elections but to also the limitations of the rules by which they act.

He provides a wider perception of the understanding of such conception, starting with the enumeration of personal dictatorship, for instance in the Kenyan pressure from the diplomatic community, in the 1990s, emphasizing the alliance of sociopaths with autocrats on the way to democracy.

For this reason, Collier is using all around the world examples, like the URSS modifications of constitutional regulations to act as self-empowerment, as well as the Nigerian and Zambian examples of limitations removal, underlying the need of a controlled system of elections.

In trying to correlate the relation between democracy and violence, and why is that in ‘bottom billion countries’ the first triggers the other, Collier is taking the example of the study of his student, Tim, by providing the reasoning behind this close connection, into the fact that violence and criminal convicts get attracted to the democratical process, as a form of magnet opportunity to the erosion of criminal lifestyle penitence.

Analyzing seven options of ways to win an election and substituting itself into the political leader’s options, Collier is evidencing seven of the most undemocratic methods ever to be found, stating that the whole process of producing democracy is far from being accountable as genuine. Furthermore, his statement is that in the international obsessive quest over election process improvement and better government, it can be identified a pressure from the external forces to internal peace-keeping.

[Juha · Rating 3 out of 5]

I've owned this book almost since it came out in 2009 but only got around reading it now. Although the world has in many respects moved on in the intervening six years, Collier's arguments regarding 'democracy in dangerous places' are still valid. Unfortunately. Collier relies mostly on quantitative studies conducted by himself and his graduate students to provide evidence on topics related to democratic challenges and conflict in the 'bottom billion' (a term he coined in his earlier book about the poorest countries in the world). The evidence is mostly convincing and often counter-intuitive, and, consequently, his conclusions go frequently against commonly accepted wisdom and are at times politically incorrect. Despite his explicit assurances to the contrary, several reviewers have accused Collier of neocolonialism or at least being an apologist for Northern domination of the developing world. As he notes: "Self-deluding thinking has bedeviled issues of development for decades. We have to work within the world as it is, rather than the world we would wish. So, while the appalling cost of the historic route is a good reason for hoping that there is a better alternative, it is not a good reason for thinking that there is one" (p. 184).

Collier makes a strong case for international action to guarantee accountability and security in the bottom billion. He argues that "the societies of the bottom billion are structurally insecure and structurally unaccountable" (p. 229) and that "security and accountability are either provided by government or they are not provided" (p. 230). He makes three concrete proposals on how the international community could help provide these public goods in places where they cannot be provided domestically. He also makes the case that "in an interconnected world, untrammeled national sovereignty leader unswervingly to hell" (p. 226).

Collier writes well and his style is quite gripping. I personally would have been interested in learning more details about the methodologies utilized by the studies he bases the book on, but that would have obviously cramped his style. The reader must now seek the methodological answers by turning to the original studies, which are listed in an annex.

Although this book is generally about the bottom billion, it really is about Africa (references to Central and Southeast Asia are few). This is understandable, as 39 of the 58 countries in the bottom billion listed in the annex are in Africa (personally, I've only visited 11 out of the total). The book is not entirely based on econometric and statistical analysis. One of the most enlightening chapters describes the rapid descent of Cote d'Ivoire from an 'African miracle' to a disastrous meltdown through a fraudulent election, two coups and a civil war, caused and aggravated by an external economic shock, internal mismanagement and ethnic identity politics.

'Wars, Guns, and Votes' like the original 'The Bottom Billion' (2007) are still worth reading for those of us concerned with international development.

[Ed · Rating 2 out of 5]

I come not to praise Paul Collier and not really to bury him but to point out what I feel are some flaws in this very highly praised book. First of all it is too "popular" by half. He leaves out all of the research that went into his book; he describes some of the difficulties he and his indefatigable band of international Ph.D. candidates had in finding data and in constructing experiments that worked and then has a list of the original research he used. More method and less description of outcomes would have made his conclusions more credible. The way the book is structured is an irresistible march from the chaotic political world of sub-Saharan Africa to development, democracy and peace made possible by national leaders agreeing to limit their sovereignty in favor of international guarantees enforced by "over the horizon" commitments for armed intervention by the United States and the former colonial powers.

His point on how elections in the poorest and most violence prone nations actually work against democracy and majority rule is excellent. In "The Trouble With Congo", Séverine Autesserre shows how and why elections demanded by the donor community in the DRC were a disaster--both the campaigns and the outcome led to more murderous violence by armed gangs supporting a warlord disguised temporarily as a candidate.

Collier's prescription for ending conflict in post-conflict societies, keeping coups from following coups and allowing development to take place in a (more) peaceful environment, giving up the rights and privileges of statehood, will not happen. In "Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow", Pierre Englebert shows how state sovereignty in Africa is a good in itself and it is based on the boundaries drawn by the former colonial masters. While there are coups and even occasional civil wars, there have been with few exceptions (Eritria, South Sudan, East Timor in Indonesia) no movements for independence from an existing state among Collier's bottom billion, even when there are very real ethnic, tribal or geographic inequities. Everyone wants to take over the state--no one wants to form a new one.

It would be easy to condemn Collier as a neo-colonialist but that is too simple and ignores his real commitment to the poorest of the world. His conclusions would work in a world where rational people follow rational courses of action not in the messy, bloody and fearsome world we live in.