This book should be included in military academies as a book on leadership. The author takes a historical event and molds mostly accurate events into a dichotomy. The dichotomy juxtaposes two structures in which military officers are allowed to lead the same dangerous mission, where one succeeds and one fails.
The mission is for two Japanese officers to navigate a dangerous mountain route during the winter. They start at opposite ends and end where the other started. Each of them is competent, but the structure provides success for one (and his men) and the death of the other (and his men).
The successful officer is given the order to accomplish the mission. Trust is imparted through the command structure and no interference is made from higher headquarters. The officer is allowed to make preparations in his own way and execute in his own way. The officer is given time to prepare, is given the opportunity to select his team, and is allowed to use the equipment deemed necessary.
The unsuccessful officer is given the order to accomplish the mission. Trust is not imparted through the command structure and higher headquarters is present, and throughout the preparation and execution phase, becomes more involved subverting the command structure (what many today would label "micromanaging"). Higher headquarters allows a Major and his staff to take part in preparations and to partake in the actual navigation of the mountain itself. The two officers' experience explain how structure can destroy the ability of equally qualified officers in two major ways.
First, the failed officer was hierarchically emasculated. It is imperative that responsibility and authority is clear. Adding a senior officer subverts the junior officer. The higher ranking officer should be in charge, or checks and balances need to be present to avoid a "coup" from the senior officer, whether through social pressure or the de facto rank structure making his word usurp the junior officer.
Second, the failed officer was bureaucratically impeded. It is imperative that the mission come first. Instead, higher headquarters emphasized the perception of the mission rather than the outcome. This resulted in not using local guides to navigate, as this implied the military being incapable, which it obviously was, but this is why you ask a professional to fix your car if you can't do it yourself. This also resulted in using improper clothing, as this implied the military clothing was not sufficient. Another result was that soldiers were selected on the higher headquarters "fair and impartial" metrics, rather than who was fittest for the mission. All of these emphases were to achieve military bureaucratic goals, rather than giving the best chance to achieve a new feat. Bureaucracy is good for maintaining what works. It is not good for venturing into the unknown.
Pg. 40 "Even if the battalion staff would not actually be part of the company, it still meant that he, as officer in command of the company, would be outranked. His position had become truly difficult."
Pg. 103 "The moment they heard the Major give the order, they sensed something was wrong. They were participating in the exercise as a company, and companies were commanded by captains... On hearing the Major give this order... most of them concluded that for some reason or other the command had shifted to the Major. And as far as the lower ranks were concerned, it really made no difference who was in charge."
Pg. 107 "Standing in the snow, they deliberated what they should do: go on or turn back. The fact that this question was being discussed at all was strange. If [the captain] was in charge.. all he had to do was report it to the Major. If the Major... considered that he himself was in command, he should state his opinion and decide... But to call all the officers together and hold a strategy meeting in a snowstorm was tantamount to admitting before the assembled lower ranks that there was a lack of unity in the command of the company."