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Douglas Haig and the First World War
From December 1915 until the armistice of November 1918, Sir Douglas Haig was commander-in-chief of the largest army his country had ever put into the field. He has been portrayed as both an incompetent 'butcher and bungler' and a clear-sighted, imperturbable 'architect of victory'. However, in this magisterial account, J. P. Harris dispels such stereotypes. A dedicated military professional, Haig nevertheless found it difficult to adjust to the unprecedented conditions of the Western Front. His capacity to 'read' battles and broader strategic situations often proved poor and he bears much responsibility for British losses 1915–17 that were excessive in relation to the results achieved. By late 1917 his own faith in ultimate victory had become so badly shaken that he advocated a compromise peace. However, after surviving the German spring offensives of 1918, he played a vital role in the campaign that finally broke the German army.
666 pages, Hardcover
First published November 1, 2008
53 people want to read
About the author
John Paul Harris
8 books2 followersA graduate of King's College, London, J.P. Harris is Senior Lecturer in the Department of War Studies at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
February 2, 2022
This targeted biography is an analysis of Haig as a military commander, with a cursory survey of his pre-WW1 career and then a comprehensive examination of his roles from 1914 to 1918, first as a BEF corps and then army commander, and finally his 3 years as head of the BEF itself.
Where you come out on this work may well depend on where you stood going in. Those inclined to view Haig as an extremely limited man (like myself) will find their beliefs reinforced, and anybody fully in line with the Terraine school will probably not be entirely dissuaded - even though Harris's strong scholarship should pose a serious challenge to anybody still thinking Haig was anything approaching a "great captain."
While still maintaining empathy for Haig's human side, Harris highlights Haig's many (and repeated) failings and limitations, to include:
1) A tendency to get excited and carried away, leading to consistent reframing of information and situations to fit his own assumptions, particularly with respect to German forces being "near the breaking point."
2) Repeated interference in the operational plans of subordinate commanders to push for breakthroughs and more ambitious initial attacks in pursuit of a chimerical decisive victory.
3) Maintaining a problematic headquarters environment and command culture where dissent and open discussion were not countenanced, leading to slower learning and implementation of many important tactical and operational lessons by the BEF in 1915-17 (a condition no doubt worsened by by the precedent created by his own politicking and palace intrigue with respect to Sir John French, the War Cabinet and CIGS, and French commanders). Haig's lifelong struggles with communication - written and spoken - were no doubt a key part of this, as they weakened his relationships with his political superiors and allies, and likely affected the GHQ command environment and his distant and unproductive relationship with subordinate commanders.
That Haig managed to survive in command until the tactical, operational, and technical improvements fostered across the BEF - and the vast disparity of resources relative to the weakening German opponent - allowed for the great victories of the "100 Days" does relatively little to justify the three prior years of repeated mistakes and bloody failures that several of Haig's contemporaries (Robertson, Rawlinson, Plumer, Petain, Foch, d'Esperey, Mangin, etc.) all recognized as mistakes as early as 1915.
Haig may very well have been, as Terraine or Max Hastings have said, a man of his time, with all the abilities and limitations of an upper-class Edwardian British Army officer. But other such men - Robertson, Rawlinson, Plumer - understood and sought to adjust to the realities of war on the Western Front much faster than Haig. The caricatures of "Lions Led By Donkeys" and "Chateau Generals" may be unfair to Haig and inaccurate, but after reading Harris's book, one is left with the inevitable conclusion that Haig surely squandered far more British and Commonwealth lives than were necessary for the defeat of Germany. The main claim of revisionists like Terraine and others - that Haig has taken unfair blame from manipulators of the record like Churchill and Lloyd George because he was merely the target for their frustrations with the impossibility of winning the war via any other means - is a valid point of historiography. It seems a much less valid basis for then giving Haig much positive credit as a general and commander of the BEF.
Where you come out on this work may well depend on where you stood going in. Those inclined to view Haig as an extremely limited man (like myself) will find their beliefs reinforced, and anybody fully in line with the Terraine school will probably not be entirely dissuaded - even though Harris's strong scholarship should pose a serious challenge to anybody still thinking Haig was anything approaching a "great captain."
While still maintaining empathy for Haig's human side, Harris highlights Haig's many (and repeated) failings and limitations, to include:
1) A tendency to get excited and carried away, leading to consistent reframing of information and situations to fit his own assumptions, particularly with respect to German forces being "near the breaking point."
2) Repeated interference in the operational plans of subordinate commanders to push for breakthroughs and more ambitious initial attacks in pursuit of a chimerical decisive victory.
3) Maintaining a problematic headquarters environment and command culture where dissent and open discussion were not countenanced, leading to slower learning and implementation of many important tactical and operational lessons by the BEF in 1915-17 (a condition no doubt worsened by by the precedent created by his own politicking and palace intrigue with respect to Sir John French, the War Cabinet and CIGS, and French commanders). Haig's lifelong struggles with communication - written and spoken - were no doubt a key part of this, as they weakened his relationships with his political superiors and allies, and likely affected the GHQ command environment and his distant and unproductive relationship with subordinate commanders.
That Haig managed to survive in command until the tactical, operational, and technical improvements fostered across the BEF - and the vast disparity of resources relative to the weakening German opponent - allowed for the great victories of the "100 Days" does relatively little to justify the three prior years of repeated mistakes and bloody failures that several of Haig's contemporaries (Robertson, Rawlinson, Plumer, Petain, Foch, d'Esperey, Mangin, etc.) all recognized as mistakes as early as 1915.
Haig may very well have been, as Terraine or Max Hastings have said, a man of his time, with all the abilities and limitations of an upper-class Edwardian British Army officer. But other such men - Robertson, Rawlinson, Plumer - understood and sought to adjust to the realities of war on the Western Front much faster than Haig. The caricatures of "Lions Led By Donkeys" and "Chateau Generals" may be unfair to Haig and inaccurate, but after reading Harris's book, one is left with the inevitable conclusion that Haig surely squandered far more British and Commonwealth lives than were necessary for the defeat of Germany. The main claim of revisionists like Terraine and others - that Haig has taken unfair blame from manipulators of the record like Churchill and Lloyd George because he was merely the target for their frustrations with the impossibility of winning the war via any other means - is a valid point of historiography. It seems a much less valid basis for then giving Haig much positive credit as a general and commander of the BEF.
December 17, 2014
Field Marshal Douglas Haig was an enigmatic figure in WWI. As Commander in Chief of the BEF, he was an enthusiastic leader & an extreme optimist in the face of battle. The problem was, he always exalted all these characteristics at the wrong time. When he was faced with any sort of opposition or resistance, he would tend to hesitate or draw back his troops. This timidity marked many of his early battles as commander of I Corps. When planning for offensives, Haig would continually overrule his subordinates' decisions. Then, during the ensuing battle, Haig had an ability to only hear what he wanted to....as in the good news, not the bad. This always led to further ordered advances by his men to capture even more territory. In the end, this extra territory was usually won backk easily by the Germans because the British soldiers were low on energy & even lower in numbers. Another part that must be questioned is Haig's rapid ascension to General. It was marked by lucky circumstances, a lack of any other legitimate options & his close ties to the royal family. It's not to say that he wasn't qualified for the job, but things just fell into place for him to reach that highest level of the army. The Somme may be the one battle Haig is best known for, but I think the 3rd Battle of Ypres better personifies Haig's inability to conform to an ever changing battlefront. Much could have & should have been learned from earlier campaigns where many young British lives were wasted. Unfortunately, Haig still held his misguided & grandiose idea of a complete breakthrough. Countless lives were lost because his plans continued to be too optimistic when it had become clear to almost every other participant in the war that a slower 'bite & hold' tactic was a superior alternative. There were many other negatives about Haig's term as General, but I think that this encompasses the worst of it. In wartime, you must adjust to change...especially in a war where technology was improving on a daily basis. He may be regarded as a great person in British history, but the blood on his hands is undeniable....& I fully believe that tarnishes his legacy.
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