Sicily '43: The First Assault on Fortress Europe

by James Holland

A major new history of one of World War II's most crucial campaigns--the first Allied attack on European soil--by the acclaimed author of Normandy '44 and a rising star in military history

On July 10, 1943, the largest amphibious invasion ever mounted took place, larger even than the Normandy invasion eleven months 160,000 American, British, and Canadian troops came ashore or were parachuted onto Sicily, signaling the start of the campaign to defeat Nazi Germany on European soil. Operation HUSKY, as it was known, was enormously complex, involving dramatic battles on land, in the air, and at sea. Yet, despite its paramount importance to ultimate Allied victory, and its drama, very little has been written about the 38-day Battle for Sicily.



Based on his own battlefield studies in Sicily and on much new research, James Holland's Sicily '43 offers a vital new perspective on a major turning point in World War II and a chronicle of a multi-pronged campaign in a uniquely diverse and contained geographical location. The characters involved--Generals George Patton and Bernard Montgomery among many--were as colorful as the air and naval battles and the fighting on the ground across the scorching plains and mountaintop of Sicily were brutal. But among Holland's great skills is incorporating the experience of on-the-ground participants on all sides--from American privates Tom and Dee Bowles and Tuskegee fighter pilot Charlie Dryden to British major Hedley Verity and Canadian lieutenant Farley Mowat (later a celebrated author), to German and Italian participants such as Wilhelm Schmalz, brigade commander in the Hermann G�ring Division, or Luftwaffe fighter pilot major Johannes "Macky" Steinhoff and to Italian combatants, civilians and mafiosi alike--which gives readers an intimate sense of what occurred in July and August 1943.



Emphasizing the significance of Allied air superiority, Holland overturns conventional narratives that have criticized the Sicily campaign for the vacillations over the plan, the slowness of the Allied advance and that so many German and Italian soldiers escaped to the mainland; rather, he shows that clearing the island in 38 days against geographical challenges and fierce resistance was an impressive achievement. A powerful and dramatic account by a master military historian, Sicily '43 fills a major gap in the narrative history of World War II.

Genres: History, World War II, Nonfiction, Military History, War, Military Fiction, European History

706 pages, Kindle Edition

First published September 3, 2020

About the author

Librarian note:
There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name

James Holland was born in Salisbury, Wiltshire, and studied history at Durham University. He has worked for several London publishing houses and has also written for a number of national newspapers and magazines. Married with a son, he lives near Salisbury.

Reviews

[Anthony · Rating 4 out of 5]

Operation Husky

Following the explosion of the Axis Powers from North Africa during the Second World War, a decision had to be made of where and how to act next. Long had the Mediterranean been seen as the ‘soft underbelly’ of Europe by both sides and perhaps this would be the key to unlocking fortress Europe. Winston S Churchill, British Prime Minister came up with an ambitious plan to capture the island of Sicily and use this as a springboard to knock Italy out of the war. The plan was risky, the distance from North Africa to Sicily was far, the seas were rough and the skies windy. It would also divert precious resources needed elsewhere. However, it was going to be a success.

On 09/07/1943 around 160,000 allied troops launched the amphibious assault on the island. The plan, organised by British General Harold Alexander, would be to land in the south of the island and capture the port town of Syracuse and move northwards, cutting off any Axis retreat to the mainland via Messina. It would be a British led operation with US support. General Dwight D Eisenhower would have overall command, but Alexander would lead the operation with General George S Patton in support, much to his frustration. WSC’s mind was on the failed amphibious assault on Gallipoli during the Great War, nothing like this had been tried since. Using new and not yet ready airborne paratroopers and gliders, soldiers would jump in and capture the key Ponte Grande Bridge at Syracuse. The wind was bad that it knocked many gliders off course and pilots released them quickly dripping into the sea. This could have been another disaster on WSC’s list. However, Italian moral was so low, now finding themselves under the jackboot of the Germans, they offered very little resistance and Syracuse and key points in the south were taken in the first day.

Within all of the Operation Mincemeat was launched, an extremely ambitious plan to have a dead ‘British major’ wash up on the shores of Spain with key documents of an imminent allied invasion of Greece. As James Holland explains this was also very successful. Following the initial successes in blistering winds and stifling heat, the Axis powers held the lines and progress was slow. However, Patton was not to be outdone and with Alexander’s vague blessing launched an attack to drive US forces northwards, whilst British forces under General Bernard Montgomery crawled in south east. The Italians and Germans were steamrolled away.

The last stronghold was the town on Mount Etna, which was converted into a fortress by the Germans. Here an allied bombardment and British infantry assault took place, in rocky and unforgiving terrain. As the British continued up and up they found dead comrades and enemies alike scattered everywhere, left to the thousands of files and mosquitos. Locals, so poor, often pushed into caves out of these and dominated by the mafia took soldiers boots as they had no shoes themselves. The Operation was a success with the island secured and now the battle for Italy could begin. This was a pivotal moment in WWII as it directly cause the collapse of Benito Mussolini who was removed from power by King Vittorio Emmanuelle III. Eventually the Italians would fight on the side of the British and Americans, not as allies but as ‘belligerents’. The campaign in Sicily was surprisingly bloodless, with only 1% of British and American soldiers being killed. But it led to a false impression that Italy would be knocked out quickly as the battle of the Italian Peninsula would prove to be slow and frustrating.

James Holland has proven himself to be a master of WWII history. Sicily ‘44 is exciting, punchy and to the point. He does jump around in places going from Axis, the US to British camps, but the structure of the book is great and he has proven himself to be a decent writer. A great book on military and WWII history.

[Jonny · Rating 4 out of 5]

"The Allies have often been accused of being too slow, too stodgy, too risk-averse. These criticisms, are, for the most part, misplaced. Britain and America – rightly – decided to use mechanization as much as possible, but rarely were they able to use their might in mechanized materiel to its very best advantage. Not on Sicily, anyway: perhaps following the end of the Normandy campaign in late August 1944, or after crossing the River Po in northern Italy in April 1945, but certainly not here, where they found themselves canalized by geography and by too many small roads unsuited to the scale of operations they were mounting. It’s no wonder it took time to advance on occasion. It is impossible not to conclude that conquering this extraordinary island in a mere thirty-eight days was a very impressive performance indeed. Having studied this campaign – and the wider war – in great detail, I simply do not understand why historians have been so grudging about what was achieved here."

James Holland bridges the gap between the second and third volumes of his Mediterranean trilogy with an examination of the Allies first major amphibious operation and break in to Fortress Europe. Taking a starting point at the planning stage, while the Tunisian campaign was still in progress, the narrative follows the action through the initial landings, through the airborne action at Primasole Bridge, the grinding advance across some particularly inhospitable terrain to the ultimate Axis withdrawal from the island.

Drawing down from the command level - from which criticism of the senior British and American leadership is fairly levelled were appropriate, together with their achievements - down through the company, squadron, to platoon level, the campaign unfolds through a number of personal accounts, relating the tragic, heroic and mildly absurd; you'll meet film stars, generals, mafiosi, a host of people who'll appear in the invasion of France less than a year later and the tallest man to fold himself into a cockpit:

"Dundas set off with 43 Squadron at 5.25 a.m., accompanying his housemate at Hal Far, Squadron Leader Micky Rook. Dundas was particularly tall at 6 feet 4 inches, but Rook was reputedly the tallest man in the RAF at 6 feet 6½ – and because he also had very large feet, he always wandered about in bedroom slippers, leaving his flying boots permanently wedged into the rudders of his Spitfire; as he clambered on to the wing, he would toss his slippers to his ground crew and somehow fold himself into the cockpit."

The text follows Holland's recurrent theme that history has been unkind to the Allies, that the Axis forces abilities were somewhat overblown, and makes the point in some detail that while there were disagreements within the Allied camp, it was as nothing when compared to the Axis, who could barely communicate. Montgomery and Patton may have been pains in the arse at times, but it's unlikely that any scenes like this would occur between them:

"They were now at Trecastagni in the last line of settlements before the slopes of Etna became too steep for habitation. So, too, that morning of 6 August, were Jupp Klein and his fellow Fallschirmjäger engineers, who had been busy laying mines and explosive charges at significant points, including two houses opposite one another at a narrow place in the middle of the town on the main road that led north towards Messina. This had involved ordering the civilians to leave their homes and get clear. Unsurprisingly, the inhabitants were far from happy, and a crowd soon gathered. Some were crying; others began threatening the Fallschirmjäger with old rifles and shotguns. ‘The spectre only came to an end when our platoon sergeant had a group of machine-gunners with an MG42 set up on the market square,’ noted Klein, ‘and made it clear to the insurgents that if they continued to obstruct their tasks he would have them shoot without consideration.’"

And at the last, Holland provides a perfect example of why the Allies would ultimately win:

"After Brolo, the Americans had ground their way through yet more detonations and mines until they’d reached the tunnel that ran under Capo Calavà. The retreating Germans had not blocked the tunnel, but they had blown a large 120-yard section of the road the far side, most of which now lay at the foot of the cliffs below. It was possible for individual troops to pick their way across the scree, but the way was utterly impassable for vehicles. The 10th Engineer Battalion was hurried forward, and Pyle watched in awestruck amazement as they set to work at around four o’clock that afternoon. Bulldozers, winches, jackhammers – all seemed to appear by magic, while men scurried about, stripped to the waist and glistening with sweat, each of them looking completely on top of what he was supposed to be doing. Overnight they drilled and blasted two holes into the side of the cliffs, while pneumatic drills helped create ledges at either end on to which abutments of wood were bolted. By morning, uprights were being lowered into the drilled holes as struts on to which cross-beams were then attached. Pyle watched one man, ‘doing practically a wire-walking act’, edge out over the timber and, with a pneumatic bit, bore a long hole down through two timbers. Into this was hammered a steel rod, joining them up. Others added more bracing, sledge-hammering huge spikes into the timbers. The whole thing was bound together with steel cables, tightened by a mechanical winch. By 11 a.m. on the 13th, just nineteen hours after work had begun, General Truscott himself rolled over in a jeep. More strengthening work continued, and by afternoon heavy vehicles were crossing and the division was rumbling forward once more. Pyle was bowled over by what these engineers had achieved. ‘They had built a jerry bridge, a comical bridge, a proud bridge,’ he wrote, ‘but above all the kind of bridge that wins wars.’ He was not wrong. "

It's a fascinating look at the Sicilian campaign, from the level down to the foxhole, a further link in the chain where the Western Allies learn more lessons in how to operate together and how to win. Recommended for anyone interested in the period, who wants an account free of any false modesty or whitewashing.

[Mark · Rating 5 out of 5]

In ‘Sicily 1943, an account of ‘Operation Husky’, James Holland provides the reader with a visceral narrative of life in the front line for the ordinary serviceman caught up in a brutal military campaign. Given the Allies were a combined force of volunteers and conscripts with relatively few career servicemen at their disposal, and this ‘amateur’ and largely untrained army up found itself up against German forces who were determined, disciplined and well trained, combat was a challenging and life shattering experience. Surrender was not an option for the Axis forces who knew they had to fight to the death; any reluctance to fight was met with the firing squad.

In addition to perceptive analysis of military strategy, and the ad hoc nature of the planning for ‘Operation Husky’ done on the hoof by the Allied Commanders strung out along the Mediterranean and separated by hundreds of miles - in Cairo, Algiers, Malta, Gibraltar, and Tunisia - the author provides a comprehensive narrative of the fighting, and provides a full understanding of the context of the Sicilian Campaign, and how it influenced the outcome of the Second World War. Not a 'side-show' as some historians have suggested, compared say with the Eastern Front, where the numbers of 'boots on the ground' far exceeded Sicily but a vial strategic gain and invaluable experience for the Allies when it came to D Day in Normandy, eleven months later.

Overtures were made to Mafia bosses and anti-fascist groups to encourage the Italian forces, some 200,000 strong, to surrender but these troops were soon bolstered by 70,000 German troops made up of both air and ground forces, of a different calibre altogether.

The Allies 'fought with steel', far greater ordnance, given their overwhelming superiority in supply and they faced an enemy fighting with 'muscle', putting their lives on the line. The Allies had 160,000 men land on 10th July 1943, backed by 14,000 vehicles, 3,500 aircraft and 2,590 naval vessels, and thirty eight days later the island had been liberated.

Included in planning was ‘Operation Barclay', a disinformation campaign, in which the deception known as 'Mincemeat’ or 'The Man with No Name’ was to persuade Hitler that his conviction was right and his High Command was wrong; that the Allies would cross from North Africa to Greece and the Balkans, and thus endanger Nazi Germany’s vital oil supplies from Rumania. For this reason the Axis, fortunately for the Allies, had not added to the defences of Sicily.

Operation Husky was the first Allied landing since their ignominious withdrawal from Dieppe in August 1942, but it was a challenging task given the scorching heat and pervasive disease, dysentery and malaria. Holland writes,

‘ It really cannot be stressed enough just how brutal it was trying to fight in Sicily. The terrible heat of the day sapped everyone’s energy. Dust got everywhere. Flies and mosquitoes buzzed and whined incessantly. Most men spent much of the day with large dark sweat patches on their shirts and glistening brows, swatting and slapping insects whenever they could. No one got much sleep, especially not when on the move or in combat. Tin helmets became painfully hot, but to be without one was courting disaster because in this rocky terrain razor-sharp and potentially lethal shards of stone would fill the air space whenever artillery and mortar shelling began.’

His writing is wonderfully descriptive and often surprising as with paradoxes,

“The air was thick with the stench of rotting bodies, explosives, smoke, and lemons, the citrus scent heavy from the shredding the groves had received.”

Biographical details are included for people like General Patton, “Kill every one of the goddamn bastards,” he told his forces, and Paddy Mayne who was instrumental in the formation of the SRS (Special Raiding Squadron) and forerunner of the SAS. ‘Mayne was something of a legend being a former rugby International for both Ireland and the British Lions and known for his fearlessness stamina and imperturbability in the face of extreme danger.’ Mayne was an imposing character standing well over six feet tall with a reddish beard ‘his form seemed to fill the whole tent with wrists twice the size of those of a normal man,’ etc , illustrated with the story of a drunken spree in a bar in Cairo for good measure.

The author catalogues the lives of every day civilians finding themselves being asked to kill,

“Ordinary, peaceful, law-abiding young men were trained to kill other young men — and so they did. Violence and brutality and even indifference to these horrors had become a new kind of normal.'

There was inevitably a huge death toll, with survival being serendipitous on the front line. One victim was Yorkshire & England slow left arm spin bowler, Hedley Verity, and as a cricket lover I was particularly moved by the author’s poignant account of his death. Verity had played in the ‘Bodyline Tour’ of 1933-34 and had taken fourteen wickets in the Ashes victory at Adelaide. Now Captain Verity, 38 years old and suffering from the debilitating effects of dysentery, remained at the front with his men as they stormed a a distant farmhouse. Verity was hit in the chest by a piece of shrapnel and dumped to the ground in agony. Yet he still implored his men to press on. There had been plans to withdraw him from the front line, after the Sicily campaign, but the chance never arose.

During the battle, Verity was struck in the chest and his batman, private Tom Rennoldson, found Verity and was able to carry him to a field hospital, where an emergency operation was carried out. Then, in sweltering, overcrowded conditions, he was ferried in an open railway truck across the straits of Messina to Reggio in Italy. Verity, by now exhausted and in very bad health, reached Naples and was taken to a military hospital in Caserta. There he was recognised by another injured Yorkshireman, medical orderly Corporal Henty from Leeds. He showed photographs of his wife and two sons, before he underwent an operation to remove part of a rib that was pressing on his lung, under a local anaesthetic, but he suffered a series of haemorrhages. which couldn't be stemmed, and died on the afternoon of 31st July.

James Holland's writing carries weight and authority as it is so rigorously researched but he always finds the 'human story' that prevents the reader becoming bogged down with too much military jargon and gory bloodletting ( there has to be some obviously). So, it is with the poignant information that the Italians gave Hedley Verity full military honours at his funeral, with officers at Caserta acting as pall bearers and his coffin itself being draped in a union flag.

[Mark · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thanks in no small measure to the numerous books, movies, and commemorations memorializing it, the Allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 is one familiar to anyone with just a passing knowledge with the history of the Second World War. By contrast, the invasion of Sicily that took place eleven months earlier, is much less well known. Yet Operation Husky, as it was named, was an even larger affair, as over 160,000 soldiers were landed on the island in July 1943. making it the largest single amphibious invasion in human history.

Even that number understates the scope of this achievement. For while the Normandy invasion benefited from both years of preparation and the lessons learned from operations in the Mediterranean, the invasion of Sicily was the first amphibious assault conducted in Europe since the disastrous Gallipoli landings in the First World War. Moreover, as James Holland details in this excellent history of the campaign, it was one planned and executed less than two months after British, American, and Commonwealth forces had wrested the Axis-controlled territories of North Africa from their grasp. To turn around and conduct a successful assault on a major Axis power was no easy feat, yet doing so led to Benito Mussolini’s downfall, Italy’s surrender, and the subsequent Allied breaching of other areas of Hitler’s “Fortress Europe.”

Not the least of the challenges the Allies faced in pulling this off was in planning a joint operation involving militaries still learning how to working together. Though the United States had joined the conflict in December 1941, their army lacked the combat experience the British had gained in over three years of warfare against the Axis powers. While American forces proved quick learners in North Africa, the British still had the edge in terms of training and skill. As a result, the British took the lead in organizing and planning the invasion, which was an ambitious plan involving forces from multiple locations across the Mediterranean converging upon the island. This was coupled with diversionary efforts elsewhere designed to disguise or at least confuse their intended destination, an effort that Holland largely credits with success.

Though Greece and Sardinia were both possible targets for landings, Holland notes that Sicily was the inevitable choice as it was the only one within range of fighter planes flying from Allied bases in North Africa and Malta. This reflected the growing shift in fortunes during this period, which Holland recounts. Here his analysis suffers from its limited scope, as the far greater demands imposed on Axis forces by the Eastern Front are mentioned only in passing. Yet along with the considerable losses suffered in North Africa, the Germans and Italians were hard pressed to provide an adequate defense of the island. This was especially true for Italy, who were increasingly urging their German ally to seek terms with the Soviets so as to concentrate their forces on their southern flank. As Adolf Hitler had no intention of doing so, many Italian leaders began weighing the possibility of withdrawing from the war or even switching sides. Only the growing presence of German troops on their soil restrained such efforts.

The lack of Italian enthusiasm was soon evident once British, Canadian, and American troops landed in southern Sicily on 10 July 1943. There they faced a mixture of demoralized Italian forces and disorganized German units only recently added to the island’s garrison. Holland recounts the course of the battle through the experiences of soldiers and civilians on both sides of the conflict, which humanizes what might otherwise have been a dry description of units clashing and objectives seized or defended. By connecting these stories to his analysis, he illustrates effectively how the Allies’ material advantage easily overwhelmed the poorly-equipped Italian forces, who were unprepared for the industrialized “war of steel” waged by their enemy. Though better equipped, the German units – particularly the recently organized Herman Göring Division – were either only recently formed or were still recovering from losses suffered in North Africa, and were in no condition to repel the landings.

Thanks to this ineffective initial resistance, the Allies were able to consolidate their beachheads quickly and move north in a matter of days. Resistance soon stiffened, however, due to the rapid infusion of Fallschirmjäger, or German paratroopers, who were flown over to reinforce the garrison. Deployed against the British and Commonwealth units under Bernard Montgomery’s command on the eastern end of the island, they slowed their advance to a bloody crawl. This gave the predominantly American forces in the west led by George Patton the opportunity to advance more rapidly in the west. Holland downplays any conflict between these two men, noting that much of it originates in the diaries the legendarily competitive Patton used to vent his frustrations. Holland credits Montgomery with bearing no grudges and Patton with following every order given, ensuring an effective conquest of the island little more than five weeks after the first soldiers were landed.

By the end of the campaign the Italians had kicked out Mussolini and were sending out peace feelers to the Allies. Unfortunately for them, the Germans anticipated this, and their deployment of troops throughout the peninsula ensured that the subsequent battle for Italy would be a tough slog that would last the remainder of the war in Europe. This does nothing to detract from the Allies’ achievement in Sicily, or Holland’s with this book. His reputation as a historian of the conflict is well earned as he provides a highly readable account that mixes well operational details with personal accounts of the participants. Though he could have gone further in showing how the lessons from the campaigns shaped subsequent amphibious operations in the war, this is nonetheless an excellent overview of a campaign that is far too neglected given its significance.

[Bob H · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a well-researched work that focuses on the Sicily campaign directly, rather than as a chapter in a larger work on the war in the Mediterranean. The book doesn't overwhelm the reader with details or minutiae, but tells the story in a straightforward way. This was the first major Allied landing on European soil, and the first one on a contested beachhead. Its fall would open up the Mediterranean to Allied shipping and would threaten mainland Italy. The landings, the internal friction on both sides (US/British and German/Italian) and command problems, the painful progress through steep and primitive landscape, all this is told well, and includes a number of first-person accounts. Highly recommend.

[William Harris · Rating 5 out of 5]

James Holland's "Sicily '43", published by Grove Atlantic, was recently provided to me in the form of an ARC. I am pleased to say that I just finished my assessment, and I am impressed with his accomplishment. To begin with, as
Holland stresses, the invasion of Sicily was a groundbreaking achievement during World War II in that it was an
amphibious assault on a heavily fortified corner of Feastung Europa. As such, it provided all participants, Allies and Axis alike, with a foretaste of the main event which would occur in Normandy little more than a year later. The insights here, to include a sort of revisionist approach to the events surrounding the invasion of Sicily, inasmuch as many earlier histories have been rather hard on the Allies and their manifest failures in the campaign without giving, in Holland's view (and I think he is right here) full weight to the enormous obstacles that had to be overcome as well as what was at stake should failure occur, are useful to anyone with an interest in World War II in Western Europe. What is more, Holland raises these points through a thoroughly entertaining narrative structured around the lives of many participants in the battle, both well known and prominent and unknown and seldom cited. He cloaks the great movements of huge armies, not in abstract terms of which units did what (at least not exclusively) but always with an eye towards what the battle was like for those who experienced it, from ""great commanders" to the often forgotten owners of the real estate being fought over and the many disparate participants in the battle. His narrative is even handed, and because it is, the humanity of all concerned shines through all of the ideological presumptions that some brought to the table. In these pages, you encounter Mafia Dons and aces of the Luftwaffe as well as their opponents in the air, on land and on the sea. It is a remarkable achiievement and goes far to illuminate what actually happened on this island and what it meant.

[Nick · Rating 3 out of 5]

I generally like Holland’s works quite well so I was well-disposed to like this one before I started. Unlike several of the other reviewers, the seemingly copious detail did not bother me in the least. It not only adds necessary background and detail but supports the points Holland is trying to make. The issue I have with this book is that it almost totally whitewashes all the issues – save the airborne landings – that plagued this campaign from its inception.

Holland is totally enthralled with Alexander as a man, a soldier, and a commander. The first two, he’ll get no argument; as to the last, he’s in a distinct minority. Alexander was notorious in his disparaging opinion of the American fighting man, based (deservedly) on their initial combats in Africa. By this point, the GI had learned quickly and well and was almost the equal of his more-experienced Commonwealth counterpart. (Alex never acknowledged this, even after Sicily.) He also failed to exert any command authority over either of his two main subordinates: Montgomery and Patton, preferring to kick everything “downstairs” to the former; Holland virtually ignores Montgomery riding roughshod over both the planning and initial command situation, going no further than his being a bit difficult. This is akin to stating that losing a limb is only mildly disconcerting and ignores the rivalry between the two armies in first reaching Messina. (He basically says that Monty was glad the US got there first) He further glosses over the rather inefficient Allied air campaign, which spent most of its resources engaging strategic targets like railroads and roads on the Mainland, which had little actual effect on stopping German supplies and reinforcements coming and going from Sicily, rather than applying that airpower against the German forces on the ground.

In short, Holland looks at Sicily as a large success. It was, if you only consider than the Allies did take island. Given their superiority in manpower, equipment, and resources, it would have been shocking if they didn’t. While nobody expected that taking Sicily would be easy, there were a number of Allied mis-steps, many of them preventable, that the Allies made before and would repeat later on. If not ignored, these are barely referenced. Holland’s point of view is “Well, it all came right in the end, what?” On the tactical level, this book is well worth the read. As a critical analysis of the Sicilian campaign, not so much.

[Creighton · Rating 5 out of 5]

A really well written book about the Sicilian campaign. I am a James Holland fan; he writes really well and has a way of telling a story in multiple layers: at the top with the generals and high command all the way down to the infantry and civilians. I am debating on whether I’m going to read his two other books on the Italian campaign.

[Chris · Rating 5 out of 5]

James Holland ranks among the best World War II historians ever. "Sicily '43" is an important work on "Operation Husky", the most important invasion of the war, after "Operation Overlord" or, D-Day. After a disastrous start to the war in North Africa the Allies pushed the Axis Powers out of Africa and gained naval and air control over the Mediterranean. The next step was to gain a foothold in Europe. To do that "Operation Husky" was devised to transport troops to southern Sicily and work their way up the northeast to Messina, near Mt. Etna, prior to landing in Italy. "Sicily '43" chronicles the heroism of the men and officers who took part in the invasion, including participants from the German and Italian armies. The operation was over in about 38 days and was such a success that it took the Italians out of the war as belligerents, turned the Italian campaign into a German defense of Hitler's Southern flank and spelled the end of the Mussolini regime. This is my second James Holland book, the first being "Normandy '44". It wasn't noticeable in the Normandy book but at one point I had to read Holland's bio to see if he was English. He is. It became very noticeable in his defense of General Montgomery's actions as opposed to General Pattons that he was coming down on the Montgomery side. Patton's actions were prompted by vain-glory, impetuosity, suspicion, and paranoia. Montgomery is never accused of any of these things. His movements are not slow but methodical and he never tries to put England's needs above others. Patton, of course, was all of the things Holland accuses him of. But the question left unanswered is which style was more effective in saving more lives and ending the campaign, Patton's speed or Monty's more orderly approach. As a New York baseball fan there was always the argument about who was better: Mickey Mantle or Willie Mays? It was always fun to argue and so is the Patton-Montgomery debate. But "Sicily '43" is a great book of the history of Operation Husky and the Sicily campaign. No argument there.

[Jay Simmons · Rating 3 out of 5]

The more I read of Holland, the more disappointed I become. Obviously, Americans should be thankful that the English army saved us in WWII. The American generals were hopeless compared to the English stars, Montgomery and Alexander and the GI had no idea how to fight the Germans. I am glad that my father does not have to read this as his experience arriving in Liverpool in late 1940 with a shipload of war supplies to be stored in England and guarded by American MPs. He traveled through Coventry and to the London docks which had been laid waste by the Luftwaffe. He said he was glad that the English never realized that they had nearly lost. His memories and photos showed damage in these areas similar to that of the German cities he later passed through.

Holland's work is normally excellent in detail and authority, but he needs to reconsider his nationalistic appraisals.

As a coverage if the Sicily campaign I have found none other that contains as much detail and factual information especially covering the German and Italian troops and commanders

[Rafa · Rating 3 out of 5]

Venía de leer en los últimos tiempos, dos libros de este autor, no eran la típica historia de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y aportaban, o a menos ampliaban, algunas pequeñas historias dentro de ese magno acto de la humanidad. Y el problema con este libro es que esperaba ese algo más que no está presente en ninguna de sus páginas.
El libro aporta poco al lector que busca algo más que las batallitas del abuelo Cebolleta, esto lo entenderán los más talluditos, aquí no hay cipayos pero si otros combatientes que no dejan sitio para un estudio más sesudo de la campaña.
Eso si, el libro está escrito con notable agilidad y será ideal para el que busque una lectura poco profunda y más cercana al telefilm del sábado por la tarde.

[Mike (HistoryBuff) · Rating 4 out of 5]

4.5
Very good narrative of the campaign in Sicily. Has a tendency to jump around somewhat, going from an American, to a Italian, then German experience of the battle or conditions. Can be a little difficult to keep track. However, the maps are a big help along with the listing of the principal personalities. You definitely get a sense of what it was like during the summer in Sicily and the hard terrain the troops had overcome.

[Chris Wray · Rating 4 out of 5]

James Holland combines being a first-class historian with being a master storyteller, and the result is a succession of highly readable, informative and thought-provoking popular narrative histories of the Second World War. This book, on Operation HUSKY to liberate Sicily in 1943, is no exception.

He begins with a summary of the events leading up to the invasion of Sicily, starting with the North African campaign. In 1940, Britain's overwhelming priority was the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean was of little strategic importance. Rather, says Holland, "Britain's strategy in the Middle East and Mediterranean was largely opportunistic. This was a part of the world where Britain could easily concentrate the assets of the Dominions and the rest of the Empire - whether manpower or supplies...It offered a chance to defeat Italy, making it a liability for Germany and exposing the Reich's southern flank...It was also the perfect testing ground for a British Army that needed to grow and develop rapidly." After early successes, Britain's fortunes waned after the deployment of the Afrika Korps in early 1941. The period from early 1942 through to Operation Torch and onto the Allies' eventual victory in Tunisia in May 1943 is wonderfully recounted in Holland's earlier book, 'Together We Stand.' At this point, two personalities stood out among the Allied military leaders: "While a host of varied factors had contributed to that huge Allied success, there was no question that Alex, as the overall Allied battlefield commander, had gripped the situation swiftly, acted with tact, charm and sound judgement, and played a key role in making sure the fighting in Tunisia was brought to a rapid and successful conclusion. Equally, it was Eisenhower who had led from the front in terms of forging the coalition."

As the Allies moved to start planning for Husky, the challenges were gargantuan. As well as being by far the largest amphibious operation ever attempted, against much more able opposition, the early planning had been carried out in parallel with the Tunisian campaign, so it had somewhat lacked focus. Additionally, the responsibility was on a different level as Sicily represented the Allies re-entry into Nazi occupied Europe and had a strategic and geo- political significance that the North African campaign did not. "Alexander, for his part, also found himself in uncharted territory. Up to this point, he had repeatedly been brought in to salvage a situation that had gone badly awry. Now, for the first time, he was commanding a multinational force that was in the ascendency, and at this stage in the war it was essential that Allied fortunes remained that way." The decision to invade Sicily was finalised at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, once it became clear that a cross-channel operation would not be practicable until 1944. To ensure success, there were certain prerequisites that everyone agreed on: "Air superiority was essential, so too was naval superiority, and so too was a sufficient speed with which ground forces could be landed and reinforced compared with the likely rate of Axis reinforcement." Naval superiority was already in place, but air superiority was a work in progress and the potential rate of Allied reinforcement was a relative unknown. The geography of Sicily also posed serious challenges, and the difficulties of terrain were amplified by the sparse and poorly developed road network. Holland stridently comments that, "Historians have not been kind to the Applied planners for HUSKY. Everyone, it seems, has had it in the neck from those sitting in the comfort of their armchairs many decades after the events took place. Eisenhower has been accused of being too weak, Alexander for not gripping the process, everyone for being at one another's throats, and Montgomery, especially, for being brash, arrogant and selfish...A different point of view on the planning of HUSKY is that it was always going to be a mind-boggingly difficult operation to prepare, and that an evolving plan was entirely normal and understandable for such an enterprise in such challenging circumstances. Furthermore, what is remarkable about the HUSKY planning is not the levels of discord involved, but rather, how well the new coalition partners were operating and rubbing along together." He also points out that we need to be careful to read the diaries and journals of senior commanders in context; that is, as a private and safe way of occasionally letting off steam by men carrying astonishing levels of responsibility. It is also certain that militating against failure trumped all other considerations. For the Allies to be repulsed at this stage in the war, after Stalingrad and Tunisgrad, would be a terrible setback and would unquestionably push back the plans for OVERLORD. Alexander was right when he urged the mitigation of all conceivable risks to the invasion being a success, even if posterity has often judged this to be undue caution.

In addressing MINCEMEAT and related deception plans, Holland insightfully concludes that the main reason they were so successful is that they reinforced a conclusion that Hitler had already decided upon. This is something that is seen again and again in the conduct of Nazi Germany during the war; the regime in general, and Hitler in particular, was unable to interpret events in any other way than through their narrow world view. In other words, they failed to consider what the Allies might do that was different to what they would have done in similar circumstances.

Moving to the campaign itself, Holland assesses that the airborne operations in Sicily were disastrous, particularly the glider operations. This is in stark contrast with the SRS (i.e. SAS) operation to destroy the Capo Murro di Porco battery. Paddy Mayne and the SRS landed from the sea, maintained the element of surprise, and completed their mission swiftly and successfully. Ironically, many of the airborne objectives (such as the Ponte Grande bridge) were also close to the sea and could have been similarly targeted. "The British - and Americans - had developed airborne arms and so felt an obligation to use them, even though the system of air transportation to the battle zone was nowhere near ready to be deployed. It would have been far better to use these highly trained and motivated troops in precisely the same way as had been done with the SRS. Politics, misunderstanding, hubris and the sense of needing to test this airborne force had conspired against better sense. The result had been an utter fiasco."

The seaborne landings, on the other hand, were highly successful, and although there was some initial stiff resistance, particularly in the American sector, "by midday, whatever brief crisis the Americans had faced at Gela was over. With it had gone the Axis forces' last chance of pushing the Allies back into the water. The battle was far from over, even on this central southern front, but - despite the poor weather, despite the fiasco of the airborne drops, despite the immense complexity of the entire operation - the Allied landings had succeeded. They now had a foothold in Europe." By the 12th of July, the American bridgehead was 50 miles wide, had linked up the forces from all three landings, and was more than 25 miles inland in places. In the southeast, where resistance was even less, the British and Empire forces had pushed even further inland. For both, it was clear that, "the Allied way of war that had been developing was increasingly based on heavy firepower. Both Britain and America had entered this war determined to use science, technology, mechanisation and their enormous global reach to the maximum, in order to get as much as possible of the hard graft done by machines rather than men." This, in a nutshell, was the strategy of 'steel not flesh'.

One incident that deserves comment is the decision by Alexander to direct XXX Corps along Route 124, cutting across the U.S. 45th Infantry Division and effectively slowing down II Corps advance. Holland notes that, "Historians over the years have repeatedly levelled the harshest criticism at Alexander's orders, arguing that they were a slight against the Americans, and one that showed a total lack of grip on his part and excessive deference to his hubristic Eighth Army commander. That view, however, takes too much account of later reputations and not enough of the situation as it stood at the time, and really does need knocking on the head." Holland maintains that the decision by Alexander, to give no detailed orders beyond the initial invasion plans of getting ashore, securing a bridgehead and capturing key airfields and ports, was a deliberate one: "The overall aim had always been then to get to Messina as quickly as possible; but there was no point issuing detailed orders on how this was to be done before those initial objectives had been taken, because it was impossible to know what the landscape would be like and how the Axis forces would be reacting. This wasn't woolly thinking, it was common sense. By the evening of 12 July, the situation was starting to look clearer. Eighth Army had always been given the lead role in the HUSKY plan, and understandably so, both for geographical reasons - their launch base in Egypt - and because of their undoubted greater experience. It cannot be stressed enough that when the plans were agreed back in early May, neither Patton nor his army had the experience to justify their taking the lead role. There was absolutely no shame in this whatsoever. It was just the way things were." Seen in this light, Alexander's orders at this point were entirely reasonable and even expected.

Alexander is someone whom I have grown in admiration for the more I have learned about him, and this book does not interrupt that trend. He must have had the patience of Job to handle both Patton and Montgomery and did it all with a self-effacing attitude and brisk efficiency. Giving Patton free rein to sweep through the West of the island was only one example of Alexander's wisdom in action. This operation gave Patton's men opportunity "to test much of what they'd trained to do and the logistical systems they had put in place. By its conclusion, his soldiers had had valuable combat experience, had learned a great deal and now ready to be tested against stiffer opposition. It had also been a terrific public relations exercise." Remarkably, all this was achieved in a mere four days.
Equally, as the campaign went on, the Allies demonstrated in spades their much greater operational and organisational skill. Compared with the Italians, they also had much superior weaponry, machinery and discipline. Again, Holland comments that, "Too often, historians have judged armies largely on tactical flair at the coal-face of war, when every bit as important is an army's ability to maintain its effort. The better supplied and equipped and maintained an army is, the better are its chances of performing on the battlefield. On Sicily in 1943, maintenance of the effort was absolutely crucial; and to keep two entire corps in ammunition, fuel, food, water and other essential supplies as they moved across difficult terrain, over such a wide area and at such speed, was immensely impressive."

Meanwhile, the opposition in the east stiffened substantially as the Germans took over and the front began to narrow towards Messina. As well as the Germans, there was also a problem posed by "trying to fight a large-scale modern, mechanized and technologically advanced war in the narrow confines of an island of many hills and mountains and not many roads or much other modern infrastructure...there was a limit, and quite a severe one, to how much infantry, armour and artillery could pass down any one road." In addition, because of the challenges with unloading supplies over the beaches, the infantry had largely marched inland on their own feet rather than using the preponderance of transport vehicles they were used to. As citizen soldiers, they simply "could not be expected to attach day after day, night after night, without respite; nor could they be expected to take the kind of casualties a German or Soviet infantry battalion might be willing to expend. Allied commanders were better men, too, for understanding that; as it was, Primosole Bridge and the fighting so far in the plain had proved as brutal and bloody and difficult as anything Eighth Army had yet faced in the war. A very delicate balance had to be struck in pushing forward as aggressively as possible - but not at too great a price." The German defenders, on the other hand, were expected to endure to the point of annihilation if needed, and this discipline was ruthlessly enforced in a way that would have been politically impossible for the Allies, even had it been militarily desirable. Finally, environmental conditions also hindered Allied progress, as the proportion of casualties due to malaria grew to over 50 per cent.

In the end, of course, the Allies did secure victory on Sicily, and the remaining German and Italian troops were withdrawn across the Straits of Messina to Italy. Even with the more attritional fighting in the north west of the island, the whole conquest of Sicily only took 38 days. In closing, Holland reflects on his own time in Sicily and rightly concludes that, "Etna seems to bear down, somehow mystical with its puff of volcanic cloud on top, and it's impossible not to be awed by the scale of the island, the awfulness of having to fight here, or amazed by the endless series of mountaintop towns that had to be climbed up to and down from and fought over. It's still not a fast or easy place to get around, and travelling across the island, it is all too easy to understand why manoeuvring highly mechanised and industrialised armies through this terrain was so difficult. The Allies have often been accused of being too slow, too stodgy, too risk-averse. These criticisms are, for the most part, misplaced. Britain and America - rightly - decided to use mechanisation as much as possible, but rarely were they able to use their might in mechanised materiel to its very best advantage. Not on Sicily, anyway: perhaps following the end of the Normandy campaign in late August 1944, or after crossing the River Po in northern Italy in April 1945, but certainly not here, where they found themselves canalised by geography and by too many small roads unsuited to the scale of operations they were mounting. It's no wonder it took time to advance on occasion. It is impossible not to conclude that conquering this extraordinary island in a mere thirty-eight days was a very impressive performance indeed. Having studied this campaign - and the wider war - in great detail, I simply do not understand why historians have been so grudging about what was achieved here."

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

A brilliant researched and managed book that gets into the real nitty gritty of the Sicilian invasion by the Allies. I really loved how Holland manages the simultaneous action of the US, UK, Canadian thrusts through the country in a way where we see very detailed specific fire fights, but also the grand scale planning, and managed to make it quite clear where everyone is aiming for.

The 10+ maps at the start of the book where an absolute MUST and very very useful in tracking the invasion's progress - whilst, like other WW2 books I've read, it was still sometimes hard to keep track of the names of the units/battalions/divisions etc.

Finally, the treatment of the human stories of individual Axis fighters was handled well, and I got a sense about the relationships between Italian and German soldiers, as well as the Italian and German higher ups.

Overall, would recommend - can't wait to try more of James Holland's histories of WW2!

[Michael Rollins · Rating 4 out of 5]

Holland gives a fascinating insite into a major campaign of WW2 that I've previously read little about. His use of describing the actions and thoughts of individual soldiers and officers makes this book far easier and more pleasant to read than many more 'hardcore' history books, and it also helps remind one that war is fought by humans with lives and families, not just by numbered companies and battalions, etc.

My sole criticism is that he does such a good job of covering so many key moments, involving a large number of different units and men that, at times, it was hard to follow. I found that having a map of Sicily open as I read it made it much easier.

[Ian Gillibrand · Rating 5 out of 5]

James Holland has quite a prodigious output but this is the first of his books I have read. Writing both non fiction and historical fiction this style of writing is evident in "Sicily 43".

Mixing tactical and strategic analysis with personal battlefield accounts and fascinating details of the friction between senior Generals of both sides I can see close similarities with the famous works of Cornelius Ryan.

Clear , engagingly written and sympathetic to the soldiers, sailors and airmen fighting at the front I can thoroughly recommend this offering by Holland.

[Zeb Kantrowitz · Rating 4 out of 5]

Unlike a lot of books about the second world war, Holland doesn't try to overwhelm you with all of the information he found while researching this book. Because this battle was seventy seven years ago doesn't mean that the reader has no background about this story as some writers expect you to be. Therefore Holland has written a story that could have been written for a contemporary about this incident and that makes it feel much more contemporary.

The first third of the book is the lead up to the Sicily invasion and focuses on the first large amphibious landings by the Allies (the United Nations) in North Africa. This was the first try at combined by not just the US and British Commonwealth troops but also trying to coordinate the Army Navy and Air Forces to work together as a single group and not just have them operate independently.

Hoping they had learned from their mistakes and give some experience to the US troops who were mostly made up of conscripts versus the British who had been fighting for two years. All of the main characters from North Africa would be involved in the Sicily fighting.

The biggest problem for the Allies was dealing with beach landings and the logistics of following up with material to supply the troops as they moved inland. The most glaring mistake to me of the campaign was coordination with the Navy who twice fired on airborne troops as they prepared to land on Sicily. You would think that SHAEF would have learned of the suicide conditions for gliders and paratroopers as the were dropped into area totally away from the areas they had prepared for and with glider pilots who has practically no experience in landing in unknown territory.

[Tony · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent read. Sicily is one of those campaigns during World War Two that I know only a little about so it was fascinating to read a more detailed account, particularly one which does a fine job of helping you to understand the strategy and tactics.

One of Holland's strengths as a historian is his ability to help you see how a particular campaign fits into the overall picture of the War.

Holland is also quite keen to show that some of the hindsight generalship by historians fails to take into account the reality on the ground. It is also nice for a historian not to paint Montgomery as some kind of fool. Indeed, if anyone comes out of this looking a little paranoid and egotistical it is Patton, whose diary entries are constant tales of perceived slights.

But, perhaps, the most interesting part of this book is how it reveals how brutal the actual process of fighting - for all sides - the battles in Sicily were. I have been reading this in parallel with John Buckley's 'Monty's Men' and what you can conclude from both books is a) being an infantryman is absolutely bloody murder; b) the 'declinist' perception of the fighting ability of the British soldier is simply bollocks and c) the German Army's fighting ability is a tad fetishized by some historians who should know better.

Holland also does let you see all sides of the fighting, not just the Allies, which makes it a far stronger book.

I'm not an expert on issues military to call out any factual errors or misattributions, but I think I'd recommend this as a book on a World War Two campaign that hasn't been hammered to death and that, I think, gives you a realistically horrifying insight into the horror of fighting in Sicily for everyone.

[patrick Lorelli · Rating 4 out of 5]

Was given this doc for an honest review.

I read this book months ago but have gotten so far behind on my reviews. I found this book to be very good in that the author gives you some of the German’s side as well as Italians' side. First, let me point out that this operation has been repeated over and over many times with many military people saying that it was unnecessary. I for one am not an expert but this operation was vital to all of the other ones that would come afterward. We had not done any amphibious landings, nor any paratrooper drops which were both done in this operation. Not all went as planned but was able to be worked out for the next ones and also would help for D-Day. Though people thought this was a failure they still took the island in less time than was expected. Saying that Germans were allowed to escape or leave is nothing different than when troops were told to stop when they got to the border of France and hundreds of German troops were able to fight another day in the Bulge.
Overall I found this to be a very good book and if you are into history worth the read. I received this book from Netgalley.com I gave it 4 stars. Follow us at www.1rad-readerreviews.com

[Casey · Rating 3 out of 5]

I found this book to be well researched, but I did not enjoy nearly as much as several other reviewers. I found the author's writing style to be somewhat ponderous and bogged down in an abundance of facts that interrupted the flow of the book. It covers a crucial piece of World War II history with the invasion of Sicily. While it was not an overly enjoyable read for me, it may be for others.

I received a free Kindle copy of this book courtesy of NetGalley and the publisher with the understanding that I would post a review on Net Galley, Goodreads, Amazon and my nonfiction book review blog. I also posted it to my Facebook page

[Annie McDonnell · Rating 5 out of 5]

James Holland is a favorite historian of mine. I’d follow him down any rabbit hole! I was so thrilled when I heard that he wrote about Sicily ‘43! This assault made its way into my soul when I read about it during “How Fires End” by Marco Rafala! So, when I heard of this retelling of it step-by-step, I knew I had to have it.
I was so excited to learn about the English involvement and Mountbatten!
I love how he weaves stories into the nonfiction, it’s such a neat way to learn how history! I can’t wait for whatever James Holland delves into next.

[Jordan Ayres · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fascinating book about the invasion of Sicily in 1943 by the Allies. A chapter of the war that surprisingly is not spoken about much and which James Holland brings new and fresh approaches too. From amphibious attacks, to ground assaults, to the bravery of individual’s and even tales of the mafia’s involvement. James Holland shows all the stages of the invasion in a comprehensive and entertaining way. A must read for anyone interested in the campaigns of WWII

[Christina Hutt · Rating 5 out of 5]

I would like to thank NetGalley and Grove Atlantic for allowing me to read this book in exchange for my honest opinion. This book was good. It was about a topic I never knew: Sicily during WW2.

[Thomas B · Rating 5 out of 5]

Compelling. James narrates from first hand accounts and diaries, bringing the lives of Axis, Allied, and civilian lives into sharp, relatable focus.

[Gregory Melahn · Rating 5 out of 5]

My Dad served in the 82nd Airborne in WW2. The 82nd was one of the units deployed in Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily in July, 1943. My brother was lucky enough to recently tour the battlefields in Sicily and gifted me this book.

I like Holland’s emphasis on contemporaneous first-hand accounts from diaries instead of using just memoirs or official histories that were written years later.

An interesting coincidence I noticed was one reference to the use of sea power in the operation. To blunt an Axis counteract against the American beachhead near Gela, shelling came from three ships, one of them the https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_B... That very same ship was the one that brought my Dad back home over two years later, in December 1945, as part of Operation Magic Carpet.

Until the day he died, my Dad kept a copy of the ship’s newsletter, https://archive.org/details/uss-boise..., published on Christmas Day 1945, during his voyage home.

[Daniel]

Hollandin järkäle on perusteellinen, mutta myös konkreettinen teos Sisilian maihinnoususta ja valtauksesta. Tapahtumia kuvataan usein rivisotilaiden kokemusten, kirjeiden ja muistelmien pohjalta ja monessa kohtaa kenraalit jäävät taka-alalle. Tyyliltään siis helpompi kuin vain Antony Beevorin vastaavat järkäleet.

[Scott Stiglmeier · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good details but thorough to a fault.
Was that one sentence about steinhaus taking 3 pervitin and flying a plane necessary? The writing seemed scatterbrained or at the least not organized right. Jumping from axis to allies in the same paragraph can get frustrating and hard to follow.

[Kevin McMahon · Rating 5 out of 5]

As always with this authors books very well researched and detailed.

[Lisa Kiely · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very good although the first half was taken up by the planning of the operation which was abit long and tidious, the second half which was about the people involved and the fighting was much better

[Arnold T. Blostein · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well Done

This was a real treat. I had read so little about the campaign in Sicily. This book really brought it into focus.