The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World

by Lorenz M. Lüthi

A decade after the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China established their formidable alliance in 1950, escalating public disagreements between them broke the international communist movement apart. In The Sino-Soviet Split, Lorenz Lüthi tells the story of this rupture, which became one of the defining events of the Cold War. Identifying the primary role of disputes over Marxist-Leninist ideology, Lüthi traces their devastating impact in sowing conflict between the two nations in the areas of economic development, party relations, and foreign policy. The source of this estrangement was Mao Zedong's ideological radicalization at a time when Soviet leaders, mainly Nikita Khrushchev, became committed to more pragmatic domestic and foreign policies. Using a wide array of archival and documentary sources from three continents, Lüthi presents a richly detailed account of Sino-Soviet political relations in the 1950s and 1960s. He explores how Sino-Soviet relations were linked to Chinese domestic politics and to Mao's struggles with internal political rivals. Furthermore, Lüthi argues, the Sino-Soviet split had far-reaching consequences for the socialist camp and its connections to the nonaligned movement, the global Cold War, and the Vietnam War. The Sino-Soviet Split provides a meticulous and cogent analysis of a major political fallout between two global powers, opening new areas of research for anyone interested in the history of international relations in the socialist world.

Genres: China, History, Nonfiction, Russia, Politics, Soviet Union, Asia

399 pages, Kindle Edition

First published February 11, 2008

Reviews

[Carlos Martinez · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very thorough assessment of the Sino-Soviet split, from its beginning (mid-1950s) to the start of the Cultural Revolution (1966). The quality of the sources is generally solid, although one sure way for any book to lose credibility is to include a few citations of the silly and sensationalised The Private Life of Chairman Mao.

Twentieth century history is usually best written from a Marxist perspective, but in this instance the author's ideological ambivalence is a blessing, since he doesn't have "skin in the game" when it comes to the biggest and most profoundly damaging split in the history of the communist movement; as such, he manages to see both sides of the story.

Various questionable formulations and assumptions, but overall a readable and useful treatment of a difficult but important topic.

[Sam · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is pretty much the only book you'll ever need on the topic of Sino-Soviet relations, at least if you are looking specifically at those relations during the Cold War. It really helps you to understand that the "Communist World" that the west was fighting against was not nearly as united as thought.

[Narek Yeranyan · Rating 1 out of 5]

This book could be an excellent analysis of the Sino-Soviet split. It could also be complete bullshit. I can't tell, because the author makes it really hard for me to tell. His framing is so bizarre that it's impossible to trust anything he says. For example:

“By the same token, the roles of security and economics in the Sino-Soviet Split cannot be understood without reference to ideology. It is true that, since the fall of 1950, American military might threatened China on the Korean peninsula. Equally, the military situation in the Taiwan Strait during the 1950s and in Indochina starting in the mid-1960s changed to China’s disadvantage. However, these security threats were not the result of an inherent U.S. imperialist aggressiveness, as Mao and his comrades believed, but were largely the consequence of Chinese Communist commitments to world revolution since the 1920s—that is, to the overthrow of the imperialist international system that happened to be headed by the United States since 1945—and of Mao’s assertive security policies since the late-1949 establishment of the PRC. Once Beijing recognized Hanoi diplomatically in early 1950 and committed itself to Pyongyang even before the Korean War, Washington’s military and political responses turned Mao’s beliefs about imperialist aggression into self-fulfilling prophecies.”

“Since mid-1950, China’s security problems were to some extent of its own making. Had the CCP not been a communist party committed to revolutionary and anti-imperialist goals, had the PRC not turned to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR), and had Mao not embarked on assertive military policies at the turn of 1949/50, many of the subsequent security problems (the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait Crises, the Vietnam Wars) would likely have been less acute.”

So it's not that the U.S. is an imperialist aggressor. It's that you, for some strange reason, don't like the imperialist international system that happened to be headed by the United States. Just stop doing random stupid shit like being to some extent a communist, and let them at least to some extent murder Koreans and Vietnamese, and they will stop being mean to you.

“Mao’s threat perceptions were, to a large degree, self-fulfilling prophecies. The Chinese leader based his strategic decisions on erroneous assumptions with regard to American military commitments in the region. Until late 1949, the United States had pursued a policy of disengagement from the East Asian continent, not one of imperialist revanchism.”

I guess in the case of the U.S., as long as you're not currently mid-genocide, that counts as disengagement.

“Mao’s ideological worldview greatly affected China’s security policies. The Chinese leader was convinced that U.S. imperialism would not accept the loss of China and thus would 'wage war . . . in lieu of Chiang Kai-shek' or seek other ways to intervene and restore the old imperialist order in East Asia.”

So unlike the author, Mao had an ideological worldview, which made him ... a guy who understands some basic stuff about the world?

Anyway, according to the author’s worldview, Stalin died in 1953, so for all I know Stalin is alive ... just a bit disengaged.

[Martin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Beneath the veneer of Soviet Socialism hidden was old Muscovite Imperialism the facts speak for themselves Attack on Poland 1939 with territories stolen and never returned after WW2, Attack on Finland 1939 With territories stolen and never returned, the attack on Hungary 1956 Interference in Poland 1956, The Invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968, Invasion and occupation of Afghanistan 1979 to 1989. Mao was completely correct we can all see the truth in the facts.

[Austin Barselau · Rating 4 out of 5]

Meticulous and incisive, The Sino-Soviet Split by Cold War historian Lorenz Lüthi, Associate Professor at McGill University, probes a panoply of archival resources from China, Russia, and beyond to reveal the discontents underlying the communist bloc from the 1950s into the late 1960s. Using declassified documents, newspapers, and memoirs, Lüthi reveals how a toxic brew of ideology and internal politics fractured relations between the USSR and a newly minted communist China.

Lüthi's balanced use of both Sino and Soviet sources portrays two world powers - one entrenched, the other resurgent - as proceeding in clashing directions. Under Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union had recently emerged from the pall of Stalin’s iron grip weary and pressed for reform; Khrushchev had launched a campaign to “de-Stalinize” Soviet rule, deescalate rhetoric with the West, and transition to balanced economic development. Mao’s China meanwhile was in the throes of revolutionary fervor and sought no compromise with its hardline interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology. An ideological opportunist, Mao sought to create and exploit international crises for domestic purposes. In this vein, Mao sought to undermine the Khrushchev’s political legitimacy by questioning his revolutionary credentials, tarring de-Stalinization as “revisionist,” rebuking any “peaceful coexistence” with the United States, and exploiting every chance to frame China as the vanguard of global communist rule.

As Lüthi argues, it was these disagreements over the correct path of political development, coupled with Mao and Khrushchev’s personality frictions and mutually poor communication on foreign policy initiatives, that precipitated an irreversible rupture in the communist world. With Lüthi’s important scholarship, these jarring nuances are no longer lost to history.

[Aishwarya Iyer · Rating 1 out of 5]

should be considered historical fiction… sources are trash too

[Drew Leadley · Rating 4 out of 5]

Luthi paints an incredible image of the Sino-Soviet Split in his account. Often history borders upon reciting of dry fact. Thankfully, Luthi does not fall into this category. His account of the Sino-Soviet Split articulates how Mao Zedong manipulated international incidents to serve his own domestic agenda. For anyone interested in international history, this event and account is a must read. Luthi uses adequate evidence, clear language, and gives appropriate historical context for the reader to understand an incident which is often overlooked in international history.

[Brandy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read this for a grad class.
Another incredibly well written book (my prof knows how to pick 'em!) that I really should have done a little background reading on in order to fully appreciate it. I plan on coming back to this one, after I've done a little contextualization and when I have the opportunity to read it all in one go, rather than in chunks over a semester.

Second time through for a different grad class:
Got to read it all in one go, so I'm happy about that. Definitely makes more sense that way, haha. Makes it much easier to follow the Chinese side of things, which I have little background in.

[Eleanore · Rating 4 out of 5]

A thoroughly researched examination of the Sino-Soviet split, based on Chinese and Soviet archives. Luthi makes a complex and interesting argument with his narrative, illuminating an important perspective on Cold War history. He also manages to wrap the often dry and analytical dynamics of foreign-relations with poignant human details and personal histories. It is difficult to imagine a better written or more nuanced discussion of the topic.

[Ke · Rating 4 out of 5]

I did quite well on the paper I read this book to write, but it does make me laugh that one of the comments I got on my footnotes was that I seemed to cite this one specific source to an excessive extent. I’m sorry, I didn’t know anything about the topic so I had to teach myself about the Sino-Soviet Split in 3 days, and this was the most comprehensive book I could find.

[灏 陈 · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book written by my master thesis supervisor and the reason I wished to come to study with him at McGill.