Decision has always exerted a powerful attraction for the student of military affairs. In the study of decisions in war, whether on the field of battle or in the councils of state, lie the great lessons of the conflicts that have shaped the course of history. These lessons the professional soldier seeks in order to fit himself for the ultimate responsibilities of command; the student of human affairs seeks them to explain past events. The historians writing the history of the United States Army in World War II have had a unique opportunity to study the decisions of that conflict. The response of the Army's schools and colleges, as well as the public, to this aspect of their work emphasized for them the interest of soldier and scholar alike in decision-making in war at various levels of government and command. As research progressed and material with which to illustrate this theme accumulated, it appeared that a book on the subject based on the work already accomplished would be of interest to a variety of This volume is an outgrowth of that idea. It is an analysis of 23 decisions reached by chiefs of state and their military subordinates during World War II. Concerned with important political, strategic, tactical, and logistical questions, they include the invasions of North Africa and Normandy, the use of the atomic bomb, the capture of Rome, the campaigns in the western Pacific, and the internment of Japanese-Americans.
General DeWitt explained what the California authorities proposed to do was to move both citizen and alien Japanese (voluntarily if possible, and in colloboration with American-born Japanese leaders) from urban areas and from along the seacoast to agricultural areas within the state. They wanted to do this in particular in order to avoid having to replace the Japanese with Mexican and Negro laborers who might have to be brought into California in considerable numbers. - page 136
Persistent dabbling by the British in this region raised, in American minds, the dread specter of military operations in the Balkan peninsula, a land of inhospitable terrain, primitive communications, and turbulent peoples. page 262
Note that a leading, maybe the, leading proponent of "Japanese removal" in 1942 was California's Attorney General, who rode the popularity of the action to the state Governorship that fall: noted "liberal" Earl Warren.
This massive collection of essays is solid all around, explaining some of the key decisions of the war, mostly those made by America. The work takes a mostly policy-wonk approach and mostly fails to see the importance of personalities and cliques in deciding strategy.