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Povo vs. Democracia
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First published March 5, 2018
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About the author
Yascha Mounk
8 books245 followersYascha Mounk is a writer, academic and public speaker known for his work on the crisis of democracy and the defense of philosophically liberal values.
Born in Germany to Polish parents, Yascha received his BA in History from Trinity College Cambridge and his PhD in Government from Harvard University. He is a Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University, where he holds appointments in both the School of Advanced International Studies and the SNF Agora Institute. Yascha is also a Contributing Editor at The Atlantic, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a Moynihan Public Fellow at City College. He is the Founder of Persuasion, the host of The Good Fight podcast, and serves as a publisher (Herausgeber) at Die Zeit.
Yascha has written five books: Stranger in My Own Country – A Jewish Family in Modern Germany, a memoir about Germany’s fraught attempts to deal with its past; The Age of Responsibility – Luck, Choice and the Welfare State, which argues that a growing obsession with the concept of individual responsibility has transformed western welfare states; The People versus Democracy – Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It, which explains the causes of the populist rise and investigates how to renew liberal democracy; The Great Experiment – Why Diverse Democracies Fall Apart and How They Can Endure, which argues that anybody who seeks to help ethnically and religiously diverse democracies thrive has reason to embrace a more ambitious vision for their future than is now fashionable; and his latest, The Identity Trap – A Story of Ideas and Power in Our Time, which tells the story of how a new set of ideas about race, gender and sexual orientation came to be extremely influential in mainstream institutions, and why it would be a mistake to give up on a more universalist humanism.
Next to his work for The Atlantic, Yascha also occasionally writes for newspapers and magazines including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and Foreign Affairs. He is also a regular contributor to major international publications including Die Zeit, La Repubblica, El País, l’Express and Folha de São Paolo, among others.
Born in Germany to Polish parents, Yascha received his BA in History from Trinity College Cambridge and his PhD in Government from Harvard University. He is a Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University, where he holds appointments in both the School of Advanced International Studies and the SNF Agora Institute. Yascha is also a Contributing Editor at The Atlantic, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a Moynihan Public Fellow at City College. He is the Founder of Persuasion, the host of The Good Fight podcast, and serves as a publisher (Herausgeber) at Die Zeit.
Yascha has written five books: Stranger in My Own Country – A Jewish Family in Modern Germany, a memoir about Germany’s fraught attempts to deal with its past; The Age of Responsibility – Luck, Choice and the Welfare State, which argues that a growing obsession with the concept of individual responsibility has transformed western welfare states; The People versus Democracy – Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It, which explains the causes of the populist rise and investigates how to renew liberal democracy; The Great Experiment – Why Diverse Democracies Fall Apart and How They Can Endure, which argues that anybody who seeks to help ethnically and religiously diverse democracies thrive has reason to embrace a more ambitious vision for their future than is now fashionable; and his latest, The Identity Trap – A Story of Ideas and Power in Our Time, which tells the story of how a new set of ideas about race, gender and sexual orientation came to be extremely influential in mainstream institutions, and why it would be a mistake to give up on a more universalist humanism.
Next to his work for The Atlantic, Yascha also occasionally writes for newspapers and magazines including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and Foreign Affairs. He is also a regular contributor to major international publications including Die Zeit, La Repubblica, El País, l’Express and Folha de São Paolo, among others.
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July 8, 2018
Yascha Mounk, the author of this book, is a political science professor at Harvard University, but I’ve become familiar with him from his podcast on Slate, “The Good Fight.” The fight he is talking about, both on the podcast and in this book, is for nothing less than saving democracy.
Professor Mounk argues that democracy is in crisis, and not just because of Donald Trump, but because of the rise of authoritarianism in Europe, which is where he was born and raised. He argues that if you interview young people, you’ll discover that they take democracy for granted to such an extent that they disdain it or will even say they don’t think it’s that important. I’ve seen this with some of the adults I know, too. One even went so far as to say that the concept of human equality came from Karl Marx, not the Enlightenment thinkers who preceded him, so it should be ignored. According to Professor Mounk, students disdain the Enlightenment, too, throwing the baby out with the bathwater because the Enlightenment wasn’t PC enough. This, I think, is an example of what he calls “undemocratic liberalism” in which PC thinking and speech are held to be more important than freedom of speech and thought. It’s a criticism I hear from my right-wing friends, which may mean that Yascha Mounk could have broad appeal to both right and left.
The opposite danger to democracy is what Professor Mounk calls “illiberal democracy.” Of course, the United States was founded as an illiberal democracy, in which only white land-owning men had voting rights. Over time, our democracy has grown to include more and more people, to have liberalized, to use an unpopular word, but now we’re seeing the backlash. Increasingly, because of Citizens United and the power of lobbyists and special interests, American democracy has become much more of an oligarchy than a liberal democracy. And those two factors - both liberalism and democracy – are what Professor Mounk argues are the keys to preserving a good future for all of us.
So why else doesn’t democracy have its old appeal? One reason is simple illiberalism and dislike of difference. Rights only belong to “real Americans,” and everyone else can go blow. But there’s also the simple fact that liberal democracy is notoriously inefficient and takes commitment to maintain. When everybody has a say, debates can seem interminable, and reaching consensus can seem like an impossible goal. People prefer quick solutions, so an undemocratic approach can hold definite appeal. To return to the right-wing side of Mounk’s argument, law carried out by administrative agencies like the FDA or EPA are much more specialist-based than democratic. These agencies are more efficient at carrying out their jobs than having Congress vote on every little thing, and it’s probably necessary because we all want safe food and drinking water, but if I understand correctly, this is another example of undemocratic liberalism. The best illustration the book gives of truly representative democracy came in the title of another book Mounk cited, Freedom is an Endless Meeting. In other words, those boring and often contentious meetings in which local people attempt to solve local issues are the backbone of democracy. And too few of us are truly committed to participating in them. But when we don’t, special interests wheedle their way in and take our place.
Overall, Mounk’s book is as scholarly and well-argued as you’d expect from a Harvard professor, and though my mind wandered in spots, he was clear and concise enough that he held my attention most of the time. The concluding chapter was especially good, but before you embark on his book, I highly recommend his podcast. It’s a good way to get to understand his philosophy and discover whether he’s a voice you want more of. I most certainly do.
Professor Mounk argues that democracy is in crisis, and not just because of Donald Trump, but because of the rise of authoritarianism in Europe, which is where he was born and raised. He argues that if you interview young people, you’ll discover that they take democracy for granted to such an extent that they disdain it or will even say they don’t think it’s that important. I’ve seen this with some of the adults I know, too. One even went so far as to say that the concept of human equality came from Karl Marx, not the Enlightenment thinkers who preceded him, so it should be ignored. According to Professor Mounk, students disdain the Enlightenment, too, throwing the baby out with the bathwater because the Enlightenment wasn’t PC enough. This, I think, is an example of what he calls “undemocratic liberalism” in which PC thinking and speech are held to be more important than freedom of speech and thought. It’s a criticism I hear from my right-wing friends, which may mean that Yascha Mounk could have broad appeal to both right and left.
The opposite danger to democracy is what Professor Mounk calls “illiberal democracy.” Of course, the United States was founded as an illiberal democracy, in which only white land-owning men had voting rights. Over time, our democracy has grown to include more and more people, to have liberalized, to use an unpopular word, but now we’re seeing the backlash. Increasingly, because of Citizens United and the power of lobbyists and special interests, American democracy has become much more of an oligarchy than a liberal democracy. And those two factors - both liberalism and democracy – are what Professor Mounk argues are the keys to preserving a good future for all of us.
So why else doesn’t democracy have its old appeal? One reason is simple illiberalism and dislike of difference. Rights only belong to “real Americans,” and everyone else can go blow. But there’s also the simple fact that liberal democracy is notoriously inefficient and takes commitment to maintain. When everybody has a say, debates can seem interminable, and reaching consensus can seem like an impossible goal. People prefer quick solutions, so an undemocratic approach can hold definite appeal. To return to the right-wing side of Mounk’s argument, law carried out by administrative agencies like the FDA or EPA are much more specialist-based than democratic. These agencies are more efficient at carrying out their jobs than having Congress vote on every little thing, and it’s probably necessary because we all want safe food and drinking water, but if I understand correctly, this is another example of undemocratic liberalism. The best illustration the book gives of truly representative democracy came in the title of another book Mounk cited, Freedom is an Endless Meeting. In other words, those boring and often contentious meetings in which local people attempt to solve local issues are the backbone of democracy. And too few of us are truly committed to participating in them. But when we don’t, special interests wheedle their way in and take our place.
Overall, Mounk’s book is as scholarly and well-argued as you’d expect from a Harvard professor, and though my mind wandered in spots, he was clear and concise enough that he held my attention most of the time. The concluding chapter was especially good, but before you embark on his book, I highly recommend his podcast. It’s a good way to get to understand his philosophy and discover whether he’s a voice you want more of. I most certainly do.
April 15, 2018
This is, so far, the best book that I have read on the global democratic crisis.
I say this for several reasons. First, it admits to the validity of the populist challenge. There has been a fundamental failure of a governing system to respond to the challenges and lives of voters.
Second, it notes that when liberal democracy weakens, there are two clear directions: illiberal democracy and liberal non-democracy. This analytic framework is useful, but it doesn't go far enough in connecting the fundamental critique of many people who support many of the populists. From their perspective, the liberal non-democracy is here. They voted for Trump because he was going to blow things up.
The backlash too Trump too often endorses and strengthens that liberal non-democracy. This analytic framework is much more helpful in describing what is happening.
It is less clear on the way out. As usual, it talks about campaign finance form and economic inequality but doesn't quite capture the cultural element of this critique. Solving clearly policy and economic problems is much easier than the harder cultural ones.
I say this for several reasons. First, it admits to the validity of the populist challenge. There has been a fundamental failure of a governing system to respond to the challenges and lives of voters.
Second, it notes that when liberal democracy weakens, there are two clear directions: illiberal democracy and liberal non-democracy. This analytic framework is useful, but it doesn't go far enough in connecting the fundamental critique of many people who support many of the populists. From their perspective, the liberal non-democracy is here. They voted for Trump because he was going to blow things up.
The backlash too Trump too often endorses and strengthens that liberal non-democracy. This analytic framework is much more helpful in describing what is happening.
It is less clear on the way out. As usual, it talks about campaign finance form and economic inequality but doesn't quite capture the cultural element of this critique. Solving clearly policy and economic problems is much easier than the harder cultural ones.
March 14, 2018
Adding context to the news and current events of the day, this writer makes sense of it all. I could barely put this book down. Mounk offers a well-researched explanation of why government is the way it is today. He offers a historical perspective that spans the world. He tends to current events in the context of the history of populism and postulates that while liberal democracy has kept government relatively stable for a span of years, its reign may be at an end. We may be reaching a place of illiberal democracy -- or undemocratic liberalism - both of which might devolve into authoritarianism. Why this matters, how it will change our world, and what to do is also part of this writing. I recommend this to every concerned citizen ( of all nations) -- especially those who are kept awake nights worrying about the day's news.
May 14, 2018
This will have to be the last Yascha Mounk book I read. Mounk has a knack for selecting timely subject matter for his books that address some of the hottest topics of the day, but with very little to say. Similar to the last book of his that I read, I find his arguments to be besides the point to the topic being addressed.
The People vs. Democracy is a study on the rise of populism & what Mounk sees as the breakdown of liberal democracy. Half of the book is used to spell out Mounk's premise that liberal democracy is deconsolidating into 2 opposing camps, "illiberal democracy/democracy without rights" & "undemocratic liberalism/rights without democracy." In the end Mounk has to accede that there has never existed a true, fully liberal democracy.
If this imperfection has always existed, I fail to see proof of the premise that this current iteration of populism is the potential doomsday breaking point to liberal democracy that Mounk makes it out to be. The only useful part I found in the first section was (& would have been better used to) demonstrate the recent rise in populism, though I have to add, some of the data was brow-raisingly questionable.*
Given that half of the book is to spent on the argument that liberal democracy is deconsolidating, there is a mere 135 pages to identify three social causes, "Origins," for the rise in populaism today & their "Remedies." Thus we have Mounk laughably "Fixing the Economy" in 20 pages! Move over Adam Smith, lol.
All in all, you might glean some interesting tidbits out of this book but nothing particularly revealing.
* For example, p 109-111, it is reported that 35% of "young, rich" Americans, ages 18-24, (apparently in 2011), favor military rule over democratic rule. And in 2017 50% of British youth prefer strongman rule over democratic rule. According to Mounk's data.
The People vs. Democracy is a study on the rise of populism & what Mounk sees as the breakdown of liberal democracy. Half of the book is used to spell out Mounk's premise that liberal democracy is deconsolidating into 2 opposing camps, "illiberal democracy/democracy without rights" & "undemocratic liberalism/rights without democracy." In the end Mounk has to accede that there has never existed a true, fully liberal democracy.
If this imperfection has always existed, I fail to see proof of the premise that this current iteration of populism is the potential doomsday breaking point to liberal democracy that Mounk makes it out to be. The only useful part I found in the first section was (& would have been better used to) demonstrate the recent rise in populism, though I have to add, some of the data was brow-raisingly questionable.*
Given that half of the book is to spent on the argument that liberal democracy is deconsolidating, there is a mere 135 pages to identify three social causes, "Origins," for the rise in populaism today & their "Remedies." Thus we have Mounk laughably "Fixing the Economy" in 20 pages! Move over Adam Smith, lol.
All in all, you might glean some interesting tidbits out of this book but nothing particularly revealing.
* For example, p 109-111, it is reported that 35% of "young, rich" Americans, ages 18-24, (apparently in 2011), favor military rule over democratic rule. And in 2017 50% of British youth prefer strongman rule over democratic rule. According to Mounk's data.
July 4, 2019
This is one of the best analysis of the populist threat to democracy that I have read. The writing is clear and accessible. It is obvious Mounk’s goal is to reach a wide audience and enlist them in a cause he cares passionately about... saving liberal democracy before it is too late!!
October 26, 2018
This joins a growing list of books convincing us of the threat to democracy. I think the threat is real, but I didn't read anything in this book that was at all new. Perhaps just the inclusion of the judiciary was an interesting insight in this one. In the end, the solution is to build trust, work locally, and take power away from some of these large government institutions.
December 14, 2023
Uff. Increíble lo profético de este libro en torno al fin del periodo de Trump.
El libro es un buen compendio sobre el peligro de los populismos y el desmoronamiento de las democracias liberales.
El libro es un buen compendio sobre el peligro de los populismos y el desmoronamiento de las democracias liberales.
December 6, 2018
This book should be read by every democratic enthusiast or every person interested by the age of democratic crisis that we cross. Very well written, accessible and wise, Yascha Mounk, a Harvard teacher, underlines the problems democracies face nowadays. Social media, economic stagnation, and identity crisis in reaction to globalization.
Furthermore, he wisely distinguish on one hand the DEMOCRACY WITHOUT RIGHTS, where a populist elected by people applies an anti-freedom policy such as Poland, Turkey or Brazil. Countries like US or France, even if they are facing this problem, it's more difficult to a Donald to reduce centuries of freedom habits. On the other hand you have RIGHTS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY where citizens enjoy freedom and have rights, but they do not take part of political decisions, they just vote every 4-6 years. It is the case in almost every western countries, especially in the European Union ruled by elected technocrats and bureaucrats.
That's the big problem, the split between the average citizen, who since decades vote for people who do not represent their self and do not identify their self with their president, deputies and senators. Then comes and outsider like Marine Le Pen who says : "I know that you had enough of this caste system, vote for me because I'm not like them", but populist are totally part of the game they criticize.
To return to the book, Yascha gives 3 solutions to solve the crisis. Domesticating nationalism, his solution is good, fixing the economy and renewing civic faith, but both solutions are too light and too superficial in my opinion. About economy, his solutions can be naive, for instance paying more the politicians will solve the corruption problem. Does he really thing that paying politicians more will end corruption ? Absolutely not, greed is a bottomless water well, tell that to Berlusconi, the richest Italian who had more legal corruption issues than Al Capone. About renewing civic faith, Yascha never mentionned the idea of involving citizens in the democratic decision procedure like in ancient Athens ? Instead of continuing to be ruled by a caste, why not empowering regular citizen to solve regular citizens problems ? How Donald or Macron, or a senator who as a student had more pocket money than my wife and me as workers, can understand me ? How can he understand and feel my daily issues for paying my basement rental, buying jeans only when on sales or paying a car insurance ? They are disconnected of 99% percent of the population.
To end my long commentary, it is a very good book, introducing this new concept of democracy without right and rights without democracy, he underlines solutions to solve the crisis but 2 solutions on 3 are too superficial. Furthermore, why not solving democracies problem, by transforming the democratic system ? Equity and empowerment of regular citizens to take part in the decisions. True democracy is direct democracy, it is Isocratie (Iso = equal + cratie = power) but we don't find this in the book, or not enough. For this, I highly recommend to read in addition and even before, "Against elections" by David Van Reybrouck, an historian who wrote this astonishing book, A REAL MUST !!!
Furthermore, he wisely distinguish on one hand the DEMOCRACY WITHOUT RIGHTS, where a populist elected by people applies an anti-freedom policy such as Poland, Turkey or Brazil. Countries like US or France, even if they are facing this problem, it's more difficult to a Donald to reduce centuries of freedom habits. On the other hand you have RIGHTS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY where citizens enjoy freedom and have rights, but they do not take part of political decisions, they just vote every 4-6 years. It is the case in almost every western countries, especially in the European Union ruled by elected technocrats and bureaucrats.
That's the big problem, the split between the average citizen, who since decades vote for people who do not represent their self and do not identify their self with their president, deputies and senators. Then comes and outsider like Marine Le Pen who says : "I know that you had enough of this caste system, vote for me because I'm not like them", but populist are totally part of the game they criticize.
To return to the book, Yascha gives 3 solutions to solve the crisis. Domesticating nationalism, his solution is good, fixing the economy and renewing civic faith, but both solutions are too light and too superficial in my opinion. About economy, his solutions can be naive, for instance paying more the politicians will solve the corruption problem. Does he really thing that paying politicians more will end corruption ? Absolutely not, greed is a bottomless water well, tell that to Berlusconi, the richest Italian who had more legal corruption issues than Al Capone. About renewing civic faith, Yascha never mentionned the idea of involving citizens in the democratic decision procedure like in ancient Athens ? Instead of continuing to be ruled by a caste, why not empowering regular citizen to solve regular citizens problems ? How Donald or Macron, or a senator who as a student had more pocket money than my wife and me as workers, can understand me ? How can he understand and feel my daily issues for paying my basement rental, buying jeans only when on sales or paying a car insurance ? They are disconnected of 99% percent of the population.
To end my long commentary, it is a very good book, introducing this new concept of democracy without right and rights without democracy, he underlines solutions to solve the crisis but 2 solutions on 3 are too superficial. Furthermore, why not solving democracies problem, by transforming the democratic system ? Equity and empowerment of regular citizens to take part in the decisions. True democracy is direct democracy, it is Isocratie (Iso = equal + cratie = power) but we don't find this in the book, or not enough. For this, I highly recommend to read in addition and even before, "Against elections" by David Van Reybrouck, an historian who wrote this astonishing book, A REAL MUST !!!
June 21, 2018
Forgot how I came across author Mounk (article? interview?) but his book sounded intriguing, especially in light of current events. An examination of the ills facing liberal democracy and what can be done in order to save it. He looks at the United States, European countries and looks at the roles of various things like social media, money and more.
I have to say, I thought this was just a lot of words telling me quite a bit of what I already knew, that would have been better set as a magazine or newspaper longread. There are plenty of facts and figures and certainly history I did not know, but at the same time it was still rather lacking.
For example, racism does not get a focus that might be required of an examination like this. It only has a few mentions in the index, although I suppose it could be part of his discussion of immigration. But racism has a rather particular role in the history of the United States and so it was disappointing to see this discussion left out.
Overall it seems like there a lot of words dedicated to a subject the author still couldn't quite cover and/or tried a little too hard to be broad. I can only really speak from a US-centric POV but trying to apply his thesis so broadly across such a wide range of countries didn't work for me. I also have been following others in social media and read other books and so it just seemed like quite a bit of repetition or stuff I've read/heard of before.
Borrowed from the library and that was best.
I have to say, I thought this was just a lot of words telling me quite a bit of what I already knew, that would have been better set as a magazine or newspaper longread. There are plenty of facts and figures and certainly history I did not know, but at the same time it was still rather lacking.
For example, racism does not get a focus that might be required of an examination like this. It only has a few mentions in the index, although I suppose it could be part of his discussion of immigration. But racism has a rather particular role in the history of the United States and so it was disappointing to see this discussion left out.
Overall it seems like there a lot of words dedicated to a subject the author still couldn't quite cover and/or tried a little too hard to be broad. I can only really speak from a US-centric POV but trying to apply his thesis so broadly across such a wide range of countries didn't work for me. I also have been following others in social media and read other books and so it just seemed like quite a bit of repetition or stuff I've read/heard of before.
Borrowed from the library and that was best.
January 22, 2020
This is a timely and important book that is well worth reading for anyone who cares about preserving liberal democracy as the best form of government yet devised. I can't begin to do justice to Mounk's analysis and arguments here, so I'm offering just a few snippets.
Mounk suggests that the conditions that fostered liberal democracy, including steady improvements in the standard of living, relatively homogeneous populations, and control of mass communications by the establishment, have all eroded. Populist movements promise simple answers to some of the issues presented by this new social and economic order. But ultimately, they are often dangerous to liberal democracy, as they are prone to devolve into "democracy without rights," autocracy, or even dictatorship. Even the United States has shown itself susceptible to the lure of this dangerous populism with the election of Donald Trump as President.
Mounk proposes various remedies to preserve liberal democracy. For one thing, he argues that it's critical to restore the primacy of civic education. He quotes James Madison's advice that democratic self-rule requires knowledgeable citizens. "His fears about what would happen to America if it neglected this crucial task sound oddly apposite today: 'a popular government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both.'" Apposite indeed.
Mounk suggests that the conditions that fostered liberal democracy, including steady improvements in the standard of living, relatively homogeneous populations, and control of mass communications by the establishment, have all eroded. Populist movements promise simple answers to some of the issues presented by this new social and economic order. But ultimately, they are often dangerous to liberal democracy, as they are prone to devolve into "democracy without rights," autocracy, or even dictatorship. Even the United States has shown itself susceptible to the lure of this dangerous populism with the election of Donald Trump as President.
Mounk proposes various remedies to preserve liberal democracy. For one thing, he argues that it's critical to restore the primacy of civic education. He quotes James Madison's advice that democratic self-rule requires knowledgeable citizens. "His fears about what would happen to America if it neglected this crucial task sound oddly apposite today: 'a popular government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both.'" Apposite indeed.
May 3, 2018
I have no idea what is the category to which this book belongs. It is not propaganda, because it is messy and unclear. It is not precisely academic writing as Mounk moves like popcorn late 20th century Eastern Germany, 19th century USA, cherry picking the pieces to argue what? Something about fear and things not being like Mounk privately remembers.
Want to read
July 8, 2018Another Fukuyama...
http://www.ips-journal.eu/regions/glo...
http://www.ips-journal.eu/regions/glo...
September 28, 2023
Yascha Mounk's The People vs. Democracy serves as an excellent summary of the contemporary challenges facing democratic systems.
Mounk asserts that, in today’s democracies, there is a prevalence of what he terms “undemocratic liberalism” – a political system that guarantee rights, but lack in democracy. In that context, citizens often feel deeply alienated from national politics, perceiving politicians as a separate class detached from their everyday concerns.
This perceived lack of democracy gives rise to populism, which can transform undemocratic liberalism into “illiberal democracy” – a form of democracy lacking in rights. Populist leaders appear to fulfil the wishes of those who elected them – or at least they give the impression that they tried to –, while gradually eroding the country’s liberal institutions. Notable examples include Poland, Hungary, and the United States under Trump. Over time, this erosion can pose a threat to democracy itself, potentially turning an illiberal democracy into an authoritarian state. Mounk’s examples are Venezuela and Turkey.
While The People vs. Democracy may not offer groundbreaking new insights, Mounk’s skillful writing makes for an enjoyable and engaging read.
Mounk asserts that, in today’s democracies, there is a prevalence of what he terms “undemocratic liberalism” – a political system that guarantee rights, but lack in democracy. In that context, citizens often feel deeply alienated from national politics, perceiving politicians as a separate class detached from their everyday concerns.
This perceived lack of democracy gives rise to populism, which can transform undemocratic liberalism into “illiberal democracy” – a form of democracy lacking in rights. Populist leaders appear to fulfil the wishes of those who elected them – or at least they give the impression that they tried to –, while gradually eroding the country’s liberal institutions. Notable examples include Poland, Hungary, and the United States under Trump. Over time, this erosion can pose a threat to democracy itself, potentially turning an illiberal democracy into an authoritarian state. Mounk’s examples are Venezuela and Turkey.
While The People vs. Democracy may not offer groundbreaking new insights, Mounk’s skillful writing makes for an enjoyable and engaging read.
Read
June 11, 2018An unfortunate thing about this book is that the “why our freedom is in danger” part is thorough, wide-ranging and convincing while the “and how to save it” part feels a bit dashed-off and wildly inadequate. Maybe that is just 2018. This book is useful in helping find the through-lines that connect Trump and European populist movements. Nothing is sui generis and nothing comes out of nowhere.
August 7, 2018
Of the dozens of books I have read on the crisis of democracy amidst the resurgence of nationalist populism across the West, The People vs. Democracy excels in discussing causes and possible alternative futures.
It reminds us that “democracy” can actually take many forms other than the one with which we are acquainted in the United States. One of these – direct rule by the majority – is the form students of classical politics feared and denounced until modern time. Nor did America’s Founders want “the people” to rule directly.
The type of democracy with which Americans – and, indeed, most Westerners – are familiar, on the other hand, is a mix of indirect rule – by the people through elected representatives – and norms of civil behavior and ideals embodied in classical liberalism that developed from the Enlightenment of the 18th century, such as freedom of the press, and the right of all citizens’ to free speech, to peacefully assemble and petition, and to equal status and protection under the law.
But these are not all respected in illiberal or populist-type “democracies” that offer democracy without rights, in which the trappings of democracy are retained but, in fact, are governed by an autocrat supported by some of the people (as is the case in Turkey, Hungary, and Venezuela today). Other countries, in which classical liberalism had deeper roots, but where the wishes of the majority are mostly not followed today – such as in much of Europe and the United States – offer some rights but without democracy.
“Liberal democracy,” Mounk warns, “is now decomposing into its component parts, giving rise to illiberal democracy on the one side and undemocratic liberalism on the other.” This poses current “an existential danger to the very survival of liberal democracy.”
Mounk notes that while “there is a genuinely democratic element to populism, it is also, in the long run, much more inimical to respect for the popular will than its defenders claim.” As has happened in Turkey, Russia, or Venezuela, “the rise of illiberal strongmen can often be a prelude to autocratic rule: once the media has been muzzled and independent institutions have been abolished, it is easy for illiberal rulers to make the transition from populism to dictatorship.”
The Nature of Populism, and Characteristic Tactics of Populist Leaders
1. Populism mixes democratic and illiberal elements: Populist does express the frustrations of many of “the people” but it does so in a manner that undermines liberal institutions. “And to understand its likely effect,” Mounk warns, “we must bear in mind that these liberal institutions are, in the long run, needed for democracy to survive: once populist leaders have done away with all the liberal roadblocks that impede the expression of the popular will, it becomes very easy for them to disregard the people when its preferences start to come into conflict with their own.”
2. Populists rely upon “glib, facile solutions”: “Voters do not like to think that the world is complicated. They certainly do not like to be told that there is no immediate answer to their problems. Faced with politicians who seem to be less and less able to govern an increasingly complex world, many are increasingly willing to vote for anybody who promises a simple solution.” Unfortunately, however, the solutions populists usually offer are not only too simple and unrealistic to actually work, but which are also “likely to exacerbate the problems that drove public anger in the first place.”
3. Populists equate “the people” with a subset of the total population: As is clear in Trump’s tweets and speeches, he is always appealing to in-group that is “united around a shared ethnicity, religion, social class, or political conviction,” while denouncing the out-group because its values and objectives are unworthy. For populists, not all who are citizens are worthy of being included among “the people.”
4. For populists, their people occupy the moral high-ground while their opponents are the threat: Since populists claim that only they have a “moral monopoly of representation,” Trump repeatedly derides and degrades persons and groups that he designates as dangerous, threatening, or an obstacle preventing him from achieving “the people’s” wishes. He also, as Mounk says is common once populists achieve office, constantly attacks all societal or governmental institutions that dare to contest his views. In fact, Trump recently instructed his followers to “ignore all the crap you see and hear” and, instead, rely solely upon him for the truth.
5. Populists are also always on the attack mode: This is a tactic designed to gradually undermine – at least in the minds of their followers – the legitimacy of any person, group, or institution that resists them. This is, Mounk asserts, because populists “realize how dangerous intermediary institutions with a real claim to representing the views and interests of large segments of society are to the fiction that they, and they alone, speak for the people.” Their most ruthless attacks, he notes, are on those governmental institutions that in any way impede the implementation of their plan. As is evident in the language against others used by Trump and his agents, “politics quickly becomes an existential struggle between the real people and their enemies. For that reason, populists on both the left and the right are likely to turn increasingly illiberal as their power grows. Over time, they come to regard anybody who disagrees with them as a traitor and conclude that any institution that stands in their way is an illegitimate perversion of the peoples’ will. Both have to be done away with.”
The Reasons Why Nationalist Populists Are in the Ascendency in the US and Europe
1. The Erosion of Checks and Balances and Growing Disregard for the Wishes of the Majority
Mounk then turns to identifying many decades-long trends that others have also noted, many of them self-identified classic conservatives. Unlike today’s hard-Right ideologues, this kind of conservative was fiscally cautious and insisted on the need to preserve the institutions and hard-won lessons of the past. While they needed to be convinced on the need for any substantive change, they were principled persons who could be swayed by facts and logic. And, always, they sought to maintain and strengthen the important institutions and traditions without which the power of the state could grow unchecked.
Over the past half-century, such conservatives frequently warned about what they considered the excessive expansion of executive power against the shrinkage of legislative prerogatives.
Mounk [in italics] agrees with many of their most important points:
Over the past decades, political elites have insulated themselves from popular views to a remarkable extent.
While the system was never set up to let the people rule, it did have important elements of popular participation. Most political decisions were made by an elected legislature. And many of these legislators had deep links with their constituents: they came from all parts of the country and had close connections with local associations, from churches to trade unions....
Today, this is true for very few professional politicians. The legislature, once the most important political organ, has lost much of its power to courts, to bureaucrats, to central banks, and to international treaties and organizations. Meanwhile, the people who make up the legislature have...become less and less similar to the people they are meant to represent: nowadays, few of them have strong ties to their local communities and even fewer have a deep commitment to a structuring ideology....
The cumulative result has been a creeping erosion of democracy: as more and more areas of public policy have been taken out of popular contestation, the people’s ability to influence politics has been drastically curtailed....
Government agencies have become increasingly influential in the design of laws passed by [legislatures]. At the same time, they have increasingly taken on the role of quasi-legislators, gaining the authority to design and implement broad rules in key areas like financial or environmental regulation. Taken together, these two developments mean that a vast share of the rules to which ordinary citizens are subject are now written, implemented, and sometimes initiated by unelected officials.
In fact, “independent agencies are now responsible for the vast majority of laws, rules, and regulations....it is simply not clear that voters enjoy any real form of oversight over the rules by which they are bound.” The most powerful such agency is the European Commission.
While independent agencies accomplish crucial tasks not easily performed by other institutions, it is difficult to deny that they take important decisions out of political contestation.
The role of the courts, too, has greatly expanded, especially through the process of judicial review in which courts assess the alleged constitutionality of laws passed by elected assemblies. Clearly, this has brought with it immense good, the protection of vulnerable minorities and checking impassioned majorities. However, the simple truth is that it takes many issues on which ordinary people have strong opinions out of political contestation.
2. The Way in Which Money, Permeating Everything, Subjugates Majority Will
Legislators, although elected by the people, have become increasingly insulated from average citizens. Effective rule by the wealthy minority is a direct consequence of politicians’ need for growing amounts of money and weak controls over contributions and reporting of donations.
There is an obvious connection between politicians needing lots of money and those most able to supply it in quantity —the wealthy elite. Legislators must spend a considerable amount of their time, even when Congress is in session, attempting to raise money. Even if specific votes are not promised in exchange for monetary donations, those contributing large sums know that they are effectively buying access to influential legislators. In addition, the small army of lobbyists that swarm Capitol Hill and the halls of state legislators provide wealthy and corporate donors additional opportunities to influence legislators’ positions on issues.
The Supreme Court decision in Citizens United unleashed even more millions of dollars allowing wealthy interests to sway voters, advance their preferred candidates, and promote issues favorable to them, often in a manner that prevents the rest of us from knowing the amount individual donors made. One of its many deleterious consequences was to further overwhelm contributions from unions and public interest groups, let alone those of average citizens.
Over the past several decades, politicians have become increasingly disconnected from average citizens. The need for them to be constantly seeking contributions for the next election is part of the reason, but it is also because they quickly assimilate the views of those with whom they spend the most time – their partisan colleagues and the representatives of the wealthy and corporate interests.
3. The Erosion of Other Cultural Norms and Institutions that Have Weakened Communal Solidarity
Like others, Mounk reviews the multiple factors that he believes have most contributed to the current state of affairs, including:
● The decline of print media and the substitution of electronic media that, at its best, cannot provide in-depth understanding of any issue and, at its worst, deliberately obfuscates or spins alternative narratives and interpretations based loosely, if at all, on “facts”;
● The cancerous spread of single-issue groups that insist that their respective issue(s) — and their own position on them — must take precedence over all else, and the accompanying cynical usage of these issues by politicians who manipulate them while also exaggerating the supposed threats post by opponents and by “outsiders”;
● The troubling tendency in recent decades of Americans to “self-sort” themselves into like-thinking social groups, work environments, and even the communities where they choose to live, further contributing to the ideological echo-chamber that makes mutual cooperation increasingly difficult and rare;
● The rise of think tanks, ideologically-driven agendas, and media factories whose true commitment is to herding people into tribal groups and, once there, keeping them enraged at the other; and
● The spinelessness of so many elected and appointed officials who have abandoned their constitutional pledges to protect the institutions and norms essential for the survival of democratic republicanism.
At bottom, it is the failure of allegedly democratic governments to meet the needs of its people that paves the way for autocracy. Since all the mechanisms of the federal government — and, increasingly, a growing number of state governments, too — have become more distant from, and less influenced by, “the people,” it is no surprise that citizens trust politicians and government substantially less than they did only 40 years ago. Increasingly, such citizens are open to “strongman leaders” who promise to speak for “the people” and to implement their agenda.
Remedies
We all:
1. Have to “take to the streets to show that populists don’t speak in the name of the whole people,” and fight to preserve the basic norms of liberal democracy.
2. Must work to “peel off” some of the supporters of populist leaders, including those holding positions in government. Despite the appearance of unanimity among a populist’s supporters, there is always division over differences, even discomfort with some of the tactics or goals chosen. But unless one speaks “the language of ordinary people” and addresses their issues, this will remain a largely impossible task.
3. Must not make the mistake of defending the status quo, for the way things are is the reason for populist successes in the first place. Present a vision of real change, one that carries a positive, uplifting, and hopeful message. While it is true that populists are initially successful by using angry denunciations and fostering tribal divisions, most people yearn for — and will respond to — more positive leadership.
4. Need to unite around a common conception of our nation, to give each other “real hope for their economic future; and to make them more resistant to the lies and the hate they encounter on social media each and every day. It is these immense challenges that will define our fight against populist, and for a better society, in the decades to come.”
5. Must find a way to successfully “domesticate” nationalism, a necessity in a time when nationalism is in clear ascendency once more. The postwar years lulled many into thinking that nation-states were less important than building regional and international cooperative arrangements.
• Part of the reason was the reaction against the great harm that aggressive nationalism did to the world in the first half of the 20th century — the United Nations, NATO, and the development of the European Common Market were tangible responses to this impulse.
• And part was also because the dramatic expansion of truly global trade called for the establishment of broad “rules of the game” that would allow trade to expand without adversely effecting some trading partners. Most of these initiatives, if not outright proposals by the United States, nonetheless imitated American models of government, law, and commerce.
However, as governments turned away from “the people” in the latter part of the century, economic hardships on the part of some rekindled old tribal feelings because, it seemed, some were clearly doing better than they were and, as always, culprits were sought, and populists were happy to help “the people” find the guilty party. As always in humanity’s sorry history of fear of “the other” in our midst, those identified as responsible were ethnic or religious minorities and more recent immigrants. In addition, those very regional and international institutions that had for so long brought peace and prosperity to formally warring states now also became targets of anger by “forcing” immigration upon states and, because of their international bureaucracies, for ignoring national wishes by allegedly favoring various cosmopolitan “elites.”
So “Brexit” should not have been such a surprise, nor the rise of right-wing parties throughout Europe. Feeding on the legitimate grievances of the people, they are more than happy to stir up old racial, regional, and inter-, as was all intra-, state grievances.
The challenge for the United States, in particular, is actually as old as the Republic — to realize the ringing promises of the Declaration of Independence for all of us, not just some of us. Throughout our relatively short history, we have wrestled with multiple prejudices: against people of color, people whose languages, religions or customs were different than “ours,” and the most recent wave of immigrants. On this last point it is truly sad that as a land of immigrants, we who arrived earlier have shown repeatedly that we distrust and dislike those who happen to be arriving now. You don’t have to scratch far below the excuse that it is only a reaction to illegal immigrants to recognize the larger truth.
In short, Mounk argues, the best chance “for bending the arc of history toward justice” is to use the symbols of liberal republic to bind us together, rather than to react by rejecting all patriotism as limiting and reactionary. The Left, in particular, must heed this warning for, in reacting to Trump in the US, it can veer close to rejecting “flag and country” symbols that are dear to Trump’s followers and, rightly understood, should be dear to the rest of us, too.
We also need to recognize that the basis for many of Trump’s followers’ complaints and concerns is legitimate. It is not helpful to react against those concerns just because Trump’s expression of them is so ugly. We should all support just immigration laws, for instance, and recognize that nations need to have some say over who enters their borders and in what volume. In so doing, we can invite those on the other side to consider how we can also have just and humane laws on sanctuary for refugees fleeing hardship or oppression. These are matters too important to be left just to the courts or, for that matter, to any “administration.” A truly democratic resolution of the issue — with which, admittedly, many will not fully concur — is called for.
Furthermore, the concerns that “the future is darker” for many Americans — especially as they see it for their children — is a valid concern and an accurate understanding of where current economic trends — as well as political and tax policies — are taking us. Words of sympathy are of little use; vigorous, corrective action would be.
The challenge, for all of us, is to “forge a new language of inclusive patriotism,” recognizing that in our multi-cultural tradition “the ties that bind go well beyond ethnicity and religion.” But while language is important, we must also rebuild a genuine sense of community among and between all Americans open to it by bringing the blessings of justice and fairness to all. This will require political and economic reforms of a fundamental nature.
And, lastly, we need to confront the many ways we are failing each other in allowing for the continual erosion of civic faith. Some hard questions are called for.
It reminds us that “democracy” can actually take many forms other than the one with which we are acquainted in the United States. One of these – direct rule by the majority – is the form students of classical politics feared and denounced until modern time. Nor did America’s Founders want “the people” to rule directly.
The type of democracy with which Americans – and, indeed, most Westerners – are familiar, on the other hand, is a mix of indirect rule – by the people through elected representatives – and norms of civil behavior and ideals embodied in classical liberalism that developed from the Enlightenment of the 18th century, such as freedom of the press, and the right of all citizens’ to free speech, to peacefully assemble and petition, and to equal status and protection under the law.
But these are not all respected in illiberal or populist-type “democracies” that offer democracy without rights, in which the trappings of democracy are retained but, in fact, are governed by an autocrat supported by some of the people (as is the case in Turkey, Hungary, and Venezuela today). Other countries, in which classical liberalism had deeper roots, but where the wishes of the majority are mostly not followed today – such as in much of Europe and the United States – offer some rights but without democracy.
“Liberal democracy,” Mounk warns, “is now decomposing into its component parts, giving rise to illiberal democracy on the one side and undemocratic liberalism on the other.” This poses current “an existential danger to the very survival of liberal democracy.”
Mounk notes that while “there is a genuinely democratic element to populism, it is also, in the long run, much more inimical to respect for the popular will than its defenders claim.” As has happened in Turkey, Russia, or Venezuela, “the rise of illiberal strongmen can often be a prelude to autocratic rule: once the media has been muzzled and independent institutions have been abolished, it is easy for illiberal rulers to make the transition from populism to dictatorship.”
The Nature of Populism, and Characteristic Tactics of Populist Leaders
1. Populism mixes democratic and illiberal elements: Populist does express the frustrations of many of “the people” but it does so in a manner that undermines liberal institutions. “And to understand its likely effect,” Mounk warns, “we must bear in mind that these liberal institutions are, in the long run, needed for democracy to survive: once populist leaders have done away with all the liberal roadblocks that impede the expression of the popular will, it becomes very easy for them to disregard the people when its preferences start to come into conflict with their own.”
2. Populists rely upon “glib, facile solutions”: “Voters do not like to think that the world is complicated. They certainly do not like to be told that there is no immediate answer to their problems. Faced with politicians who seem to be less and less able to govern an increasingly complex world, many are increasingly willing to vote for anybody who promises a simple solution.” Unfortunately, however, the solutions populists usually offer are not only too simple and unrealistic to actually work, but which are also “likely to exacerbate the problems that drove public anger in the first place.”
3. Populists equate “the people” with a subset of the total population: As is clear in Trump’s tweets and speeches, he is always appealing to in-group that is “united around a shared ethnicity, religion, social class, or political conviction,” while denouncing the out-group because its values and objectives are unworthy. For populists, not all who are citizens are worthy of being included among “the people.”
4. For populists, their people occupy the moral high-ground while their opponents are the threat: Since populists claim that only they have a “moral monopoly of representation,” Trump repeatedly derides and degrades persons and groups that he designates as dangerous, threatening, or an obstacle preventing him from achieving “the people’s” wishes. He also, as Mounk says is common once populists achieve office, constantly attacks all societal or governmental institutions that dare to contest his views. In fact, Trump recently instructed his followers to “ignore all the crap you see and hear” and, instead, rely solely upon him for the truth.
5. Populists are also always on the attack mode: This is a tactic designed to gradually undermine – at least in the minds of their followers – the legitimacy of any person, group, or institution that resists them. This is, Mounk asserts, because populists “realize how dangerous intermediary institutions with a real claim to representing the views and interests of large segments of society are to the fiction that they, and they alone, speak for the people.” Their most ruthless attacks, he notes, are on those governmental institutions that in any way impede the implementation of their plan. As is evident in the language against others used by Trump and his agents, “politics quickly becomes an existential struggle between the real people and their enemies. For that reason, populists on both the left and the right are likely to turn increasingly illiberal as their power grows. Over time, they come to regard anybody who disagrees with them as a traitor and conclude that any institution that stands in their way is an illegitimate perversion of the peoples’ will. Both have to be done away with.”
The Reasons Why Nationalist Populists Are in the Ascendency in the US and Europe
1. The Erosion of Checks and Balances and Growing Disregard for the Wishes of the Majority
Mounk then turns to identifying many decades-long trends that others have also noted, many of them self-identified classic conservatives. Unlike today’s hard-Right ideologues, this kind of conservative was fiscally cautious and insisted on the need to preserve the institutions and hard-won lessons of the past. While they needed to be convinced on the need for any substantive change, they were principled persons who could be swayed by facts and logic. And, always, they sought to maintain and strengthen the important institutions and traditions without which the power of the state could grow unchecked.
Over the past half-century, such conservatives frequently warned about what they considered the excessive expansion of executive power against the shrinkage of legislative prerogatives.
Mounk [in italics] agrees with many of their most important points:
Over the past decades, political elites have insulated themselves from popular views to a remarkable extent.
While the system was never set up to let the people rule, it did have important elements of popular participation. Most political decisions were made by an elected legislature. And many of these legislators had deep links with their constituents: they came from all parts of the country and had close connections with local associations, from churches to trade unions....
Today, this is true for very few professional politicians. The legislature, once the most important political organ, has lost much of its power to courts, to bureaucrats, to central banks, and to international treaties and organizations. Meanwhile, the people who make up the legislature have...become less and less similar to the people they are meant to represent: nowadays, few of them have strong ties to their local communities and even fewer have a deep commitment to a structuring ideology....
The cumulative result has been a creeping erosion of democracy: as more and more areas of public policy have been taken out of popular contestation, the people’s ability to influence politics has been drastically curtailed....
Government agencies have become increasingly influential in the design of laws passed by [legislatures]. At the same time, they have increasingly taken on the role of quasi-legislators, gaining the authority to design and implement broad rules in key areas like financial or environmental regulation. Taken together, these two developments mean that a vast share of the rules to which ordinary citizens are subject are now written, implemented, and sometimes initiated by unelected officials.
In fact, “independent agencies are now responsible for the vast majority of laws, rules, and regulations....it is simply not clear that voters enjoy any real form of oversight over the rules by which they are bound.” The most powerful such agency is the European Commission.
While independent agencies accomplish crucial tasks not easily performed by other institutions, it is difficult to deny that they take important decisions out of political contestation.
The role of the courts, too, has greatly expanded, especially through the process of judicial review in which courts assess the alleged constitutionality of laws passed by elected assemblies. Clearly, this has brought with it immense good, the protection of vulnerable minorities and checking impassioned majorities. However, the simple truth is that it takes many issues on which ordinary people have strong opinions out of political contestation.
2. The Way in Which Money, Permeating Everything, Subjugates Majority Will
Legislators, although elected by the people, have become increasingly insulated from average citizens. Effective rule by the wealthy minority is a direct consequence of politicians’ need for growing amounts of money and weak controls over contributions and reporting of donations.
There is an obvious connection between politicians needing lots of money and those most able to supply it in quantity —the wealthy elite. Legislators must spend a considerable amount of their time, even when Congress is in session, attempting to raise money. Even if specific votes are not promised in exchange for monetary donations, those contributing large sums know that they are effectively buying access to influential legislators. In addition, the small army of lobbyists that swarm Capitol Hill and the halls of state legislators provide wealthy and corporate donors additional opportunities to influence legislators’ positions on issues.
The Supreme Court decision in Citizens United unleashed even more millions of dollars allowing wealthy interests to sway voters, advance their preferred candidates, and promote issues favorable to them, often in a manner that prevents the rest of us from knowing the amount individual donors made. One of its many deleterious consequences was to further overwhelm contributions from unions and public interest groups, let alone those of average citizens.
Over the past several decades, politicians have become increasingly disconnected from average citizens. The need for them to be constantly seeking contributions for the next election is part of the reason, but it is also because they quickly assimilate the views of those with whom they spend the most time – their partisan colleagues and the representatives of the wealthy and corporate interests.
3. The Erosion of Other Cultural Norms and Institutions that Have Weakened Communal Solidarity
Like others, Mounk reviews the multiple factors that he believes have most contributed to the current state of affairs, including:
● The decline of print media and the substitution of electronic media that, at its best, cannot provide in-depth understanding of any issue and, at its worst, deliberately obfuscates or spins alternative narratives and interpretations based loosely, if at all, on “facts”;
● The cancerous spread of single-issue groups that insist that their respective issue(s) — and their own position on them — must take precedence over all else, and the accompanying cynical usage of these issues by politicians who manipulate them while also exaggerating the supposed threats post by opponents and by “outsiders”;
● The troubling tendency in recent decades of Americans to “self-sort” themselves into like-thinking social groups, work environments, and even the communities where they choose to live, further contributing to the ideological echo-chamber that makes mutual cooperation increasingly difficult and rare;
● The rise of think tanks, ideologically-driven agendas, and media factories whose true commitment is to herding people into tribal groups and, once there, keeping them enraged at the other; and
● The spinelessness of so many elected and appointed officials who have abandoned their constitutional pledges to protect the institutions and norms essential for the survival of democratic republicanism.
At bottom, it is the failure of allegedly democratic governments to meet the needs of its people that paves the way for autocracy. Since all the mechanisms of the federal government — and, increasingly, a growing number of state governments, too — have become more distant from, and less influenced by, “the people,” it is no surprise that citizens trust politicians and government substantially less than they did only 40 years ago. Increasingly, such citizens are open to “strongman leaders” who promise to speak for “the people” and to implement their agenda.
Remedies
We all:
1. Have to “take to the streets to show that populists don’t speak in the name of the whole people,” and fight to preserve the basic norms of liberal democracy.
2. Must work to “peel off” some of the supporters of populist leaders, including those holding positions in government. Despite the appearance of unanimity among a populist’s supporters, there is always division over differences, even discomfort with some of the tactics or goals chosen. But unless one speaks “the language of ordinary people” and addresses their issues, this will remain a largely impossible task.
3. Must not make the mistake of defending the status quo, for the way things are is the reason for populist successes in the first place. Present a vision of real change, one that carries a positive, uplifting, and hopeful message. While it is true that populists are initially successful by using angry denunciations and fostering tribal divisions, most people yearn for — and will respond to — more positive leadership.
4. Need to unite around a common conception of our nation, to give each other “real hope for their economic future; and to make them more resistant to the lies and the hate they encounter on social media each and every day. It is these immense challenges that will define our fight against populist, and for a better society, in the decades to come.”
5. Must find a way to successfully “domesticate” nationalism, a necessity in a time when nationalism is in clear ascendency once more. The postwar years lulled many into thinking that nation-states were less important than building regional and international cooperative arrangements.
• Part of the reason was the reaction against the great harm that aggressive nationalism did to the world in the first half of the 20th century — the United Nations, NATO, and the development of the European Common Market were tangible responses to this impulse.
• And part was also because the dramatic expansion of truly global trade called for the establishment of broad “rules of the game” that would allow trade to expand without adversely effecting some trading partners. Most of these initiatives, if not outright proposals by the United States, nonetheless imitated American models of government, law, and commerce.
However, as governments turned away from “the people” in the latter part of the century, economic hardships on the part of some rekindled old tribal feelings because, it seemed, some were clearly doing better than they were and, as always, culprits were sought, and populists were happy to help “the people” find the guilty party. As always in humanity’s sorry history of fear of “the other” in our midst, those identified as responsible were ethnic or religious minorities and more recent immigrants. In addition, those very regional and international institutions that had for so long brought peace and prosperity to formally warring states now also became targets of anger by “forcing” immigration upon states and, because of their international bureaucracies, for ignoring national wishes by allegedly favoring various cosmopolitan “elites.”
So “Brexit” should not have been such a surprise, nor the rise of right-wing parties throughout Europe. Feeding on the legitimate grievances of the people, they are more than happy to stir up old racial, regional, and inter-, as was all intra-, state grievances.
The challenge for the United States, in particular, is actually as old as the Republic — to realize the ringing promises of the Declaration of Independence for all of us, not just some of us. Throughout our relatively short history, we have wrestled with multiple prejudices: against people of color, people whose languages, religions or customs were different than “ours,” and the most recent wave of immigrants. On this last point it is truly sad that as a land of immigrants, we who arrived earlier have shown repeatedly that we distrust and dislike those who happen to be arriving now. You don’t have to scratch far below the excuse that it is only a reaction to illegal immigrants to recognize the larger truth.
In short, Mounk argues, the best chance “for bending the arc of history toward justice” is to use the symbols of liberal republic to bind us together, rather than to react by rejecting all patriotism as limiting and reactionary. The Left, in particular, must heed this warning for, in reacting to Trump in the US, it can veer close to rejecting “flag and country” symbols that are dear to Trump’s followers and, rightly understood, should be dear to the rest of us, too.
We also need to recognize that the basis for many of Trump’s followers’ complaints and concerns is legitimate. It is not helpful to react against those concerns just because Trump’s expression of them is so ugly. We should all support just immigration laws, for instance, and recognize that nations need to have some say over who enters their borders and in what volume. In so doing, we can invite those on the other side to consider how we can also have just and humane laws on sanctuary for refugees fleeing hardship or oppression. These are matters too important to be left just to the courts or, for that matter, to any “administration.” A truly democratic resolution of the issue — with which, admittedly, many will not fully concur — is called for.
Furthermore, the concerns that “the future is darker” for many Americans — especially as they see it for their children — is a valid concern and an accurate understanding of where current economic trends — as well as political and tax policies — are taking us. Words of sympathy are of little use; vigorous, corrective action would be.
The challenge, for all of us, is to “forge a new language of inclusive patriotism,” recognizing that in our multi-cultural tradition “the ties that bind go well beyond ethnicity and religion.” But while language is important, we must also rebuild a genuine sense of community among and between all Americans open to it by bringing the blessings of justice and fairness to all. This will require political and economic reforms of a fundamental nature.
And, lastly, we need to confront the many ways we are failing each other in allowing for the continual erosion of civic faith. Some hard questions are called for.
October 18, 2018
Liberal democracy has served as the governing principle in the US during an era of unprecedented peace, freedom and prosperity. The spread of democracy throughout the world since WWII was hailed as a leading indicator of human progress. In fact, in The End of History and the Last Man Francis Fukuyama argued that the advent of Western liberal democracy represents the pinnacle, and end point, of human governance (because of its fundamental superiority over all other systems). Yet here we are only a few decades later as the political system that many have taken for granted is losing ground to authoritarian populism in the US and around the globe.
To comprehend the terms of the debate, it’s important to have an understanding of a few basic phrases.
The first is ‘liberal democracy’, which is also sometimes referred to as ‘western democracy’. A liberal democracy is a form of government characterized by elections between multiple distinct political parties, a separation of powers into different branches of government, the rule of law in everyday life as part of an open society, and the equal protection of human rights, civil rights, civil liberties and political freedoms for all people. The phrase derives its meaning from the terms ‘liberal’, in the sense of classical liberalism (which advocates for civil liberties), and ‘democracy’, in the form of the representative democracy we’re all familiar with.
The second is ‘authoritarian populism’, a system of governance which combines the desire for a strong central leader with a belief that society is divided into two groups: self-serving elites and good, ordinary people. The authoritarian populist claims to speak on behalf of the people in contrast to various out-groups: immigrants, racial and ethnic minorities, and anyone who disagree with them. Exclusionary rhetoric is employed to enhance these divisions. Checks and balances (such as laws and limits to power) are seen as roadblocks to the authoritarian’s will and viewed with contempt.
The strategy employed by authoritarian populists to gain power is one that has been demonstrably effective throughout history:
1. Create a mythic past and sense of nostalgia for a past that is racially pure, traditional and patriarchal
2. Sow divisions among the populace
3. Attack the truth
It should be noted that authoritarian populist movements can be a product of either left or right wing ideologies. However, the current incarnation in the US and Europe consists of the latter.
In The People vs. Democracy Yascha Mounk (a German-American political scientist who works as a lecturer at Harvard University) attempts to explain and offer solutions to the radical and sudden political shift from liberal democracy to authoritarian populism. Mounk fears we are headed towards one of two scenarios … a system of “democracy without rights” (i.e. an illiberal democracy) or one of “rights without democracy” (i.e. undemocratic liberalism). The former would be characterized by a tyranny of the majority and a trampling the rights of minorities and the powerless. The latter by a dictatorial approach to public policy that does not reflect the will of the people (such as forced austerity measures in some EU countries).
Liberal democracy thrived after WWII within the context of broad social and economic gains. However, 30 years of rising income inequality has brought with it a growing sense of disillusionment of democratic governance. Many people no longer believe that public policy is enacted in their best interests, and the evidence suggests that they are correct. A study published by researchers from Princeton and Northwestern Universities concluded that:
“When the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy.”
Because the system is broken, citizens are turning to alternatives (authoritarian populism on the right, and democratic socialism on the left).
Mounk credits three primary causes for this trend:
1. The rise of social media, which allows for an insular propagation of self-reinforcing narratives that are free of disconfirming facts.
2. Increasing levels of income inequality and a stagnation of wages for those at the bottom, providing a strong basis for discontent as well as the opportunity for the very wealthy to skew public policy in their favor.
3. Changing demographics. Specifically, the fear and hostility resulting from increasing immigrant populations (foreign-born residents made up 13.7% of the U.S. population in 2017, up from 5.4% in 1960).
Mounk then goes on to propose a few solutions, but I found these to be fairly conventional and rather than recount them here I’ll simply refer you to the book, which I’d recommend that you read.
Here’s the key point … authoritarianism represents an existential threat to liberal democracy. Even if you are thrilled by the idea of lower taxes for the wealthy, curtailment of immigration, imposition of tariffs, relaxation of regulations, or the gutting of Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare … the price to be paid, in the form of tyranny, will prove to be costly indeed.
If you are inclined to dismiss such claims as mere fearmongering, all you have to do is listen to what they actually say. Tyranny happens by degrees. Today’s chants of ‘lock her up’ become tomorrow’s criminalization of political dissent. Today’s demonization of the free press, becomes tomorrow’s suppression of free speech, assassination of journalists, and a fawning state-run media. Today’s claims that ‘the election is rigged’ becomes tomorrow���s refusal to concede power. Hard as it is to believe, there are those in the US (more than I would ever have thought possible) who would gleefully cheer such developments … and you know all too well this is true. Those who believe (in the words of Sinclair Lewis) that “it can’t happen here”, simply haven’t been paying attention.
Our system of governance is far from perfect, but it can be fixed. We can elect thoughtful, pragmatic politicians with the ability to solve problems while respecting political norms. The sacrifice we need to make today, that of placing country over party in the coming elections, seems relatively small indeed compared with the ultimate price many have paid for our freedoms. Yet the cause is no less important than that which others have fought and died for … the preservation of our liberal democracy and the opportunity for the country’s citizens to chart their own destiny.
To comprehend the terms of the debate, it’s important to have an understanding of a few basic phrases.
The first is ‘liberal democracy’, which is also sometimes referred to as ‘western democracy’. A liberal democracy is a form of government characterized by elections between multiple distinct political parties, a separation of powers into different branches of government, the rule of law in everyday life as part of an open society, and the equal protection of human rights, civil rights, civil liberties and political freedoms for all people. The phrase derives its meaning from the terms ‘liberal’, in the sense of classical liberalism (which advocates for civil liberties), and ‘democracy’, in the form of the representative democracy we’re all familiar with.
The second is ‘authoritarian populism’, a system of governance which combines the desire for a strong central leader with a belief that society is divided into two groups: self-serving elites and good, ordinary people. The authoritarian populist claims to speak on behalf of the people in contrast to various out-groups: immigrants, racial and ethnic minorities, and anyone who disagree with them. Exclusionary rhetoric is employed to enhance these divisions. Checks and balances (such as laws and limits to power) are seen as roadblocks to the authoritarian’s will and viewed with contempt.
The strategy employed by authoritarian populists to gain power is one that has been demonstrably effective throughout history:
1. Create a mythic past and sense of nostalgia for a past that is racially pure, traditional and patriarchal
2. Sow divisions among the populace
3. Attack the truth
It should be noted that authoritarian populist movements can be a product of either left or right wing ideologies. However, the current incarnation in the US and Europe consists of the latter.
In The People vs. Democracy Yascha Mounk (a German-American political scientist who works as a lecturer at Harvard University) attempts to explain and offer solutions to the radical and sudden political shift from liberal democracy to authoritarian populism. Mounk fears we are headed towards one of two scenarios … a system of “democracy without rights” (i.e. an illiberal democracy) or one of “rights without democracy” (i.e. undemocratic liberalism). The former would be characterized by a tyranny of the majority and a trampling the rights of minorities and the powerless. The latter by a dictatorial approach to public policy that does not reflect the will of the people (such as forced austerity measures in some EU countries).
Liberal democracy thrived after WWII within the context of broad social and economic gains. However, 30 years of rising income inequality has brought with it a growing sense of disillusionment of democratic governance. Many people no longer believe that public policy is enacted in their best interests, and the evidence suggests that they are correct. A study published by researchers from Princeton and Northwestern Universities concluded that:
“When the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy.”
Because the system is broken, citizens are turning to alternatives (authoritarian populism on the right, and democratic socialism on the left).
Mounk credits three primary causes for this trend:
1. The rise of social media, which allows for an insular propagation of self-reinforcing narratives that are free of disconfirming facts.
2. Increasing levels of income inequality and a stagnation of wages for those at the bottom, providing a strong basis for discontent as well as the opportunity for the very wealthy to skew public policy in their favor.
3. Changing demographics. Specifically, the fear and hostility resulting from increasing immigrant populations (foreign-born residents made up 13.7% of the U.S. population in 2017, up from 5.4% in 1960).
Mounk then goes on to propose a few solutions, but I found these to be fairly conventional and rather than recount them here I’ll simply refer you to the book, which I’d recommend that you read.
Here’s the key point … authoritarianism represents an existential threat to liberal democracy. Even if you are thrilled by the idea of lower taxes for the wealthy, curtailment of immigration, imposition of tariffs, relaxation of regulations, or the gutting of Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare … the price to be paid, in the form of tyranny, will prove to be costly indeed.
If you are inclined to dismiss such claims as mere fearmongering, all you have to do is listen to what they actually say. Tyranny happens by degrees. Today’s chants of ‘lock her up’ become tomorrow’s criminalization of political dissent. Today’s demonization of the free press, becomes tomorrow’s suppression of free speech, assassination of journalists, and a fawning state-run media. Today’s claims that ‘the election is rigged’ becomes tomorrow���s refusal to concede power. Hard as it is to believe, there are those in the US (more than I would ever have thought possible) who would gleefully cheer such developments … and you know all too well this is true. Those who believe (in the words of Sinclair Lewis) that “it can’t happen here”, simply haven’t been paying attention.
Our system of governance is far from perfect, but it can be fixed. We can elect thoughtful, pragmatic politicians with the ability to solve problems while respecting political norms. The sacrifice we need to make today, that of placing country over party in the coming elections, seems relatively small indeed compared with the ultimate price many have paid for our freedoms. Yet the cause is no less important than that which others have fought and died for … the preservation of our liberal democracy and the opportunity for the country’s citizens to chart their own destiny.
January 25, 2020
As I was reading, I kept thinking: "Huh. Never thought about it this way." and "Why didn't I think about it this way?"
This kind of reminds me of Harari's "21 Lessons for the 21st Century" (just kinda) but it's a little more focused on the political aspect of it. Interesting perspectives on the current political climate with
good historical context. Very timely. Will read this again in 10 years for fun if the world hasn't ended by then.
This kind of reminds me of Harari's "21 Lessons for the 21st Century" (just kinda) but it's a little more focused on the political aspect of it. Interesting perspectives on the current political climate with
good historical context. Very timely. Will read this again in 10 years for fun if the world hasn't ended by then.
March 25, 2021
O autor identifica os problemas e fragilidades da democracia liberal, ilustrando com exemplos atuais (faltou o Brasil). Mas a conclusão deixa a desejar.
June 14, 2018
Yascha Mounk’s “The People vs. Democracy” is an outstanding analysis of the roots of our current political situation. It is a rare book that combines the best of the fox and hedgehog approach to organizing knowledge. The Fox is an animating thesis that Democracy (i.e., popular choice) and Liberalism (i.e., protections for minorities, freedom of expression, other rights) are two different concepts that only happen to have gone together but that either of them can also override the other. At the same time, Mounk does not offer a single explanation/solution but instead provides a thoughtful and nuanced argument for three of the major theories floating around: immigration, economics and social media. Finally, Mounk offers a range of solutions.
I cannot understate how well organized Mounk’s book is with a clear statement of its thesis, a roadmap to the chapters, and then all of them fitting together logically into different sections. In the course of this Mounk draws liberally from examples around the world, but especially from the United States and Europe, as well as from some of the political science literature.
Overall I found Mounk’s diagnosis of the problem original and compelling, his explanation of the causes of the problem sensible but not as convincing as I would have liked, his solutions also sensible but possibly not sufficient, and his predictions highly implausible. Let me take these in turn.
For the diagnosis, separating out the concepts of democracy and liberalism and describing how their coexistence has been more of a fortunate coincidence than an inevitable outcome is one way this book will change my perspective going forward, along with the ways that an excess of democracy can overcome liberalism (e.g., people voting for leaders who limit rights or even directly voting to limit rights, like Switzerland’s referendum that banned the construction of minarets). But also ways that liberalism can limit democracy, particularly through the expansion of the administrative state, judicial review, and international treaties—all of which come together in something like the European Commission. (Although I would note that Mounk talks about controversy over the Democratic legitimacy of bureaucratic rules or the Supreme Court, but it is not like everyone happily accepts the Affordable Care Act because it came to us through the democratic process.)
For explanation, I am personally sympathetic to Mounk’s argument that liberal Democracy thrived because it coincided with economic advancement, communications were limited to oligopolistic providers of news/information, and nation states were monotonic or had dominant ethnicities. The flip side of this is that economic slowdowns, social media and immigration all move the other way. But I wish that Mounk did more to prove this. He is right that you can’t just do simple data correlating presence of immigrants or income with votes, but that leaves him with less testable hypotheses. Moreover, what about earlier periods of slower growth in American history or the advent of radio which transformed communications or the different trajectories of immigration in different countries?
For cure, I liked just about all of Mounk’s ideas. But even if we adopted all of his economic prescriptions, for example, it would not radically transform growth/incomes. And some ideas might actually increase tensions, like expanding social supports which may exacerbate resentments.
Finally, on prediction, I wish Mounk would define what he means by ending liberal democracy and put a probability on it. I myself would put a probability close to zero on any of the following in the United States: the government shutting down major media publications or universities or think tanks or websites, elections being suspended and rule is continued without them, or a President remaining in office for 12 years, or even a single political party controlling the Presidency and both houses of Congress for 12 straight years. I’m not sure if Mounk is putting higher odds on one/all of these outcomes or else is defining the end of liberal democracy in a much less severe way than this, it would be worth being clearer on it so we can better assess whether or not the predictions have come true.
I cannot understate how well organized Mounk’s book is with a clear statement of its thesis, a roadmap to the chapters, and then all of them fitting together logically into different sections. In the course of this Mounk draws liberally from examples around the world, but especially from the United States and Europe, as well as from some of the political science literature.
Overall I found Mounk’s diagnosis of the problem original and compelling, his explanation of the causes of the problem sensible but not as convincing as I would have liked, his solutions also sensible but possibly not sufficient, and his predictions highly implausible. Let me take these in turn.
For the diagnosis, separating out the concepts of democracy and liberalism and describing how their coexistence has been more of a fortunate coincidence than an inevitable outcome is one way this book will change my perspective going forward, along with the ways that an excess of democracy can overcome liberalism (e.g., people voting for leaders who limit rights or even directly voting to limit rights, like Switzerland’s referendum that banned the construction of minarets). But also ways that liberalism can limit democracy, particularly through the expansion of the administrative state, judicial review, and international treaties—all of which come together in something like the European Commission. (Although I would note that Mounk talks about controversy over the Democratic legitimacy of bureaucratic rules or the Supreme Court, but it is not like everyone happily accepts the Affordable Care Act because it came to us through the democratic process.)
For explanation, I am personally sympathetic to Mounk’s argument that liberal Democracy thrived because it coincided with economic advancement, communications were limited to oligopolistic providers of news/information, and nation states were monotonic or had dominant ethnicities. The flip side of this is that economic slowdowns, social media and immigration all move the other way. But I wish that Mounk did more to prove this. He is right that you can’t just do simple data correlating presence of immigrants or income with votes, but that leaves him with less testable hypotheses. Moreover, what about earlier periods of slower growth in American history or the advent of radio which transformed communications or the different trajectories of immigration in different countries?
For cure, I liked just about all of Mounk’s ideas. But even if we adopted all of his economic prescriptions, for example, it would not radically transform growth/incomes. And some ideas might actually increase tensions, like expanding social supports which may exacerbate resentments.
Finally, on prediction, I wish Mounk would define what he means by ending liberal democracy and put a probability on it. I myself would put a probability close to zero on any of the following in the United States: the government shutting down major media publications or universities or think tanks or websites, elections being suspended and rule is continued without them, or a President remaining in office for 12 years, or even a single political party controlling the Presidency and both houses of Congress for 12 straight years. I’m not sure if Mounk is putting higher odds on one/all of these outcomes or else is defining the end of liberal democracy in a much less severe way than this, it would be worth being clearer on it so we can better assess whether or not the predictions have come true.
January 31, 2019
Comentario general:
Habiéndolo leído luego de "Cómo mueren las democracias", me pareció una respuesta mucho más completa y convincente que ese libro, siendo de una extensión similar. Hasta ahora, de lo mejor que he leído en libros recientes que hablan sobre el decaimiento democrático (y qué hacer al respecto).
La tesis central es que la democracia liberal [aquella cuyas instituciones reflejan la voluntad mayoritaria del Pueblo, pero a la vez protegen los derechos individuales y de las minorías] fue posible durante un tiempo, pero hoy pareciera estar descomponiéndose en "democracia iliberal" o "liberalismo no-democrático".
Esta des-consolidación de la democracia liberal estaría originada en su incapacidad de seguir proveyendo una mejora material en la calidad de vida de las personas (al menos al ritmo del siglo XX), el influjo de las redes sociales y medios de comunicación difusos y difíciles de controlar, y las ansiedades provenientes de una creciente diversidad étnica en sectores geográficos tradicionalmente mono-étnicos. Además, la influencia del dinero en la política y un aislamiento y homogenización cada vez mayor de los representantes políticos frente a sus representados, también contribuirían a la desafección democrática. La última parte del libro ensaya algunas respuestas frente a estos desafíos.
Puntos destacados:
*Es interesante que no sólo busque una respuesta al repliegue democrático en el sistema político, sino que también en ciertas fuerzas más estructurales. Particularmente verosímil parece ser el punto de que las personas nunca han tenido la mejor opinión de los políticos y la política, pero adhirieron a la democracia mientras ésta se tradujo en un impensable progreso económico. Hoy, en cambio, muchos creen que sus hijos estarán peor.
*Creo que el autor acierta en la valoración de los dos productos de la "descomposición" de la democracia liberal: la democracia iliberal y el liberalismo anti-democrático. Sobre el primero, a diferencia de muchos autores, Mounk reconoce una cierta energía democrática -aunque torcida y últimamente temporal- al populismo. Creo que es un punto de vista necesario para quienes pretender competir con él y ganarle. ¿Qué de bueno/cierto/necesario hay ahí? No creo que una alternativa política que busque vencerlo o evitarlo pueda hacerlo simplemente condenándolo. Por otra parte, el autor también defiende la necesidad de cierto liberalismo anti-democrático, reconociendo la labor de jueces y organismos internacionales que han sido efectivos en proteger los derechos de grupos de personas cuando la voluntad mayoritaria lo hubiera impedido, o en resolver asuntos complejos de política pública, que requieren expertise técnica. Ambos entonces tienen parte de verdad y de justicia, pero fácilmente pueden desbocarse sin su contrapeso.
*El joven autor de Harvard propone en la última parte una serie de políticas que parecieran ayudar a domesticar o revertir las fuerzas que empujan hacia la desconsolidación democrática. Las propuestas -varias, aunque no todas de la mayor profundidad- van desde la concepción de un patriotismo inclusivo a políticas de vivienda, y pueden ser un aporte interesante a los hacedores de políticas.
Puntos débiles:
*No me convenció del todo su definición de democracia y liberalismo (así como su conjunción, en la democracia liberal). Tampoco están muy desarrollados en el libro estos conceptos, por lo que son una definición que aparece rápidamente y debe ser dada por hecho. ¿Es la democracia sólo instituciones que reflejan la voluntad mayoritaria? ¿Es el liberalismo solamente tener respeto por los derechos individuales y de las minorías? ¿Podemos desintegrar tan fácilmente la democracia y liberalismo, siendo que la primera -al menos en su versión moderna- va de la mano históricamente del segundo?
*Las propuestas de la tercera parte efectivamente son muy interesantes, aunque para algunos podrían ser también superficiales. Mounk busca arreglar "lo que hay", sin plantearse mayores innovaciones en el andamiaje de las instituciones democráticas contemporáneas.
Habiéndolo leído luego de "Cómo mueren las democracias", me pareció una respuesta mucho más completa y convincente que ese libro, siendo de una extensión similar. Hasta ahora, de lo mejor que he leído en libros recientes que hablan sobre el decaimiento democrático (y qué hacer al respecto).
La tesis central es que la democracia liberal [aquella cuyas instituciones reflejan la voluntad mayoritaria del Pueblo, pero a la vez protegen los derechos individuales y de las minorías] fue posible durante un tiempo, pero hoy pareciera estar descomponiéndose en "democracia iliberal" o "liberalismo no-democrático".
Esta des-consolidación de la democracia liberal estaría originada en su incapacidad de seguir proveyendo una mejora material en la calidad de vida de las personas (al menos al ritmo del siglo XX), el influjo de las redes sociales y medios de comunicación difusos y difíciles de controlar, y las ansiedades provenientes de una creciente diversidad étnica en sectores geográficos tradicionalmente mono-étnicos. Además, la influencia del dinero en la política y un aislamiento y homogenización cada vez mayor de los representantes políticos frente a sus representados, también contribuirían a la desafección democrática. La última parte del libro ensaya algunas respuestas frente a estos desafíos.
Puntos destacados:
*Es interesante que no sólo busque una respuesta al repliegue democrático en el sistema político, sino que también en ciertas fuerzas más estructurales. Particularmente verosímil parece ser el punto de que las personas nunca han tenido la mejor opinión de los políticos y la política, pero adhirieron a la democracia mientras ésta se tradujo en un impensable progreso económico. Hoy, en cambio, muchos creen que sus hijos estarán peor.
*Creo que el autor acierta en la valoración de los dos productos de la "descomposición" de la democracia liberal: la democracia iliberal y el liberalismo anti-democrático. Sobre el primero, a diferencia de muchos autores, Mounk reconoce una cierta energía democrática -aunque torcida y últimamente temporal- al populismo. Creo que es un punto de vista necesario para quienes pretender competir con él y ganarle. ¿Qué de bueno/cierto/necesario hay ahí? No creo que una alternativa política que busque vencerlo o evitarlo pueda hacerlo simplemente condenándolo. Por otra parte, el autor también defiende la necesidad de cierto liberalismo anti-democrático, reconociendo la labor de jueces y organismos internacionales que han sido efectivos en proteger los derechos de grupos de personas cuando la voluntad mayoritaria lo hubiera impedido, o en resolver asuntos complejos de política pública, que requieren expertise técnica. Ambos entonces tienen parte de verdad y de justicia, pero fácilmente pueden desbocarse sin su contrapeso.
*El joven autor de Harvard propone en la última parte una serie de políticas que parecieran ayudar a domesticar o revertir las fuerzas que empujan hacia la desconsolidación democrática. Las propuestas -varias, aunque no todas de la mayor profundidad- van desde la concepción de un patriotismo inclusivo a políticas de vivienda, y pueden ser un aporte interesante a los hacedores de políticas.
Puntos débiles:
*No me convenció del todo su definición de democracia y liberalismo (así como su conjunción, en la democracia liberal). Tampoco están muy desarrollados en el libro estos conceptos, por lo que son una definición que aparece rápidamente y debe ser dada por hecho. ¿Es la democracia sólo instituciones que reflejan la voluntad mayoritaria? ¿Es el liberalismo solamente tener respeto por los derechos individuales y de las minorías? ¿Podemos desintegrar tan fácilmente la democracia y liberalismo, siendo que la primera -al menos en su versión moderna- va de la mano históricamente del segundo?
*Las propuestas de la tercera parte efectivamente son muy interesantes, aunque para algunos podrían ser también superficiales. Mounk busca arreglar "lo que hay", sin plantearse mayores innovaciones en el andamiaje de las instituciones democráticas contemporáneas.
February 7, 2020
Catchy title for a book, don't you think? I mean, why would the people be against democracy? Some of the answer comes from the definition of democracy, or in the case of this book, the definition of liberal democracy, which is not a left-leaning democracy, but rather one that consolidates the popular will (democracy) with the rights of all (liberalism).
Most of this book is spent describing what democracy without rights and rights without democracy look like, and why these “deconsolidated democracies” have come about in the past few years. How is it that the majority of voters in a heretofore liberal democracy would choose a leader with no respect for the rule of law, or conversely, that the elites (intellectual, technological, or financial) in a similar society would decide that in the name of progress it’s OK to ignore the will of the people? The crux of Mounk’s argument is both phenomena happen because people don’t believe liberal democracies are working for them, and in fact, they often aren’t. A lot of commentators point to economic factors as causes of the current upheaval, but Mounk discusses social and cultural ones as well.
So reading the first 180 pages of this book was very helpful to me in that it helped answer a question I’ve had since November of 2016: what would make people so desperate they would vote for Donald Trump for President of the United States? As a bonus Mounk discusses threats to liberal democracies old and new all over the world, which ended up being both enlightening and depressing.
A five-star read for sure, just for the amount of things I learned and for Mounk’s generally clear-eyed, even-handed view of history. However, I do have a couple of quibbles. One is that even though this purports to be an account of both “democracy without rights” and “rights without democracy,” the book describes a lot more threats from populists than from bureaucrats. Similarly, although Mounk says authoritarians come from both sides of the political spectrum, we mostly see examples from the right, not the left. The other is that I didn’t find the “Remedies” section of the book very convincing. I’m glad it was included, and I can see the merit of a lot of the proposals, but unlike the earlier chapters where Mounk drew a clear line between this social cause and that political effect, he didn’t present any evidence that his suggestions would actually stem the tide. The best he could manage to say is that these are things we’re not doing now, which makes them sound more like shots in the dark than proven solutions
Most of this book is spent describing what democracy without rights and rights without democracy look like, and why these “deconsolidated democracies” have come about in the past few years. How is it that the majority of voters in a heretofore liberal democracy would choose a leader with no respect for the rule of law, or conversely, that the elites (intellectual, technological, or financial) in a similar society would decide that in the name of progress it’s OK to ignore the will of the people? The crux of Mounk’s argument is both phenomena happen because people don’t believe liberal democracies are working for them, and in fact, they often aren’t. A lot of commentators point to economic factors as causes of the current upheaval, but Mounk discusses social and cultural ones as well.
So reading the first 180 pages of this book was very helpful to me in that it helped answer a question I’ve had since November of 2016: what would make people so desperate they would vote for Donald Trump for President of the United States? As a bonus Mounk discusses threats to liberal democracies old and new all over the world, which ended up being both enlightening and depressing.
A five-star read for sure, just for the amount of things I learned and for Mounk’s generally clear-eyed, even-handed view of history. However, I do have a couple of quibbles. One is that even though this purports to be an account of both “democracy without rights” and “rights without democracy,” the book describes a lot more threats from populists than from bureaucrats. Similarly, although Mounk says authoritarians come from both sides of the political spectrum, we mostly see examples from the right, not the left. The other is that I didn’t find the “Remedies” section of the book very convincing. I’m glad it was included, and I can see the merit of a lot of the proposals, but unlike the earlier chapters where Mounk drew a clear line between this social cause and that political effect, he didn’t present any evidence that his suggestions would actually stem the tide. The best he could manage to say is that these are things we’re not doing now, which makes them sound more like shots in the dark than proven solutions
July 14, 2018
Liked the first half of the book a lot, where he defines populism and discusses its history and manifestations in different places and times. Also really thought his discussion of “liberal democracies” was good, especially the conflicts that arise when the majority of voters oppose protections for minorities.
The latter half of the book, where he proposes strategies and fixes, seemed a lot weaker.
The latter half of the book, where he proposes strategies and fixes, seemed a lot weaker.
August 31, 2018
A thorough and readable analysis of the threats on liberal democracy. Yascha Mounk explores the tensions between liberalism and democracy (how you can have illiberal democracies and non-democratic liberalism), the social and economic factors that gives rise to populism, and more. Though the focus is on the U.S., the book reflects on worldwide trends, using examples from around the world, and offers optimistic and pessimistic readings of the future. Mounk also provides some interesting analysis of how anti-immigrant sentiment can be especially strong in places that don't have many immigrants, plus a helpful comparison of the differences between U.S. and European-style multiculturalism. I appreciated the thoughtful discussion of growing polarization within the U.S. and careful evaluation of free speech, cultural appropriation, social media, nationalism and more.
August 25, 2019
Good book as a basic introduction but it is much too simplistic, lacking any depth. I do like how Mounk phrases things, he does a great job in framing the difference between liberalism and Democracy.
June 4, 2021
Gostei muito do livro. A discussão e preocupação a respeito do avanço populista em todo o mundo é muito relevante, e há uma boa identificação embasada sobre os fatores causadores desse processo. No entanto, achei o autor um pouco vago ao tratar de possíveis soluções para todo esse problema.
July 14, 2019
Hé! Dat boek heb jij toch ook? Aan het woord is mijn vrouw. Plaats van spreken is de kerk van Midsland op Terschelling, tijdens Oerol een paar weken geleden. We waren met mijn broertje en zijn vrouw daar naartoe. Cadeau van ons voor hen voor hun huwelijk nog. We waren alleen vergeten om van tevoren tickets voor voorstellingen te kopen. Oeps. Gelukkig is er de mogelijkheid om ter plaatse nog in te slaan, maar de meest bekende/populaire shows waren steeds uitverkocht. Nou ja, zo ontdek je nog eens iets. Aldus belandden we bij In Search Of Democracy 3.0 van Stichting Nieuwe Helden. Tijdens de voorstelling krijgen we een opfriscursus politicologie en staatsinrichting (weet je nog: demos en kratein?), gevolgd door allerlei stellingen over onze democratie en tenslotte nog een overzicht van allerlei initiatieven van over de hele wereld die zijn gestart om de democratie te vernieuwen. De zaal was bepaald niet verlegen en al gauw werden allerlei discussies gevoerd. Geweldige middag al met al, want hoe vaak sta je stil bij een dergelijk onderwerp? Nog leuker was dat we de hele avond ook nog hebben volgekletst met elkaar over democratie en aanverwante onderwerpen. Over politiek spreken is één, maar het is eigenlijk nog veel boeiender om een stap dieper te kijken. Pas dan begrijp je de wereld om je heen echt beter. Aanrader dus als onderwerp voor tijdens een etentje of zo :).
Maar goed, dat boek. Helemaal aan het begin van de show gaven de acteurs/presentatoren aan dat de show was geïnspireerd op The People vs. Democracy, het boek dat ik afgelopen jaar aan Sinterklaas had gevraagd. Hoe ik er bij kwam weet ik niet meer, wellicht uit een voetnoot van No Is Not Enough van Naomi Klein? Ik weet het niet meer. Maar het boek dat onderop de stapel op mijn nachtkastje lag moest direct worden gepakt toen we weer thuis waren. Meestal doe ik vervolgens wel even over een dergelijk werk, in feite een studieboek, maar nu - een week of drie later - heb ik het dus al verslonden. Wat heeft Mould mijn ogen geopend over de opkomst van het populisme, de wings van Trump, het success van Baudelaire, etc. In mijn omgeving wordt de opkomst van het populisme onbegrijpelijk gevonden en ook niet gezien als zo'n grote dreiging voor Nederland. Ik vrees dat we wakker moeten worden en allemaal heel rappoklappo dit boek moeten lezen. Want anders stonden we erbij en keken we ernaar...
De analyse van de verslechterende staat van de liberale democratie is briljant in zijn eenvoud. Overal ter wereld zie je het populisme opkomen. Hierbij maakt het niet zoveel uit of het rechts (Haider, Orban, Trump, Wilders) of links (Tsipras, Grillo) populisme is. Overal roepen dergelijke lieden dat zij de echte wil van het volk vertegenwoordigen. En natuurlijk dat de bestaande machthebbers daar onvoldoende naar hebben geluisterd. Bij grote volksstammen vinden zij een gewillig oor. Eenmaal aan de macht tornen zij echter aan de individuele vrijheden. Want ja, de macht van het volk betekent in feite dat de meerderheid bepaalt, ten koste van minderheden die niet langer beschermd worden. Tegelijk wordt iedere vorm van oppositie stap voor stap ingedamd, kijk bijvoorbeeld naar Erdogan. In feite is ongecontroleerde democratie, de meerderheid van het volk bepaalt dus, een heel eng systeem. Niet voor niets zijn westerse samenlevingen ontworpen als liberale democratieën. Het volk krijgt de kans om haar vertegenwoordigers te kiezen of weg te stemmen, maar wel binnen de grenzen van verworvenheden als de vrijheid van meningsuiting, vergadering en godsdienst en heel expliciet de bescherming van minderheden. Wat je nu ziet is dat we afglijden, vaak heel bewust gestuurd door de nieuwe populistische leiders, richting een illiberale democratie (geen bescherming van rechten meer). Daarnaast is er de rechtsstaat zonder democratie, zoals de EU en tenslotte de autoritaire staat (Rusland onder Poetin).
Maar waarom geef ik geen vijf sterren aan het boek? Omdat Mould eigenlijk ook niet weet hoe we de liberale democratie kunnen redden. Hij komt ook niet echt verder dan wat naïeve uitingen en hoopt erop dat er voldoende positieve krachten bestaan in de wereld. Het is natuurlijk ook allemaal noet zo simpel, maar hopelijk heeft hij in de volgende druk een paar nieuwe goede ideeën opgenomen. We gaan het zien. Wat we volgens mij vanaf nu elke dag moeten doen? Elke mogelijke bedreiging van onze individuele vrijheden moet veel meer voorpaginanieuws zijn en we moeten het onderling ook veel meer hebben over dit soort bedreigingen van onze vrijheid. En laten we vooral blijven stemmen op gevestigde politieke partijen. Hoewel niet perfect, zijn we met dergelijke ervaren partijen en politici honderd keer beter af dan wanneer het volk regeert, dan wanneer de wil van de meerderheid in de meest zuivere vorm wordt omgezet in beleid. Geloof je dit niet? Kijk dan even op twitter wat het volk wil...
Maar goed, dat boek. Helemaal aan het begin van de show gaven de acteurs/presentatoren aan dat de show was geïnspireerd op The People vs. Democracy, het boek dat ik afgelopen jaar aan Sinterklaas had gevraagd. Hoe ik er bij kwam weet ik niet meer, wellicht uit een voetnoot van No Is Not Enough van Naomi Klein? Ik weet het niet meer. Maar het boek dat onderop de stapel op mijn nachtkastje lag moest direct worden gepakt toen we weer thuis waren. Meestal doe ik vervolgens wel even over een dergelijk werk, in feite een studieboek, maar nu - een week of drie later - heb ik het dus al verslonden. Wat heeft Mould mijn ogen geopend over de opkomst van het populisme, de wings van Trump, het success van Baudelaire, etc. In mijn omgeving wordt de opkomst van het populisme onbegrijpelijk gevonden en ook niet gezien als zo'n grote dreiging voor Nederland. Ik vrees dat we wakker moeten worden en allemaal heel rappoklappo dit boek moeten lezen. Want anders stonden we erbij en keken we ernaar...
De analyse van de verslechterende staat van de liberale democratie is briljant in zijn eenvoud. Overal ter wereld zie je het populisme opkomen. Hierbij maakt het niet zoveel uit of het rechts (Haider, Orban, Trump, Wilders) of links (Tsipras, Grillo) populisme is. Overal roepen dergelijke lieden dat zij de echte wil van het volk vertegenwoordigen. En natuurlijk dat de bestaande machthebbers daar onvoldoende naar hebben geluisterd. Bij grote volksstammen vinden zij een gewillig oor. Eenmaal aan de macht tornen zij echter aan de individuele vrijheden. Want ja, de macht van het volk betekent in feite dat de meerderheid bepaalt, ten koste van minderheden die niet langer beschermd worden. Tegelijk wordt iedere vorm van oppositie stap voor stap ingedamd, kijk bijvoorbeeld naar Erdogan. In feite is ongecontroleerde democratie, de meerderheid van het volk bepaalt dus, een heel eng systeem. Niet voor niets zijn westerse samenlevingen ontworpen als liberale democratieën. Het volk krijgt de kans om haar vertegenwoordigers te kiezen of weg te stemmen, maar wel binnen de grenzen van verworvenheden als de vrijheid van meningsuiting, vergadering en godsdienst en heel expliciet de bescherming van minderheden. Wat je nu ziet is dat we afglijden, vaak heel bewust gestuurd door de nieuwe populistische leiders, richting een illiberale democratie (geen bescherming van rechten meer). Daarnaast is er de rechtsstaat zonder democratie, zoals de EU en tenslotte de autoritaire staat (Rusland onder Poetin).
Maar waarom geef ik geen vijf sterren aan het boek? Omdat Mould eigenlijk ook niet weet hoe we de liberale democratie kunnen redden. Hij komt ook niet echt verder dan wat naïeve uitingen en hoopt erop dat er voldoende positieve krachten bestaan in de wereld. Het is natuurlijk ook allemaal noet zo simpel, maar hopelijk heeft hij in de volgende druk een paar nieuwe goede ideeën opgenomen. We gaan het zien. Wat we volgens mij vanaf nu elke dag moeten doen? Elke mogelijke bedreiging van onze individuele vrijheden moet veel meer voorpaginanieuws zijn en we moeten het onderling ook veel meer hebben over dit soort bedreigingen van onze vrijheid. En laten we vooral blijven stemmen op gevestigde politieke partijen. Hoewel niet perfect, zijn we met dergelijke ervaren partijen en politici honderd keer beter af dan wanneer het volk regeert, dan wanneer de wil van de meerderheid in de meest zuivere vorm wordt omgezet in beleid. Geloof je dit niet? Kijk dan even op twitter wat het volk wil...
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
November 3, 2021
On page 150 of the book, Mounk cited a very fitting quote by George Orwell: “Whoever is winning at the moment will always seem to be invincible”. I think this quote represents not only the feeling that many people have about the rise of populism, but also a key driving force behind this book – to challenge the sense of inevitability and invincibility of the decline of democracy by offering “a clear and trenchant analysis of what ails our democracy and what it will take to get it back on track”.
Indeed, I think Mounk did a very good job in the Introduction and Part One of his book to debunk two big assumptions that shaped have our “political imagination”: (1) the idea that rich countries in which the government had repeatedly changed hands through free and fair elections would forever remain democratic and (2) liberalism and democracy make a cohesive whole (see pp. 5-6, 97-98). Regarding the former, Mounk provided countless examples of democratic backsliding and democratically elected populist leaders dismantling democratic institutions and norms. As for the latter, Mounk made what I think is a very enlightening observation: “the mutual dependence of liberalism and democracy shows just how quickly dysfunction in one aspect of our politics can breed dysfunction in another” and that “this slow divergence of liberalism and democracy may be exactly what is now happening” (p. 6). He then goes on in Part One to expand on this second big assumption, distinguishing “illiberal democracy” (democracy without rights) and “undemocratic liberalism” (rights without democracy).
In general, I found this distinction between illiberal democracy and undemocratic liberalism to be very convincing. Further, I appreciated how Mounk overtly acknowledged the democraticness of populism and the liberalness of elitism, as well as the illiberalness and undemocraticness of them respectively. For example, on page 52, Mounk wrote: “I also fear that the refusal to acknowledge that there is something democratic about the energy that propels them [populists] to power in the first place stops us from understanding the nature of their appeal – and makes it more difficult to think carefully and creatively about how to stop them…it is impossible to understand their nature without acknowledging the democratic energy that is driving them – and yet it is also impossible to understand what damage they are likely to wreak without recognizing how quickly that energy can turn against the people”.
In Part Two, Mounk identified three origins of this rise of illiberal democracies and undemocratic liberalism. Among them, I found his chapter on “identity” to be the most interesting. At one point, in discussing the relationship between immigration and populism, he noted that “the most fundamental transition in the lives of most citizens might take place when they start having to deal with immigrants on a regular basis, not when the number of immigrants with whom they interact on a regular basis increases” (p. 171). I think this observation is key to understanding why areas with high levels of immigration may not be supportive of populism, but rather embracive of pluralism. In the same chapter, Mounk discussed a very interesting concept of what he called “the rise of post-post-materialist voters” (p. 181). I liked how he tied in the very famous Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and noted that reversal of the “postmaterialist turn”, that is, instead of striving for self-actualisation, people/voters are once again turning to the lower rungs of Maslow’s hierarchy (basic needs and belonging).
Lastly, in Part Three, remedies were explained. I really liked Mounk’s discussion about “domesticating nationalism”. To begin, I must admit that when I first learned about the EU, I was personally very much drawn to the “idealistic wish for a supranational future”. However, the more I read and learn about the EU, it is accurate to say that “supranational ideals appear to be in retreat”. With that said, I think the distinction between “exclusionary nationalism” and “inclusive patriotism” that Mounk provided resonated with me. And also, I was convinced by why we should not abandon nationalism despite the unwarranted temptation to do so. To sum it up, Mounk wrote that there must be a compromise: “the defenders of inclusive nationalism should defend the rights of people who are already in the country and advocate for keeping the door open to close relatives of residents and highly skilled immigrants. But at the same time, they should take concerns about the rapid pace of migration seriously and acknowledge that the nation is a geographically bounded community that can only persist when it has control over its borders” (p. 214). The last thing I wanted to mention is his chapter on “renewing civic faith”. I found it quite amusing to read about his “rant” regarding academia and his experience at Harvard. For example, he noted: “students and faculty have made a tacit pact of nonaggression: as long as students don’t take up too much of their times, professors will make it easy for the bulk of their charges to get a degree without thinking too hard” (p. 247).
All in all, Mounk provided a timely and coherent explanation of the deconsolidation of democracy and the dangers of a potential “populist age”. However, he also listed a number of feasible remedies. But of course, whether the people and the government will act on them so as to bring back liberal democracy is something yet to be seen.
Indeed, I think Mounk did a very good job in the Introduction and Part One of his book to debunk two big assumptions that shaped have our “political imagination”: (1) the idea that rich countries in which the government had repeatedly changed hands through free and fair elections would forever remain democratic and (2) liberalism and democracy make a cohesive whole (see pp. 5-6, 97-98). Regarding the former, Mounk provided countless examples of democratic backsliding and democratically elected populist leaders dismantling democratic institutions and norms. As for the latter, Mounk made what I think is a very enlightening observation: “the mutual dependence of liberalism and democracy shows just how quickly dysfunction in one aspect of our politics can breed dysfunction in another” and that “this slow divergence of liberalism and democracy may be exactly what is now happening” (p. 6). He then goes on in Part One to expand on this second big assumption, distinguishing “illiberal democracy” (democracy without rights) and “undemocratic liberalism” (rights without democracy).
In general, I found this distinction between illiberal democracy and undemocratic liberalism to be very convincing. Further, I appreciated how Mounk overtly acknowledged the democraticness of populism and the liberalness of elitism, as well as the illiberalness and undemocraticness of them respectively. For example, on page 52, Mounk wrote: “I also fear that the refusal to acknowledge that there is something democratic about the energy that propels them [populists] to power in the first place stops us from understanding the nature of their appeal – and makes it more difficult to think carefully and creatively about how to stop them…it is impossible to understand their nature without acknowledging the democratic energy that is driving them – and yet it is also impossible to understand what damage they are likely to wreak without recognizing how quickly that energy can turn against the people”.
In Part Two, Mounk identified three origins of this rise of illiberal democracies and undemocratic liberalism. Among them, I found his chapter on “identity” to be the most interesting. At one point, in discussing the relationship between immigration and populism, he noted that “the most fundamental transition in the lives of most citizens might take place when they start having to deal with immigrants on a regular basis, not when the number of immigrants with whom they interact on a regular basis increases” (p. 171). I think this observation is key to understanding why areas with high levels of immigration may not be supportive of populism, but rather embracive of pluralism. In the same chapter, Mounk discussed a very interesting concept of what he called “the rise of post-post-materialist voters” (p. 181). I liked how he tied in the very famous Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and noted that reversal of the “postmaterialist turn”, that is, instead of striving for self-actualisation, people/voters are once again turning to the lower rungs of Maslow’s hierarchy (basic needs and belonging).
Lastly, in Part Three, remedies were explained. I really liked Mounk’s discussion about “domesticating nationalism”. To begin, I must admit that when I first learned about the EU, I was personally very much drawn to the “idealistic wish for a supranational future”. However, the more I read and learn about the EU, it is accurate to say that “supranational ideals appear to be in retreat”. With that said, I think the distinction between “exclusionary nationalism” and “inclusive patriotism” that Mounk provided resonated with me. And also, I was convinced by why we should not abandon nationalism despite the unwarranted temptation to do so. To sum it up, Mounk wrote that there must be a compromise: “the defenders of inclusive nationalism should defend the rights of people who are already in the country and advocate for keeping the door open to close relatives of residents and highly skilled immigrants. But at the same time, they should take concerns about the rapid pace of migration seriously and acknowledge that the nation is a geographically bounded community that can only persist when it has control over its borders” (p. 214). The last thing I wanted to mention is his chapter on “renewing civic faith”. I found it quite amusing to read about his “rant” regarding academia and his experience at Harvard. For example, he noted: “students and faculty have made a tacit pact of nonaggression: as long as students don’t take up too much of their times, professors will make it easy for the bulk of their charges to get a degree without thinking too hard” (p. 247).
All in all, Mounk provided a timely and coherent explanation of the deconsolidation of democracy and the dangers of a potential “populist age”. However, he also listed a number of feasible remedies. But of course, whether the people and the government will act on them so as to bring back liberal democracy is something yet to be seen.
October 1, 2021
Partiendo de la reeditada vigencia del populismo en distintos lugares y su renovado brío en sociedades que se tenían por sumamente democráticas (EE.UU. de Trump), y ejemplos como Turquía, Polonia y la participación de partidos de este corte en distintas sociedades europeas, el autor plantea el deterioro desde dentro de la Democracia en países donde la misma se suponía tenía raigambre.
Para ello, primero pone sobre la mesa dos tendencias contrapuestas: la aparición de modelos de democracia sin libertad (modelo clásico donde hay elecciones pero ataques arbitrarios a distintas libertades desde dentro: usualmente desde el propio gobierno de turno) y de libertad sin democracia (hay derechos y respeto a los mismos, pero por ejemplo el marco de decisión que se desprende de autoridades electorales es cada vez menor). Las razones de la aparición (y preferencia electoral) de estas opciones populistas derivan para el autor de 3 razones básicas: los cambios en la comunicación de masas producto de la emergencia de las redes sociales, el deterioro de las expectativas económicas (o para ser más exacto: la mayor brecha de desigualdad y las expectativas futuras en torno a ello), y finalmente, la pérdida de homogeneidad "cultural" (etiqueta que aglomera fragmentaciones sociales producto de inmigración, diferencias religiosas, regionalismos y nacionalismos dentro de un estado). Aunado al diagnóstico, el autor plantea también algunos posibles cursos de acción para evitar un mayor deterioro en la democracia.
Escrito en 2018, está bastante bien estructurado, y aunque quizás se puedan sumar razones adicionales, las 3 causales están bastante bien presentadas y sustentadas. Las recomendaciones posteriores al diagnóstico posiblemente planteen más suspicacias en algunos lectores.
Viviendo en Perú y padeciendo una plétora de candidatos y políticos populistas permanentemente, el retrato que hace de "líderes que hablan en nombre y con la autoridad moral del Pueblo" parece un calco de lo que se ve y escucha todos los días: populismo 100% y con poco sustento/expectativa de éxito real de largo plazo. No hay muchos ejemplos latinoamericanos (más allá de Venezuela), pero quizá sea porque se enfoca en democracias en deterioro (y no ya deterioradas).
El texto fue leído unos meses después de "How democracies die" (Ziblatt, Levitsky) y me parece mejor articulado, para temáticas similares.
Para ello, primero pone sobre la mesa dos tendencias contrapuestas: la aparición de modelos de democracia sin libertad (modelo clásico donde hay elecciones pero ataques arbitrarios a distintas libertades desde dentro: usualmente desde el propio gobierno de turno) y de libertad sin democracia (hay derechos y respeto a los mismos, pero por ejemplo el marco de decisión que se desprende de autoridades electorales es cada vez menor). Las razones de la aparición (y preferencia electoral) de estas opciones populistas derivan para el autor de 3 razones básicas: los cambios en la comunicación de masas producto de la emergencia de las redes sociales, el deterioro de las expectativas económicas (o para ser más exacto: la mayor brecha de desigualdad y las expectativas futuras en torno a ello), y finalmente, la pérdida de homogeneidad "cultural" (etiqueta que aglomera fragmentaciones sociales producto de inmigración, diferencias religiosas, regionalismos y nacionalismos dentro de un estado). Aunado al diagnóstico, el autor plantea también algunos posibles cursos de acción para evitar un mayor deterioro en la democracia.
Escrito en 2018, está bastante bien estructurado, y aunque quizás se puedan sumar razones adicionales, las 3 causales están bastante bien presentadas y sustentadas. Las recomendaciones posteriores al diagnóstico posiblemente planteen más suspicacias en algunos lectores.
Viviendo en Perú y padeciendo una plétora de candidatos y políticos populistas permanentemente, el retrato que hace de "líderes que hablan en nombre y con la autoridad moral del Pueblo" parece un calco de lo que se ve y escucha todos los días: populismo 100% y con poco sustento/expectativa de éxito real de largo plazo. No hay muchos ejemplos latinoamericanos (más allá de Venezuela), pero quizá sea porque se enfoca en democracias en deterioro (y no ya deterioradas).
El texto fue leído unos meses después de "How democracies die" (Ziblatt, Levitsky) y me parece mejor articulado, para temáticas similares.
November 9, 2024
A notable contribution to the discourse on the current decline of democracy and the rise of far-right populism around the world. While he talks about numerous countries experiencing the same thing, this book was a response to the first election of Donald Trump. I've read countless books on this subject and Mounk does just about as well as anyone at describing the forces that created the environment for these rightwing populism to surge.
I think one part in which he excels in this book compared to others is that he dissects the pairing of liberalism and democracy, stating that democracy can become illiberal that liberalism can also become undemocratic. For democracy to work, it must be both democratic and liberal. He arranged the content efficiently in three parts, the first exploring what liberal democracy entails and how it has been collapsing over the past 30 years. Part two explores the reasons why this has happened and he offers solutions in the final part.
For anyone that was surprised by the reelection of Trump in 2024, this would be a good book to read. Essentially, none of the things that Mounk outlined have changed, so we shouldn't have been surprised. He offered his own predictions in the conclusion. These came six years ago when the book was written, but he's not far off. He predicted that Trump would be impeached and even that Trump would refuse to accept the results of the 2020 election. His best-case scenario was that Trump would be a one-term president and that this would inoculate our democracy from the likes of far-right populism. Unfortunately, Mounk's worst-case scenario is coming true, in which our democracy continues to degrade until one point we look back and try to pinpoint where things went so wrong.
I think one part in which he excels in this book compared to others is that he dissects the pairing of liberalism and democracy, stating that democracy can become illiberal that liberalism can also become undemocratic. For democracy to work, it must be both democratic and liberal. He arranged the content efficiently in three parts, the first exploring what liberal democracy entails and how it has been collapsing over the past 30 years. Part two explores the reasons why this has happened and he offers solutions in the final part.
For anyone that was surprised by the reelection of Trump in 2024, this would be a good book to read. Essentially, none of the things that Mounk outlined have changed, so we shouldn't have been surprised. He offered his own predictions in the conclusion. These came six years ago when the book was written, but he's not far off. He predicted that Trump would be impeached and even that Trump would refuse to accept the results of the 2020 election. His best-case scenario was that Trump would be a one-term president and that this would inoculate our democracy from the likes of far-right populism. Unfortunately, Mounk's worst-case scenario is coming true, in which our democracy continues to degrade until one point we look back and try to pinpoint where things went so wrong.
April 11, 2018
Mounk has accomplished what few political science writers have been able to pull off. He's taken a mountain of research concerning the decades long shift from liberal democracy to populist authoritarianism in many parts of the world and written a treatise that brings together all of the elements, past and present, that have created this trend while also making it easily consumed by the reader.
The author posits that the liberal democracy that has thrived for several centuries, particularly in North American and Western Europe, is splitting into undemocratic liberalism (technocracy) as exemplified by the European Union, and illiberal democracy (populist rule) as exemplified by countries like Poland, India and the United States. The how and why of it all, including the surprising success of Trump in the 2016 presidential election, is presented in well thought out detail that drifts neither too far left nor right in making the case. Also unlike many political texts, Mounk gets prescriptive and offers an array of possible remedies to strengthen faltering democracies. While some may seem a little naive, most are of the common sense variety and require only a bit of political courage to move them forward. A worthwhile read.
The author posits that the liberal democracy that has thrived for several centuries, particularly in North American and Western Europe, is splitting into undemocratic liberalism (technocracy) as exemplified by the European Union, and illiberal democracy (populist rule) as exemplified by countries like Poland, India and the United States. The how and why of it all, including the surprising success of Trump in the 2016 presidential election, is presented in well thought out detail that drifts neither too far left nor right in making the case. Also unlike many political texts, Mounk gets prescriptive and offers an array of possible remedies to strengthen faltering democracies. While some may seem a little naive, most are of the common sense variety and require only a bit of political courage to move them forward. A worthwhile read.
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