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288 pages, Hardcover
First published February 16, 2021
The U.S. needed a force capable and determined enough to fight ISIS but willing to stop short of taking on Assad. America had no desire to institute a regime change in Damascus or to be responsible for the future of another nation in the Middle East. The Obama administration felt it had to defeat ISIS, saw no standing armies ready to do so, and had no intention of putting Americans on the ground. (55)
For the United States, the YPG remained the only ground force that stood a chance of countering ISIS militarily, and the Kurds sought self-rule, not regime change… Special operations forces drew up possible plans to support this small band of fighters that seemed to be managing to do what no one else had; the YPG and the YPJ had shown they could be tactically resilient and disciplined enough to take on ISIS. Most important, they entered the fight with a will to win. (59)
Battling ISIS had become deeply personal to Znarin. She had seen its commanders; she had seen its prisoners. She had seen the women who fought as part of the Islamic State’s forces — as Azeema’s teammates had that day in Kobani, when they spotted a female sniper — and the women the ISIS men married. She also had seen the dead bodies of ISIS fighters decaying in the street. While the world considered ISIS a movement, Znarin zaw it as far less grand than that: for her, ISIS was a group of men who brutalized women and who wanted to destroy her and her friends. (143)
Fauzia didn’t know how to think about the future. None of them did. They understood that in a given afternoon they could face Syrian government forces or a Turkish attack or a Russian offensive or an ISIS onslaught. Maybe all of those at once. They knew the Americans could abandon them the moment they judged that supporting the Kurds no longer served their interests. Whatever happened the next day would happen the next day. But for now they would stay organized, consolidate their gains, and build on them. (163)
The Americans could still sever ties with the Syrian Kurds the moment they didn’t need them, but in the meantime the U.S. had signaled publicly to the world that it had chosen the Kurdish-led forces for the highest-profile fight yet. This step toward international legitimacy mattered a lot more to the Syrian Kurds than any of the American weapons.
Now Nowruz and Rojda and the fighters serving under them sought battlefield victories resounding enough to convince the U.S. that remaining aligned with them would serve America’s counter-terrorism interests while buying time for their own political project to grow. (179)
The Americans offered the Syrian Kurds military support, but no one could say with certainty how long that would last. Given America’s history of abandoning the Kurds, she found it hard to imagine that they would be enduring allies, even if she hoped she was wrong. If circumstances forced America to choose between a few million Syrian Kurds and Turkey, a populous and powerful NATO ally, the Kurds would lose every time. All these gains they had fought for since 2011 could vanish instantly if regional powers decided to attack.
The irony of the unintended consequences of ISIS’s decision to attack Kobani was striking. By setting out to achieve its utopian vision of ideological dominance in such a splashy and barbaric way in 2013 and 2014, ISIS had inadvertently led the United States to counter with the only ground force that met its needs: the People’s Protection Units. With America’s support, the Syrian Kurds had turned Kobani into an opening that allowed their own utopian vision to come to life. (167)
The same conversation kept greeting the YPJ fighters as they made their way toward the center, clearing Manbij of ISIS. Mothers and daughters, especially, would come out into the streets. The women from Manbij would stare at them, talk with them, and sometimes hug them wordlessly, their embraces expressing more than words could about just how much they had witnessed and suffered. Znarin realized how strange it must have been for women in these villages to see female soldiers come through with braids and ponytails, carrying rifles and dressed in camouflage; it was strange enough for the Kurdish families to whom these women belonged. (147)