Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East

by Philip H. Gordon

One of Foreign Affairs' Best of Books of 2021 and "Books For The Century"!"Book of the Week" on Fareed Zakaria GPSFinancial Times Best Books of 2020 The definitive account of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policymakers for decades—and why it always seems to go wrong."It's a first-rate work, intelligently analyzing a complex issue, and learning the right lessons from history."—Fareed Zakaria Since the end of World War II, the United States has set out to oust governments in the Middle East on an average of once per decade—in places as diverse as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and Syria. The reasons for these interventions have also been extremely diverse, and the methods by which the United States pursued regime change have likewise been highly varied, ranging from diplomatic pressure alone to outright military invasion and occupation. What is common to all the operations, however, is that they failed to achieve their ultimate goals, produced a range of unintended and even catastrophic consequences, carried heavy financial and human costs, and in many cases left the countries in question worse off than they were before.Philip H. Gordon's Losing the Long Game is a thorough and riveting look at the U.S. experience with regime change over the past seventy years, and an insider’s view on U.S. policymaking in the region at the highest levels. It is the story of repeated U.S. interventions in the region that always started out with high hopes and often the best of intentions, but never turned out well. No future discussion of U.S. policy in the Middle East will be complete without taking into account the lessons of the past, especially at a time of intense domestic polarization and reckoning with America's standing in world.

Genres: History, Middle East, Politics, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Political Science, War

362 pages, Kindle Edition

Published October 6, 2020

About the author

Philip Gordon is an American diplomat and foreign policy expert. From 2013 to 2015, Gordon served as Special Assistant to the President, and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf Region. From 2009 to 2013, he served as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.

Reviews

[Saman · Rating 4 out of 5]

چند سالی است که بخشی از مخالفان و برخی رسانه‌های ایرانی وقتی حرف از تغییر رژیم می‌زنند، لا به لای حرفهاشون از یک یار کمکی به اسم حمله‌ی دشمن خارجی هم سخن به عمل میاد و معمولا سعی می‌کنند این پیشنهاد زشت رو با توجیهات فراوان برای مخاطب تشریح کنند. همونهایی که پیشتر از تحریم‌های ظالمانه‌ی آمریکا علیه ایران با توجیه اینکه این تحریم ها رفتار رژیم رو تغییر میده و مثل شیمی درمانی میمونه حمایت کردند.تحریم هایی که بعد از حدود 15 سال دست و پنجه نرم کردن ایرانیان با اون بر کمتر کسی پوشیده است که ضرر اصلیش نه به حاکمیت که به مردم ایران وارد شد و میشه و اثرات چندگانه‌ای بر شئونات گوناگون زندگی ما مردم گذاشته و همچنان درگیر این آثار هستیم.چنان این واقعیت از نظر من بدیهی است که از صحبت کردن بیشتر در موردش پرهیز می‌کنم. یا در همین جنگ دوازده روزه اخیر صداهایی در موافقت با حملات نظامی شنیده شد. در یک کلام این ایده‌ی به زعم من به غایت پر ضرر و سراب گونه و خبیثانه و بسیار شنیع و غیراخلاقی، یعنی حمله نظامی کشور خارجی به نیت تغییر رژیم، طرفدارانی ولو اندک داخل کشور داره. از این جهت خوندن این کتاب و تجربیاتی که ایالات متحده در تلاش‌هایی در دهه های گوناگون برای تغییر رژیم‌ها در خاورمیانه انجام داده خالی از لطف نیست و میتونه یک دید مناسب تر به ما بده. دیدی عبرت آموز که نشان میده، این ایده چه ضرر و زیان‌هایی داشته و در صورت اجرا چه خطراتی خواهد داشت..

این کتاب میاد تجربه های تغییر رژیم و تلاش برای تغییر رژیم و دخالت در کشورها در خاورمیانه رو بررسی می‌کنه. شرحی است خواندنی و عبرت آمیز از این جهت که ایلات متحده هر جایی وارد بحث و تلاش برای تغییر رژیم شد،درسته در نابودی اون نظام موفق عمل کرد اما این تازه اول ماجرا بود و بعد از اون باتلاقی درست شد که گریبان همه رو گرفت به ویژه مردمان همون کشور. بحث با کودتا علیه مصدق شروع میشه و در فصول بعدی سایر نمونه ها رو هم بررسی می‌کنه. دو مورد بررسی افغانستان،یکی زمانی که با شوروی جنگید و دیگری بعد از حمله 11 سپتامبر. یک مورد عراق و سرنگونی صدام و در فصول بعدی مصر و لیبی و سوریه مورد بررسی نویسنده قرار می‌گیرند. نویسنده کیست؟ آقای فیلیپ گوردون، کسی که در دولت اوباما در وزارت خارجه و شورای عالی امنیت ملی مشغول به کار شد و مسئولیت هایی رو به عهده گرفت. او هم اکنون در شورای روابط خارجی آمریکا مشغول به کار است و این کتاب رو سال 2020 نوشته. او در این کتاب و در هفت فصل که در بالا نام کشورهایی که مورد بررسی قرار داده رو گفتم، با مروری بر تاریخ گذشته نشان میده چه قدر ایده تغییر رژیم توسط حمله آمریکا، پر هزینه، کم ثمر و همچون سرابی بوده که حتی برای خود امریکا و اهدافی که تعیین کرده دستاورد قابل ملاحظه ای نداشته چه برسه مردمان اون کشور. در همین تاریخ معاصر خودمون، برخی از مورخین و علاقه مندان تاریخ، اهمیت ویژه ای برای کودتا علیه دکتر مصدق قائل هستند و معتقدند مسیر تاریخ رو به نحوی تغییر داد. نمونه های دور و بر خودمون هم و کشورهایی که آمریکا وارد شده رو داریم می‌بینیم. در فصل انتهایی کتاب، گوردون یک جمع بندی انجام میده که چرا تغییر رژیم در خاورمیانه همیشه به شکست منجر میشه و دلایل قابل توجهی رو ذکر می‌کنه که خوندن این دلایل واقعا از دید یک آمریکایی جالب توجه بود.

با اینکه از توصیه‌ی مستقیم خوندن یا نخوندن یک کتاب خوشم نمیاد اما این بار میخوام واقعا به کسانی که به هر دلیلی موافق حمله نظامی به کشور هستند، این کتاب رو یه نگاهی بندازند.شاید بتونه یه دید بهتر بهشون بده و به فکر فرو ببرشون.

کتاب رو از کجا بخونیم؟

طبق گفته مترجم کتاب خانم فاطمه کریمخان کتاب چاپ نشده و نمیشه و به صورت نسخه پی دی اف میتونید بخونیدش. من کتاب رو از کانال تلگرامی باشگاه ادبیات دانلود کردم. نام کتاب هم هست : باختن در نبرد طولانی، وعده دروغ تغییر حکومتها در خاورمیانه. اگر مایل بودید میتونید کتاب رو از این کانال دانلود کنید و بخونید. آدرس کانال:

https://t.me/BashgaheAdabiyat

[Coolguy · Rating 2 out of 5]

Insofar as this books acts as a history of US intervention in the Middle East during the Bush and Obama years, it largely succeeds. But Gordon unnecessarily formats the books as an argument against regime change that is superfluous and unnecessary. Basically throwing his hands up in the air and admitting that all options are bad and perhaps we should do nothing, which he also admits is probably a poor choice, he embraces "containment" as the proscribed best alternative. But he never fully develops what containment means in his context. How does one contain Syria, which is allied with Iran and Russia? He also criticizes non-engagement, but what does a policy of government to government engagement attached to vigorous containment look like? One can only guess as he spends the entirety of his book explaining how everyone else is wrong without providing a roadmap or set of principles to fully develop his containment alternative. That is not to say he is necessarily wrong- he may be entirely correct. But this was his opportunity to provide a critical alternative approach and he failed to do so even though the fundamental purpose of the book is to persuade the reader that containment is preferable to the various forms of regime change oriented intervention during the Bush and Obama years.

[Carol Storm · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent study of many of America's key foreign policy mistakes. Failed coup attempts, failed revolutions, friends and allies betrayed, enemies empowered. There's a coherent narrative and a clear thesis at the end. The problem is, there is no sense of urgency and nothing feels real. There are no stories about young Marines maimed or killed in combat, or bitter parents turning to Trump for answers. There's no sense of what two disastrous foreign wars really did to this country's morality and its sense of self.

[Frank Kelly · Rating 4 out of 5]

Philip Gordon is one of our most experienced diplomats on the scene today. Having served in the National Security Council, the State Department as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs, and as a distinguished senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, he has written an important book here. Focusing on Washington's reoccurring and usually flawed efforts at regime change - Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, etc. - he provides tremendous color to the policy process, the players, and ultimately the decisions. As we retreat from Afghanistan, this is an important book to read to understand how we got here.

[Brian Belworthy · Rating 3 out of 5]

It was extremely sad reading about the number of deaths resulting from the regime changes.

[Joseph Spuckler · Rating 5 out of 5]

Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East by Philip H. Gordon is a St. Martin Press publication. Gordon is an American diplomat and foreign policy expert. From 2013 to 2015, Gordon served in the White House as Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf Region. From 2009 to 2013, he served as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.

In August 2007, a section of I-35 in Minneapolis collapsed into the Mississippi River, killing 13 people and injuring 145. A commentator on the disaster said that part of the problem was that America was a great builder. It took pride in building great works, but maintenance is rarely an afterthought. This seems like an adept analogy for American regime change in other countries. We will remove the regime but do little to establish a new system. There are exceptions. Installing the Shah as leader of Iran in 1953 and the overthrow of Allende in Chile in 1973 created decades of stable governments but under less than democratic rule. Panama and Grenada proved to be mostly successful.

Gordon borrows from Tolstoy to make another analogy — every unsuccessful regime change is unsuccessful in its own way. There is not a formula that fits regime change, and rarely one that provides positive results. The First Gulf War stopped short of removing Hussein because it would have left a power vacuum. There was no replacement government. There was no one or group to assume power, and the country would soon fall under Iranian influence. In the second war, we expected that the people would rise and greet us as liberators. In fact, the vice president was quoted: “Now, I think things have gotten so bad inside Iraq, from the standpoint of the Iraqi people, my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.” This was not to be the case.

Losing the Long Game studies regime change in Iran (1953), Afghanistan (1979-1992), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), Egypt (2011), Libya (2011), and Syria (2011). The US involvement in the first Afghanistan conflict was by proxy to oust the Soviet government and support the resistance. Here we helped create and empower our own enemies. That was by no means the plan. America likes the easy part of overthrowing regimes. We have the military power to do so with minimum loss of life on our part. When it comes to peacekeeping and nation-building, we shy away. Although the loss of life in war is a terrible cost, there is a tolerance for it in public opinion as long as it is seen as a good fight or a battle against evil. Death in peacekeeping or nation-building has little patience in public opinion. Elected leaders feel the need to bring the troops back home as quickly and safely as possible.

After World War II, America stayed in Germany and Japan and kept the peace and allowed for nation-building. Germany did have a background in elected governments, and the Soviet threat also created motivation for a stable government. In Japan, we let the emperor live and allowed him to remain a ceremonial leader keeping the people united. Douglas MacArthur drafted the new constitution, and its promise seemed to make us less of a hostile occupying force. In both cases, we remained and, to some extent, still remain safeguarding their sovereignty. We do not have that in the Middle East. We are not liked and really never have been.

The US use of force in the Middle East is seen as interference and not as assistance. These are lands that, in many places, are made up of competing tribes and factions held together by strong leadership. In the absence of leadership, they do not just fold, they fight among themselves for power and create further instability. No two regimes are alike, and so far, we only recognize this in hindsight. America’s policies in the Middle East and Near Asia remain a difficult situation. Interference digs us a deeper hole. Non-intervention creates moral dilemmas and security issues. We have the will to fight but not the will to rebuild. We attack symptoms but ignore the cause. An excellent book examining historical and current failures in diplomatic and military interventions.

[Dave S · Rating 4 out of 5]

As a foreigner living in the US, I was able to learn how and why US has systematically overestimated their hegemony in the Middle East. The author delves into the US’s efforts on regime change since WWII in Iran, Afghanistan, etc., and how it brought unintended, horrible consequences that would quagmire the locals and Americans alike in following decades. Especially helpful was his narratives on Afghanistan, which fell into the Taliban rule in 1996 after the US-assisted Islamic leaders, many of which were corrupt and extreme in religious doctrine, succeeded in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Kabul in late 1980s. Middle East, I learned, is vastly different from Japan, Germany, and Korea, all of which prospered following the US occupation/ intervention post-WWII.

“Temptation to declare victory before it was achieved and to vastly underestimate the degree of effort and resources that would be required to maintain stability and build functioning institutions after the previous regime was removed” - the mistake has been repeated in Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Is this a systematic bias stemmed from hubris, or is this a lesson that could be carefully reconsidered in the future?

[Itay · Rating 4 out of 5]

פיליפ גורדון סוקר את הכישלונות הרבים של ארצות הברית בניסיון לעורר שינויי משטר במזרח התיכון. הספר נהיה רלוונטי מאוד במהלך הקריאה שלי עם הנסיגה האמריקאית מאפגניסטאן. גורדון מתחיל מהחטא הקדמון: אירן ב-1953, ממשיך עם אפגניסטן והמלחמה נגד הטאליבן, עירק, לוב, מצריים וסוריה. התבנית חוזרת בכל מקום, אי היכרות של האמריקאים עם התרבות המקומית, התמוטטות משטר דיקטטורי המייצרת ואקום שלטוני וגוררת את האזרחים חזרה לזרועות שבטיות או סקטיות, שיתוף פעולה עם קיצוניים במטרה להוריד דיקטטור, אשר עולים אחר כך לשלטון, הערכת יתר של תרומת המדינות השכנות לשמירת השלום באזור, והמון היבריס.
השם של הספר מתאר את התופעה שחוזרת פעם אחר פעם: ארצות הברית מנצחת בקלות את המערכה הצבאית (ה-Short Game) ולא מצליחה בטווח הארוך לבסס שלטון חלופי מתון.

[Liz Norell · Rating 2 out of 5]

Whew. This was a rough one to finish. Honestly, this entire book could have been a short (<1,000 words) essay with one key takeaway: Regime change in the Middle East not only doesn't work, it generally makes things worse, no matter how well-intentioned the interveners are.

I appreciate the author's deep knowledge and experience, and if I had no prior knowledge about any of these interventions, I probably would've gotten a lot out of this. As it was, listening to the audiobook unfailingly put me to sleep. Sorry, narrator-with-the-great-voice, but you're a great cure for insomnia.

[glassglow · Rating 5 out of 5]

Detailed and engaging history of Americans attempts at various flavors of regime change in the middle east.

Each chapter goes over the motivations, execution of, and fallout from regime change operations in one country and covers Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and Syria.

You do not need to be an expert in the middle east to read this book, but some knowledge of major players is assumed. As long as you are willing to do some looking up as you read you will be fine.

[Marren · Rating 2 out of 5]

What was the premise of this book? The author makes lot of criticisms without solutions or analysis of how a situation should have been handled. The author's criticisms aren't unfounded, but this book would have been more improved if he would have clarified the principles that could have been drawn from each situation. The conclusion briefly hints at some principles, but these weren't clear at all in the main part of the book.

[David Newman · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good read for those interested in a broad sweep of U.S. democracy promotion in the Middle East. The central argument is, in my opinion, low hanging fruit—which is not necessarily a bad thing. The writing is very journalistic in style and accommodates the non-academics. Gordon is a bit of an Obama apologist, which is unsurprising given that he worked for that administration. So don’t expect the book to be balanced on partisan lines. Final criticism, the chapter on Iran is the weakest, as it attempts to draw a seamless connection between the overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953 and the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Many would have no qualms with this, but I tend to disagree.

Overall, though, this book was an enjoyable and insightful read.

[Feng Ouyang · Rating 3 out of 5]

Regime change in the Middle East has become an increasingly prominent focus of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the years following 9/11, often marked by initial success but eventual failure. In "Losing the Long Game", Philip H. Gordon delves into this complex history, exploring why these efforts consistently fell short of establishing stable, effective governance aligned with American objectives. Gordon argues that these failures are not merely accidental but stem from deep-seated and systemic challenges, setting the stage for a critical examination of decades of interventionist policies.

At the core of the book is the assertion that common and predictable factors doomed every attempt at regime change. Among the most significant are the lack of effective state institutions compatible with the envisioned political ideologies and the United States' insufficient commitment of resources, which is itself constrained by domestic political support. Gordon’s analysis reveals that these interconnected factors make regime change a far more perilous and unpredictable strategy than often assumed.

Gordon’s conclusion is both sobering and pragmatic: while regime change might be warranted in rare cases where conditions are exceptionally favorable and the risks of alternatives are overwhelmingly high, policymakers should exercise much greater caution when choosing this option. Moreover, they must anticipate outcomes that are likely to be far worse than initially expected.

While the book’s ultimate conclusions may not be groundbreaking or novel, "Losing the Long Game" offers unique value through its depth of insight and the author’s rich professional background. Gordon is a seasoned diplomat with extensive experience in U.S. foreign policy. He served in key roles such as White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf Region, as well as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs during the Clinton and Obama administrations. He has also held prominent academic positions, including roles at the Brookings Institution, further solidifying his expertise. As both an ex-official and a scholar, he provides a compelling insider’s perspective on the decision-making processes behind various regime change operations. He delves into the misunderstandings and misjudgments that fueled misplaced confidence, offering readers a rare glimpse into the complexities of these high-stakes decisions.

One of the book’s standout features is its detailed play-by-play analysis of the initial successes and ultimate failures of regime change efforts. Gordon meticulously demonstrates that these failures cannot simply be attributed to flawed policies or strategies but are instead the result of insurmountable risks and challenges given the limits of available resources and domestic political will. Additionally, he explores alternative scenarios, convincingly arguing that no viable path to success existed in these cases.

However, "Losing the Long Game" is not without its limitations. The book’s narrow focus on the Middle East—a region of undeniable strategic importance—leaves readers wondering why similar challenges in other parts of the world, such as South America, are not addressed. While Gordon’s insights are specific to the Middle East, many of the identified difficulties and challenges seem broadly applicable to other regions. Expanding the scope of the book’s conclusions to a global context would enhance its value and relevance.

Another overlooked issue is the operational norms of the U.S. military, which adheres to high humanistic standards in its treatment of both soldiers and adversaries. For instance, while IED attacks by Iraqi insurgents held little military significance, the limited casualties they inflicted nonetheless fueled strong domestic opposition to the war, as reflected in Congressional debates and media coverage. Additionally, the U.S. military’s extensive efforts to minimize civilian casualties significantly increased the resources needed to achieve its objectives. This dilemma—balancing ethical conduct with strategic goals—poses a profound challenge, particularly in the protracted conflicts often associated with regime change. While such complexities are difficult to resolve, they should be recognized as fundamental obstacles to sustained military engagements.

Overall, "Losing the Long Game" is a thought-provoking and meticulously researched work that sheds light on the enduring complexities of regime change. It serves as a cautionary tale for policymakers and scholars alike, urging greater humility and realism when considering interventions in foreign governments. For those interested in understanding the limits of American influence and the perils of interventionist strategies, Gordon’s analysis provides an essential and compelling read.

[notformebabesbooks · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book provides a strong basis for understanding the recent history of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Dedicating each chapter to a specific country, it outlines the various methods the U.S. equipped to try and implement regime change. The consequence, largely, was that the country failed tremendously, and in fact this was further exacerbated by more extremism, violence, and instability.

What makes this book hard to read is the density and work-around of Gordon’s point. He highlights the various mistakes the U.S. made, but fails to truly provide a solid alternative. Perhaps he can’t be expected to, as the whole argument of his book focuses on the fact that there seems to be no better choice for dealing with the Middle East that we know of.

On top of that, he uses an abominable amount of quotes. No doubt this is so that each one is understood to the fullest extent, but at times, it just became tedious. Reading about what Obama or his advisors said, one after the other, in various meetings seems less like the book is providing arguments to the failure of successful regime change in the Middle East, and more just going over what has been said and done.

I think the next step would be to create a book with much more detail, perhaps focusing on just one or two countries. While I recognize this book was a basis for the Middle East, I just felt like a large portion of the argument that I expected to be present was not fully realized.

[Zeb Kantrowitz · Rating 4 out of 5]

The main problem with any plan the US has had since the end of WW2 to opt for regime change in countries that "were not on our side" has not resulted in one country being turned by military force. Even in Serbia, we were able to initiate a change of government by economically isolating the government and leaving in to the people living there to finally change the regime. It was Milosevic's loss of Kosovo that lead to his overthrow.

For the rest of the regimes that we stuck our noses in, they are still in active Civil War (Libya, Yemen, Syria, Iraq) or there is a new strongman running parts or all of those countries. In a strange way Vietnam is our only success, in that once we got our and minded our own business, the Regime (a hard corp Communist Cadre) has been replaced by technocrats and economists.

Our lack of success in the Regime Incidents, seem to mirror the lack of success that we have had over the last fifty years in eliminating Poverty and Drugs. Anyone who looks at the two public plans will see that not only are the poor poorer but the amount of drugs on the street and the violence it causes have only gotten worse.

Considering the amount of money we have thrown at these problems, maybe we would have been better off giving all the people in these countries $50,ooo each and leaving with a way to upgrade their lives and not lose any of our military.

[Mohammad Sadegh Alizadeh · Rating 4 out of 5]

💢خوشا سر دلبران و گفته آید در زبان دیگران و این صحبت‌ها. نمونه‌اش همین جنابِ #شکست_در_بازی_طولانی. طرف از قبیله همین موجوداتی بوده که همواره در طول تاریخ امریکا، زیرگوش رئیس‌جمهور ایالات متحده وز وز می‌کرده‌اند برای انگولک کردن حکومت‌های این سمت کره خاکی. کتاب از مرحوم مصدق شروع کرده و تا زماننا هذا و دیکتاتورهای عرب منطقه در مصر و تونس جلو آمده و تهش هم به این رسیده که آنچه ما توسعه دموکراسی می‌نامیم برای بقیه دنیا امپریالیسم است. زرشک!

💢نویسنده در فقره سوریه و عراقِ مابعد اشغال و پیشاداعش، اعترافی سوسکی هم دارد که اگر ایران و روسیه نبودند این دو مورد هم به لیست صادرات کانتینری و زورچپّانی دموکراسی اضافه شده و الان نه تنها نسبت به قبل اوضاع کویتی نداشتند که بهتر از موردی مانند افغانستان نبودند که تهش امریکایی‌ها خاک به توبره کشیده افغان‌ها را هبه کردند به همان کسانی که بیست قبل آمده بودند تا ریشه آخرین کروموزوم‌شان را هم از افغانستان بکنند. غرض اینکه نسخه تک خطی توسعه دموکراسی خورده توی طاق آقا!

💢غرض آنکه هر جا سپاه آزادی‌بخش ایالات متحده و یار غارش ناتو از راه رسیده‌‌ و زده‌اند زیر لنگ یک به زعم خودشان دیکتاتور، یکی دو دهه بعد نه تنها اوضاع مساعد نشده بلکه ناامنی و تروریسم و سلفی‌گری و فقر و فساد از سر و کول همان دیار دیکتاتورزده پیشین بالا رفته. از قضا سرکنگبین دموکراسی صفرای تروریسم فزود. نمونه‌اش؟ همین عراق پیشاداعش و لیبیِ پساقذافی که بهشت سلفی‌ها شده و افغانستان پیشاطالبان. غرض نویسنده اینکه مسئولان کاخ سفید! بفهمید و آگاه باشید که آب قطع است. که عقل و اراده و همتی که از بعد از جنگ جهانی دوم صرف کردید برای به اصطلاح آدم کردن بقیه نقاط دنیا، بوی گند تاریخ انقضایش از همان ابتدا و کله کردن حکومت مصدق بلند بود.

پ.ن۱: من اگر بودم این مانیفست برخاسته از میدانِ مشاور خاورمیانه‌ای اوباما را می‌کردم متن درسی آکادمی دانشگاهی که دیگر یکی مثل آن دخترک دانشجوی شریف نیاید و در روز دانشجو خزعبل قرقره نکند.

پ.ن۲: شرح حماسه‌ای که ناتو و امریکا در فقرات مصر و لیبی داشتند و ریز جزئیات کلاهی که سر مردم این دو کشور گذاشتند و تا روی زانوی‌ آن بنده خداها هم رفت، عجیب خواندنی‌ست و صد البته سوزناک.

پ.ن۳: به تعبیر #تتلو در نماهنگ #خونه_خوبه، اون بیرون خبری نیست!

[Issak Flores · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book layed out the case for how U.S. regime change in the Middle East has never worked out in Americas interest, such examples range from Obama’s decision to overthrow Mummar Ghaddafi (dictator of Libya) and the fallout from that fiasco, to the U.S. overthrowing Iranian leadership to install a more U.S. friendly government and then less than two decades later the Iranian people overthrowing the U.S. backed Shah and installing a regime that has become more hostile and from what it seems, a permanent adversary in the region. Even when the U.S. had successfully overthrown a regime, the regime put in power to be more friendly to the United States hardly ended up enacted policies that did so, such as the U.S. backed Iranian Shah being responsible for creating OPEC (Organization Petroleum Exporting Countries) and getting other countries in the region to embargo oil to the U.S. during Israeli and Palestinian conflict, which the Arab nations didn’t agree with. Overall a fantastic read for anyone who thinks foreign forever wars advance American interests abroad and or at home.

[Antonio Stark · Rating 3 out of 5]

National security advisor to VPOTUS, Assistant secretary for state European and Eurasian affairs, and White House coordinator for the Middle East, Mr. Gordon's resume has seen the Middle East through the administrations of Clinton, Obama, and (now) Biden. Led by the United States, Western nations have had a long history of regime change in the Middle East (and Latin America, as briefly mentioned in various parts of the book), even during administrations that opposed nation-building in theory. Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, ... the list reaches into the Cold War, where the U.S. has used one regional faction to combat perceived global threats, only to conceive more extreme political/religious groups and uncontrollable demagogues. This book presents a unique insight into the White House - Dept of State - Intelligence Community chain of command that makes these decisions, and the uncertainties of a region that has defied complete external control for centuries. While the reader must remain a skeptic of the book's conclusions (most often "it was the least worst of bad options"), the system this book describes is priceless.

[Ciprian Bujor · Rating 4 out of 5]

O carte care explică, din perspectiva unui om care a participat din interiorul administrației americane la unele dintre cele mai importante decizii din ultimii 30 ani, de ce politica intervenționistă a acesteia a eșuat în fiecare dintre cazuri. Și nu doar acum, ci mereu in istorie. O perspectivă interesanta care arată de ce izolarea ori atacarea regimurilor care nu se înscriu în linia "civilizației" sunt menite a avea rezultate minore față de eforturile de integrare și acceptare a participării lor la economia mondială.

[Chelsea · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book is a good behind the scenes look at recent regime change efforts by the US. It is clear this problem is attractive to both political parties. Examining the root of the problem with American exceptionalism fueling disastrous results mostly in the Middle East. It was also interesting to he examine most the factions in the Obama administration. The tension between more senior members and younger members with more idealistic views of how America could assist and lean into the role of police/protector of the world.

[Peter Podbielski · Rating 5 out of 5]

The definitive account of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policymakers for decades--despite never achieving its proponents' far-reaching aims. The definitive question, "will Americans ever learn?" will remain unanswered.

This is a must-read for every politician, policy wonk and wannabe, and pundit touting regime change. If they haven't read Gordon's book, they should remain silent.

[Sanjay Banerjee · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author, a former White House Coordinator for the Middle-East Asia, examines the regime change efforts by the US in the Middle East across Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Libya. He advocates a more humble approach towards US Foreign Policy by the US Govt with greater historical awareness of the region. According to him, the US should stop it’s over-reliance on military power and focus more upon people-to-people engagements, diplomacy and economic investments.

[Alex · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this essentially on the recommendation of Robert Wright, because we were all assuming naïvely that Philip H. Gordon would be Kamala Harris' NSA, and because I was interested in the chapters on Egypt, Libya, and Syria. A little dry but you do get a lot of broad behind the scenes thinking about how the Obama administration approached various FoPo entanglements. The afterward is a bit of a belly flop.

[Peter Learn · Rating 5 out of 5]

A frank and informed discussion. US policy in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria is shown to have resulted in millions of deaths, tens of millions of refugees, and trillions of dollars wasted. Only Syria, Iran, Russia, the Taliban, North Korea, and any number of warlord thugs have benefited.

In each case doing nothing could hardly have been worse.

[Grace Spicer-Pilon · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is extremely well-written and accessible, even for those with limited knowledge on foreign policy and previous attempts at regime change in the Middle East. It was so surprisingly understandable and clear, especially for me who loses interest in cerebral and long-winded scholarly and academic journals after the first page. Definitely a new fave!

[Brett Sorge · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book is just to dry for me. Plus the author has a lot of biases which I don’t agree with. He is looking at outcomes and shaping them to fit his thinking. I did not finish This book as it was a very boring reading.

[D.H. Marks · Rating 5 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book because it took a deep dive into all the problems of the Middle East, with a heavy background of history and how we got there. Nearly totally discourages the concept of regime change either on our part or on any other country's part

[Allie · Rating 3 out of 5]

Average book on this issue.

[Jonah · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book could've been an op-ed, and in fact I've read more than one op-ed in my life thats made these arguments more succinctly. 276 pages and I didn't learn a single new thing

[Alan Eyre · Rating 3 out of 5]

I guess I won’t topple any more Middle East regimes