The Unknown Enemy

by Christian Tripodi

Western counterinsurgency doctrine proposes that cultural intelligence is an important requirement for those forces operating amidst the unfamiliar socio-political structures often found in distant conflict zones. Yet while the determination to understand the intricate nature of alien societies may appear a rational undertaking in such circumstances, Christian Tripodi argues that these endeavours rarely help deliver success. The frictions of war and the complex human, cultural and political 'terrain' of the operating environment render such efforts highly problematic. In their attempts to generate and instrumentalize local knowledge for the purpose of exerting influence and control, western military actors are drawn into the unwelcome realm of counterinsurgency as a form of political warfare. Their operating environment now becomes a space charged with phenomena that they rarely comprehend, rarely even see and which they struggle to exert any meaningful control over. All in pursuit of a victory that might literally mean nothing.

300 pages, Paperback

Published November 12, 2020

Reviews

[Philip · Rating 4 out of 5]

Every soldier and civilian going anywhere near a possible COIN scenario needs to read and re read this useful book a few times! The author looks at the mixed and often disastrous results of Western armies attempting to respond to the the realities of fighting campaigns in extremely complex and fractured societies with asymmetrical threats. From British Imperial officers on the NW Frontier through the vast French intulectual mobilization of academics and trained experts during the Algerian War, the US political fiasco in Vietnam and the very relevant Western defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan, attempts have been made to equip battlefield commanders and fighting units with a deeper cultural understanding of context, richer and more relevant HUMINT and to engender local support for forces and operations against insurgents. The author identifies fascinating glimpses of both success and failures often deeply rooted in the institutional culture of the armies and individual corps and units that are always untimately betrayed by a compete political failure on the part of the government of the day or the coalition of governments to developed even the most elementary level of coherence and consistency in strategic objectives and aligned policies. The overall lesson is that modern democracies are singularly ill equipped to fight counter insurgency campaigns. An important book.