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Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Votes, Drugs, and Violence
One of the most surprising developments in Mexico's transition to democracy is the outbreak of criminal wars and large-scale criminal violence. Why did Mexican drug cartels go to war as the country transitioned away from one-party rule? And why have criminal wars proliferated as democracy has consolidated and elections have become more competitive subnationally? In Votes, Drugs, and Violence, Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley develop a political theory of criminal violence in weak democracies that elucidates how democratic politics and the fragmentation of power fundamentally shape cartels' incentives for war and peace. Drawing on in-depth case studies and statistical analysis spanning more than two decades and multiple levels of government, Trejo and Ley show that electoral competition and partisan conflict were key drivers of the outbreak of Mexico's crime wars, the intensification of violence, and the expansion of war and violence to the spheres of local politics and civil society.
- GenresPolitics
380 pages, Paperback
Published September 3, 2020
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
December 23, 2020
“Votes, Drugs, and Violence: The Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico” (Cambridge University Press, 2020) is an extraordinary book written by Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley (a role model, and someone I deeply admire). This publication is the result of a decade of hard work and research, and contains groundbreaking insights for anyone who studies violence, organized crime, and more generally, rule of law. Reading it was a delightful experience.
*
The authors used a multi-method approach to explain three crucial moments in the development of Mexico’s drug wars. First, the outbreak of wars between criminal organizations, which began with party alternation at the state level throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (after decades of PRI hegemony). Second, the intensification of violence after the federal intervention led by Felipe Calderón (president from 2006 to 2012), when criminal groups fragmented (from 5 to 62 groups) and expanded their range of illicit activities beyond drug trafficking, to include new criminal markets, such as the illegal extraction of human wealth and natural resources. The authors claim that Calderón rushed to war, without a proper diagnosis and well-developed strategy, as an attempt to distract people’s attention from AMLO challenging the elections (p. 144). They also suggest that Calderón politicized the intervention, since he collaborated with co-partisan local authorities (PAN), but did not cooperate with leftist governments. Third, the expansion of war and violence to the spheres of local politics and civil society, with criminal organizations targeting municipal presidents and party leaders. This occurred because criminal organizations wanted to subdue local governments “to gain de facto territorial control over clusters of municipalities where they would develop subnational criminal governance regimes” (p. 216).
*
Trejo and Ley make the strong assumption that organized crime can only exist in the gray zone of criminality (the area where the spheres of crime and state intersect), in which criminal groups enjoy some level of informal government protection. In addition, the authors suggest that changes in state power “that upsets the terms of engagement between the state and organized criminal groups can destabilize the gray zone, introducing uncertainty and generating incentives for large-scale criminal violence” (p. 10). Of course, this was possible in Mexico because the country experienced a thin democratic transition (electoral democracy), where post-authoritarian elites failed to reform the country’s security and judicial systems. This is why upholding the rule of law is so important!
*
This book ends by delineating three policy implications. First, that in combating organized crime, “governments should focus on dismantling these networks through intelligence and judicial action”, rather than through militarized action (p. 293). Second that “policymakers should focus on creating institutional reforms that prevent presidents and executive authorities from making a partisan use of security agencies (…) and the judiciary” (p. 293). Third, that “when new democratic elites fail to reform authoritarian sources of state coercive power and leave a long history of state impunity for gross human rights violations intact –as Mexican political elites did in 2000– democratic institutions are likely to become intimately intertwined with organized crime” (p. 294-295).
*
Finally, this book is very well written and structured: the authors outlined their assumptions, definitions, and findings in each section; every claim is well documented; and their methodology and results are clearly explained. FIVE STARS.
*
The authors used a multi-method approach to explain three crucial moments in the development of Mexico’s drug wars. First, the outbreak of wars between criminal organizations, which began with party alternation at the state level throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (after decades of PRI hegemony). Second, the intensification of violence after the federal intervention led by Felipe Calderón (president from 2006 to 2012), when criminal groups fragmented (from 5 to 62 groups) and expanded their range of illicit activities beyond drug trafficking, to include new criminal markets, such as the illegal extraction of human wealth and natural resources. The authors claim that Calderón rushed to war, without a proper diagnosis and well-developed strategy, as an attempt to distract people’s attention from AMLO challenging the elections (p. 144). They also suggest that Calderón politicized the intervention, since he collaborated with co-partisan local authorities (PAN), but did not cooperate with leftist governments. Third, the expansion of war and violence to the spheres of local politics and civil society, with criminal organizations targeting municipal presidents and party leaders. This occurred because criminal organizations wanted to subdue local governments “to gain de facto territorial control over clusters of municipalities where they would develop subnational criminal governance regimes” (p. 216).
*
Trejo and Ley make the strong assumption that organized crime can only exist in the gray zone of criminality (the area where the spheres of crime and state intersect), in which criminal groups enjoy some level of informal government protection. In addition, the authors suggest that changes in state power “that upsets the terms of engagement between the state and organized criminal groups can destabilize the gray zone, introducing uncertainty and generating incentives for large-scale criminal violence” (p. 10). Of course, this was possible in Mexico because the country experienced a thin democratic transition (electoral democracy), where post-authoritarian elites failed to reform the country’s security and judicial systems. This is why upholding the rule of law is so important!
*
This book ends by delineating three policy implications. First, that in combating organized crime, “governments should focus on dismantling these networks through intelligence and judicial action”, rather than through militarized action (p. 293). Second that “policymakers should focus on creating institutional reforms that prevent presidents and executive authorities from making a partisan use of security agencies (…) and the judiciary” (p. 293). Third, that “when new democratic elites fail to reform authoritarian sources of state coercive power and leave a long history of state impunity for gross human rights violations intact –as Mexican political elites did in 2000– democratic institutions are likely to become intimately intertwined with organized crime” (p. 294-295).
*
Finally, this book is very well written and structured: the authors outlined their assumptions, definitions, and findings in each section; every claim is well documented; and their methodology and results are clearly explained. FIVE STARS.
June 13, 2021
Me pareció un libro sumamente ilustrativo sobre la lógica de operación de los cárteles en relación a la política mexicana. ¿Por qué hay tantos políticos municipales que son asesinados por el crimen organizado? Lo que proponen los autores es que cárteles buscan controlar municipios, sus presupuestos, aparatos de seguridad e información para maximizar la utilidad de sus actividades ilícitas. Con dicho control e información, y a través del uso de la violencia y amenazas, cárteles logran que autoridades municipales les entreguen parte de su presupuesto, aprenden a qué negocios e individuos se les puede extraer dinero (extorsión/secuestros) y llegan a dominar a la policía local. Todo esto con el fin de monopolizar el control sobre los mercados ilícitos locales y ahuyentar a la competencia.
Lo interesante de este libro es que nos dice cuándo podemos esperar este tipo de comportamiento. Los autores arguyen que los grupos de crimen organizado saben identificar a municipios vulnerables, tanto geográficamente como temporalmente, y esto se ven en los datos. Los municipios que reciben ataques sin aquellos controlados por un gobernador de oposición y durante ciclos electorales locales. Usan datos de la administración de Calderón y muestran que cárteles rivales identificaron la falta de protección que Calderón le daba a estados del PRD, lo cual llevó a que estos cárteles intentaran aprovechar la vulnerabilidad de los políticos locales para dominar el territorio y así competir con el cártel ya establecido en el área.
Tremendo análisis y muy relevante aún ya que los factores causales de la violencia y la falta de un estado de derecho siguen estando presentes.
Lo interesante de este libro es que nos dice cuándo podemos esperar este tipo de comportamiento. Los autores arguyen que los grupos de crimen organizado saben identificar a municipios vulnerables, tanto geográficamente como temporalmente, y esto se ven en los datos. Los municipios que reciben ataques sin aquellos controlados por un gobernador de oposición y durante ciclos electorales locales. Usan datos de la administración de Calderón y muestran que cárteles rivales identificaron la falta de protección que Calderón le daba a estados del PRD, lo cual llevó a que estos cárteles intentaran aprovechar la vulnerabilidad de los políticos locales para dominar el territorio y así competir con el cártel ya establecido en el área.
Tremendo análisis y muy relevante aún ya que los factores causales de la violencia y la falta de un estado de derecho siguen estando presentes.
February 28, 2023
The authors use a clever methodology to propose that organized crime in Mexico functions as a relevant participant in the partisan political process. In particular, they argue that changes in the partisan affiliation of mayors and state governors, as well as the elections that precede them, can generate increases or decreases in violence. As a lay reader, I can only guess at the quality of the data and analysis, but it strikes me as plausible. The prose is sometimes a little rigid, short on narrative and anecdote that might render it a little more engaging, but overall the book offers a compelling new framework for understanding organized violence in contemporary Mexico.
March 1, 2024
Valuable contribution to the scholarship on this issue but poorly written which made it unpleasant to read. It was unbelievable how gratuitously repetitive they were in repeating their hypotheses and key terms (I think la zona gris de la criminalidad was used about twice per sentence).
September 6, 2022
Votos, Drogas y Violencia es uno de los mejores libros sobre el crimen organizado en México que he leído producto de una gran y rigurosa investigación (uno como quien fue estudiante del CIDE lo sentirá muy familiar). Se la rifaron Guillermo Trejo y Sandra Ley.
Si bien es cierto que parte de la tesis central de este libro lo vimos en clase con Sandra Ley (lo concerniente con lo que denominan la “zona gris” por ejemplo), aquí viene todo muy extendido en un profundo análisis que debería marcar un parteaguas con respecto del estudio de la violencia de los cárteles en México. El libro profundiza en la metodología: muestra datos, regresiones y gráficas, pero, a su vez, es muy fácil de entender para cualquier persona.
Si bien es cierto que parte de la tesis central de este libro lo vimos en clase con Sandra Ley (lo concerniente con lo que denominan la “zona gris” por ejemplo), aquí viene todo muy extendido en un profundo análisis que debería marcar un parteaguas con respecto del estudio de la violencia de los cárteles en México. El libro profundiza en la metodología: muestra datos, regresiones y gráficas, pero, a su vez, es muy fácil de entender para cualquier persona.
February 2, 2023
es un libro sumamente técnico, solo recomendado para investigadores
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews