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La ciencia y el relativismo: Controversias básicas en filosofía de la ciencia
La imagen contemporánea de la ciencia es la de un procedimiento progresivo y objetivo para conocer el mundo. Los desarrollos tecnológicos dependientes de ella, desde la energía atómica a la ingeniería genética, refuerzan esa idea. Sin embargo, precisamente cuando nuestra sociedad más depende y se beneficia del conocimiento científico, ha aparecido una tradición filosófica que subraya el carácter relativista del mismo. La filosofía post-positivista de T. S. Kuhn, apoyada en el análisis de la historia de la ciencia, ha mostrado que las decisiones de los científicos no se fundamentan exclusivamente en los experimentos y razonamientos matemáticos, sino en la sociología de los grupos científicos. La radicalización de estas posturas por parte de los actuales sociológicos de la ciencia conduce a la tesis de que el modo en que no representamos el mundo poco tiene que ver con cómo sean las cosas y mucho con los intereses sociales de los grupos de investigación. La tesis, aunque extremada, no es arbitraria ni está falta de apoyos históricos, empíricos y filosóficos. Larry Laudan reconoce la fuerza del relativismo a la vez que niega que suministre una idea adecuada de la ciencia. "La ciencia y el relativismo" enfrenta en un diálogo chispeante y vivo las principales posiciones actuales: el relativismo, el realismo, el positivismo y el pragmatismo del propio autor.
208 pages, Paperback
First published August 15, 1990
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247 people want to read
About the author
Larry Laudan
21 books13 followersLarry Laudan was an American philosopher of science and epistemologist. He strongly criticized the traditions of positivism, realism, and relativism, and he defended a view of science as a privileged and progressive institution against popular challenges.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
August 3, 2018
This is an engaging book written in a fictive dialogue form between four philosophers of science from different philosophical camps: one relativist, the second pragmatist, the third positivist and the last character realist. The last three characters gang up to corner the relativist throughout the book. Larry Lauden (b. 1941) the author of the book, himself a pragmatist philosopher of science, gives more voice in these dialogues to pragmatist side of the dialogues than the other three in criticising relativism.
They talk about progress (relativist denies it others defend it), theory-ladenness and underdetermination (it seems that all agree on theory-ladenness, underdetermination and fallibility but relativist argues that they lead to relativism while others argue they do not and even the claim that 'underdetermination leads to relativism' is self-undermining for relativist). They also discuss holism (the relativist defends it the other three deny it), standards of success and incommensurability. Even the relativist side of the dialogues denies the strong version of incommensurability according to which all concepts of a paradigm is untranslatable to another paradigm defending instead its weak version. The last topic they discuss is interests and the social determination of belief.
In the introduction Lauden laments the pervasiveness of relativism despite the fact that he considers it to be 'wrong-headed'. He also claims that relativism has no serious place among philosophers of science but it is still common among cultural philosophers such as Rorty and sociologists such as Winch (p. viii).
The book is written with the intention of being accessible to non-specialists. While it is mainly successful in keeping up with this intention sometimes the book laps into specialism full of jargons which makes the book inaccessible to the general reader. The differences between pragmatism, positivism and realism have only been touched upon here and there and there is only passing and short discussions between the positivist, pragmatist and realist regarding their own differences.
The arguments presented against relativism do not seem decisive. It is only in the last chapter discussing interests and the social determination of belief that arguments seem more irresistible if not decisive. For example, see this part in which the realist argues against the relativist on the issue of social constructivism argument raised by the relativist:
'if different scientists have radically different personal agendas and interests, as you claim they do, and if those agendas rather than shared cognitive rules are the determinants of belief in the scientific community, which you also claim, then it becomes utterly mysterious how strong consensus can arise in the scientic community.' (p. 153)
The main relativist philosophers quoted in the book are Rorty, Quine, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Feyerabend wrote a short review of the book (Isis, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Jun., 1992), pp. 367-368) accusing it of being old-fashioned, textually inaccurate and insensitive to the history of science.
Towards the very end of the discussion, the realist character of the dialogues neatly summarises the whole arguments against relativism discussed in the book:
'relativism is self-referentially incoherent, and to boot it is predicated on several dubious epistemological theses – for instance, incommensurability, holism, and radical underdetermination. The relativist supposes that fallibilism, which we all accept, entails that all beliefs are equally well- or ill-founded. Except his own, which he believes to be better-founded than ours!' (p. 169).
They talk about progress (relativist denies it others defend it), theory-ladenness and underdetermination (it seems that all agree on theory-ladenness, underdetermination and fallibility but relativist argues that they lead to relativism while others argue they do not and even the claim that 'underdetermination leads to relativism' is self-undermining for relativist). They also discuss holism (the relativist defends it the other three deny it), standards of success and incommensurability. Even the relativist side of the dialogues denies the strong version of incommensurability according to which all concepts of a paradigm is untranslatable to another paradigm defending instead its weak version. The last topic they discuss is interests and the social determination of belief.
In the introduction Lauden laments the pervasiveness of relativism despite the fact that he considers it to be 'wrong-headed'. He also claims that relativism has no serious place among philosophers of science but it is still common among cultural philosophers such as Rorty and sociologists such as Winch (p. viii).
The book is written with the intention of being accessible to non-specialists. While it is mainly successful in keeping up with this intention sometimes the book laps into specialism full of jargons which makes the book inaccessible to the general reader. The differences between pragmatism, positivism and realism have only been touched upon here and there and there is only passing and short discussions between the positivist, pragmatist and realist regarding their own differences.
The arguments presented against relativism do not seem decisive. It is only in the last chapter discussing interests and the social determination of belief that arguments seem more irresistible if not decisive. For example, see this part in which the realist argues against the relativist on the issue of social constructivism argument raised by the relativist:
'if different scientists have radically different personal agendas and interests, as you claim they do, and if those agendas rather than shared cognitive rules are the determinants of belief in the scientific community, which you also claim, then it becomes utterly mysterious how strong consensus can arise in the scientic community.' (p. 153)
The main relativist philosophers quoted in the book are Rorty, Quine, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Feyerabend wrote a short review of the book (Isis, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Jun., 1992), pp. 367-368) accusing it of being old-fashioned, textually inaccurate and insensitive to the history of science.
Towards the very end of the discussion, the realist character of the dialogues neatly summarises the whole arguments against relativism discussed in the book:
'relativism is self-referentially incoherent, and to boot it is predicated on several dubious epistemological theses – for instance, incommensurability, holism, and radical underdetermination. The relativist supposes that fallibilism, which we all accept, entails that all beliefs are equally well- or ill-founded. Except his own, which he believes to be better-founded than ours!' (p. 169).
August 25, 2012
4 1/2 stars. When I opened this book, seeing that it was written in dialogue, I was pretty irritated. I really didn't think the format would work well for the issues at hand. However, Laudan does an admirable job at representing each speaker (realist, positivist, pragmatist, and relativist) fairly. The pragmatist is, of course, made to seem more wise in a variety of subtle ways, but that's to be expected, considering it's Laudan's own position. Pretty much all the big issues relating to relativism in science are touched upon and subsequently dismantled. The incoherence of the relativist position makes this project particularly easy for Laudan, so I would measure his success here as very high, indeed, if not unexpected.
April 11, 2025
Buenísima obra de Larry Laudan en la que busca explorar y proyectar sus inseguridades hacia el programa relativista mediante un diálogo a 4 del mismo con el resto de corrientes imperantes en la filosofia de la ciencia del último siglo (positivismo, pragmatismo y realismo). Muy recomendable como libro introductorio de la materia.
September 1, 2021
This is a good clear summary of Relativism (within the Philosophy of Science), and how it responds to its critics. It uses the traditional (Platonic) format of dialogues so that it can show the nuances of how arguments unfold.
The six chapters work through the key issues with a topic per chapter. Chapter 1 is a discussion of “progress” showing the way that the Relativist is unhappy with claims that Science is making “progress.” The most that the Relativist will allow is that new theories have “popularity” and are socially acceptable or preferable, rather than having any kind of objectively provable success.
Newton may update Galileo, and Einstein may update Newton, but the Relativist refuses to give any content to that idea of ‘updating.’ This is because no one can give a cast iron proof that later theories are really and truly “better” than the earlier ones which they "update."
This issue of the inability of Science to “truly prove” its conclusions drives the Relativists critique. In later chapters we hear about ‘theory-ladenness’ and the idea that there is no “truly provable” sharp distinction between a theory and its proofs (or between hypothesis and observation). We also encounter the idea of ‘underdetermination,’ that no amount of data can ever conclusively prove anything.
At the heart of the dialogues is a messy fuzziness which captures the messiness of the philosophical issues. Relativists reject absolutism, but that very rejection is an absolutist rejection of absolustism. Khun and Feyerabend reject absolustism but they reject the label ‘relativist.’
The cognitive messiness of the thinking involved in these kinds of positions is captured very well in the dialogue format, as disputants sometimes seem to go round in circles and end up unable to agree about very much at all.
Capturing the messiness is a strength of the book, but a little more help for the reader might have been useful, especially a more detailed introduction explaining the starting point of its four protagonists: the Positivist, Relativist, Pragmatist and Realist.
I thought that there was also an artificialness to some of the debates which could have been summed up or explained in a post-script. For example, it is all very well to argue that no word can ever be translated, because of (Quinean) radical indeterminacy (or under-determination) but the fact is that there are professional translators working successfully all round the world. When philosophers are arguing about the impossibility of something that we can see happening around us, there is something wrong within the philosophy.
The book hints at this, but its dialogue format prevents it from drawing a conclusion, as the reader cannot be taken outside the dialogue to reflect from a different (higher) perspective. This means for example that the question arises in the dialogues whether the Relativist is a Sceptic. The disputants disagree, but we never get a conclusion because there is no higher perspective outside the dialogues.
Overall, this is a skilfully written and enjoyable book. Its strength of a dialogue format, is also its weakness, at times. It also makes philosophical demands of its readers, so that those less familiar with the underlying issues may find aspects of the dialogues less easy to follow.
The six chapters work through the key issues with a topic per chapter. Chapter 1 is a discussion of “progress” showing the way that the Relativist is unhappy with claims that Science is making “progress.” The most that the Relativist will allow is that new theories have “popularity” and are socially acceptable or preferable, rather than having any kind of objectively provable success.
Newton may update Galileo, and Einstein may update Newton, but the Relativist refuses to give any content to that idea of ‘updating.’ This is because no one can give a cast iron proof that later theories are really and truly “better” than the earlier ones which they "update."
This issue of the inability of Science to “truly prove” its conclusions drives the Relativists critique. In later chapters we hear about ‘theory-ladenness’ and the idea that there is no “truly provable” sharp distinction between a theory and its proofs (or between hypothesis and observation). We also encounter the idea of ‘underdetermination,’ that no amount of data can ever conclusively prove anything.
At the heart of the dialogues is a messy fuzziness which captures the messiness of the philosophical issues. Relativists reject absolutism, but that very rejection is an absolutist rejection of absolustism. Khun and Feyerabend reject absolustism but they reject the label ‘relativist.’
The cognitive messiness of the thinking involved in these kinds of positions is captured very well in the dialogue format, as disputants sometimes seem to go round in circles and end up unable to agree about very much at all.
Capturing the messiness is a strength of the book, but a little more help for the reader might have been useful, especially a more detailed introduction explaining the starting point of its four protagonists: the Positivist, Relativist, Pragmatist and Realist.
I thought that there was also an artificialness to some of the debates which could have been summed up or explained in a post-script. For example, it is all very well to argue that no word can ever be translated, because of (Quinean) radical indeterminacy (or under-determination) but the fact is that there are professional translators working successfully all round the world. When philosophers are arguing about the impossibility of something that we can see happening around us, there is something wrong within the philosophy.
The book hints at this, but its dialogue format prevents it from drawing a conclusion, as the reader cannot be taken outside the dialogue to reflect from a different (higher) perspective. This means for example that the question arises in the dialogues whether the Relativist is a Sceptic. The disputants disagree, but we never get a conclusion because there is no higher perspective outside the dialogues.
Overall, this is a skilfully written and enjoyable book. Its strength of a dialogue format, is also its weakness, at times. It also makes philosophical demands of its readers, so that those less familiar with the underlying issues may find aspects of the dialogues less easy to follow.
August 15, 2018
للأسف دى أسوأ ترجمة لكتاب فى المركز القومى للترجمة
يعنى الفلسفة الاولى ليه مقالوش اسمها المعروف الميتافيزيقا
والبراديم ليه مقالوش نموذج فكرى ؟
والمفروض كمان اى مصطلح انجليزى صعب يترجموه للعربى ويكتبوا بعده اسمه الاصلي بالانجليزى عشان لو ترجمهتم غلط او بعيدة عن القارىء يفهم من الانجليزية
يعنى الفلسفة الاولى ليه مقالوش اسمها المعروف الميتافيزيقا
والبراديم ليه مقالوش نموذج فكرى ؟
والمفروض كمان اى مصطلح انجليزى صعب يترجموه للعربى ويكتبوا بعده اسمه الاصلي بالانجليزى عشان لو ترجمهتم غلط او بعيدة عن القارىء يفهم من الانجليزية
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August 1, 2020This book is, interestingly, formatted, as a dialogue, which I found made it very quick to read and easy to digest. It begins as primarily a polemic against the radical relativism ushered in by postructuralism (on the continental side) and highly skeptical and relativistic philosophers of science such as Quine, Kuhn, and Feyerabend (on the analytic)--but this is just because Laudan wants to carefully stake out his territory as opposing such trite relativism. In fact he tracks a course, as an avowed pragmatist (one who abjures Rorty), that positions him between relativism and the more presumptuous philosophies of objectivistic science such as positivism or realism, synthesizing elements of both.
August 9, 2020
All what i was going to write in my review -literally all of it- is present in the top review written by ياسر ميردامادي !
May 6, 2022
Two thumbs up. This is a fictional dialogue between a scientific realist (Popper), pragmatist (Peirce), relativist (Quine), and logical positivist (Carnap) with the fictional group arguing about important elements in the Philosophy of Science. It’s pretty approachable for a non-expert though it helps to have some background knowledge on the various viewpoints. I think Laudan nails this one and fairly gives each side their time to present their views. Some of the key topics include incommensurability, theory-ladeness, and scientific progress. Highly recommended to amateur philosophers of science.
March 6, 2016
Written in dialogue this book pitches contemporary philosophical views on science against each other. I found this treatment worked really well to elucidate the respective pro's and con's of views like pragmatism, realism, relativism and positivism.
Although Laudan himself is a pragmatist (as he tells us in the preface), I thought he did a fair job presenting views not his own.
Why are not more books on philosophy written in dialogue?
Although Laudan himself is a pragmatist (as he tells us in the preface), I thought he did a fair job presenting views not his own.
Why are not more books on philosophy written in dialogue?
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June 24, 2010like Feyerabend?
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews