The SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945

by Gerald Reitlinger

The SS--short for the German Schutzstaffeln --was a far-flung organization, of which the Gestapo was only one branch, that served as the tyrannical expression of Nazi bureaucracy, a politics of terror. Germans in high places still use the SS as a standard excuse for the acts of murder, extortion, and genocide that were facts of daily life under the Nazis. Reitlinger explores the complex social machinery that allowed the SS to operate--the administration and internal rivalries, the SS field divisions, German military intelligence, and the organization of the concentration and death camps. He shows how the SS was embedded in the basic government of the country during those years and how its members were not so much lunatic killers as loyal citizens doing the bidding of a country that had gone insane. Powerful, objective, and based on original German documents and interviews--including information from Himmler's statistician--this book rejects the SS as an alibi for a nation's responsibility in the most far-reaching racial massacre in history.

Genres: History, Holocaust, Nonfiction, World War II, War, Germany

528 pages, Paperback

First published November 8, 1968

Reviews

[Katherine Addison · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is, unfortunately, not a very good book. Mr. Reitlinger lacks the gift of explication almost entirely, and to explain the SS, you need the jumbo super-size gift of explication. Also . . . well, the word that keeps floating around my head is "gossipy." He says things like "Bouhler was a really silly man whom no one thought anything of." His argument, which he finally gets around to making explicit in the last chapter, is buried for most of the book beneath the avalanche of petty details, and I allocated more brain space than should have been necessary to critiquing his paragraph structure.

What he does do well is chart the intensely creepy and unjust process by which, ten years after World War II, those Nazis who weren't either executed within the first couple years or captured by the Russians were being let slide, step by step, out from under. Death sentence commuted to life sentence, and men with life sentences were being let out after ten, or five, or three years. Many Nazis weren't prosecuted at all. Nazi generals were receiving municipal pensions in Germany. Now, I have ethical issues with both capital punishment and long-term incarceration (not to mention extreme doubts about their efficacy), but the way in which the Allies took this grand moral stand--shock! horror! Nuremberg trials!--and then backed down, and down, and down some more, until you get Nazis being presented as martyrs, and being championed by Senator Joseph McCarthy of abhorrèd memory, and simply not being held accountable: that's not justice, either.

[Simon · Rating 2 out of 5]

The book was written in the 1950s, and really has been superseded by historians with more complete access to documents. Reitlinger was an art historian, and perhaps lacked the ability to look at the broader history of the Third Reich. He also has a penchant for cutting remarks (my personal favorite is when he uncovers the fact that Ribbentrop's son did a stint at Reitlinger's own public school, making him "the only Westminster old boy who was in the SS"). He gets nitpicky details about names and relationships wrong a significant portion of the time. I kept an open internet while I read the book in order to check it out.

But, and this is the redeeming element of the book, Reitlinger was furious when he wrote Alibi of a Nation He is enraged by the fact that cold-blooded Nazis who had participated in genocidal activities were walking around either scot free or after serving minimal sentences. Eichmann was still out there when Reitlinger wrote, but he is more interested in those SS officers who had not fled Germany. It was astounding to discover that less than a decade after Belsen was uncovered, members of the SS were holding reunions and publishing their own special interest magazines. The reason was obvious, i.e. the need for West German participation in NATO against the Soviet threat. This makes it particularly ironic to read Reitlinger's account of Himmler's last months. He attempted to come to terms with the Allies, on the assumption that Germany could surrender to them, and then the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS could join their former foes and stop the Bolshevik menace. It was a lunatic idea, testimony to Himmler's infinite capacity for self-delusion --- he did not seem to understand that the world viewed him as a mass murderer. Had he not killed himself, he would certainly have stood in the dock at Nuremberg and been hanged.

But ten years after his death . . .

[Tim Pendry · Rating 4 out of 5]

Alongside Trevor-Roper's 'Last Days of Hitler' and Crankshaw's 'Gestapo', this book was one of the earliest attempts (1956) to come to terms with the then very recent experience of the horrendously chaotic and destructive national socialist experiment in Germany.

We have to remember that the period from the Nazi seizure of power to the collapse of the regime in 1945 was just twelve years ... which is no more than three Presidential terms and only two years more than Tony Blair's 'reign'. Reitlinger was writing only a decade after the regime collapsed.

In other words, a historian's objectivity was likely to be difficult in such circumstances. Reitlinger was, in fact, an historian and specialist in Asian ceramics who just wanted to tell this particular history and, in another book, that of the holocaust.

He also had to rely on a limited range of sources - unreliable media and Nuremburg process documentation and self-serving memoirs from former German officials and soldiers with a great deal of important evidence locked up in the closed Soviet system.

From this perspective, his achievement - even if only preliminary and overtaken by other researchers - was significant. Although his emotional responses to what were recent events come through, the work is nevertheless a work of history albeit a provisional one.

There is a bias towards the story of the chaotic concentration camps uncovered by the Western allies rather than the extermination process uncovered by the Soviets. This would be corrected by later writers. His horrified emotional responses are, of course, understandable regardless.

His holocaust study had underestimated deaths in the extermination camps by a significant number. It took two decades more for academics to expose the scale of what happened in the East. From that perspective, giving slight primacy to Belsen over Auschwitz is of its time.

He expresses a righteous disgust at the ease with which so many SS mass murderers got off lightly and you sense anger that the German State at the root of the crimes was too ready to try and forget what was done. However, he does not mention the Cold War context enabling this leniency.

As an interim assessment of the role of the SS in the Hitlerite imperium Reitlinger's account remains useful today even if those emotional qualities to the book now look unnecessary and more polemical than academic. Yet the horrible facts still stand.

Reitlinger has a polemical point and it is a fair point. In contemporary terms he wants to knock on the head the dangerous myths surrounding the SS as competent or idealistic or the sole monsters of the Nazi regime. He wins his point on the evidence then available.

The story is also the story of Heinrich Himmler (where perhaps the account is sometimes less satisfactory as psychology) and of the SS as just one important element in the fragmented one person rule of that brilliant monomaniac Adolf Hitler.

The SS starts off as a personally loyal death squad to deal with Hitler's problem with his own Party embodied in the SA as a potentially revolutionary armed force. To understand Hitler, one must understand that he was not a revolutionary but concerned only with the seizure of the State.

The Nazi State was not like the Communist State - the arm of a Party - but the German State owned and guided by the Fuhrer who exercised control through not only the Party but the traditional organs of state power (the civil service) and, after its personal oath, the Army.

Hitler did not give a damn which bit of the system he used so long it was directed at his personal ideological ends - effectively, a throwback to Wilhelmine imperialism combined with an existential loathing of the Jews and Bolsheviks.

Each of his gangster barons was granted personal leave to exploit a segment of the machinery for these ends and their own. Each was allowed to compete ruthlessly for territory knowing that the Fuhrer could dispossess any one of them at any time to the advantage of another.

Goebbels incorporated the revolution into Hitler's mainstream and came to control the nation qua nation. Goering was responsible for the economy and air power until his failings saw his influence crumble, largely in favour of Speer.

Bormann rose to rule Germany as administrative machine through the Party Gauleiters. Others ruled segments - whether foreign affairs (Ribbentrop), the navy (Doenitz), occupied territories. 'justice' (meaning state control of society) or whatever.

Himmler was both immensely powerful and an outsider with an emerging two-fold brief to police the Nazi State and act as brutal agent of Germanisation and social control (and obviously anti-semitism) in the grey area between Germany itself and the front lines of war.

Hitler was a creature of his own history. He feared a 'stab in the back' while he pursued his warrior ambitions. Himmler's job was in part (alongside those of Goebbels and Bormann) to make sure that German dissent could not rise from below and snatch victory away.

This helps to explain the viciousness of Hitler's reaction to the July Bomb Plot. One of the three great arms of Hitlerite power (the Army) had gone over a line and stabbed Germany, represented by him, in the back. The SS' importance rose accordingly but still not above that of the Army.

When Himmler in the last days tried to negotiate futilely with the West to create an anti-Bolshevik front (we see a pale version of this today in the East European nationalist-NATO alliance against Russia), Hitler saw another betrayal under conditions where the personal was the political.

The SS may have started life as a death squad-cum-personal protection operation for the Party Leader and it may have poddled along for some years accumulating power and numbers as a slightly potty ideological avant-garde with influence but war made it.

It was charged with implementation of the Commissar Order (the slaughter of captured Soviets) and then of Jews (brought to a fine industrial art in the camps) and expanded as an economy in its own right as well as an auxiliary generally brave but variably competent military force.

It 'grew like topsy' to the point where it was to become clear that Himmler himself could no longer cope. The last months of the war in 1945 show a man constantly on the edge of personal mental breakdown.

The overwhelming impression is not of some dark lord of inherent evil but of someone without a traditional moral bottom who was led by circumstances ever deeper into the mire so that one wonders whether his eventual suicide may not have been a relief.

Reitlinger's contempt for him may be deserved but two decades in corporate life taught me that there but for the grace of god would go not a few people I have worked with given perks, status, pathways to the top and a carefully cultivated ignorance of the consequences of their actions.

From this perspective, Reitlinger wins his implicit polemic point that the attempt by modern (1950s) Germans to put all the blame for the evil done on the SS was criminally self-serving. The SS was the implementation agent for evil acts in which the German State as a whole was complicit.

I do not agree, however, with Reitlinger's attempt to blame the German nation as a whole - like many people even today, he cannot draw the correct distinction between a nation and that filthy but necessary thing we call the State.

I tend to believe Doenitz when he said that he did not know of the miserable horrors of the last days of the concentration camps which were largely the product of regime chaos and neglect let alone the extermination programme. Many if not most Germans would have been insulated from all this.

He is right that the SS, evil though its actions were, cannot be allowed to be an alibi for Germany but we should be specific that we are talking about Germany as an elite State operation made up of a forced alliance of Party, civil service and military. A lot of that State survived 1945.

It took all these forces working together to murder Jews, engage in imperialistic wars and create widespread mayhem and carnage - the SS was simply given the dirty jobs to do and it is clear that many of them did not enjoy it. It was just a job in a system.

Because of sourcing problems the period before the war is less well served than the war. The account then starts to come alive but this reflects the relative unimportance of Himmler in the grand scheme of things until he is commissioned to deal with the occupied territories.

What is very useful is the picture that the book develops of the bureaucratic rivalries under Hitler and within Himmler's own network. These demonstrate just how circumscribed Himmler could be by the machinations of others. His fear of Hitler lasts to the very end.

The figures of Heydrich, Canaris, Schellenburg, Ohlendorf, Kaltenbrunner, Wolff and many others weave in and out of the story as what amount to Divisional Directors of National Socialism, Inc. of Bertlin and its offices across Europe - competing, conniving, sometimes dying.

Sometimes the machinations become so abstruse and complex that the general reader may have difficulty in following what is happening but, at its best, incidents such as the Night of the Long Knives (1934) or the July 20th Bomb Plot (1944) can be positively exciting.

Reitlinger is also good on weakening substantially myths about the SS's competence and even idealism which still hold the attention of popular culture three quarters of a century later. There were competent bureaucrats and idealists but the total system was a shambles.

Although they tried hard, the SS were not professional soldiers in general. By the last eighteen months of the war, Himmler was commanding a motley group of 'racial Germans' (from outside Germany proper) and anti-communist occupied forces with weak military skills.

This is not to say that they did not often fight bravely but it is to say that they were no substitute for the fully trained regular Wehrmacht once their numbers exceeded the original German core of dedicated Nazis and some of those were more enthusiastic than capable.

As to the idealism, this could certainly be found in fanatic Nazis and in the dreamy 'Europeanists' in the Divisions raised in the West (the starting point for the European ideal now represented by Ursula Von Der Leyen) towards the end of the war but this was a minority if a dangerous one.

Perhaps sometimes Reitlnger overstates his case but the case is there on the evidence he has to hand. Further analysis would in due course refine the picture, remove some of the emotion without losing the values and balance the picture out a bit but this still remains a useful history.

Himmler and the SS should definitely not be let off the hook. They engaged in horrendous crimes in a horrendous age. However, the buck does not stop with them. They were part of a total system and this book makes it hard to accept claims that Hitler knew nothing of these crimes.

There may be no incriminating piece of paper fingering Hitler but we can be sure that the SS was an agent more than it was a principal and that it was only one part of a much more complex criminal enterprise that encompassed almost every significant part of the German State System.

[Trevor Seigler · Rating 3 out of 5]

I was under the impression, for some reason, that this book was much more recently published, but it turns out that its original publishing date was in the late Fifties. So this is one of those history books where the events being described are still fresh in the world's memories, where even the dead people being discussed have only been deceased for ten or fifteen years at the most. And much like William L. Shirer's "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" (which was published in 1960 or 1961), this book has the refreshing take (if you're familiar with the "Nazis were secretly geniuses!" approach of much of History Channel's Hitler-centric programming) of calling the Nazis idiots (*malicious and evil* idiots, but idiots nonetheless). Gerald Reitlinger was writing this history of the SS when there was still a chance of more trials of ex-Nazis coming down the pipeline, not to mention that Adolf Eichmann's capture was no certainty nor the death outside of captivity of Josef Mengele. This book documents the history of the SS and is pretty good for a general introduction, though Heinz Hohne's later "Order of the Death's Head" is the authoritative text. I found the last few chapters kind of a slog, rehashing the 20 July plot to kill Hitler and speculating that Himmler, while not involved, certainly saw benefit in not stopping Hitler's would-be assassins in their attempt to rid the world of the the worst monster it had ever seen. Honestly, I started scanning the last few pages. Still, this is a good intro to the topic for anyone curious about one of the most cruel regimes in history and its instrument of terror, which Reitlinger points out was nowhere near as efficient as its legend has made it out to be.

[Russ Spence · Rating 4 out of 5]

one of the first books that really outlined the chaos at the heart of what was thought of (at the time) as one of the most evil but efficient organisations underlying Nazi rule in Germany and Europe - the SS in this book serve as a microcosm of the nazi state, one overriding ego and a pantheon of underlings all conspiring against each other, even if they ruined their nation's chances of winning an unwinnable war. And millions died.

[Allison · Rating 1 out of 5]

Tried to get through it, couldn't. The title is very misleading. This book is less about the SS as a whole and more about Hitler's inner circle. The prose hasn't shown its age well, and it was very tedious to slog through.

[Jonathan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Lots of useful information delivered in a style that marks the author as a "historian of tedium,"

[Nick Girvin · Rating 2 out of 5]

Admittedly I had to skim a lot as it went on, because this is ENTIRELY too dense and full of info that I really wasn’t anticipating, nor will I remember much of it. It’s to the point that I felt like I was reading just to read, not truly absorbing the info. From the gate, I’ll admit that part of the problem here is me.

More than anything, this tracks the motives and moves of Heinrich Himmler, with Heydrich, Goebbels, Roehm, and other larger figures as the side characters (I’d even say that about Hitler himself in this narrative). The title should have somewhat given away to me that this was going to focus more on the in-betweener notes rather than the general picture. For what it’s worth, the info checks out and there’s a LOT of it, but it’s tedious, and as someone who doesn’t have the background in Nazi Germany that I could, this likely wasn’t the best spot for me to start. Perhaps I’ll revisit parts of this in the future. And fair warning, the content is so dry it makes the Sahara look like a rainforest.

I guess at least it was free, as someone didn’t want this book in their collection anymore. Understandable, really.

[Devin Burnett · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is one of the many books I have read about Nazi Germany. This book is a pretty good book all around. There are a few things that I find wrong with the book and that it really does not keep the reader focused. I had a hard time following the book at some points because of how long the book is. The book was very detailed and even had some pictures of the holocaust and some graphic pictures. I did enjoy the book it really gave more information that people should know more about. I also like the very detailed moments that they had about people that are important in the book like Adolf Hitler. This book was not one of the best books I have read but it gave perfect ideas and information that were supported in this book. I would have to give this book a rating of two stars just because of how long and dreadful it was at some points in the book I would just give that as a warning to reading I hope you read the book and give it another rating

[Walt Ross · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting insights into just how dysfunction the Third Reich was. Factions within factions, in-fighting, stealing others' credit for accomplishments, misdirecting blame, self-serving motivations everywhere disguised as being for the greater good. You'll read this and wonder how Nazi Germany accomplished as much as it did. Then you'll realize how far they would have gotten if they actually had their shit together. Scary warning against the extremists of today.

[Matthew Eyre · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the grimmest books I have ever read. And for once I will not attempt to summarise its powerful conclusions. I quote exactly. In the end he says the SS "meant nothing beyond loyalty to one ma but the racial transplantations, concentration camps, interrogation cells, medical experiments, mass reprisals, manhunts for slave labour and merciless exterminations will be remembered forever."

[Harry · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm sorry, this book is somewhat awkward to read; although,it seems to be written by aquite knowledgable author.

[Kafkasfriend · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the first and still one of the best essays on Nazism and Germany during the period. Essential reading