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160 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1313
when the craftsman is perfect and his instrument is in excellent order, if a flaw occurs in the work of art it is to be imputed exclusively to the material; in the same way, since God attains the highest perfection and his instrument (i.e. the heavens) cannot fall short of the perfection appropriate to it (as is clear from those things philosophy teaches us about the heavens), our conclusion is this: whatever flaws there are in earthly things are flaws due to the material of which they are constituted, and are no part of the intention of God the creator and the heavens; and whatever good there is in earthly things, since it cannot come from the material (which exists only as a potentiality), comes primarily from God the maker and secondarily from the heavens, which are the instrument of God's handiwork, which is commonly called 'nature.' II.iiAny aristotelian can see that this argument addresses the material cause and the efficient cause, but doesn't mention the formal or final causes, either of which could be independently flawed, and irrespective of any other problems with this passage (e.g., if humans are flawed material, how is that flawed status outside the intention of the creator, who concluded that their creation was good in Genesis? Have they deviated from God's intention? Is this like in the Iliad (q.v.) wherein characters routinely threaten to exceed their allotted portion? What is regular for paganism strikes me as heretical for orthodoxy.)
That God performed miracles so that the Roman empire might be supreme is confirmed by the testimony of illustrious authors. For Livy tells in the first part of his work that in the time of Numa Pompilius, the second king of the Romans, a shield fell from heaven into God's chosen city as he was sacrificing according to the pagan rite.He follows this extraordinary moment--wherein Christianity allegedly ratifies a pagan sacrifice--with further tall tales from virtuous pagans Lucan and Virgil. I love it, but not because it proves anything other than Dante seems to skewer orthodoxy. In the Commedia, recall, the virtuous pagans end up in Limbo, which is told in Inferno, whereas other pagans (such as Odysseus, the epicureans, and Caesar's assassins) end up in torment within the Inferno proper. Thereafter Dante carves out humorous intellectually dishonest exceptions to place Cato in Purgatorio (to reward his otherwise damnable suicide as an example of stoic liberty, perhaps--an interest in political freedom as against a universal monarch, say) and Trajan in Paradiso (placing this text's favored universal monarch in heaven).
Now the human race is in its ideal state when it is completely free. [...] free will is free judgment in matters of volition. [...] judgment is the link between perception and appetition: for first a thing is perceived then it is judged to be good or evil, and finally the person who judges pursues it or shuns it. Now if judgment controls desire completely and is in no way pre-empted by it, it is free; but if judgment is in any way at all pre-empted and thus controlled by desire, it cannot be free, because it does not act under its own power, but is dragged along in the power of something else. (I.xii)Okay, not invulnerable, but fair enough to kick around as an assumption. But push this idea back into the poem, and we start to see how the text becomes a sledgehammer to bring the whole edifice down in ruin. Consider Paradiso III, "As to the King, who makes his will our will. / And his will is our peace," or XXXIII, the finale, "but my / desire and will were moved already—like / a wheel revolving uniformly—by / the Love that moves the sun and the other stars." There is no freedom here, at least according to Dante's own terms--Beatrice and others explain to him that thought and desire are surveilled and made to conform in heaven.
In reply to this, I accept the literal meaning of Matthew and their interpretation of it, but I reject what they try to infer from it. [p.75]It devolves into a he-said-she-said. In fact, another axiom of Matthew’s, 26:52, is quite appropriate: “Live by the sword, die by the sword.” Dante who proposed trial by combat as a surefire method of determining the divine logic of Right has no problem embiggening the analogical scope of “combat” beyond duels between men and physical bouts writ large:
It therefore remains to argue the case only with those who, motivated by some zealous concern for Mother Church, are unaware of that truth which we seek; and so it is with them… that I engage in battle in this book in the cause of truth. [p.68]So he should’ve been fine with his expulsion from Florence in the same way he would’ve had the Jews and Persians accede to their Roman subjugation, though none of these parties fought, legally or physically, “by free agreement of both sides… solely out of a passionate concern for justice”; some phantasy is required to contort these terms to the events concerned. Other propositions, a moment’s thought suffices to falsify:
And what can be brought about by a single agent is better done by a single agent than by more than one. [p.23]Obviously not if more people can do it faster or better, but the real calamity is how no qualifiers are supplied; the statement stands absolute as an obelisk, ripe for jeers. On the other hand, to say that that which is best brought about by a single agent is better done by a single agent than by more would be correct—correct and tautological, and meaningless. But can a meaningful set of qualities possessed by the generality of events best manifested by singletons be produced? I challenge you thus.
[T]hose who have never studied philosophy acquire the habit of philosophical truth more easily and perfectly than those who have studied for a long time and become familiar with false notions. [p.23]
And he, together with other thinkers of that period, longed for unity among men, for unity that seemed never to be made a reality. Yet Dante believed and proclaimed that such a unity could come about, but in one way only, through a regeneration of society and a uniting of political interests under one head independent of the Church.