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Spinoza, the Epicurean: Authority and Utility in Materialism
Through a radical new reading of the 'Theological Political Treatise', Dimitris Vardoulakis argues that the major source of Spinoza’s materialism is the Epicurean tradition that re-emerges in modernity when manuscripts by Epicurus and Lucretius are rediscovered. This reconsideration of Spinoza's political project, set within a historical context, lays the ground for an alternative genealogy of materialism. Central to this new reading of Spinoza are the theory of practical judgment (understood as the calculation of utility) and its implications for a theory of democracy that is resolutely positioned against authority.
368 pages, Hardcover
Published July 8, 2020
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September 19, 2024
I have very mixed feelings about this book. These may, in part, be because of the identity-crisis that the book evinces. It is unclear, even after having read it, what it is meant to accomplish or be. Here are some things which the author might have had in mind for it:
i) A chapter-by-chapter guide to Spinoza's TTP,
ii) An attempt to exegetically trace the influence of Epicurean philosophy on Spinoza's ideas,
iii) A creative re-reading of Spinoza's philosophy as if he was an Epicurean, independently of any actual influence of Epicureanism on his ideas,
iv) A work of self-promotion to encourage readers to buy Vardoulakis' other books so they can understand what he means.
i) would explain why the book is as exhaustingly repetitive as it is. Someone writing a guide should assume that readers will consult individual chapters without reading the whole book. ii) would be the book's most novel contribution, but that is abandoned fairly quickly, and the arguments presented in this respect are unconvincing. iii) places the book in the lineage of Deleuze et al., of using Spinoza's words to make him say something he didn't (and may never have). But all of this ultimately yields to iv). Huge parts of Vardoulakis' argument are not explained here, instead being filled out by footnotes simply stating that, to understand the argument fully, one must buy another of his books. He doesn't even outline or describe the arguments he has made in his other works: he simply states where he has made the argument. This is simply bad writing, and immoral authorial practice. Perhaps this is lazy of me to say, but I don't think you should have to read all of an author's other books to understand what they are doing in a work of secondary literature.
A further issue with this book concerns its claim to have located a 'dialectic of authority and utility' in Spinoza's works, partly by positing an Epicurean influence on his ideas. The last chapter and conclusion suffer from the same withering deficiencies of all dialectical thinking: a refusal to see what is actually new in different historical moments, in part because of the assumption that everything in history is just an expression of the dialectical unfolding of two contradictory principles (here, authority and utility). Yet, it is just this escape from dialectical thinking, and the restoration to thought of the really new, that Spinoza's philosophy was thought (or hoped) to provide.
Lastly, I want to say something about Vardoulakis' core conceit, that many radical solutions to our deficient democracies are inadequate. For the most part, I don't need any convincing with this. But Vardoulakis rejects the idea that democracies don't function because citizens are not adequately trained or educated to participate fully in them as 'elitism.' This is a wild claim, and one that I think is exactly backwards. Vardoulakis thinks that people will never be adequately self-sufficient to self-govern democratically - and this, at least, he does clearly get from Spinoza. But that, I would say, is exactly Spinoza's elitism! There is nothing anti-elitist in thinking that some people will just never be capable of self-governing. And that thought ultimately underlies Vardoulakis' deference to what he calls 'agonistic democracy,' but which is really nothing other than a disguised description of representative democracy. If there is no way of overcoming the alienating separation of manual and intellectual labour, then maybe the best we can hope for is representative democracy. But to accept that there is no overcoming that separation is to abandon any claim to radicalism, including radical democracy.
Still, despite all this, the author has clearly read enormously around the subject, and is naturally a well-known and highly regarded Spinoza scholar. Although you might not guess it from reading this book.
i) A chapter-by-chapter guide to Spinoza's TTP,
ii) An attempt to exegetically trace the influence of Epicurean philosophy on Spinoza's ideas,
iii) A creative re-reading of Spinoza's philosophy as if he was an Epicurean, independently of any actual influence of Epicureanism on his ideas,
iv) A work of self-promotion to encourage readers to buy Vardoulakis' other books so they can understand what he means.
i) would explain why the book is as exhaustingly repetitive as it is. Someone writing a guide should assume that readers will consult individual chapters without reading the whole book. ii) would be the book's most novel contribution, but that is abandoned fairly quickly, and the arguments presented in this respect are unconvincing. iii) places the book in the lineage of Deleuze et al., of using Spinoza's words to make him say something he didn't (and may never have). But all of this ultimately yields to iv). Huge parts of Vardoulakis' argument are not explained here, instead being filled out by footnotes simply stating that, to understand the argument fully, one must buy another of his books. He doesn't even outline or describe the arguments he has made in his other works: he simply states where he has made the argument. This is simply bad writing, and immoral authorial practice. Perhaps this is lazy of me to say, but I don't think you should have to read all of an author's other books to understand what they are doing in a work of secondary literature.
A further issue with this book concerns its claim to have located a 'dialectic of authority and utility' in Spinoza's works, partly by positing an Epicurean influence on his ideas. The last chapter and conclusion suffer from the same withering deficiencies of all dialectical thinking: a refusal to see what is actually new in different historical moments, in part because of the assumption that everything in history is just an expression of the dialectical unfolding of two contradictory principles (here, authority and utility). Yet, it is just this escape from dialectical thinking, and the restoration to thought of the really new, that Spinoza's philosophy was thought (or hoped) to provide.
Lastly, I want to say something about Vardoulakis' core conceit, that many radical solutions to our deficient democracies are inadequate. For the most part, I don't need any convincing with this. But Vardoulakis rejects the idea that democracies don't function because citizens are not adequately trained or educated to participate fully in them as 'elitism.' This is a wild claim, and one that I think is exactly backwards. Vardoulakis thinks that people will never be adequately self-sufficient to self-govern democratically - and this, at least, he does clearly get from Spinoza. But that, I would say, is exactly Spinoza's elitism! There is nothing anti-elitist in thinking that some people will just never be capable of self-governing. And that thought ultimately underlies Vardoulakis' deference to what he calls 'agonistic democracy,' but which is really nothing other than a disguised description of representative democracy. If there is no way of overcoming the alienating separation of manual and intellectual labour, then maybe the best we can hope for is representative democracy. But to accept that there is no overcoming that separation is to abandon any claim to radicalism, including radical democracy.
Still, despite all this, the author has clearly read enormously around the subject, and is naturally a well-known and highly regarded Spinoza scholar. Although you might not guess it from reading this book.
Displaying 1 of 1 review