In the past year or so, I've been picking up bits of news relating to the centenary celebrations of events in Irish history – apparently President Higgins was roundly criticised in some quarters for refusing an invitation to a ceremony celebrating Partition, though he apparently decided that it was not something for a President of Ireland to celebrate – so this seemed a worthwhile volume to fill me in with some of the background.
Gibbons's political orientation fairly soon begins to appear: he has little sympathy for Irish republicanism. Republicanism is first characterised by the curious term 'Irish-Irelandism', and a little later he refers to 'zealous republican dogmatists' or 'ideological republican separatists' (in contrast to the 'moderate nationalists' of the Irish parliamentary party). These republican separatists, he asserts, were guilty, in the early 1920s, of 'growing violent insurgency': presumably he is referring to the military response by the IRA to Britain's attempt to govern Ireland by military force (including the use of the notorious Black and Tans) after they refused to recognise the results of the 1918 general election, which saw an overwhelming victory for Sinn Fein and the formation of the first Irish parliament, Dail Eireann.
So it is hardly surprising that the author barely mentions President De Valera's response to Unionist demands, which was that a measure of autonomy could certainly be granted to north-east Ulster, but that this should be a matter for negotiation between the different interest groups in Ireland, north and south, not something imposed by Britain.
In the event, the actual settlement in Northern Ireland was imposed by Britain, in defiance of the wishes of the Unionists. Gibbons gives a good deal of detail on the terms of the Government of Ireland (1920) Act, which set up Partition, and on the later Boundary Commission, the recommendations of which were never implemented. He is less informative on why that particular approach was insisted on by the British government, and how it worked out on the ground. He does point out that all the Unionist MPs at Westminster voted against the Act, because (following their leader, Edward Carson) they wanted Ulster to remain as part of the UK, rather than be fobbed off with a devolved government. Carson in fact said some years later, after he had relinquished the leadership of the Unionist party (if I recall correctly a detail in a Wikipedia article on him) that he had devoted all his energies to keeping Ulster in the United Kingdom, but it had actually been demoted to a second rate dominion. The question which Gibbons fails to answer properly (and it is a question to which I would like an answer) is why Britain was so insistent on detaching Northern Ireland from the normal party politics of the UK – a question well worth asking, since all subsequent attempts to reconnect Northern Ireland with British political life have met with peremptory refusal, both from the British government, and the main political parties. Gibbons goes no further than asserting that, while the Government of Ireland Act did not coincide with any Irish political aspiration, it did allow Britain to withdraw from Ireland on her own terms. One can only assume that they felt more secure with an Ireland completely divorced from British political parties and hence political activity, despite the grossly – and often violently – sectarian character of the statelet their legislation had created.
The final chapter, which brings the narrative up to the present day, makes more explicit the distaste for Irish republicanism evident in the early chapters. He suggests that 'the core problem that Irish nationalists face is their complete inability to see any role for Britishness in modern Ireland', and goes on effectively to argue for the return of Ireland to the British Commonwealth. Republicans would, of course, see their point of view, not as an inability, but as a firmly held principle based on the facts of Irish history – but that is a matter for a whole new book.