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The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War, 1916-1917
A revelatory new history that explores the tantalizing and almost-realized possibility that the First World War could have ended in 1916, saving millions of lives and utterly changing the course of history.
In August 1916, two years into World War I, leaders in all the warring powers faced a crisis. There were no good military options. Money, people, and food were running short. Yet roads to peace seemed daunting too, as exhausted nations, drummed forward by patriotic duty and war passion, sought meaning from their appalling sacrifices.
Germany made the first move. Its government secretly asked Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States and leader of the only great power still neutral, to mediate an end to the Great War. As a token of good faith, Germany promised to withdraw from occupied Belgium. Wilson was too anxious to make peace. If he failed, he felt sure America would drift into a dreadful, wider war. Meanwhile, the French president confided to Britain's King that the Allies should accept Wilson's expected peace move and end the war.
In The Road Less Traveled, Philip Zelikow recounts the five months when, behind closed doors, the future of the war, and the world, hung in the balance. It is a story of civic courage, of awful responsibility, and of how some rose to the occasion or shrank from it. "Peace is on the floor waiting to be picked up!" pleaded the German ambassador to the United States. This book shows how right he was, and how close leaders came to doing so.
In August 1916, two years into World War I, leaders in all the warring powers faced a crisis. There were no good military options. Money, people, and food were running short. Yet roads to peace seemed daunting too, as exhausted nations, drummed forward by patriotic duty and war passion, sought meaning from their appalling sacrifices.
Germany made the first move. Its government secretly asked Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States and leader of the only great power still neutral, to mediate an end to the Great War. As a token of good faith, Germany promised to withdraw from occupied Belgium. Wilson was too anxious to make peace. If he failed, he felt sure America would drift into a dreadful, wider war. Meanwhile, the French president confided to Britain's King that the Allies should accept Wilson's expected peace move and end the war.
In The Road Less Traveled, Philip Zelikow recounts the five months when, behind closed doors, the future of the war, and the world, hung in the balance. It is a story of civic courage, of awful responsibility, and of how some rose to the occasion or shrank from it. "Peace is on the floor waiting to be picked up!" pleaded the German ambassador to the United States. This book shows how right he was, and how close leaders came to doing so.
384 pages, Hardcover
First published March 16, 2021
38 people are currently reading
558 people want to read
About the author
Philip D. Zelikow
23 books22 followersPhilip D. Zelikow is an American diplomat, academic and author. He has worked as the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, and Counselor of the United States Department of State. He is the White Burkett Miller Professor of History at the University of Virginia and was American Academy in Berlin Axel Springer Fellow in the autumn of 2009. He has written on terrorism, national security, public policy, peace settlements of WW1 and many significant events of the 20th century.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 54 reviews
August 26, 2021
Just finished this book for my Verity Kent series research and it was amazing. Meticulously researched from so many primary resources with such a sharp analysis, it tells the tale of how close the Great War came to ending in peace without victory in late 1916-early 1917. I cannot recall the last time I reacted so viscerally to a book. There were so many times I wanted to jump up and scream at the diplomats and world leaders in the pages. It’s absolutely agonizing to discover how close the world came to peace, how many lives might have been spared, and how differently the 20th century might have played out. Highly recommended!
March 23, 2021
This is a 4-star plus book. The new material in it would have it at a 5-star, but, Zelikow errs in still painting by “consensus history” colors in showing Wilson as the determined neutral. He’s not as bad as some, and in some of the new information, he shows Wilson at times was — or acted like, in the moment — a true neutral. But, he never followed though.
That said, that perception was part of what did make this largely 5-star. On the other hand, the weight of the “consensus history” elements tilted me back to 4-star. With that? Let’s dig in. (Warning: Much of the rest of the review is spoiler alerts. Scroll 80 percent of the way down, since we can't put an anchor mid-review to hide just the part after it as a spoiler alert.)
There is a lot of new information here, even to someone like me who’s pretty knowledgeable about WWI and many of its specifics. I knew about the German peace feelers, and some of their specifics. Zelikow still filled in a few details for me, including how much of an intermediary House was and how much he bollixed some of this. More on that later.
Much of what he talked about on the British side, the big picture as well as the details, was very new to me.
I knew money was tight, but didn’t realize how tight by how much Britain was scraping for securities in the US to serve as loan collateral with the House of Morgan. Did not know that going off the gold standard got a halfway serious Asquith Cabinet discussion. Did not know Britain had tried floating an unsecured bond issue before this and it got only nibbles in the US.
So, then we get to the meat.
The British tried to float another unsecured issue. The Federal Reserve, with the chair at the time prompted by the head of the NY Fed, decided to issue an official “investors’ caution” note. This was brought to Wilson’s attention — and he told the Fed to SHARPEN the note. Yes.
It’s at a time like this that Wilson is halfway open to interpretation as a true neutral.
But, then Wilson’s feet of clay come into play, to riff on Clemenceau at Versailles. And Zelikow shows this. First, he references British politicians who, in talking about Wilson working on a peace plan, note he was an idealist, and might even have ideals that were statesmanlike — but that he had an indifferent grasp of governance.
Part of this connects to the smallness of the U.S. government at this time. But, part of it connects to how close Wilson played his cards to his vest, and didn’t trust many people. Neither his second wife nor Col. House was a government or any kind of administrator. And, while House might either accidentally or deliberately undercut Wilson while outside his presence, neither he nor Edith would challenge or redirect him in person. This had several fallouts.
First, Wilson had no idea he had Britain by the financial gonads for months after getting the Fed to sharpen its note. And, without a semi-war cabinet looping in Treasury, he couldn’t.
Second, beyond small government, he had a small cabinet. Not small in size for his era, but small minded, largely sleepy southern segregationists. Wilson may have admired British cabinet government, and Bagehot’s ideas on government, in the abstract and academic, but in the real world? Not at all.
Third, as Zelikow notes, it wasn’t until Versailles that Wilson learned about House truckling him. (That said, House didn’t have the worst of the ideas side in all cases he did this.)
Fourth, because Wilson himself wasn’t reading Amb. Bernstorff closely enough, he didn’t grasp time pressures Germany faced — or rather, that Bethmann faced from unrestricted submarine warfare mongers.
Zelikow is also very good on the Nov.-Dec. 1916 machinations of Lloyd George, including how he first considered keeping Asquith as a figurehead premier. He adds as background that with many Liberals already deserting him, a coalition government was his only chance to grasp the brass ring. I had “minimum high regard” for Lloyd George before this, but even worse afterward. Britons who criticize the American presidency in general are on soft ground, given some of their prime ministers.
VERY good on the machinations of Col House … and why: his desire for continued “access” to British society. This led him to get Wilson to yank his call for a peace conference, which totally defanged Wilson’s leverage in terms of the big picture. It also led the Kaiser, anti-Bethmanns in the civilian government, and above all, Hindenberg and Ludendorff, to decide that Wilson couldn’t be trusted. House also lied about who wanted to go further forward and who was delaying, between him and Wilson.
At the same time, House misrepresented some Britons, or with the likes of Grey, simply didn’t represent them to Wilson at all.
End of spoilers.
And now ….
“Consensus history” errors about Wilson earlier on. While noting his admiration for the British parliamentary system, he ignores him writing his PhD on Bagehot, and yet claims Wilson really was neutral.
Related and worse: Claims Wilson just urged Germany to “restrict” submarine war by not targeting merchantmen. Ignores British violations of int’l law through its extended blockade and its use of food as a blockade-item weapon; ignores that these are the parallels to Germany targeting merchantmen. (Also ignores British false-flagging, the Lusitania carrying munitions and more.)
Says that Wilson said he would tackle blockade issue after getting Germany to “cruiser warfare” after Sussex. He didn’t.
And, in turn, then, is Zelikow correct in his interpretation that Wilson didn’t know just how bad British finances were and that he didn’t know he had Britain by the gonads? Or, did he, and did he choose not to follow up (since he really never did follow up)?
That said, that perception was part of what did make this largely 5-star. On the other hand, the weight of the “consensus history” elements tilted me back to 4-star. With that? Let’s dig in. (Warning: Much of the rest of the review is spoiler alerts. Scroll 80 percent of the way down, since we can't put an anchor mid-review to hide just the part after it as a spoiler alert.)
There is a lot of new information here, even to someone like me who’s pretty knowledgeable about WWI and many of its specifics. I knew about the German peace feelers, and some of their specifics. Zelikow still filled in a few details for me, including how much of an intermediary House was and how much he bollixed some of this. More on that later.
Much of what he talked about on the British side, the big picture as well as the details, was very new to me.
I knew money was tight, but didn’t realize how tight by how much Britain was scraping for securities in the US to serve as loan collateral with the House of Morgan. Did not know that going off the gold standard got a halfway serious Asquith Cabinet discussion. Did not know Britain had tried floating an unsecured bond issue before this and it got only nibbles in the US.
So, then we get to the meat.
The British tried to float another unsecured issue. The Federal Reserve, with the chair at the time prompted by the head of the NY Fed, decided to issue an official “investors’ caution” note. This was brought to Wilson’s attention — and he told the Fed to SHARPEN the note. Yes.
It’s at a time like this that Wilson is halfway open to interpretation as a true neutral.
But, then Wilson’s feet of clay come into play, to riff on Clemenceau at Versailles. And Zelikow shows this. First, he references British politicians who, in talking about Wilson working on a peace plan, note he was an idealist, and might even have ideals that were statesmanlike — but that he had an indifferent grasp of governance.
Part of this connects to the smallness of the U.S. government at this time. But, part of it connects to how close Wilson played his cards to his vest, and didn’t trust many people. Neither his second wife nor Col. House was a government or any kind of administrator. And, while House might either accidentally or deliberately undercut Wilson while outside his presence, neither he nor Edith would challenge or redirect him in person. This had several fallouts.
First, Wilson had no idea he had Britain by the financial gonads for months after getting the Fed to sharpen its note. And, without a semi-war cabinet looping in Treasury, he couldn’t.
Second, beyond small government, he had a small cabinet. Not small in size for his era, but small minded, largely sleepy southern segregationists. Wilson may have admired British cabinet government, and Bagehot’s ideas on government, in the abstract and academic, but in the real world? Not at all.
Third, as Zelikow notes, it wasn’t until Versailles that Wilson learned about House truckling him. (That said, House didn’t have the worst of the ideas side in all cases he did this.)
Fourth, because Wilson himself wasn’t reading Amb. Bernstorff closely enough, he didn’t grasp time pressures Germany faced — or rather, that Bethmann faced from unrestricted submarine warfare mongers.
Zelikow is also very good on the Nov.-Dec. 1916 machinations of Lloyd George, including how he first considered keeping Asquith as a figurehead premier. He adds as background that with many Liberals already deserting him, a coalition government was his only chance to grasp the brass ring. I had “minimum high regard” for Lloyd George before this, but even worse afterward. Britons who criticize the American presidency in general are on soft ground, given some of their prime ministers.
VERY good on the machinations of Col House … and why: his desire for continued “access” to British society. This led him to get Wilson to yank his call for a peace conference, which totally defanged Wilson’s leverage in terms of the big picture. It also led the Kaiser, anti-Bethmanns in the civilian government, and above all, Hindenberg and Ludendorff, to decide that Wilson couldn’t be trusted. House also lied about who wanted to go further forward and who was delaying, between him and Wilson.
At the same time, House misrepresented some Britons, or with the likes of Grey, simply didn’t represent them to Wilson at all.
End of spoilers.
And now ….
“Consensus history” errors about Wilson earlier on. While noting his admiration for the British parliamentary system, he ignores him writing his PhD on Bagehot, and yet claims Wilson really was neutral.
Related and worse: Claims Wilson just urged Germany to “restrict” submarine war by not targeting merchantmen. Ignores British violations of int’l law through its extended blockade and its use of food as a blockade-item weapon; ignores that these are the parallels to Germany targeting merchantmen. (Also ignores British false-flagging, the Lusitania carrying munitions and more.)
Says that Wilson said he would tackle blockade issue after getting Germany to “cruiser warfare” after Sussex. He didn’t.
And, in turn, then, is Zelikow correct in his interpretation that Wilson didn’t know just how bad British finances were and that he didn’t know he had Britain by the gonads? Or, did he, and did he choose not to follow up (since he really never did follow up)?
April 15, 2021
This outstanding book shows us a tragic window where WW1 could have ended in late 1916/early 1917.
The warring countries were exhausted and willing to hold a peace conference with minimum preconditions with the help of Wilson.
However, Wilson would not do anything until after the election. Also, he did not have good diplomatic counselors to guide him on how to handle setting up a conference. By the time Wilson had some momentum, it was too late. The same day that Germany agreed to a conference, it also sent a note that it would begin unrestricted submarine warfare. Wilson was so shocked and upset about the u-boats, he dismissed the conference note.
This part of WW1 history has not been discussed in depth before, so Zelikow breaks new ground. This is a must read for any WW1 fans. Truly tragic and fascinating.
The warring countries were exhausted and willing to hold a peace conference with minimum preconditions with the help of Wilson.
However, Wilson would not do anything until after the election. Also, he did not have good diplomatic counselors to guide him on how to handle setting up a conference. By the time Wilson had some momentum, it was too late. The same day that Germany agreed to a conference, it also sent a note that it would begin unrestricted submarine warfare. Wilson was so shocked and upset about the u-boats, he dismissed the conference note.
This part of WW1 history has not been discussed in depth before, so Zelikow breaks new ground. This is a must read for any WW1 fans. Truly tragic and fascinating.
April 2, 2022
A readable and well-researched work.
Zelikow ably covers how dependent Britain was on American financial support, Wilson’s distrust of many of his own subordinates (many of whom don’t strike you as particularly objective or intelligent), and the Americans’ failure to appreciate the situation in Germany (where the government faced pressure from the seemingly unchallengeable Ludendorff) His coverage of House and Lloyd George is pretty good.
The narrative moves along at a fast pace and Zelikow provides vivid portraits of people and places. He’s critical of the Germans, but even more critical of Wilson (and his incompetent diplomats) Many histories of the war portray both sides as intransigent, but Zelikow ably shows how seriously they considered American mediation. At the same time, it also shows how nationalism among their populations and elites made the belligerents less likely to compromise.
There could have been some more qualifications when discussing Wilson’s “neutrality,” and on Britain’s legally dubious blockade. Still, an illuminating and engaging work.
Zelikow ably covers how dependent Britain was on American financial support, Wilson’s distrust of many of his own subordinates (many of whom don’t strike you as particularly objective or intelligent), and the Americans’ failure to appreciate the situation in Germany (where the government faced pressure from the seemingly unchallengeable Ludendorff) His coverage of House and Lloyd George is pretty good.
The narrative moves along at a fast pace and Zelikow provides vivid portraits of people and places. He’s critical of the Germans, but even more critical of Wilson (and his incompetent diplomats) Many histories of the war portray both sides as intransigent, but Zelikow ably shows how seriously they considered American mediation. At the same time, it also shows how nationalism among their populations and elites made the belligerents less likely to compromise.
There could have been some more qualifications when discussing Wilson’s “neutrality,” and on Britain’s legally dubious blockade. Still, an illuminating and engaging work.
January 26, 2022
Is this going to be on the test?
My thanks go to Net Galley and Public Affairs for the review copy. This book is for sale now.
I am initially drawn to this title when I see the subtitle—an opportunity to make an early peace that went unanswered—and I also want to read more about World War I. I love military history, and am sick to death of World War II material, so this felt like it might be a breath of fresh air.
Or not.
There is no doubt that Zelikow knows his field, and his research is above reproach. Students and researchers may find this book useful, albeit with a careful eye toward a very conservative point of view that affects his analysis. However, for those of us just in it for the joy of learning, I must caution that this is a slog. I read the first half in the digital format I was given, and after publication, I also availed myself of the audio version available at Seattle Bibliocommons, and it’s difficult to focus on either for long at a time, because it’s just Zzzzzzzz
Oh, I’m sorry! Was that me? Let me try again. The research is splendid; the analysis is reactionary; the presentation is a little zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
I might have spared myself some frustration had I researched the author. Once I was able to focus long enough to get a feel for his political leanings, I ran a brief Google search, and discovered he’d been with the U.S. State Department under the Reagan and Bush administrations.
Oh.
At this point, you know enough to decide whether you want to read this thing. If you have a strong interest in the topic and aren’t squeamish about drawing information from the far right, then this is your book. Not mine, though.
My thanks go to Net Galley and Public Affairs for the review copy. This book is for sale now.
I am initially drawn to this title when I see the subtitle—an opportunity to make an early peace that went unanswered—and I also want to read more about World War I. I love military history, and am sick to death of World War II material, so this felt like it might be a breath of fresh air.
Or not.
There is no doubt that Zelikow knows his field, and his research is above reproach. Students and researchers may find this book useful, albeit with a careful eye toward a very conservative point of view that affects his analysis. However, for those of us just in it for the joy of learning, I must caution that this is a slog. I read the first half in the digital format I was given, and after publication, I also availed myself of the audio version available at Seattle Bibliocommons, and it’s difficult to focus on either for long at a time, because it’s just Zzzzzzzz
Oh, I’m sorry! Was that me? Let me try again. The research is splendid; the analysis is reactionary; the presentation is a little zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
I might have spared myself some frustration had I researched the author. Once I was able to focus long enough to get a feel for his political leanings, I ran a brief Google search, and discovered he’d been with the U.S. State Department under the Reagan and Bush administrations.
Oh.
At this point, you know enough to decide whether you want to read this thing. If you have a strong interest in the topic and aren’t squeamish about drawing information from the far right, then this is your book. Not mine, though.
April 24, 2023
3 stars. Solid enough book, and the "what-ifs" the author presents are often heartbreaking.
Many thanks to #NetGalley for a copy of this book in exchange for my honest review.
Many thanks to #NetGalley for a copy of this book in exchange for my honest review.
May 28, 2022
Very thoroughly written. Great sources.
What would have happened had the President been able to create peace? A very good what if.
What would have happened had the President been able to create peace? A very good what if.
July 3, 2021
This book examines the peace that almost was. It reveals the story of Wilson’s attempt to broker a peace to WWI in 1916. Zelikow is a gifted writer and balances narrative and detail well. However, he never really convinces the reader that his thesis is anything more than a neat thought experiment.
Zelikow shines a spotlight on an oft-forgotten piece of WWI history. The narrative plays out like a tragedy. All the major players were interested in peace talks, but a combination of political calculations, misunderstandings, outright subterfuge, and diplomatic missteps caused the opportunity to fizzle out.
Zelikow laments the fact that historians often ignore what doesn’t happen. And while that’s an interesting perspective, there’s a reason behind it. The strength of the book is in its narrative. Zelikow reserves most of the interpretation for the epilogue, and he engages in quite a bit of extrapolation. He makes a lot of assumptions (albeit educated ones) about how prospective peace talks would have gone down, and creates a laundry list of all the things that wouldn’t have happened afterwards (including WW2). The argument isn’t beyond the pale, but needs to be couched in more nuanced language.
As a result, we have a book that will appeal to fans of diplomatic and WWI history. However, it is not the major list event of the war that Zelikow implies it to be.
Zelikow shines a spotlight on an oft-forgotten piece of WWI history. The narrative plays out like a tragedy. All the major players were interested in peace talks, but a combination of political calculations, misunderstandings, outright subterfuge, and diplomatic missteps caused the opportunity to fizzle out.
Zelikow laments the fact that historians often ignore what doesn’t happen. And while that’s an interesting perspective, there’s a reason behind it. The strength of the book is in its narrative. Zelikow reserves most of the interpretation for the epilogue, and he engages in quite a bit of extrapolation. He makes a lot of assumptions (albeit educated ones) about how prospective peace talks would have gone down, and creates a laundry list of all the things that wouldn’t have happened afterwards (including WW2). The argument isn’t beyond the pale, but needs to be couched in more nuanced language.
As a result, we have a book that will appeal to fans of diplomatic and WWI history. However, it is not the major list event of the war that Zelikow implies it to be.
May 13, 2023
An interesting and attention-getting title leads us into the secret battle to end the great war. Philips Zelikow (PZ) Starts out this book with a brief and well-known story of how Frost came to write the ionic poem “The Road Less Traveled”.
Frost went to England to calm his nerves and find a quiet opportunity to write. While in England he developed a friendship with Edward Thomas, an accomplished English poet. As the clouds of war appeared over England, Frost made a hasty trip back to New England and he took Thomas’s son with him. Thomas was left with a dilemma, should he, as suggested by Frost, get on a ship headed to America, or should he stay and fight in this stupid war? Frost encouraged the passage to America, yet Thomas vacillated over his duty to his native land. This was the genesis of the poem, regarding the fork in the road. Thomas elected to stay and fight and subsequently die in battle. PZ uses this vehicle to introduce his story about the stupidity of this war and the stupidity of the nation’s not accepting the road less traveled and ending this war in 1916. I enjoyed revisiting the friendship of Frost and Thomas, yet I felt that PZ initially overworked the use of the poem. I would have also liked the title to have been “Peace is on the floor waiting to be picked up”.
PZ has a simple-to-read style that surprised this reader. As a college professor, former Diplomat, and someone who worked in five former administrations, I expected an opaquer style; his up-front and easy-to-read style lets the reader fly through this book. At times, PZ starts at the end of a subject and works back to the beginning. This style was not hard to adjust to, I found it a little unusual but interesting.
The German government was among the first to realize the futility of continuing the slaughter and they contacted President Wilson of the US to mediate peace. This request by Germany is carried throughout this book if only Wilson would have picked up the peace off the floor.
PZ goes back in time and presents a biographical sketch of President Wilson and the National mood in the United States. The majority wanted to stay out of Europe’s problems. But there were hawks like Teddy Roosevelt who wanted US involvement in the conflict.
PZ presents a picture of Wilson that is quite interesting reading. The US was 50 years out from the civil war. America was growing by leaps and bounds but the government had not kept pace with the expansion. The office of the President of the United States and his administration were austere. PZ says that Wilson for the most part kept his own counsel on domestic and foreign policy, except for his discussions with his wife and close friend Edward House. Wilson’s attributes of arrogance kept others from participating and contributing to his administration. By 1914, America was too busy and big to administer from the dinner table discussions with his wife and friend Edwin House. The Office of the President included a very small staff, mostly clerical. Wilson did read dispatches but had little interaction with the Ambassadors and diplomats abroad. Edward House was the exception, Wilson used him as a sounding board and dispatched him to Europe to observe and report back.
I found the initial discussion of Edward House delightful. If there is anyone whom I would like to emulate it would be Edward House. PZ describes him as an educated, quiet, and gentle man who came from money and inherited wealth. His life consisted of a New York City home, a summer home in New England, and an annual tour of Europe. He developed influential friends on both sides of the Atlantic with his calm but sophisticated demeanor, intelligence, and trustworthiness. He was considered an unofficial part of the Wilson family and he was the first one called when Wilson had a dilemma to ponder. This man was gifted with all the attributes that I wished I had. I can only guess he inherited quality genes as well as wealth. But no one has ever described him as a Statesman, and that is his great failing.
The ability to finance this war was the paramount issue even ahead of the horrendous casualty counts. All the combatant countries were essentially bankrupted by this silly war. Britain begged and borrowed huge amounts from American banks and was dependent on American farmers to feed their citizens. This reader doubts that these debts were ever fully repaid.
PZ goes back and forth in his narrative between England and Germany as he describes the push and pull of the peace initiative debate. Each Country had its hawks and doves, each military had a false opinion of their ability to win this war. Germany seemed to be the most sensible about wanting and needing peace while England seemed not to have a statesman or courageous leader who could get a coalition together to force a peace conference. It is frustrating to read, so I can only guess what pressure was felt by the leadership.
The research necessary for this book was immense and PZ did a great job. But this large quantity of detailed research added to the frustration. PZ could have been more concise by not detailing each dispatch that basically had the same content.
The book created more frustration because as the reader follows all the near-missed opportunities for peace, yet we know that America will eventually fail in her peace initiatives and will send Americans to die in this stupid war.
In a final chapter, PZ reviews what and who was responsible for a failed peace attempt in 1916. It can be summarized as a Wilson/House failure because they did not have the wisdom to know that a peace conference was achievable by just calling for it to happen. Also, the Prussian Military arrogance in believing that a U- boat innovative would bring the allies to their knees, was the major cause of this lost opportunity.
A few points puzzled me, for instance, both the Central Powers and the Allies believed that only Wilson could win peace. Why weren’t governments talking? Could contacts between heads of State arrange a peace conference? It seemed to me that the top government officials were unable and unwilling to act, while the lower-level government people saw the situation quite clearly. For instance, Noel Buxton, a liberal member of Parliament argued that a total subjugation of Germany was both unnecessary and unwise. “The policy of aggression and the influence of the military leaders are discredited already. ‘In fact, the internal development of Germany towards liberal institutions would not be hastened but would be checked by further exhaustion. Limited terms of peace would be enough. The renunciation of conquered lands by negotiation would be recognized in Germany as a complete failure of aggression. On the other hand. Further humiliation, Buxton warned, would produce a degree of resentment and bitter feeling of revenge. That reaction would obscure the unpopularity of the military school and revive the aggressive policy”. These observations were profoundly prophetic and obviously ignored but his foresight was deemed accurate two decades later. So, there were government officials with wisdom, but they were generally ignored.
The final assessment of Edwin House was that of a bright man of the world, yet not a statesman. He was not a good counselor to Wilson and may have deceived him on occasion because of his anglophile nature and his willingness to see America go to war with Germany. Sad! Because I initially wanted to be just like him. PZ says of him that House was cleverly and deliberately sabotaging the peace process, conniving to drive America into the war. The question can be boiled down to, was House a fool or a villain? House did want a compromise peace, yet he did dissemble. He was an observant man and a gifted player of people. But his analysis of the world situation was dilettantish and superficial. The quality of his thought did not approach that of Wilson or men of ideas. Nor was he gifted or experienced in the craft of making or executing policy, such as the construction of a negotiation to end the war. Wilson’s reliance on House and his wife was a measure of Wilson’s aloofness and conceit that resulted in hundreds and thousands of deaths in the tragedy of World War 1 and II and even the rise of communism.
This was an amazing story of how mankind almost did something right by ending the war in 1916 and propagating peace. PZ’s research and presentation of that research were excellent.
Frost went to England to calm his nerves and find a quiet opportunity to write. While in England he developed a friendship with Edward Thomas, an accomplished English poet. As the clouds of war appeared over England, Frost made a hasty trip back to New England and he took Thomas’s son with him. Thomas was left with a dilemma, should he, as suggested by Frost, get on a ship headed to America, or should he stay and fight in this stupid war? Frost encouraged the passage to America, yet Thomas vacillated over his duty to his native land. This was the genesis of the poem, regarding the fork in the road. Thomas elected to stay and fight and subsequently die in battle. PZ uses this vehicle to introduce his story about the stupidity of this war and the stupidity of the nation’s not accepting the road less traveled and ending this war in 1916. I enjoyed revisiting the friendship of Frost and Thomas, yet I felt that PZ initially overworked the use of the poem. I would have also liked the title to have been “Peace is on the floor waiting to be picked up”.
PZ has a simple-to-read style that surprised this reader. As a college professor, former Diplomat, and someone who worked in five former administrations, I expected an opaquer style; his up-front and easy-to-read style lets the reader fly through this book. At times, PZ starts at the end of a subject and works back to the beginning. This style was not hard to adjust to, I found it a little unusual but interesting.
The German government was among the first to realize the futility of continuing the slaughter and they contacted President Wilson of the US to mediate peace. This request by Germany is carried throughout this book if only Wilson would have picked up the peace off the floor.
PZ goes back in time and presents a biographical sketch of President Wilson and the National mood in the United States. The majority wanted to stay out of Europe’s problems. But there were hawks like Teddy Roosevelt who wanted US involvement in the conflict.
PZ presents a picture of Wilson that is quite interesting reading. The US was 50 years out from the civil war. America was growing by leaps and bounds but the government had not kept pace with the expansion. The office of the President of the United States and his administration were austere. PZ says that Wilson for the most part kept his own counsel on domestic and foreign policy, except for his discussions with his wife and close friend Edward House. Wilson’s attributes of arrogance kept others from participating and contributing to his administration. By 1914, America was too busy and big to administer from the dinner table discussions with his wife and friend Edwin House. The Office of the President included a very small staff, mostly clerical. Wilson did read dispatches but had little interaction with the Ambassadors and diplomats abroad. Edward House was the exception, Wilson used him as a sounding board and dispatched him to Europe to observe and report back.
I found the initial discussion of Edward House delightful. If there is anyone whom I would like to emulate it would be Edward House. PZ describes him as an educated, quiet, and gentle man who came from money and inherited wealth. His life consisted of a New York City home, a summer home in New England, and an annual tour of Europe. He developed influential friends on both sides of the Atlantic with his calm but sophisticated demeanor, intelligence, and trustworthiness. He was considered an unofficial part of the Wilson family and he was the first one called when Wilson had a dilemma to ponder. This man was gifted with all the attributes that I wished I had. I can only guess he inherited quality genes as well as wealth. But no one has ever described him as a Statesman, and that is his great failing.
The ability to finance this war was the paramount issue even ahead of the horrendous casualty counts. All the combatant countries were essentially bankrupted by this silly war. Britain begged and borrowed huge amounts from American banks and was dependent on American farmers to feed their citizens. This reader doubts that these debts were ever fully repaid.
PZ goes back and forth in his narrative between England and Germany as he describes the push and pull of the peace initiative debate. Each Country had its hawks and doves, each military had a false opinion of their ability to win this war. Germany seemed to be the most sensible about wanting and needing peace while England seemed not to have a statesman or courageous leader who could get a coalition together to force a peace conference. It is frustrating to read, so I can only guess what pressure was felt by the leadership.
The research necessary for this book was immense and PZ did a great job. But this large quantity of detailed research added to the frustration. PZ could have been more concise by not detailing each dispatch that basically had the same content.
The book created more frustration because as the reader follows all the near-missed opportunities for peace, yet we know that America will eventually fail in her peace initiatives and will send Americans to die in this stupid war.
In a final chapter, PZ reviews what and who was responsible for a failed peace attempt in 1916. It can be summarized as a Wilson/House failure because they did not have the wisdom to know that a peace conference was achievable by just calling for it to happen. Also, the Prussian Military arrogance in believing that a U- boat innovative would bring the allies to their knees, was the major cause of this lost opportunity.
A few points puzzled me, for instance, both the Central Powers and the Allies believed that only Wilson could win peace. Why weren’t governments talking? Could contacts between heads of State arrange a peace conference? It seemed to me that the top government officials were unable and unwilling to act, while the lower-level government people saw the situation quite clearly. For instance, Noel Buxton, a liberal member of Parliament argued that a total subjugation of Germany was both unnecessary and unwise. “The policy of aggression and the influence of the military leaders are discredited already. ‘In fact, the internal development of Germany towards liberal institutions would not be hastened but would be checked by further exhaustion. Limited terms of peace would be enough. The renunciation of conquered lands by negotiation would be recognized in Germany as a complete failure of aggression. On the other hand. Further humiliation, Buxton warned, would produce a degree of resentment and bitter feeling of revenge. That reaction would obscure the unpopularity of the military school and revive the aggressive policy”. These observations were profoundly prophetic and obviously ignored but his foresight was deemed accurate two decades later. So, there were government officials with wisdom, but they were generally ignored.
The final assessment of Edwin House was that of a bright man of the world, yet not a statesman. He was not a good counselor to Wilson and may have deceived him on occasion because of his anglophile nature and his willingness to see America go to war with Germany. Sad! Because I initially wanted to be just like him. PZ says of him that House was cleverly and deliberately sabotaging the peace process, conniving to drive America into the war. The question can be boiled down to, was House a fool or a villain? House did want a compromise peace, yet he did dissemble. He was an observant man and a gifted player of people. But his analysis of the world situation was dilettantish and superficial. The quality of his thought did not approach that of Wilson or men of ideas. Nor was he gifted or experienced in the craft of making or executing policy, such as the construction of a negotiation to end the war. Wilson’s reliance on House and his wife was a measure of Wilson’s aloofness and conceit that resulted in hundreds and thousands of deaths in the tragedy of World War 1 and II and even the rise of communism.
This was an amazing story of how mankind almost did something right by ending the war in 1916 and propagating peace. PZ’s research and presentation of that research were excellent.
April 15, 2021
This is a peculiar and frustrating book about an important topic. The author is an attorney and career diplomat and this background comes through in so many ways. He is a decent storyteller, but three to four pages about one diplomat's decision to make a trip or not make a trip or whether he should pass along a note, well, that can wear you down for a while. Ultimately, he does a decent job of demonstrating the manipulative nature of England's foreign policy, the pressures on the German diplomat from the generals, and the general war-weariness of everyone by 1916. Woodrow Wilson is revealed as the man of principle he was, but no effort is made to dig into what his motivation my have been for his constant waffling and procrastination. (Unfortunately, his one civilian advisor was a bit of a dope, in well over his empty head). Another ignored elephant in the room is Arthur Balfour. And so forth.
An interesting peek into a major issue, but just not enough there.
An interesting peek into a major issue, but just not enough there.
September 19, 2021
This was an interesting read. It put the German chancellor in a good light. He seemed to try his best in holding off the militants in his country to push for a winnerless end to the war.
September 3, 2023
معرفی کتاب: راهی کم مسافر: نبردی پنهان برای پایان دادن به جنگ بزرگ ۱۹۱۷ – ۱۹۱۶
عنوان کتاب: راهی کم مسافر: نبردی پنهان برای پایان دادن به جنگ بزرگ ۱۹۱۷ – ۱۹۱۶ (The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War, 1916-1917)
ناشر: پابلیک افیرز (PublicAffairs (March 16, 2021))
زبان: انگلیسی
صفحات: ۳۵۲
شابک ده رقمی: ۱۵۴۱۷۵۰۹۵۰
یکی از معروفترین شعرهای معاصر زبان انگلیسی راه کمتر پیموده شده است (Road Less Traveled) که رابرت فراست ملک الشعرای ایالات متحده آمریکا آنرا در سال ۱۹۱۶ برای دوستی انگلیسی نوشت که بین رفتن به جبهه جنگ یا مهاجرت به ایالات متحده آمریکا سرگردان بود. فیلیپ زلیکو با الهام از این شعر یادآور می شود در همان روزها دولتمردان بریتانیایی، آلمانی و فرانسوی در آرزوی رسیدن به صلحی بدون پیروزی و با امید به میانجیگری وودرو ویلسون، رئیس جمهور ایالات متحده، به پیمودن راه صلح فکر می کردند. حاصل پژوهشهای او کتاب جالب و نفسگیریست درباره تلاشها برای رسیدن به صلح در میانه ویرانگرترین جنگ تاریخ معاصر که جزء کتابهای برگزیده سال ۲۰۲۱ هفته نامه اکونومیست است.
کتاب بیشتر بر تلاشهای ایالات متحده آمریکا متمرکز است. وودرو ویلسون می داند که اگر جنگ در اروپا ادامه یابد ایالات متحده مجبور به ورود به جنگ خواهد بود و برای جلوگیری از این اتفاق مایل است که راهی برای پایان دادن به آن بیابد. ایالات متحده کشور بیطرفیست که دولت متفق انگلیس، فرانسه و روسیه برای تامین هزینه های جنگ به بازارهای مالی و بانکهای او متکی هستند. همینطور کشوریست که آلمان امیدوار است هرگز وارد جنگ نشود. ده سال پیش از ورود وودرو ویلسون به کاخ سفید تئودرو روزولت با برگزاری یک کنفرانس صلح به جنگ روسیه و ژاپن پایان داده بود که منافع ایالات متحده در اقیانوس آرام را تضمین می کرد و به پرستیژ بین المللی ایالات متحده افزوده بود. حالا ویلسون که پیروزیش در انتخابات مدیون تفرقه در میان جمهوریخواهان است باید راهی برای پایان دادن به جنگی بیابد که در سه قاره فروزان است.
کتاب با جزئیات به تلاشهای ویلسون برای سنجش وضعیت در اروپا با فرستادن یک نماینده شخصی غیررسمی، سرهنگ هاوس، می پردازد. شخصیت ویلسون، هاوس، وزرای انگلیسی، سیاستمداران فرانسوی و دیپلماتهای آلمانی را موشکافانه بررسی می کند. یکی از برتریهای کتاب بررسی نقش ارتباطات و تفسیر پیامهای دریافتیست. چطور تفسیرهای شخصی هاوس و ویلسون نقش بزرگی در انگیزه شان برای ادامه تلاشهایشان برای صلح دارد و در نهایت باعث شکستشان می شود. خواننده متوجه می شود که مذاکرات و پیامهای تلگرافی و سیگنالهایی که دولتهای درگیر جنگ از طریق حملات نظامی و زیردریایی به یکدیگر ارسال می کردند چطور باعث کندی آنها در پاسخ دادن به پیامهای دریافتی از ایالات متحده می شده و چطور جاه طلبیهای سیاسی و نظامی پایان جنگ را غیرممکن می کند.
خواننده با انتظار رسیدن به نتیجه، به یک کنفرانس صلح و پایان جنگ این کتاب را می خواند. نویسنده خواننده را از هر صفحه به صفحه بعدی و از هر فصلی به فصل بعدی می کشاند و او را منتظر نگه می دارد. حتی خواننده ای که می داند جنگ اول در ۱۹۱۷ پایان نیافت باور می کند که صلح در همان نزدیکیست. ولی در هر دولتی گروهی خواهان صلح و گروهی خواهان جنگ هستند. سیاستمداران لیبرال انگلیسی با آگاهی از سقوط احتمالی حکومت تزاری در روسیه و علم به تلفات سنگین جنگ خواهان مذاکره فوری و برگزاری کنفرانس صلح هستند. سیاستمداران محافظه کار به رهبری عضو رادیکال لیبرال دولت لوید جورج خواهان مذاکره بعد از یک پیروزی در میدان جنگ هستند. لوید جورج با وجود آگاهی از وضعیت بحرانی انگلیس و فرانسه علنا از بسیج عمومی همه منابع برای پیروزی در جنگ می گفت. او در عمل با آینده بریتانیا و جان میلیونها بیگناه قمار می کند.
در طرف مقابل آلمان قراردارد. صدراعظم آلمان، بتمان هلاگ و دیپلماتهایش بی صبر��نه صلح می خواهند. آنها محرمانه اعلام می کنند که حاضر به خروج از اراضی اشغالی هستند. در برابر آنها ژنرالهای آلمانی قرار دارند که سیاست خارجی را ادامه جنگ می دانند و در سیاست خارجی بدون ملاحظه دخالت می کنند. آنها می خواهند دشمن را وادار به تسلیم کنند. آنها صلحی اجباری و بر مبنای پیروزی می خواهند نه صلحی بدون پیروزی. در حالیکه آلمان برای حفظ حسن نیت ایالات متحده باید از حمله به کشتی های بازرگانی آمریکایی خودداری کند که مواد غذایی به بریتانیا و فرانسه حمل می کنند، ژنرالها می خواهند زیردریاییهای آلمانی اجازه حمله به هر کشتی باری را داشته باشند. در حالیکه ویلسون از یکسو از بتمان می شنود که آلمان آماده تخلیه بلژیک اشغال شده است از سوی دیگر شاهد حملات روز افزون به کشتیهای آمریکاییست.
پایان این تلاش را همه می دانند. صلح محقق نمی شود. تزار روسیه نیکولاس دوم و پسر خاله اش امپراتور آلمان قیصر ویلهلم دوم هر دو سقوط می کنند. امپراتوری هاپسبورگ و دوران این قدیمیترین خاندان سلطنتی اروپا پایان می یابد. و عصر طلایی اروپا به آخر می رسد. کمونیسم مانند بلایی بر سر دنیا فرود می آید و جنگهای منطقه ای در روسیه، لهستان، بالکان و خاورمیانه تا اوائل دهه بیست میلادی ادامه پیدا می کنند. جنگ زیردریایی ها باعث صلح نمی شود بلکه فقط ورود ایالات متحده به جنگ و شکست آلمان را قطعی می کند. ژنرالهای آلمانی اما شکست را نمی پذیرند. آنها باور دارند هیچوقت همه منابع آلمان در اختیارشان نبوده است. نظریه پردازان توطئه با خلق داستان از پشت خنجر خوردن و حضور یهودیانی مانند تروتسکی در میان بلشویکها ادعا می کنند که شبکه جهانی بانکداران یهودی باعث شکست آلمان در جنگ شده است. ژنرالهای شکست خورده در جنگ زمینه یک دیکتاتوری نظامی در بعد از جنگ را آماده می کنند.
یهودی ستیزی و نژادپرستی قوت می گیرد و راه برای صعود سرجوخه ای اتریشی به پیشوایی رایش هموار می شود. آلمان یکبار دیگر می جنگد، اینبار تنها با نابودی کاملش هست که آلمانها می فهمند با زور نمی شود به همه چیز رسید. درسی که اگر ژنرالهای آلمانی در ۱۹۱۶ یاد گرفته بودند، شاید هنوز امپراتوری آلمان برقرار بود.
عنوان کتاب: راهی کم مسافر: نبردی پنهان برای پایان دادن به جنگ بزرگ ۱۹۱۷ – ۱۹۱۶ (The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War, 1916-1917)
ناشر: پابلیک افیرز (PublicAffairs (March 16, 2021))
زبان: انگلیسی
صفحات: ۳۵۲
شابک ده رقمی: ۱۵۴۱۷۵۰۹۵۰
یکی از معروفترین شعرهای معاصر زبان انگلیسی راه کمتر پیموده شده است (Road Less Traveled) که رابرت فراست ملک الشعرای ایالات متحده آمریکا آنرا در سال ۱۹۱۶ برای دوستی انگلیسی نوشت که بین رفتن به جبهه جنگ یا مهاجرت به ایالات متحده آمریکا سرگردان بود. فیلیپ زلیکو با الهام از این شعر یادآور می شود در همان روزها دولتمردان بریتانیایی، آلمانی و فرانسوی در آرزوی رسیدن به صلحی بدون پیروزی و با امید به میانجیگری وودرو ویلسون، رئیس جمهور ایالات متحده، به پیمودن راه صلح فکر می کردند. حاصل پژوهشهای او کتاب جالب و نفسگیریست درباره تلاشها برای رسیدن به صلح در میانه ویرانگرترین جنگ تاریخ معاصر که جزء کتابهای برگزیده سال ۲۰۲۱ هفته نامه اکونومیست است.
کتاب بیشتر بر تلاشهای ایالات متحده آمریکا متمرکز است. وودرو ویلسون می داند که اگر جنگ در اروپا ادامه یابد ایالات متحده مجبور به ورود به جنگ خواهد بود و برای جلوگیری از این اتفاق مایل است که راهی برای پایان دادن به آن بیابد. ایالات متحده کشور بیطرفیست که دولت متفق انگلیس، فرانسه و روسیه برای تامین هزینه های جنگ به بازارهای مالی و بانکهای او متکی هستند. همینطور کشوریست که آلمان امیدوار است هرگز وارد جنگ نشود. ده سال پیش از ورود وودرو ویلسون به کاخ سفید تئودرو روزولت با برگزاری یک کنفرانس صلح به جنگ روسیه و ژاپن پایان داده بود که منافع ایالات متحده در اقیانوس آرام را تضمین می کرد و به پرستیژ بین المللی ایالات متحده افزوده بود. حالا ویلسون که پیروزیش در انتخابات مدیون تفرقه در میان جمهوریخواهان است باید راهی برای پایان دادن به جنگی بیابد که در سه قاره فروزان است.
کتاب با جزئیات به تلاشهای ویلسون برای سنجش وضعیت در اروپا با فرستادن یک نماینده شخصی غیررسمی، سرهنگ هاوس، می پردازد. شخصیت ویلسون، هاوس، وزرای انگلیسی، سیاستمداران فرانسوی و دیپلماتهای آلمانی را موشکافانه بررسی می کند. یکی از برتریهای کتاب بررسی نقش ارتباطات و تفسیر پیامهای دریافتیست. چطور تفسیرهای شخصی هاوس و ویلسون نقش بزرگی در انگیزه شان برای ادامه تلاشهایشان برای صلح دارد و در نهایت باعث شکستشان می شود. خواننده متوجه می شود که مذاکرات و پیامهای تلگرافی و سیگنالهایی که دولتهای درگیر جنگ از طریق حملات نظامی و زیردریایی به یکدیگر ارسال می کردند چطور باعث کندی آنها در پاسخ دادن به پیامهای دریافتی از ایالات متحده می شده و چطور جاه طلبیهای سیاسی و نظامی پایان جنگ را غیرممکن می کند.
خواننده با انتظار رسیدن به نتیجه، به یک کنفرانس صلح و پایان جنگ این کتاب را می خواند. نویسنده خواننده را از هر صفحه به صفحه بعدی و از هر فصلی به فصل بعدی می کشاند و او را منتظر نگه می دارد. حتی خواننده ای که می داند جنگ اول در ۱۹۱۷ پایان نیافت باور می کند که صلح در همان نزدیکیست. ولی در هر دولتی گروهی خواهان صلح و گروهی خواهان جنگ هستند. سیاستمداران لیبرال انگلیسی با آگاهی از سقوط احتمالی حکومت تزاری در روسیه و علم به تلفات سنگین جنگ خواهان مذاکره فوری و برگزاری کنفرانس صلح هستند. سیاستمداران محافظه کار به رهبری عضو رادیکال لیبرال دولت لوید جورج خواهان مذاکره بعد از یک پیروزی در میدان جنگ هستند. لوید جورج با وجود آگاهی از وضعیت بحرانی انگلیس و فرانسه علنا از بسیج عمومی همه منابع برای پیروزی در جنگ می گفت. او در عمل با آینده بریتانیا و جان میلیونها بیگناه قمار می کند.
در طرف مقابل آلمان قراردارد. صدراعظم آلمان، بتمان هلاگ و دیپلماتهایش بی صبر��نه صلح می خواهند. آنها محرمانه اعلام می کنند که حاضر به خروج از اراضی اشغالی هستند. در برابر آنها ژنرالهای آلمانی قرار دارند که سیاست خارجی را ادامه جنگ می دانند و در سیاست خارجی بدون ملاحظه دخالت می کنند. آنها می خواهند دشمن را وادار به تسلیم کنند. آنها صلحی اجباری و بر مبنای پیروزی می خواهند نه صلحی بدون پیروزی. در حالیکه آلمان برای حفظ حسن نیت ایالات متحده باید از حمله به کشتی های بازرگانی آمریکایی خودداری کند که مواد غذایی به بریتانیا و فرانسه حمل می کنند، ژنرالها می خواهند زیردریاییهای آلمانی اجازه حمله به هر کشتی باری را داشته باشند. در حالیکه ویلسون از یکسو از بتمان می شنود که آلمان آماده تخلیه بلژیک اشغال شده است از سوی دیگر شاهد حملات روز افزون به کشتیهای آمریکاییست.
پایان این تلاش را همه می دانند. صلح محقق نمی شود. تزار روسیه نیکولاس دوم و پسر خاله اش امپراتور آلمان قیصر ویلهلم دوم هر دو سقوط می کنند. امپراتوری هاپسبورگ و دوران این قدیمیترین خاندان سلطنتی اروپا پایان می یابد. و عصر طلایی اروپا به آخر می رسد. کمونیسم مانند بلایی بر سر دنیا فرود می آید و جنگهای منطقه ای در روسیه، لهستان، بالکان و خاورمیانه تا اوائل دهه بیست میلادی ادامه پیدا می کنند. جنگ زیردریایی ها باعث صلح نمی شود بلکه فقط ورود ایالات متحده به جنگ و شکست آلمان را قطعی می کند. ژنرالهای آلمانی اما شکست را نمی پذیرند. آنها باور دارند هیچوقت همه منابع آلمان در اختیارشان نبوده است. نظریه پردازان توطئه با خلق داستان از پشت خنجر خوردن و حضور یهودیانی مانند تروتسکی در میان بلشویکها ادعا می کنند که شبکه جهانی بانکداران یهودی باعث شکست آلمان در جنگ شده است. ژنرالهای شکست خورده در جنگ زمینه یک دیکتاتوری نظامی در بعد از جنگ را آماده می کنند.
یهودی ستیزی و نژادپرستی قوت می گیرد و راه برای صعود سرجوخه ای اتریشی به پیشوایی رایش هموار می شود. آلمان یکبار دیگر می جنگد، اینبار تنها با نابودی کاملش هست که آلمانها می فهمند با زور نمی شود به همه چیز رسید. درسی که اگر ژنرالهای آلمانی در ۱۹۱۶ یاد گرفته بودند، شاید هنوز امپراتوری آلمان برقرار بود.
January 10, 2023
Tragedy on tragedy. What if the history of the 20th century could have been different? What if the amateur class of some American diplomats, their whims, and poor coms, and other human infirmities stopped an early end to the First WW, virtually guaranteed the Second (given the right people anyway, who did exist, and resented—and used the end of the First WW to launch the Second)?
What if the whole chain was unwound—the whole chain of events? And though we would have found new ways to err, it would not have been via Nazis and Red recolution, terror, and purging communists, would not have been via nuclear bombs, or even all the loss of individual lives in the Holocaust, or damage to say women as the Red Army marched across East Germany, let alone China? What if the iron curtain had never had—of necessity—to fall? No Vietnam?
No rise of America? Not in this way, tho our GDP would still grow and grow, if more slowly. Not even the curiousity of the WWII relic of employers having to pay health insurance—and thus becoming entangled in the state in new and (at one time surprising) ways would have occurred. The state may grow. But would it have grown so much?
And as I say what new harms would we have found. If balance of power wars could continue — if perhaps defused in smaller less world wide engagements? If German scientists retained their edge in peace time and found their way to nukes, rockets, and the moon?
What if. Historian Philip Zelikow while not engaging in what ifs beyond the First World War, certainly lays the groundwork for them. And other noted historians agree.
Could it all have been avoided? Not in its start, but in its drawn out conclusion?
It hurts one’s heart to think so. To think of all the tragedies that befell, and still befall, the world. We must imagine Sisyphus happy, some say. Others say God will not forget us and is still (somehow) in charge. (Others say he has promised not to destroy the world again by flood. But he has not said anything about preventing us from destroying ourselves, has he? Ah, free will, theodicy, what ifs and counterfactuals, in 1, 10, 100, then thousands of ways. . . but back to the book.
Tragedy, tragedy. Like Faulkner’s remembrance of King David’s cry, “Absalom, oh Absalom!” Why the symmetry? The past like David’s son, now out of our grasp. And yet, as the foresightful Gray said in Britain, pondering why he and others (including on the German liberal side, failed in finding a negotiated peace), when the future seems too obscured, we turn to build castles in the past.
There are many other wise things in this book. They need to be studied. Having grown up with WWII vets, it is easy to shortshrift the staging ground of WWI. And as the children today have grown up with neither, they will give short shrift to these both and others as well. This (and this book) needs to be studied—closely. . .
With regard to this, I am grateful for my relations who fought in WWI, for my grandfather and great uncles in WWII, and made it real to me in their stories. And in their character.
I am grateful for Mr Fuller, navy vet, who taught us history for a year in a double period. And made it come alive. Including what I still have as my broad outline in my mind for this war and it’s prelude and after math. I am drawn to mention him in particular bc I know few kids today could have his equal. And yet this foundation for even an interest in books like these needs to be set down.
Oh. What the author does in bringing to light the WWI personal tragedy that contributed to Robert Frost’s most famed poem, that contributes the title, is phenomenal. It is so beautiful and so tragic the rich friendship and bright mind and life that was lost in this small scene of the whole, that peaks out throughout the book. It may be the remedy for “one death is a tragedy; a million are a statistic”, if we let it be.
Well, let us hope. Let us live in hope. And let us learn. Tho now the stakes loom high as cliffs.
What if the whole chain was unwound—the whole chain of events? And though we would have found new ways to err, it would not have been via Nazis and Red recolution, terror, and purging communists, would not have been via nuclear bombs, or even all the loss of individual lives in the Holocaust, or damage to say women as the Red Army marched across East Germany, let alone China? What if the iron curtain had never had—of necessity—to fall? No Vietnam?
No rise of America? Not in this way, tho our GDP would still grow and grow, if more slowly. Not even the curiousity of the WWII relic of employers having to pay health insurance—and thus becoming entangled in the state in new and (at one time surprising) ways would have occurred. The state may grow. But would it have grown so much?
And as I say what new harms would we have found. If balance of power wars could continue — if perhaps defused in smaller less world wide engagements? If German scientists retained their edge in peace time and found their way to nukes, rockets, and the moon?
What if. Historian Philip Zelikow while not engaging in what ifs beyond the First World War, certainly lays the groundwork for them. And other noted historians agree.
Could it all have been avoided? Not in its start, but in its drawn out conclusion?
It hurts one’s heart to think so. To think of all the tragedies that befell, and still befall, the world. We must imagine Sisyphus happy, some say. Others say God will not forget us and is still (somehow) in charge. (Others say he has promised not to destroy the world again by flood. But he has not said anything about preventing us from destroying ourselves, has he? Ah, free will, theodicy, what ifs and counterfactuals, in 1, 10, 100, then thousands of ways. . . but back to the book.
Tragedy, tragedy. Like Faulkner’s remembrance of King David’s cry, “Absalom, oh Absalom!” Why the symmetry? The past like David’s son, now out of our grasp. And yet, as the foresightful Gray said in Britain, pondering why he and others (including on the German liberal side, failed in finding a negotiated peace), when the future seems too obscured, we turn to build castles in the past.
There are many other wise things in this book. They need to be studied. Having grown up with WWII vets, it is easy to shortshrift the staging ground of WWI. And as the children today have grown up with neither, they will give short shrift to these both and others as well. This (and this book) needs to be studied—closely. . .
With regard to this, I am grateful for my relations who fought in WWI, for my grandfather and great uncles in WWII, and made it real to me in their stories. And in their character.
I am grateful for Mr Fuller, navy vet, who taught us history for a year in a double period. And made it come alive. Including what I still have as my broad outline in my mind for this war and it’s prelude and after math. I am drawn to mention him in particular bc I know few kids today could have his equal. And yet this foundation for even an interest in books like these needs to be set down.
Oh. What the author does in bringing to light the WWI personal tragedy that contributed to Robert Frost’s most famed poem, that contributes the title, is phenomenal. It is so beautiful and so tragic the rich friendship and bright mind and life that was lost in this small scene of the whole, that peaks out throughout the book. It may be the remedy for “one death is a tragedy; a million are a statistic”, if we let it be.
Well, let us hope. Let us live in hope. And let us learn. Tho now the stakes loom high as cliffs.
March 8, 2023
A very interesting read about the opportunity apparently missed by the U.S., UK and Imperial Germany to broker a peace conference to end WW1 two years sooner than in fact it did end; in turn a missed opportunity to avoid - or so the author speculates - a large selection from the catalog of 20th century horrors (Communism, Fascism, WW2). Several major issues are, however, unaddressed or glossed.
The interests and position of France, and the challenge of coordination and cohesion within the Entente are substantially unaddressed, leaving the impression that the Entente was an “All UK, all the time” arrangement. There are suggestions in the book that UK’s position in respect of Entente financing made this so, but the point should have been more elaborated.
The likelihood of the German military establishment acquiescing in an early peace conference is implicitly presented as high, but this seems hard to reconcile with their actual behaviour at the end of, and following the war when they actively undermined the civilian government after having themselves asked the civilians to bail them out of their battlefield failures (stab in the back, and all that). The author seems to acknowledge that the German military would have experienced an early negotiated peace for the status quo ante as a complete repudiation of all that they stood for (e.g., the U.S. was apparently counting on it), so it’s not hard to imagine a military coup being the immediate result of a serious peace move by the civilians.
Most glaringly, the complex and intractable dynamic in southeast Europe, Turkey and the Middle East is substantially ignored. Contrary to received wisdom, the start of the war in southeast Europe was not a bizarre fluke, but more likely something that was inevitable given the terminal decline of the Ottoman Empire, and the unavoidable contention between Russia and Austria-Hungary over how the resulting vacuum would be filled. The world is still dealing with this conundrum more than a hundred years later. It’s quite difficult to imagine how it could have been better sorted at a peace conference in 1917 when the very survival of two key players - Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire (who in 1917 were more-or-less still standing) - would have been at stake. Even with these two powers essentially swept off the stage by the time of the Versailles Conference, the result in SE Europe and ME was rather a mess.
All this said, a really good book, providing insight and perspective that is hard - if not impossible - to find elsewhere (at least in the general literature on the War).
The interests and position of France, and the challenge of coordination and cohesion within the Entente are substantially unaddressed, leaving the impression that the Entente was an “All UK, all the time” arrangement. There are suggestions in the book that UK’s position in respect of Entente financing made this so, but the point should have been more elaborated.
The likelihood of the German military establishment acquiescing in an early peace conference is implicitly presented as high, but this seems hard to reconcile with their actual behaviour at the end of, and following the war when they actively undermined the civilian government after having themselves asked the civilians to bail them out of their battlefield failures (stab in the back, and all that). The author seems to acknowledge that the German military would have experienced an early negotiated peace for the status quo ante as a complete repudiation of all that they stood for (e.g., the U.S. was apparently counting on it), so it’s not hard to imagine a military coup being the immediate result of a serious peace move by the civilians.
Most glaringly, the complex and intractable dynamic in southeast Europe, Turkey and the Middle East is substantially ignored. Contrary to received wisdom, the start of the war in southeast Europe was not a bizarre fluke, but more likely something that was inevitable given the terminal decline of the Ottoman Empire, and the unavoidable contention between Russia and Austria-Hungary over how the resulting vacuum would be filled. The world is still dealing with this conundrum more than a hundred years later. It’s quite difficult to imagine how it could have been better sorted at a peace conference in 1917 when the very survival of two key players - Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire (who in 1917 were more-or-less still standing) - would have been at stake. Even with these two powers essentially swept off the stage by the time of the Versailles Conference, the result in SE Europe and ME was rather a mess.
All this said, a really good book, providing insight and perspective that is hard - if not impossible - to find elsewhere (at least in the general literature on the War).
September 15, 2025
Fascinating diplomatic history about the catastrophic failures that let slide a period in the autumn of 1916 when liberal, pro-peacemaking factions were ascendant in both Germany and the UK, when the stars seemed to align for a negotiated peace. This is not a counter-factual, but a forensic autopsy of a back channel peace process of extraordinary promise, that the author convincingly proves with meticulous research could have very plausibly succeeded in ending the Great War before the cataclysmic upheavals that brought down three empires and the ensuing victors' peace. In a very realistic sense, the failure of a very few men to grasp the opportunity staring them in the face led not only to tens of millions of more deaths in the short term, but a messy aftermath from which the world has still not recovered.
Professor Zelikow has, with this book, not only used both his historical and diplomatic expertise to make a tremendous contribution to our understanding of World War I, but he has powerfully illustrated the importance of a U.S. president faced with foreign policy challenges relying on the advice of professional diplomats and seeking a broad range of expert opinions. Wilson chose to rely only on a tiny inner circle of his family and his best friend, along with a secretary of state with an agenda at odds with his own. One if Zelikow's most poignant points is that Wilson never understood why the Germans rejected his mediation, when they had been begging him to mediate for 6 months.
The main problem I had with the book - at least the one under the author's control - was a tendency to jump around in time a bit too much. we'll be in October, then a few pages later we're back in August. I was never quite clear why it was necessary and given the importance of the timeline to the narrative I found it made it more confusing than necessary.
The biggest problem with the book is to Professor Zelikow's credit by making the story seem so suspenseful when we know how it turns out! (If you don't know how World War I goes after 1916, I highly recommend starting with a different book for an overview. ) It's like watch a horror film despite knowing they all die in the basement and wanting to yell at the screen, "No, you idiots! Don't go down to the basement!!!"
Alas...
Professor Zelikow has, with this book, not only used both his historical and diplomatic expertise to make a tremendous contribution to our understanding of World War I, but he has powerfully illustrated the importance of a U.S. president faced with foreign policy challenges relying on the advice of professional diplomats and seeking a broad range of expert opinions. Wilson chose to rely only on a tiny inner circle of his family and his best friend, along with a secretary of state with an agenda at odds with his own. One if Zelikow's most poignant points is that Wilson never understood why the Germans rejected his mediation, when they had been begging him to mediate for 6 months.
The main problem I had with the book - at least the one under the author's control - was a tendency to jump around in time a bit too much. we'll be in October, then a few pages later we're back in August. I was never quite clear why it was necessary and given the importance of the timeline to the narrative I found it made it more confusing than necessary.
The biggest problem with the book is to Professor Zelikow's credit by making the story seem so suspenseful when we know how it turns out! (If you don't know how World War I goes after 1916, I highly recommend starting with a different book for an overview. ) It's like watch a horror film despite knowing they all die in the basement and wanting to yell at the screen, "No, you idiots! Don't go down to the basement!!!"
Alas...
April 5, 2021
Did the United States led by Woodrow Wilson blunder its way into the First World War in 1917 because the president committed the "most consequential diplomatic failure" in U.S. history?
Yes, says the author of this exciting new book, former diplomat and now University of Virginia scholar Philip Zelikow. Full disclosure: I interviewed Zelikow about his argument for my podcast. The episode drops 4/6/21.
http://historyasithappens.radio.washi...
This is a short book but not a breezy read. It is the work of a fastidious researcher and experienced diplomat (Zelikow worked in five presidential administrations and was involved in the reunification of Germany, to name one endeavor). He presents an impressive amount of documentary evidence.
Zelikow makes a convincing case, even if no one can be sure how the "what if" scenario would have played out in the long run. But it is not unreasonable to think that Europe would have been spared the carnage of the 1940s had the First World War been brought to a negotiated end in a compromise peace in 1916, when Wilson had an opportunity to do so.
As the book demonstrates, the Germans -- led by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg -- had been imploring Wilson to offer mediation at a peace conference through most of 1916. The Germans offered to withdraw from Belgium, among other important concessions, as a precondition and show of good faith. At the same time the British (and French) were looking for a way out of the catastrophic war, especially after the disasters of the summer offensives in 1916. The Allied finances were on the brink of collapse, and all the warring countries were strained to the breaking point after two years of vicious bloodshed.
But Wilson vacillated. He dithered. And, according to Zelikow, he came up small when the moment called for bold diplomacy. By spring 1917, the Germans had run out of patience and the military leaders, who had never trusted Wilson to begin with, convinced the Kaiser to lift all restrictions on the U-boat war.
It is tantalizing to think about what may have happened, had the U.S. been able to avoid getting involved in the war, and had brought about a peace without victors, instead of the unworkable peace of 1919.
Yes, says the author of this exciting new book, former diplomat and now University of Virginia scholar Philip Zelikow. Full disclosure: I interviewed Zelikow about his argument for my podcast. The episode drops 4/6/21.
http://historyasithappens.radio.washi...
This is a short book but not a breezy read. It is the work of a fastidious researcher and experienced diplomat (Zelikow worked in five presidential administrations and was involved in the reunification of Germany, to name one endeavor). He presents an impressive amount of documentary evidence.
Zelikow makes a convincing case, even if no one can be sure how the "what if" scenario would have played out in the long run. But it is not unreasonable to think that Europe would have been spared the carnage of the 1940s had the First World War been brought to a negotiated end in a compromise peace in 1916, when Wilson had an opportunity to do so.
As the book demonstrates, the Germans -- led by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg -- had been imploring Wilson to offer mediation at a peace conference through most of 1916. The Germans offered to withdraw from Belgium, among other important concessions, as a precondition and show of good faith. At the same time the British (and French) were looking for a way out of the catastrophic war, especially after the disasters of the summer offensives in 1916. The Allied finances were on the brink of collapse, and all the warring countries were strained to the breaking point after two years of vicious bloodshed.
But Wilson vacillated. He dithered. And, according to Zelikow, he came up small when the moment called for bold diplomacy. By spring 1917, the Germans had run out of patience and the military leaders, who had never trusted Wilson to begin with, convinced the Kaiser to lift all restrictions on the U-boat war.
It is tantalizing to think about what may have happened, had the U.S. been able to avoid getting involved in the war, and had brought about a peace without victors, instead of the unworkable peace of 1919.
May 3, 2021
This book is tightly focused on a major but little-known "what if" of World War I - the fitful effort by President Wilson in 1916 to broker a peace between the Entente (Britain & France) and Germany. The Germans especially were eager for an end to the war - they were in a strong position, having occupied most of Belgium, part of France, and Poland, every bloody attempt to dislodge them having failed. Britain seemed most eager to continue to fight and had choked off trade to Germany with their blockade. However, the book reveals Britain's dire financial situation, their ability to pay for vital American arms and supplies almost exhausted. In fact, had America not entered the war, Britain would have been forced to make a peace by spring 1917.
Wilson begins his efforts to bring the powers to negotiations beginning in fall 1916, but puts off any concrete moves until after the November election (frustratingly, the book never explains why he thought brokering peace before that would be bad for his election). The middle of the book gets way into the weeds detailing every back and forth communication, frequently losing context and getting tedious at times. But Zelikow wraps it up nicely, detailing how Wilson's failings left him without the imagination and diplomatic smarts to close the deal. Zelikow convincingly makes the case that, first, a conference was possible, given Germany's willingness to evacuate occupied Belgium & France and America's financial hold over Britain; second, resumption of the war would have been unlikely; and how the resulting peace essentially restoring the prewar status quo would have led to a dramatically better outcome.
I do think the book would have better with a little less excruciating detail on every communication and instead placed it in the context of other attempts to broker a peace, both before and after the events in this book. It is a frustrating read ultimately, because just a little more push might have avoided the worst possible outcome of a harsh victor's peace and the resulting, even deadlier conflicts and ideologies that arose from it.
Wilson begins his efforts to bring the powers to negotiations beginning in fall 1916, but puts off any concrete moves until after the November election (frustratingly, the book never explains why he thought brokering peace before that would be bad for his election). The middle of the book gets way into the weeds detailing every back and forth communication, frequently losing context and getting tedious at times. But Zelikow wraps it up nicely, detailing how Wilson's failings left him without the imagination and diplomatic smarts to close the deal. Zelikow convincingly makes the case that, first, a conference was possible, given Germany's willingness to evacuate occupied Belgium & France and America's financial hold over Britain; second, resumption of the war would have been unlikely; and how the resulting peace essentially restoring the prewar status quo would have led to a dramatically better outcome.
I do think the book would have better with a little less excruciating detail on every communication and instead placed it in the context of other attempts to broker a peace, both before and after the events in this book. It is a frustrating read ultimately, because just a little more push might have avoided the worst possible outcome of a harsh victor's peace and the resulting, even deadlier conflicts and ideologies that arose from it.
May 30, 2021
The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War
By Philip Zelikow
There are moments in history that are pivot points. There are moments that had events gone in a different direction; the world would be different from today. These are moments that are the ones that fans of alternate history love to examine and change to see how the timeline could be different if the events occurred differently. Call it the For All Mankind or the Man in the High Castle principle.
I have always been fascinated by what would have happened if World War One played out differently. Would Russia's revolution been less violent had World War One not continued into 1917 and Germany's involvement in getting Lenin transported from Switzerland to Russia to encourage a more radical Russian revolution.
This brings me to the excellent new book by Philip Zelikow, The Road Less Traveled.
Zelikow examines the Wilson Administrations' attempt to intervene in the ongoing war and attempt to set up a peace conference that could have ended the war in 1917 before the United States would even enter the war.
From August 18, 1916, through January 31, 1917, there was a serious effort on the parts of the Administration and the German government to end the war through a peace conference. Zelikow examines how Wilson, through his passivity and over-dependence on his advisor Colonel House failed to take advantage of the situation and get a peace conference convened that could have ended the war and saved Europe from not only the Russian Revolution but the Second World War as well.
Zelikow's narrative moves at a steady pace, and those familiar with the history of the war and Wilson already.
It's an excellent book that provides some great insights on how history could have been different if Wilson was more direct and played his hand correctly.
I highly recommend it to my fellow history nerds who also like to think about What If? Scenarios.
By Philip Zelikow
There are moments in history that are pivot points. There are moments that had events gone in a different direction; the world would be different from today. These are moments that are the ones that fans of alternate history love to examine and change to see how the timeline could be different if the events occurred differently. Call it the For All Mankind or the Man in the High Castle principle.
I have always been fascinated by what would have happened if World War One played out differently. Would Russia's revolution been less violent had World War One not continued into 1917 and Germany's involvement in getting Lenin transported from Switzerland to Russia to encourage a more radical Russian revolution.
This brings me to the excellent new book by Philip Zelikow, The Road Less Traveled.
Zelikow examines the Wilson Administrations' attempt to intervene in the ongoing war and attempt to set up a peace conference that could have ended the war in 1917 before the United States would even enter the war.
From August 18, 1916, through January 31, 1917, there was a serious effort on the parts of the Administration and the German government to end the war through a peace conference. Zelikow examines how Wilson, through his passivity and over-dependence on his advisor Colonel House failed to take advantage of the situation and get a peace conference convened that could have ended the war and saved Europe from not only the Russian Revolution but the Second World War as well.
Zelikow's narrative moves at a steady pace, and those familiar with the history of the war and Wilson already.
It's an excellent book that provides some great insights on how history could have been different if Wilson was more direct and played his hand correctly.
I highly recommend it to my fellow history nerds who also like to think about What If? Scenarios.
June 10, 2021
Five start because of the startling news this book conveys, not so much for literary merit, although the writing is well-done. In a nutshell: World War 1 could realistically have been cut short by two years, but for the incompetence of Woodrow Wilson. Yes, his ego and his personal self-reliant style, along with the generally-less-staffed government of the time, kept him from gathering reasonable help and advice; and he strangely relied on a single (unstable) advisor for foreign policy. The author takes us step-by-step through very-well-researched chronology, so the conclusion is unassailable. He thoroughly dissects contradictory historical reports, and calmly hypothesizes reasonable assumptions. He also avoids elaborating on alternate histories (what if Wilson had acted a month sooner), spending only a couple of pages of stunning and quite reasonable consequences: mainly precluding the rise of Hitler and Bolshevism. Imagine 1940 without Hitler, without Bolsheviks.
A chapter or two on Austro-Hungarian and French situations would have added to the bulk, and strengthened the case even more. Yet all we really need for our alternate history dream is this new research into US, UK, and German government responses to that Great War.
This is truly the butterfly-wing-flapping effect on history: if only Wilson had kept in his reference to a peace conference in his 1916 speech; if only Edward House had not embarked on his bizarre fantasy about potential British-Japanese invasion of the US... and on and on... The author makes a reasonable case for the outsize influence of these tiny events, making us all more cognizant of our own behavior, within our own little human surroundings.
Must Must Must read for any U.S. or World history buff.
A chapter or two on Austro-Hungarian and French situations would have added to the bulk, and strengthened the case even more. Yet all we really need for our alternate history dream is this new research into US, UK, and German government responses to that Great War.
This is truly the butterfly-wing-flapping effect on history: if only Wilson had kept in his reference to a peace conference in his 1916 speech; if only Edward House had not embarked on his bizarre fantasy about potential British-Japanese invasion of the US... and on and on... The author makes a reasonable case for the outsize influence of these tiny events, making us all more cognizant of our own behavior, within our own little human surroundings.
Must Must Must read for any U.S. or World history buff.
November 19, 2021
(Audiobook) The accepted narrative about World War I was that is was 4 years of near-pointless slaughter, where armies rarely advanced more than a few hundred yards at most, especially on the Western Front. Once war started in 1914, the combatants planned to fight to the end, with victory the only acceptable end. Yet, there was a serious and significant effort to try to end the war long before November 1918. In particular, the combination of Woodrow Wilson and combatants reeling from the brutal losses of the various 1916 offenses offered a potential opening for hostilities to end. This book explores the back-channel and out of the limelight efforts to try to get the combatants to end the war in late 1916-17.
That these efforts did not come to pass is unfortunate for so, so many reasons. The reasons why the effort failed are varied, and all parties have their role to play. From outright national pride, arrogance of some leaders, internal political maneuvering, timing and outright miscommunication…they all factor into this discussion. Ultimately, the talks and peace effort did not come to pass, but this work describes how legitimately close those efforts came to pass.
The “What Ifs” should this effort have come to pass could fill volumes of other works. Aside from the millions who would not have died, the course of world history would have been completely altered. Setting aside the pain of that realization, this work is a detailed and readable accounts of what could have been, and perhaps should have been. The rating is the same, regardless of the format. A must for any looking to learn more about World War I.
That these efforts did not come to pass is unfortunate for so, so many reasons. The reasons why the effort failed are varied, and all parties have their role to play. From outright national pride, arrogance of some leaders, internal political maneuvering, timing and outright miscommunication…they all factor into this discussion. Ultimately, the talks and peace effort did not come to pass, but this work describes how legitimately close those efforts came to pass.
The “What Ifs” should this effort have come to pass could fill volumes of other works. Aside from the millions who would not have died, the course of world history would have been completely altered. Setting aside the pain of that realization, this work is a detailed and readable accounts of what could have been, and perhaps should have been. The rating is the same, regardless of the format. A must for any looking to learn more about World War I.
May 5, 2021
Not even two months off the press, Zelikow exhibits his read of the pivotal (and at the time secret) 5 month period in 1916-17 to end WWI. The book’s title is loosely borrowed from Robert Frost’s most famous poem, “The Road Not Taken,” in which Frost’s close friend, British poet Edward Thomas, struggles with the decision to enlist in the war. He does so and stays comfortably in France for 3 months before dying in the Battle of Arras, Easter 1917. The parallels of this micro story reflect the greater effort of the British leadership—Asquith, Hankey and many others—to put an end to the war behind the scenes through a brokered peace. That peace process would have been led by US President Woodrow Wilson, representing the largest neutral country, and would like have been held at The Hague. Political maneuvering, strategy, underhandedness and other machinations in combination with the food and money shortages of the belligerents seemed to lean towards a peace outcome. Yet Germany continued to fight on secretly, having the advantage while displaying outward peace longings. Eventually, Germany’s warring, particularly against civil shipping and non-combatants not only took a potential peace option off the table, it brought in a reluctant but willing and combative US into the war in early 1917. Fantastic slice of history!
December 24, 2021
Outstanding explanation of what and why Wilson's attempt to end WWI 2 years earlier failed. The consequences of this failure are only speculation but there is reasonable evidence that for example:
- Lenin w/o support from Germany looking to disrupt the Russian forces, would not have been able to lead the Bolsheviks to power
- Wilson's and many Europeans' plans for a 'peace w/o victory' would have prevented the harsh surrender terms imposed upon the Germans. As Keynes predicted, those conditions fueled the likes of Hitler and a populace ripe for a war of revenge.
This is easily the best read for me this year with some very good competition. The book reads like a suspense mystery where the dastardly deed has happened but we have to patiently follow our detective Zelikow as he examines the evidence leading up to the US decision to go to war on the side of the allies. Without spoiling the suspense I can report that Zelikow after all his research found some of the moves by the principals inexplicable.
All readers must wonder why after 100 years does a new book have anything to offer about WWI. Zelikow refers to new information only recently uncovered. Based on the notes and references in the text I'm guessing that private letters and diaries became available.
Lots of villains in the story to share most of the blame in addition to Wilson's own part.
- Lenin w/o support from Germany looking to disrupt the Russian forces, would not have been able to lead the Bolsheviks to power
- Wilson's and many Europeans' plans for a 'peace w/o victory' would have prevented the harsh surrender terms imposed upon the Germans. As Keynes predicted, those conditions fueled the likes of Hitler and a populace ripe for a war of revenge.
This is easily the best read for me this year with some very good competition. The book reads like a suspense mystery where the dastardly deed has happened but we have to patiently follow our detective Zelikow as he examines the evidence leading up to the US decision to go to war on the side of the allies. Without spoiling the suspense I can report that Zelikow after all his research found some of the moves by the principals inexplicable.
All readers must wonder why after 100 years does a new book have anything to offer about WWI. Zelikow refers to new information only recently uncovered. Based on the notes and references in the text I'm guessing that private letters and diaries became available.
Lots of villains in the story to share most of the blame in addition to Wilson's own part.
July 25, 2021
For this reader this fine study came as a revelation. Prof. Zelikow argues that President Wilson came very close to brokering an armistice, and subsequently a compromise peace, in the fall of 1916 and the early winter of 1916/17. He looks carefully at the situation after the failed offensives of 1916, which dramatically affected the leaders of both sides.
Great Britain was on the verge of bankruptcy and Wilson could turn off the American loans which kept it solvent. Germany and Austria-Hungary were hungry and discouraged. France had suffered huge losses. Russia was on the brink of revolution. There was a real chance for peace.
The German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, who is the (failed) hero of this story, was willing to offer German withdrawal from Belgium. British politicians would have accepted this. And Wilson sent his confidant House to see both sides.
For Zelikowsky it was House’s over confidence in himself and his pro British partisanship which doomed the project. Wilson was a loner, and when House dallied negotiations slowed. And Bethmann was unable to stop the declaration of unrestricted submarine war. And the US entered the war.
This in depth look at one of History’s great “might have beens “ is well worth a detailed read!
Great Britain was on the verge of bankruptcy and Wilson could turn off the American loans which kept it solvent. Germany and Austria-Hungary were hungry and discouraged. France had suffered huge losses. Russia was on the brink of revolution. There was a real chance for peace.
The German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, who is the (failed) hero of this story, was willing to offer German withdrawal from Belgium. British politicians would have accepted this. And Wilson sent his confidant House to see both sides.
For Zelikowsky it was House’s over confidence in himself and his pro British partisanship which doomed the project. Wilson was a loner, and when House dallied negotiations slowed. And Bethmann was unable to stop the declaration of unrestricted submarine war. And the US entered the war.
This in depth look at one of History’s great “might have beens “ is well worth a detailed read!
November 24, 2021
As I was reading this book, I wanted to scream “Will SOMEONE please do SOMETHING???”
This is a very well-researched true account of the little-known secret peace negotiations that went on between Germany, Great Britain, and the U. S. in late 1916 and early 1917. If these negotiations had been successful, World War One would have ended two years before it ultimately did, saving millions of lives and changing the course of history.
(For example, the author – historian and former diplomat Philip Zelikow – makes a case that there is a very good chance that both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union would never have existed if the war had ended in 1916.)
That the negotiations failed was due to a frustrating combination of several different factors: high-minded good intentions (you know what they say about good intentions and hell); miscalculations; dissimulation; political ambitions; touchy tempers; even bad writing.
The Germans made the first move, proposing that the then-neutral United States mediate a compromise peace between the warring nations. President Woodrow Wilson genuinely wanted to help end the war and form a league of nations to help prevent future wars.
However, he was hampered by his reliance on Edward House, who was not a professional diplomat but a private citizen and personal friend of Wilson. House traveled widely and had the people skills Wilson lacked but he was also socially ambitious, and misrepresented and outright lied about several things.
(House even had a bizarre fear of a British-Japanese invasion of the U.S. that caused him to urge Wilson to delay sending a peace proposal to the Allies.)
There were so many things that got in the way of this peace conference happening that could have been avoided.
During the early stages of the negotiations, House sent a crucial letter by “snail-mail” instead of by cable. 1916 was an election year, so Wilson didn’t want to commit himself to negotiations until he knew he was going to be in office again. The new British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, privately wanted peace but publicly took a “fight to the finish” stance to enhance his political image. Neither Wilson nor House realized how much financial leverage they had over Britain’s ability to wage war, since the British were completely dependent on American loans. When Wilson wrote his famous “peace without victory” speech, he didn’t include any concrete actions in it and didn’t press for a conference, although he was in a perfect position to do so.
Even when Germany’s military leadership finally declared unrestricted submarine warfare, the announcement included terms of peace which Wilson was urged to act upon. However, he was so offended by the declaration that he immediately broke off diplomatic relations by sending the German ambassador – his last link to negotiations – back home to Germany.
An informative but frustrating read about how the 20th century could have been so different.
This is a very well-researched true account of the little-known secret peace negotiations that went on between Germany, Great Britain, and the U. S. in late 1916 and early 1917. If these negotiations had been successful, World War One would have ended two years before it ultimately did, saving millions of lives and changing the course of history.
(For example, the author – historian and former diplomat Philip Zelikow – makes a case that there is a very good chance that both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union would never have existed if the war had ended in 1916.)
That the negotiations failed was due to a frustrating combination of several different factors: high-minded good intentions (you know what they say about good intentions and hell); miscalculations; dissimulation; political ambitions; touchy tempers; even bad writing.
The Germans made the first move, proposing that the then-neutral United States mediate a compromise peace between the warring nations. President Woodrow Wilson genuinely wanted to help end the war and form a league of nations to help prevent future wars.
However, he was hampered by his reliance on Edward House, who was not a professional diplomat but a private citizen and personal friend of Wilson. House traveled widely and had the people skills Wilson lacked but he was also socially ambitious, and misrepresented and outright lied about several things.
(House even had a bizarre fear of a British-Japanese invasion of the U.S. that caused him to urge Wilson to delay sending a peace proposal to the Allies.)
There were so many things that got in the way of this peace conference happening that could have been avoided.
During the early stages of the negotiations, House sent a crucial letter by “snail-mail” instead of by cable. 1916 was an election year, so Wilson didn’t want to commit himself to negotiations until he knew he was going to be in office again. The new British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, privately wanted peace but publicly took a “fight to the finish” stance to enhance his political image. Neither Wilson nor House realized how much financial leverage they had over Britain’s ability to wage war, since the British were completely dependent on American loans. When Wilson wrote his famous “peace without victory” speech, he didn’t include any concrete actions in it and didn’t press for a conference, although he was in a perfect position to do so.
Even when Germany’s military leadership finally declared unrestricted submarine warfare, the announcement included terms of peace which Wilson was urged to act upon. However, he was so offended by the declaration that he immediately broke off diplomatic relations by sending the German ambassador – his last link to negotiations – back home to Germany.
An informative but frustrating read about how the 20th century could have been so different.
April 30, 2021
This is excellent book about a little-known or studied aspect of efforts made by President Wilson, as well as the British and German governments. to end World War 1 before the US declared war on Germany in 1917. Professor Zelikow is a superb writer and has obviously done a vast amount of research on this topic.
My views after reading Zelikow's book about President Wilson, his efforts to avoid American intervention in the conflict, his relationship to and reliance on advisor Edward House, as well as the British and German leadership have evolved. I now appreciate that Wilson, although a highly intelligent person and effective President in many aspects, failed to understand the dynamics of diplomacy. WWI was a tragedy that did not need to occur or last as long as it did. Wilson played a central part in not bring the conflict to an end sooner.
I strongly recommend this book both to those who know a great deal about that war and era as well as those who don't!
My views after reading Zelikow's book about President Wilson, his efforts to avoid American intervention in the conflict, his relationship to and reliance on advisor Edward House, as well as the British and German leadership have evolved. I now appreciate that Wilson, although a highly intelligent person and effective President in many aspects, failed to understand the dynamics of diplomacy. WWI was a tragedy that did not need to occur or last as long as it did. Wilson played a central part in not bring the conflict to an end sooner.
I strongly recommend this book both to those who know a great deal about that war and era as well as those who don't!
August 26, 2023
Well, it certainly doesn't paint Woodrow Wilson in a very flattering light.
Having read GJ Meyer's The World Remade: America in World War I not that long ago, this book helps explain some of Wilson's behavior in the postwar era. It is somewhat dull reading...learning what one diplomat said to another, whether they meant what they said or not, but Zelikow backs up his claims with records from the respective capitols. Overall, I felt frustrated with the historical figures (American, Entente, Central Powers) that come off as rank amateurs. So I suppose that means it's a good book. I don't know enough about this topic to say for sure if the writing is accurate, but I do think it's a worthwhile read for historians.
Having read GJ Meyer's The World Remade: America in World War I not that long ago, this book helps explain some of Wilson's behavior in the postwar era. It is somewhat dull reading...learning what one diplomat said to another, whether they meant what they said or not, but Zelikow backs up his claims with records from the respective capitols. Overall, I felt frustrated with the historical figures (American, Entente, Central Powers) that come off as rank amateurs. So I suppose that means it's a good book. I don't know enough about this topic to say for sure if the writing is accurate, but I do think it's a worthwhile read for historians.
October 19, 2023
Interesting recap of the peace initiative in the works before USA entered WW I. The warring parties in Europe (France, England, Germany, Belgium, et al) secretly, behind the scenes worked for many months to come up with a plan to end the war with their hopes and wishes that USA President Woodrow Wilson would perform the mediator role with a peace conference. But, several activities maintained those efforts in the secret backgrounds and Wilson did not want to become involved in those efforts until after his campaign for reelection in the 1916 national elections was completed with a win.
Then the warring parties were politically hamstrung with their own political infighting. Because of the two warring political parties in Germany, Germany re-commenced the U-boat campaign that then drew USA into the war full fledged.
A sad story on, because of political egos, that WW I lasted so long and cost so much!
Then the warring parties were politically hamstrung with their own political infighting. Because of the two warring political parties in Germany, Germany re-commenced the U-boat campaign that then drew USA into the war full fledged.
A sad story on, because of political egos, that WW I lasted so long and cost so much!
March 16, 2025
In 1916 through January 1917, the Great War was looking hopelessly all-consuming for both sides, and almost everyone - especially Britain and Germany - were looking for a way out. Their terms were compatible. Woodrow Wilson was meanwhile looking to arrange a peace. But, it all failed - due to both British and German unwillingness to set out all their terms, and to Wilson's incompetence at trying to broker peace.
This builds out my previous picture of Woodrow Wilson: not only did he surround himself by abject flatterers, not only did he roundly fail at the Treaty of Versailles, but he roundly failed earlier trying to broker a peace he had no idea how to start with. He didn't even know how to propose a peace conference! Nor did the flatterers around him!
And so, the world was plunged into a further abyss that tore down the old world and brought on a century of new kinds of strife.
This builds out my previous picture of Woodrow Wilson: not only did he surround himself by abject flatterers, not only did he roundly fail at the Treaty of Versailles, but he roundly failed earlier trying to broker a peace he had no idea how to start with. He didn't even know how to propose a peace conference! Nor did the flatterers around him!
And so, the world was plunged into a further abyss that tore down the old world and brought on a century of new kinds of strife.
June 18, 2021
This book is a must read for anyone seriously interested in history, political science, and international relations. It goes into depth about how the First World War could have been ended in 1916-17 through President Wilson's peace plan. It didn't end because Wilson lacked the diplomacy skills to carry out his intensions. This was a real tragedy because all of the elements existed to end the war.
Wilson's shortcomings were magnified by the miscalculations of the warring parties, the Allies and the Central Powers. It is, again, a recurring theme of folly that has existed throughout history where defeat is grasped out of the jaws of victory.
What occurred after Wilson's failure set in motion the seeds of WWII, the establishment of the Soviet Union, and most of the ills of the 20th century that have spilled over to present times. Again, a must read for serious students of history.
Wilson's shortcomings were magnified by the miscalculations of the warring parties, the Allies and the Central Powers. It is, again, a recurring theme of folly that has existed throughout history where defeat is grasped out of the jaws of victory.
What occurred after Wilson's failure set in motion the seeds of WWII, the establishment of the Soviet Union, and most of the ills of the 20th century that have spilled over to present times. Again, a must read for serious students of history.
July 19, 2021
Interesting book. However, having read much (and written some) on World War I, I think the author vastly overestimates the influence of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg and the German Ambassador to the U.S. Count von Bernstorff. He greatly underestimates the influence of General Ludendorff (who was not, by the way, von Ludendorff. The author ignores the tremendous pro-Allied sentiment in Congress, particularly amongst the Republicans and the financial stake the U.S. had in an Allied victory. A glaring omission also is hardly any (or no) mention of Clemenceau, who would have done everything in his power to torpedo a peace deal.
Suppose Wilson got his peace conference. The fighting would have continue while negotiations continued (remember the Paris Peace talks about the Vietnam War). Ludendorff would have insisted on playing the U Boat card and the U.S. would have gone to war.
Suppose Wilson got his peace conference. The fighting would have continue while negotiations continued (remember the Paris Peace talks about the Vietnam War). Ludendorff would have insisted on playing the U Boat card and the U.S. would have gone to war.
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