This dissertation examines how Leo Strauss, Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida, and Alexander Dugin responded to Martin Heidegger’s inceptual thought when defining and relating philosophy and the political. The Introduction discusses the general concepts, motivations, and aims of the study. Chapter One provides a précis of Heidegger’s philosophy from The History of the Concept of Time to his middle-period writings. Chapter Two compares Strauss and Heidegger on the Idea of the Good in Plato. Chapter Three argues that Rorty is prevented from a philosophically serious reading of Heidegger by his a priori social-democratic commitments. Chapter Four distinguishes the spaces of Derridean and Heideggerian political philosophy. Chapter Five is an account of Dugin’s embrace and extension of Heidegger’s inceptual thought. The Conclusion analyses obstacles blocking access to Heidegger in political theory and argues for a new way forward.
A thesis turned into a book, this explores Heidegger through four modern philosophers whose views range across the political spectrum.
I found it good to dig into the ideas that interested me. The book really presupposes that you will have some familiarity with Heidegger himself before hand.
It’s clearly written and a fascinating accompaniment to modern political theory by an important thinker.
Let us be done with the gods of being, truth, and theory, with all gods except those of our making, and let us make the gods that best serve us and our purposes, so that it is we who become the demiurges of our world— a world of our free making.”
The main reason I am reading this book is to learn more about Alexander Dugin aka "Putin's Brain." I have only read Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics for a College level Philosophy course on Existentialism and Ontology that focused on Sartre, Heidegger, & Kierkegaard. I was not really impressed by Martin Heidegger and his philosophical views. I tried reading the State University of New York edition of Being and Time only to find out Martin NEVER FINISHED writing the book.
This fact is the main reason I don't see the book as his Magnum Opus. This is one of the reasons I am finding flaws in the authors thesis. The other reasons are of a medico-legal stance, and the author's use of Tarot Cards and other occult examples which places his ideas into a more arcane and less scientific area.
The author describes intentionality in the correct way and then attempts to rationally explain that an inanimate object has an intent even though it has no conscious awareness and cannot form the thought process to create the requisite intent. We give the object of our perception the intent and in many cases those intents are erroneous perceptions which explains why eyewitness testimony during a crime from five different people will never match up 100%. Those five different people saw the same act five different ways and the best example is Akira Kurosawa's movie Rashomon.
The first major discovery of phenomenology is intentionality. Intentionality is a “structure of lived experience,” according to which “the very being of comporting is a directing-itself-toward.”
All doctors and lawyers agree that consciousness is an awareness of something. An individual can have a conscience and consciousness unless they have an altered mental status. There are substances (alcohol, LSD, Opiates, THC, etc.) and situations (assault, battery, coercion, etc.) in which that consciousness can be altered making the use of the conscience null and void.
The Glasgow Coma Scale is one way of describing an altered level of consciousness. A patient in a comatose state that is unresponsive to opening eyes, speech, or pain would receive a 3; while a rock or Millerman's infamous chair would receive the same score.
In Millerman's chair example the chair never intended to appear yellow. The woodworkman who created the chair and then painted it might have liked the color yellow and chose that color. Or that particular color of paint was all he could afford or have been the only color available in stock.
The main point of Phenomenology is to look at all the different possibilities by using the tool of the Epoché aka the Phenomenological Reduction which is expressed as a set of {brackets} used to isolate the individual phenomena and think of all the ways that it can be explained. This fact is another reason I am finding issues with the author's thesis because he falls to mention them earlier in the introduction in favor of more esoteric occult examples.
An interesting book, to be sure. Odd in some instances, not especially clear in others. The strength of the book was in the author’s close reading of the work of Russian philosopher Alexander Dugan.
Michael Millerman’s Beginning with Heidegger: Strauss, Rorty, Derrida, Dugin, and the Philosophical Constitution of the Political (2020) offers a bold and intellectually rigorous exploration of Martin Heidegger’s philosophical influence on modern political thought. Millerman situates Heidegger’s ontology as a central point of contention and inspiration for a diverse array of thinkers, including Leo Strauss, Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida, and Alexander Dugin. Through a comparative and dialogical approach, the book examines how these figures engage with Heidegger’s work to formulate divergent responses to the crisis of modernity, revealing the ways philosophy intersects with politics at a profound level.
Millerman opens by emphasizing Heidegger’s significance as a thinker who challenged the metaphysical foundations of Western philosophy. This critique, centered on Heidegger’s analysis of Being, provides a fertile ground for interpreting political problems, particularly those arising from modernity’s technological enframement. Millerman adeptly frames Heidegger’s thought as both a philosophical and a political intervention, suggesting that his legacy lies not only in his critique of modernity but also in the possibilities he offers for rethinking political life.
The book is divided into thematic chapters, each devoted to a thinker who grapples with Heidegger’s philosophy in distinct ways. Leo Strauss, for example, is presented as a thinker who engages Heidegger critically to recover classical political philosophy. Strauss’s interpretation highlights the tension between philosophical inquiry and the demands of political life, an issue central to his critique of Heidegger’s alleged historicism. In contrast, Richard Rorty’s pragmatism rejects Heidegger’s foundationalism, opting instead for a liberal, anti-metaphysical stance that underscores the contingency of truth and politics.
Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction, as Millerman explains, builds on Heidegger’s dismantling of metaphysics while diverging in its political implications. Derrida’s focus on différance and the aporia of justice exemplifies a more radical openness to the undecidability of political life, in contrast to Heidegger’s emphasis on rootedness in Being. Millerman’s analysis of Derrida is particularly nuanced, revealing the affinities and tensions between deconstruction and Heideggerian thought.
The inclusion of Alexander Dugin, a controversial figure, is perhaps the most provocative aspect of Millerman’s book. Dugin’s appropriation of Heidegger for his “Fourth Political Theory” demonstrates the philosopher’s capacity to inspire anti-liberal and geopolitical discourses. Millerman’s engagement with Dugin is critical yet measured, avoiding simplistic denunciations while highlighting the risks of politicizing Heidegger’s ideas in ways that may align with authoritarianism.
One of the book’s strengths is its capacity to clarify complex philosophical arguments without sacrificing depth. Millerman’s prose is precise and accessible, making Heidegger’s dense and often opaque ideas comprehensible to readers less familiar with his work. Moreover, the book’s comparative framework offers a unique perspective on the intersection of philosophy and politics, illuminating the varied ways Heidegger has been interpreted and deployed across ideological lines.
However, some readers may find the inclusion of Dugin problematic, given the ethical and political concerns surrounding his work. While Millerman addresses these issues, his critical stance could be more explicit in delineating the dangers of Dugin’s appropriation of Heidegger. Additionally, the book’s focus on Heidegger as a unifying thread risks underplaying the distinct philosophical projects of the figures discussed.
Beginning with Heidegger is a significant contribution to the study of political philosophy and Heideggerian thought. Millerman demonstrates how Heidegger’s critique of modernity continues to resonate in contemporary debates, shaping diverse and often conflicting visions of political life. Scholars interested in the relationship between philosophy and politics will find this book both enlightening and provocative, even as it raises challenging questions about the implications of engaging with Heidegger’s legacy.