One of baseball's infamous events is the 1919 World Series between the Chicago White Sox and the Cincinnati Reds. Overshadowed by the suspicion cast upon, and the subsequent indictment of, eight White Sox players for throwing the games, the 1919 World Series has often been simplistically and inaccurately portrayed by the popular media in the decades since. This book takes an objective look at the series, players, managers, owners, and on-field events to separate fact from fiction in regard to the outcome. The Reds would probably have emerged victorious no matter how the game was played because they were, in fact, an excellent team capable of beating the seemingly superhuman White Sox. Included are various statistical references that include line and box scores as well as comparative statistical charts of batting averages, pitching and team records, and other relevant information.
There is more than one author in the Goodreads catalog with this name. This entry is for William A. ^ Cook.
William A. Cook is the author of numerous nonfiction books, including seven on baseball history, and has appeared in productions on ESPN2 and the MLB Network. A retired health care administrator and former township councilman, he lives in Manalapan, New Jersey.
It took me about two hours to read this book. I wish I had the time back.
William Cook has a huge task ahead of him in this book.. His stated goal is to demonstrate that the Cincinnati Reds would have clearly won the 1919 World Series, even if gamblers had never been involved.
The problem is that it's never quite clear how Cook proposes to accomplish this task. There is no real theoretical framework behind his approach. Cook goes through the games of the 1919 World Series one by one, giving a complete play-by-play of every single game, and peppers this with a variety of quotations from contemporary newspaper accounts. Cook then includes a chapter on the unfolding of the scandal in September 1920, and leaves us with this.
Nowhere is there any attempt at a counterfactual model. Cook had multiple options before him, including numerous simulations, a variety of theoretical sabermetric-based counterfactual approaches, as well as an in-depth analysis of the games that the individual teams played in the regular season. Cook uses none of these approaches, instead opting for occasional sarcastic comments about how the "conspiracy theorists" are wrong.
Cook has an odd fascination with second-guessing in-game managerial decisions. In particular, he comes down very hard on Cincinnati Reds manager Pat Moran, who decided not to pinch hit for pitcher Jimmy Ring in the bottom of the 8th of Game 6. Ring came up to bat with two runners on base and two outs in a 4-4 game. The championship was technically on the line: Cincinnati had a lead in the series, 4 games to 1, and could have clinched the game right then and there. Moran did not pinch hit for Ring, who promptly grounded out, ending the rally.
Cook did not consider looking at what Pat Moran's strategy usually was in similar situations during the regular season. It just so happens that Jimmy Ring frequently came up to bat while pitching late in tight games during the stretch run of the season. On August 10th, August 14th, and August 30th, Ring stayed in the ballgame despite the games being close, and being particularly important to the pennant race. Ring also frequently remained late in ballgames in which the Reds were losing during the September stretch. Cook's criticism of Moran is excessive as-is; however, when Moran's managerial strategy during the regular season is taken into consideration, the criticism turns into nonsense.
Cook seems skeptical that a fix ever existed. In fact, at one point (page 64) he insinuates that Hugh Fullerton may have exaggerated the case for a fix because he initially predicted that the White Sox would win the World Series. Cook's problem, of course, is the grand jury testimony, a much stronger piece of evidence than his wild conjecture. Now, anybody who has studied the Black Sox Scandal knows that the grand jury testimony is quite problematic. Rather than getting into the specific issues with the testimony, however, Cook simply implies that the players were coerced to testify the way that they did, and leaves it there.
I could go on. Cook doesn't use any statistics other than batting average, ERAs, and winning percentages. He concludes that the Cincinnati pitching was worse in 1920 based on the pitchers' won-loss records - forgetting, apparently, that there were only so many Reds wins to go around. Cook's writing is generally boring; in fact, the game summaries in the 1920 Reach and Spalding guides are much better written than what you find in this book. Cook also mentions Eliot Asinof only once, and only in passing at that, focusing all of his criticism on the Hollywood version of "Eight Men Out" and the Ken Burns Baseball series.
I can't recommend this book for anybody interested in the 1919 World Series. In fact, this is one of the worst approaches to any baseball controversy that I've ever seen.