(Jim Cook’s review) The third volume in Kenny’s History of Western Philosophy covers the period from the beginning of the 16th century to the start of the 19th century, i.e., from the writing of Machiavelli’s Prince to the death of Hegel. The cover is illustrated with a picture of Rene Descartes sitting at his desk. Descartes was one of the key philosophers who lived during this era.
As in the preceding two volumes, volume 3 is copiously illustrated, and is divided into two sections. The first three chapters provide information about the life and times of the major philosophers discussed in volume 3 and the rest of the book consists of thematic chapters discussing their central ideas in greater detail. Unlike the first two books, however, volume 3 (and 4) includes a chapter on “political philosophy.”
Kenny’s rationale for not including chapters on this topic in the first two volumes of his history is rather peculiar. Kenny didn’t include a discussion of this topic in the earlier volumes, he says, because prior to the writings of Machiavelli no previous philosopher has anything to say that is “relevant to current discussions” in the field of political philosophy. He repeats this controversial claim in voume 4.
But surely this is wrong-headed? If you look at many twentieth century philosophers engaged in political philosophy, for example, you will find quite of few of them who would have been rendered mute were it not for the work of their predecessors in Classical Greece. Popper, Strauss, Nussbaum, to mention only three such philosophers are examples. Another somewhat dubious claim by Kenny is an idea he floats of a “constitutional Papacy” which, he says would have prevented the split in Christianity that occured during the years of the Reformation. (See p. 11)
An even more hare-brained notion is advanced by Kenny in the later chapters of his book where he discusses the philosophy of Rousseau and Hegel. He argues that their “flawed metaphysics” directly led to, in the first named writer’s case, the French Revolution (and other, subsequent violent conflicts); and, in the case of Hegel, to the “two World Wars that disfigured the twentieth century” (p. 302). Although he can blame secular philosophers like Rousseau and Hegel for violence occuring after they had died, Kenny nowhere in his History makes similar allegations regarding the horrors visited upon innocent people by Christian fanatics. He fails in his duty both as a philosopher and a historian when he takes ‘cheap shots” like this. As we will see in my review of volume 4, some of his commentary there is even more amaturish. Or, to use one of Kenny’s favorite expressions, jejune.
That said, I still enjoyed reading Kenny’s third volume. It contains, for example, some of the clearest commentary about the key concepts advanced by Kant that I have read. It also includes insightful and no-nonsense criticism of some of the ideas of influential thinkers such as Hume, Rousseau, and Berkeley. Kenny rightly notes that Rousseau’s concept of the “general will” is “theortically incoherent and practically vacuous”; that Hume’s epistemology “is nothing less than absurd”; and, that both Hume and Berkeley’s philosophy of mind and their philosophical psychology are “remarkably jejune.” Kenny supports these assertions with appropriate textual references in each case.
Overall, while volume 3 has some weaknesses (more than the first two volumes), I recommend it to anyone who wants to learn about the great philosophers of this era.