Mussolini's War: Fascist Italy from Triumph to Collapse, 1935-1943

by John Gooch

SHORTLISTED FOR THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON MEDAL FOR MILITARY HISTORY 2021

A DAILY TELEGRAPH BOOK OF THE YEAR 2020

From an acclaimed military historian, the definitive account of Italy's experience of the Second World War

While staying closely aligned with Hitler, Mussolini remained carefully neutral until the summer of 1940. Then, with the wholly unexpected and sudden collapse of the French and British armies, Mussolini declared war on the Allies in the hope of making territorial gains in southern France and Africa. This decision proved a horrifying miscalculation, dooming Italy to its own prolonged and unwinnable war, immense casualties and an Allied invasion in 1943 which ushered in a terrible new era for the country.

John Gooch's new book is the definitive account of Italy's war experience. Beginning with the invasion of Abyssinia and ending with Mussolini's arrest, Gooch brilliantly portrays the nightmare of a country with too small an industrial sector, too incompetent a leadership and too many fronts on which to fight.

Everywhere - whether in the USSR, the Western Desert or the Balkans - Italian troops found themselves against either better-equipped or more motivated enemies. The result was a war entirely at odds with the dreams of pre-war Italian planners - a series of desperate improvizations against Allies who could draw on global resources and against whom Italy proved helpless.

This remarkable book rightly shows the centrality of Italy to the war, outlining the brief rise and disastrous fall of the Italian military campaign.

'It is hard to imagine a finer account, both of the sweep of Italy's wars, and of the characters caught up in them' Caroline Moorhead, The Guardian

Genres: History, Italy, Nonfiction, World War II, European History, War, Military History

576 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2020

About the author

John Gooch is Emeritus Professor of International History, University of Leeds, and Honorary Professor of History, University of Kent.

Reviews

[Ian · Rating 3 out of 5]

Italy’s participation in WW2 has not been the subject of many books in English, and I have seen this one described in the press as the “definitive history” of the subject. It also covers Italy’s military adventures during the 1930s. The story is told very much from the strategic perspective. This isn’t a book where you will hear the voice of the ordinary soldier, nor does it really get down to even the tactical level. Quite large battles are often described in just a few paragraphs. Instead, this book looks at the high-level decision making that guided (if that’s the right word) Fascist Italy’s conduct of the wars it was involved in. There’s a huge emphasis on logistical issues – transport, materiel, the supply of raw materials etc. I suppose these are the sort of things the General Staff would have concerned themselves with. The book is informative, but personally I also found it quite dry, and over-heavy on statistics. There’s a mass of the latter, covering everything from numbers of trucks, tanks, aircraft, ships etc, to things like boots and bullets, and production figures for materials like steel and copper.

The book starts with Fascist Italy’s initial military successes during the 1930s; the conquest of Abyssinia; its participation in the Spanish Civil War; and the occupation of Albania. These victories were achieved against opponents who were poorly equipped and poorly organised, or in the case of Albania, offered little resistance. Italy’s subsequent invasion of Greece was disastrous. In facing the British, and subsequently the Soviets and the Americans, the boot was on the other foot, with the Italians facing modern armies who in most respects were better equipped than they were.

Mussolini is portrayed as someone who fantasised about recreating the “Mare Nostrum” of the Roman Empire. He wanted Italy to control the whole North African coast from Morocco to Egypt; also Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece; the south coast of France; and Malta and Gibraltar. On top of all that, Mussolini felt obliged to support Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union, in recognition of Hitler having rescued him in Greece and North Africa. He seemed completely unable to concentrate on one objective at a time, constantly switching priorities and throwing military planning into confusion. The Italian economy, the weakest among the Great Powers, was of course quite unable to support his grandiose ambitions. The final section of the book provides a useful summary of how Italy’s campaign was doomed to disaster, the character of Mussolini himself being not the least of the reasons why.

[Geevee · Rating 5 out of 5]

John Gooch's Mussolini's War reviews the period of the Duce's overseas campaigns from Italy's war in Ethiopia (Abyssinia) in 1935 to its and Mussolini's denouement in 1943.

Within this timeframe there is much more that the battles and operations Italy's armed forces undertook. They are present and for this reader, they were covered well at the level one expects in a history of this quality and aims; meaning that those looking for action at a fighting level with first-hand accounts this book will not be for you; the battles are brief and described at a command level with armies, corps and divisions but done well in the overall rationale and strategic plan.

It is this command level along with the rational and strategic plan that Mr Gooch tells the story of Mussolini's War. The senior commanders of Italian forces feature heavily both in how they commanded their relevant arms and armies/ships/air forces and also how they worked (or not) together and interacted with Mussolini. The relationships with Hitler and the German senior staff and commanders are also described and help show how these developed, frayed and eventually broke down.

For Mussolini, Ethiopia in 1935 was the start of Rome creating its new empire and following a good showing in the Spanish Civil War (which is well covered in the book), the commencement of WWII, saw Libya, East Africa/Ethiopia, The Balkans including the Adriatic coast, and Greece all coveted and then invaded (some successfully, others less so). Moreover, wanting to make sure Italy did not miss out on the spoils of war this time around Mussolini was keen to support Hitler and sent troops to Russia - the Italian experience of being late to war in WWI and not one of the major allies (France, Britain, USA) saw them miss out on, or so they thought, in areas of the Balkans for example.

These forays into North and East Africa, the Balkans/Greece, the Mediterranean and Russia, whilst also defending home territory and in Vichy France once Germany took full control, stretched Italy's armed forces. All three military arms were in dire need of modernisation and to cope with the Duce's foreign operations huge expansion.

Mr Gooch provides some fascinating information and data that clearly show Italy was clearly, even by 1940, never going to succeed. Simply, it did not have the men and material to create and operate the divisions, ships and squadrons needed and it also did not have the industrial base to manufacture armaments at pace. It also lacked the raw materials and natural resources (oil, steel, rubber) and the money, the people, food and infrastructure - notably roads and railways. It also struggled to design, develop and bring into production new tanks, artillery, ships and planes, let alone build the tens of thousands of trucks needed. Within this too, the industrial north of Italy suffered poor work relations with strikes and saw men drafted for military service and then returned. Italy was not on the total war footing that Britain, Canada, the USA and its ally Germany was. It is interesting to read that woman featured so little in Italy's home front industry. Whereas the aforementioned countries used women in almost all areas that men traditionally occupied in peacetime, in Italy this was not so. For example, in 1943 at Ansaldo Meccanico just 10% of the workforce were women. At Olivetti, the percentage of women workers stayed the same as that pre-war, and at Pirelli, the numbers of women workers actually dropped (pages 414/415).

As such a number of Italian military and politicians knew of these supply problems and reported to Mussolini, yet little if anything was done to remedy. Estimates by the three services as early as 1940 saw requirements that could not be fulfilled thru the need for new tooling, designs and manufacture until 1942; other estimates to be properly equipped were given as 1944 and 45; astoundingly, estimates were made that should production be less than the required monthly run rates then the military would not be ready until ten years later, 1955.

This problem was exacerbated as Italy had no ally to provide investment or take up the gap to produce the numbers needed. It increasingly needed oil, steel and rubber (in astronomical tonnages) to meet its planned demands. This saw Italy continually call on Germany to provide the raw materials and resources and as war progressed actual tanks, planes, trucks and munitions.

In short, Mt Gooch shows that whatever Italy did and where and how it fought it would never have the scale to create, deploy and maintain (with battlefield losses) the divisions it needed in Africa, The Balkans, Greece and in Russia, let alone at home especially as the air war came to Italy and its cities in advance of the landings at Sicily, Salerno and Anzio.

There is some good information on the Italians in theatre. Again, this is not, as I mention above, detail fighting wise, but we do read of and get a very good understanding in how Italy became bogged down in Greece and especially the Balkans with partisan warfare as well as regular troops. The story in the Mediterranean for anti-shipping, convoy and actions such as against Malta are all covered and well described too.

One area I was pleased to see was that of Italian troops and their performance on the battlefield. For many today, the Italian army is seen as a joke with poor performance, massive defeats, surrenders and abandonment of positions. It is true these happened, but it is also true that all armies in WWII had disasters. Yet Italian troops did fight hard, bravely and often to the last man. There are many examples in the Western Desert - Italian artillery units being one - and also in Russia. Where they came unstuck often through poor generalship (that includes German), poor supply, poor communications, outdated weapons and organisation not suited to modern war. Over 300k Italian dead soldiers, sailors and airmen testify to this.

Mussolini's War: Fascist Italy. From Triumph to Collapse 1935-43, is a solid history that is readable, interesting and memorable.

There are eleven black & white maps (could be more and better); thirty-five black and white photos, and 26 mini-biographies of senior Italian commanders.

My copy was a Penguin paperback with 532 pages. Published in 2021.

[Boudewijn · Rating 5 out of 5]

A comprehensive account of Il Duce's disastrous attempt to make Italy a great power.

In this book, John Gooch chronicles Mussoline and his forces in the events leading up to World War II and World War II itself. It shows Mussolini and his delusions on the role Italy could play and - without clear focus or strategic insight and chronical shortage in resources - becoming more and more dependent on Germany for fuel and weapons.

The book starts with the Second Italo-Abyssinian War in October 1935, where two hundred thousand soldiers of the Italian Army attacked and defeated obsolete Ethiopian forces. It then deals with Italy's role in the Spanish civil war before it turns to the start of World War II.

The successes in Abyssinia and (to a lesser extent) the Spanish civil war lead to Mussolini's overconfidence in the ability for the Italian army to wage a modern war. It also brings to the fore the Italian generals (Rodolfo Graziani and Pietro Badoglio to name a few) and the personal rivalries between them.

At the outbreak of World War II, it becomes quickly clear that the army is no match for the modern armies of France, Russia and the British. The Italian army is characterised in bureaucratic inertia which makes coordinated actions nearly impossible. Continual shortage in commodities like steel, coal and above all oil makes warfare more and more impossible.

Due to Mussolini's erratic decisions, where his political ambitions do not match the army's capabilities, Italy is sucked into campaigns across north and east Africa, Russia and the Balkans, so the only way that Fascist Italy could earn her place was by depending ever more on Germany. Italy has the men, but lacks the material and resources.

In the end, I started to wonder how Mussolini was able to hold on to power for such a long time, because after reading this book you wonder how such an incompetent man, without any grasp of strategy, was able to plunge Italy into such disaster.

Do not expect a detailed description of the actual battles - large battles are often described in just a few paragraphs. Instead, the story focusses on the strategic level and logistical issues and resources. Detailed statistics are given on nearly everything: numbers of tanks, aircraft, ships even to things like boots and bullets, and production figures for materials like steel and copper. This I found very informative and any book detailing such an approach for any of the other major participants in World War II will earn a place on the top of the list of my to-read shelf.

So all in all truly deserving a five star rating - a great description of Italy's grand strategy and a much needed introduction to Mussolini's disastrous leadership.

[Anthony · Rating 3 out of 5]

Chasing Mars

Italy’s entry into the Second World War in many ways resembles that of it’s old enemy Austria-Hungry in the Great War. A weakened power, latched onto a more powerful ally, a divided country with a military with an abysmal track record. Add this to a relativity destitute country and one gets what Geoffrey Wawro has described for Austria-Hungry as a ‘mad catastrophe’. For me, Benito Mussolini’s pursuit of glory was doomed from the start and if he wasn’t a Facist dictator, he wouldn’t have got Italy tangled up as he did in WWII, trying to make Italy a ‘great power’. This is the story of the the decline and fall of Facist Italy in the Second World War.

Mussolini came to power in 1922, with his famous March on Rome. It is suggested that King Vittorio Emmanuelle III had an opportunity to prevent it, but stood by, from there on in the monarchy and the country was on a course for collapse. II Duce’s took over a country which was only formed in 1861, with the final ‘war of unification’ taking place in the Great War. Her international prestige was not great, switching from her allies Germany and Austria-Hungry and joining in 1915, she performed badly in WWI, especially in battles such as Caporetto. She was cast aside as a ‘second rate power’ at Versailles and like Imperial Japan became isolated from the allies. In the wake of this Mussolini wanted to forge a great and powerful Italy, one which dominated the Mediterranean and would seek its place among the elite in the world.

The first task was Libya, conquered just before and then mostly lost in WWI, Italy saw these territories as its inherited right. This was a success and spurred the dictator with thirst for more. Next was the independent African nation of Abyssinia in 1935 and although threatened with sanctions from the weak League of Nations Italian forces entered and after initially being humiliated managed to subdue the empire, infamously with the use of poisoned gas. In 1936 Civil War came to Spain and all of the regimes of Europe looked to assert their influence for a favourable outcome. Even with huge debts, Italy provided ships, arms and then men to the conflict in an ever more desperate attempt to provide Francisco Franco with a victory. In 1939, the country was broke and military exposed as incompetent. Had much been achieved? Mussolini had certainly stomped in front of the other powers, but recognition and respect was not there. It was in May this year that the Pact of Steel was signed with Nazi Germany, that each would come to the others aid in a war. But with a megalomaniac in charge of the Third Reich and no money to wage any sort of effective war until 1943, this was a mad catastrophe.

Within the Second World War, Italy got spread across five fronts. Mussolini knew she did not have the resources to fight on any, but persisted. No men, steel, tanks, aeroplanes, guns or oil to fight effectively anywhere. But he was now stuck with the Germans who thought very little of their Italian allies. For his bit Mussolini for very little of his Italian military and political leaders and would not listen to any advice offered. It is clear from John Gooch’s analysis that Italy was to be a servant to German war aims from the start. Where did it fit into the grand Mediterranean empire to invade the USSR? Germany said so and Italy followed. Greece was a disaster and Northern Africa only reaffirmed the inevitable, poor performance and road to defeat.

There is focus on II Duce himself, a man who his generals thought was mad for the last four years of his regime. Incompetent with no grasp of military strategy, indecisive and only liking advice if it agreed with him. Tension was always at the top and there appeared to be no unwavering support like Hitler had in Germany. By 1943 the game was up, with multiple plots to topple him becoming apparent, complete lack of food or resources and demonstrations in the street, the country split in two. Arrested by the king and then rescued by the Nazis, Hitler did not allow Mussolini to quietly slip away but imposed him on a puppet republic in northern Italy. Soon after he and his mistress were caught and murdered. Amazing Gooch doesn’t touch on this subject at all. He does explain how the monarchy was put in a ‘lose-lose’ situation during the 20 years of Mussolini’s power and with the end of the war was also swept away, Winston Churchill tried to save it, FDR was not interested.

Mussolini’s War is decent, but you need to have prior knowledge of WWII and Facist Italy to be able to understand it fully. I felt as if I need to read more around this subject to get the most of out this book. There is also a lack of an incredible amount of detail in certain points, I have mentioned the end of the regime is vastly swept over that if you blink you will miss it. Jumping around the various fronts made it also hard to follow. It is also not quite a political and not quite a military history of the war, battles aren’t described and internal political not much so either. So ultimately a very interesting subject is glossed over and as a result one comes away confused and asking questions. This is not the ultimate volume of Italy in WWII.

[Shrike58 · Rating 4 out of 5]

If, like me, you've read about most of the campaigns covered in this fine study over the years, why make the return visit? For one, Gooch is basically the English-speaking authority on the Italian military of the period, so one can safely assume that you're getting a solid analysis. Two, by examining the whole period in question from the strategic-operational perspective, one gets to trace Mussolini's relations with his flag-grade officers, how he used them, and vice-versa. Three, one can always learn something new. For example, Gooch treats how the moral corners that the Italian military learned to cut in its colonial wars, colored Italian behavior in its Balkan operations. Also, while Gooch has a lot to say about Italian admirals and generals (many of whom left diaries and post-war apologies), the airmen tend to waft through this book like ghosts; a commentary on the failure of Italian aviation to have an operational impact when involved in a fair fight.

Be that as it it may, in the final analysis, this work reinforces the reality that Italy had no business being involved in World War II until it absolutely had to, let alone jumping in as early as possible to try gain what what it supposedly deserved. But, at the end of the day, Mussolini made all his decisions through the prism of politics; not economic reality or military necessity.

One further thought is to note that I read this book, in part, because I thought it would make the author's own "Mussolini and His Generals" (2007) redundant. But, with Gooch's "The Italian Army and the First World War," one really has something of a trilogy.

[Jamie Smith · Rating 4 out of 5]

Armchair generals talk tactics; real generals talk logistics.
- Army proverb

This book spends as much time discussing the logistics of the Italian war effort as it does the political and military maneuvering, because logistics is the key to understanding how Mussolini’s grand – and grandiose – plans came crashing down. Too many books gloss over the importance of creating and distributing essential war material, making it seem almost as if ships and planes and guns are simply created out of thin air. The Italians were chronically short of everything, starting with raw materials and fuel, but including trained officers and NCOs, guns, ammunition, ships, aircraft, artillery, trucks, and shipping. One of the divisions sent to Russia had no transport, and had to walk 1400 kilometers to get to the front lines. Despite all these crippling shortages, Italy’s soldiers fought well across half a dozen different theaters of operations, tying down enemy armies and fleets that the Allies would have preferred to use elsewhere.

The book begins with Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia in 1936. General Pietro Badoglio conquered a territory as large as France and Germany combined in only six months, which the western powers assumed would take at least two years if it could be done at all. Badoglio formulated and executed a campaign using multiple columns of infantry supported by aircraft to penetrate deep into Ethiopian territory, supplemented by poison gas in large quantities. The campaign helped salvage Badoglio’s career, which was still shadowed by allegations that he had been partly responsible for the disaster at Caporetto during World War I, when he abandoned his headquarters and his troops to save himself.

Italy provided large scale and effective support to Franco during the Spanish Civil War, possibly tipping the balance of the conflict, and gained valuable experience for its army in combined ground/air operations. “By mid-February 1937 there were 48,230 Italian troops in Spain, together with 46 light tanks, 488 guns, 706 assault mortars and 1,211 machine guns.” The fighting there also bound Italy more tightly into Hitler’s orbit, and broke ties with the Soviet Union.

In the 1920s and early 1930s relations between [Italy and the Soviet Union] had been relatively amicable. It seemed then that they had more in common than not, especially their hostility towards capitalist-imperialist powers. ‘Corporativist’ Fascists claimed that Fascism and bolshevism stood side by side against the bourgeois plutocracies, and Fascist ideologues argued that both movements agreed on the necessity of a centralized and unitary state underpinned by strict discipline, differing only over the means to achieve it.

Moscow’s support for League of Nations sanctions against Italy during the Abyssinian war, and her support for the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War, changed all that. Thereafter, as far as Fascist Italy was concerned, the two ‘popular’ revolutionary polities were fundamentally in conflict.

Mussolini knew a European war was coming, and that having thrown his lot in with Hitler, he would have to join the German war effort at some point. Had they not done so, Italy would continue to be seen as a second rate power, and Il Duce had visions of himself ruling over a mighty empire spanning southern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Nevertheless, he knew that Italy did not have the industrial base to sustain a long war, and asked Hitler to defer hostilities until 1943. Mussolini’s war planners wanted an even longer delay, “The message...was crystal clear: Italy was not yet ready to fight and would not be fully ready even to begin to do so until 1945. Only in 1949 would she be fully ready to fight for a year and if labour only worked one ten-hour shift a day that date would be set back by a decade.”

Hitler, as usual, took no account of his ally’s wishes when preparing his war plans, but even he was surprised that France and Britain would go to war over an authoritarian state like Poland, when they had taken no action after the Sudetenland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, or Danzig.

As it had in World War I, Italy sat out the start of World War II. It was only after Germany’s stunning six week victory over France that they joined in, hoping to claim a share of the spoils. Mussolini wanted southeastern France as far as the Rhone river, including the city of Nice, but the creation of the Vichy government turned France into an ostensible ally of Germany, frustrating his plans.

And plans he had. His visions of glory were vastly greater than the ability of his armies to realize them. At various times he considered attacking Gibraltar, Malta, Tunisia, Corsica, Albania, Greece, France again, and Egypt, while expanding the colonial holdings in Ethiopia. He changed his mind so often that the armed forces commanders eventually stopped ordering detailed plans, certain that his attention would soon wander off to some new scheme.

Mussolini today is remembered as a buffoon, and this book will not change that impression, so it is surprising to hear that in the 1920s and 30s he was one of the world’s most respected leaders. Gandhi hailed him as “one of the great statesmen of our time,” and Churchill said, “If I had been Italian, I am sure I would have been with you from the beginning.” Even George Bernard Shaw said of him that “Socialists should be delighted to find at last a Socialist who speaks and thinks as responsible rulers do.”

Mussolini’s ambitions knew no bounds. After some early success in North Africa, before the British had organized their defenses in Egypt, “the army began planning the carve-up of Africa. Italy, Germany, Spain and Portugal would share out African territory, leaving France with a minimal stake and allowing Egypt and the Union of South Africa to remain in existence, free of British influence, as the only two independent states.” Closer to home “Even Switzerland became a potential theatre of operations: by mid-July the army had a plan for the joint dismemberment of the country with Germany.”

Nothing ever turned out the way the great leader planned. The invasion of Albania was met by a furious Greek response, which sent the Italian divisions tumbling back toward the coast where they were in danger of being annihilated before Germany sent troops sweeping in to conquer the Balkans and Greece it self. Afterwards the Italians were faced with a growing and increasingly violent insurgency, which they tried to handle diplomatically, while the German response to resistance was to massacre everyone in the vicinity.

The fighting in North Africa had the goal of invading Egypt and seizing or rendering unusable the Suez Canal. Hitler was willing to support this, and offered Italy bombers and an armored division, but Mussolini, still believing that he should be treated as a full equal with Germany, turned them down. It is interesting to speculate on the course of the war if a joint Italo-German offensive had swept into Egypt before the British defenders were ready. However, even when the Germans came in force with Rommel, it soon became clear that defeat was just a matter of time. Allied Naval forces in the Mediterranean had increased to the point where attempting to resupply Africa was a suicide mission and eventually the Axis forces there, starved of fuel and supplies, surrendered en masse.

The Italians joined the German invasion of Russia and took part in the initial successes. Unlike the Germans, the Italians knew their forces would have to fight during the brutal Russian winter, and provided appropriate clothing for their soldiers. The Italian effort would end catastrophically at Stalingrad. “Facing the two Italian corps (II and XXXV) and the twelve battalions of the Cosseria and Ravenna divisions, each on average 300 to 400 men strong, that were their immediate targets were ninety Red Army rifle battalions backed by twenty-five battalions of motorized infantry and 754 tanks supported by 810 guns and 1,255 mortars, 300 anti-tank guns and 200 rocket launchers.”

Just prior to the start of Stalingrad the Italian 8th Army had numbered 229,888 men. By the end of January 1943 they had taken 114,520 casualties, including 84,830 dead. Over 70,000 were taken prisoner: 22,000 died on the way to captivity and 38,000 in the POW camps, In 1946, when the survivors were released, only 10,032 returned home.

Once the American and British forces had taken North Africa, everyone knew it was only a matter of time before they selected their next target, but the Italians were left guessing as to whether it would be Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, southern France, or Greece. When the Allies landed in Sicily it was clear that Italy was almost finished, and that a landing on the Italian peninsula was soon to come. “The Sicilian campaign cost the Italians some 40,800 dead and missing and 116,681 prisoners of war. German losses added up to 8,900 dead and missing and 5,523 prisoners of war. The Allied armies suffered much less: 4,299 dead and 13,083 wounded.”

By this time the entire Italian war effort was unraveling, and people just wanted peace. Mussolini was dismissed by the king, arrested, freed by the Germans, and set up as the head of a rump government in northern Italy. Confused plans were made for the armies, for the Italians to stop fighting and move to defensive positions in the south, and meanwhile the Germans disarmed their erstwhile allies and retreated behind strong defensive positions in the north of the country.

Mussolini was a gambler, and he staked everything on rapid German victory. When it became clear that the war would be protracted, and the United States entered the conflict, and once the Soviet Union stabilized its lines and went on the offensive, there was only one way the war would end. It nevertheless ground on for three more bloody years, with millions of deaths and great cities of Europe reduced to rubble. A smarter man, an abler politician, would have recognized the long odds and reduced Italy’s exposure to catastrophe, but Mussolini was blinded by visions of glory and led his country into the abyss.

[Oleksandr Zholud · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a non-fic about (military) history of Fascist Italy in the 30s and 40s. it is very heavy on data (who ordered how many troops to go where) and therefore a nice reference, but maybe not the best overview book, especially on audio, at least for me.

It is very interesting because unlike many historical novels it shows what info was available whenthis or that decision was made, not what we know really happened after. Maybe one of the prominent example is joining the WW2. The WW2 started on September, 1st, but Italy hasn’t joined Germany until mid-1940, after Germany almost finished France: “The Dunkirk evacuation began on 26 May. Three days later Mussolini called the heads of the armed forces together and told them he was going to join in the war at any time from 5 June. Waiting for a fortnight or a month would not improve things and would risk giving Germany the impression that the Italians were arriving ‘when the job was done’. Joining in when the risk was minimal would do Italy no good when it came to peacemaking.” He was warned that the army isn’t ready and won’t be ready for at least several years (it just started reform and re-armament, scheduled to end in 1949!), but the situation was that after France the operation of attack on England was expected and Mussolini feared to jump in too late.

Another important issue that book shows perfectly is that modern wars are won not on battlefields but by ones with better logistics and deeper pockets. Mussolini often wanted to go fast and decisive but it is impossible to throw armies from theater to theater instantly, especially if your armies are only on paper. For example, to join the war against the USSR, Mussolini sends “an army corps composed of two ‘auto-transportable’ infantry divisions (a term which meant that they were trained as lorry-borne troops, but not that they actually possessed the lorries they needed)” and starts to seek lorries after the commitment, so that “Watching the drive-past of requisitioned trucks still carrying the names of the commercial companies they had come from, one of Mussolini’s diplomatic entourage saw ‘a gypsy-like improvisation’ when compared with the highly organized German war machine.”

Also the lightning war or Blitzkrieg was suggested and used by Italians under the name guerra lampo (‘fast war’) as early as Abyssinian campaign of 1935. To which they prepared for three years and it was a victory of logisticians and engineers, who created roads and readied supplies.

With deficit of almost everything from trained officers to rubber, steel and coal, it is more surprising that they were able to keep even for so long.

[Stephen King · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a comprehensive and detailed military history of engagements fought by the Italian armed forces from then early 1920’s until the end of WWII. As a British reader, my knowledge of WWII has been generally though the Allies’ perspective so it was interesting to view this though the minor partner in the Axis forces. Gooch is an expert on Italian military history and there is plenty here for the avid military historian from the detailed internecine squabbles of Italian generals to the minutiae of quartermaster supplies in the North African theatre. For myself there was sadly too much of an emphasis on WWII and very little (comparatively) on the Ethiopian war and Italian East Africa. Donald Trump shares much of the capriciousness of Mussolini as I write from a 2020 perspective. Bombastic, a self proclaimed expert on every topic and vain. I doubt, however, that they will share the same endgame but will no doubt share a similar space in history.

[Julio The Fox · Rating 4 out of 5]

"There is too much history, and only me and old Muss to handle it".--- Ezra Pound. This book might be better titled "How to Lose a War" by Benito Mussolini. First, always fight with Italians under your command. Second, take the Germans for allies. You know they always treat their allies as partners. Third, fight on as many fronts as possible simultaneously; in this case North Africa, the Balkans, and Russia. This book will come in handy for those who recognize that per Napoleon, "an army travels on its stomach" and Il Duce could neither feed his troops nor could Italians, soldiers, and civilians, stomach the wars of 1936-1945. Over the years I've had fruitful conversations with Italians on why their military has historically been so feeble. "We're lovers, not fighters", one fratello told me. D'acordo, amico.

[Nathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

An extremely well written account of the Italian armed forces' performance in ww2, which as explained by the author was abysmal due to Mussolini and his governments' incompetence.

This book does a good job of explaining the war from Italy's point of view on a tactical and strategic level, while excelling at neither but does acommendable job at both considering the small page count of 423.

For a five star rating I would have wanted further exploration of specific reasons why italy's economy was so poor and their military so under equipped compared to their European counterparts, as well a brief run-through of Italian military performance after the armistice with the allies.

Otherwise, this is a great introduction to Italian military campaigns before and during ww2, highly recommend.

[Roger · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a tale of woe: a case of a country that didn't have the means to undertake a war of conquest, but owing to a prideful dictator and generals who were too scared to say no (and who were fond of glory), embarked not only on colonial expansion in Africa, but also fought in Europe and Russia. The result, as John Gooch shows in this wonderful book, was never in doubt. Italy could never have won, even if they had limited their greed to the Balkans, let alone Greece, Russia and their African empire.

Mussolini's War is at base a military history of Fascist Italy, which shows quite clearly that it was not necessarily the military efficiency of Italy that was the problem (although it was a problem), it was the paucity of Italy's economic and natural resources that crippled all efforts by Italy on the battlefield. This paucity combined lethally with the personality of Mussolini, who was determined to re-create Italy as a great power, not only with his African empire, but also as a power to effect changes in the body politic of Europe.

Gooch begins this book with the invasion and conquest of Abyssinia, and shows that even in this military adventure, the Italian military and economy struggled to keep the army in the field. His adventure in Spain drained the well even further, without much to show for it. Economists explained to Mussolini and the generals that the country could in no way take part in a general European war until at least 1944, as it would take that long to get enough equipment made to equip the army. Mussolini not only agreed with that assessment, but assured his generals that nothing would happen in Europe until at least then, because it would take Germany that long to equip as well. Of course, Hitler could not contain his aggression, and war came much earlier in 1939.

At first Italy kept aloof from the conflict, based on its inability to equip itself. However after the quick German victories, Mussolini began to worry that an Italy that hadn't participated would be left out of any reckoning after a German victory. This led Italy to get involved in the Balkans, where they had already taken Albania after a war that didn't go entirely their way. Greece and Yugoslavia not only exposed the poor equipment of the Italian army, but also the lack of an effective officer corps. Needing Germany to help finish the job did nothing for Mussolini's ego, and led directly to him offering troops for Hitler's invasion of Russia.

The lack of equipment for Italian troops was chronic from the start, and never got better - the industrial capacity of Italy could from 1940-1943 barely keep pace with losses of Army equipment, let alone build up the Air Force and Navy. Italy spent almost its entire war going cap-in-hand to Germany to ask for raw materials and equipment to enable it to fight. The lack of equipment actually crippled Italy's ability to fight effectively : its armies couldn't maneuvre owing to the lack of transport, and when it did fight it struggled with ancient artillery and a lack of automatic weapons. The Air Force did not have enough aircraft to complete the tasks assigned to it, and the Navy didn't even have enough fuel oil to participate in the War at all in 1943.

The logistic problems did not end there - the capacity of the ports in North Africa was too small to enable proper re-supply of the Italian forces in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and Italy had no means to supply its East African colonies. Abyssinia was left to its own devices, and was destroyed by the Allies, and in North Africa Italy once again suffered Germanic take-over of their military effort. While Italy supplied most of the men in North Africa, men were not enough, especially when faced with the increasing all-arms co-operation that the Allies were perfecting.

While we may think of Italy as "Germany - lite", Gooch explains that, in the Balkans, Italy was not beyond massacring the local populace and burning whole villages. Both in the Balkans and Greece Italy was a ruthless conqueror, depriving Greece of food and leaving thousands to starve, and ruling its Balkan provinces with a first of iron. While it can be shown that Italian rule was not quite as disastrous for local populations in these areas as was German, it was far from benevolent.

Mussolini's adventurism finally caught up with him in 1943, when the Allies attacked Italian soil for the first time. While the Generals and the King had been sanguine about their relationship with Germany up until now, they realised that their future lay in surrender and a change of sides, something that would have been impossible with the Duce at the helm. Once they had got rid of him, the problem then became how to deal with a Germany that was determined to fight on in Italy, no matter what the government thought.

As a well-researched and well-written account of all these events, I think it would be hard to find a book in English that would surpass Mussolini's War. As someone who thinks they know quite a bit about World War II, I learnt a lot more from reading this book. While the maps in this book are merely serviceable, the other apparatus in this book are excellent - comprehensive notes, wonderful bibliography and good index. Recommended.

Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/

[Dan McCarthy · Rating 3 out of 5]

An in depth retrospective on the Italian army under fascist Italy. Though dry at times, there is a bit of talk about raw materials imports and factory outputs, Gooch's knowledge does shed some light on this less covered aspect of WW2.

Be prepared for "then Mussolini changed his mind" quite often!😂

I do wish we got more primary material from Italian soldiers, there's only a few excerpts from soldier letters which would break up the high-level history in the book.

now I'm really interested in finding Gooch's book on the WW1 Italian army!

[Monty Milne · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fascinating study. Italy’s failure in world war two was inevitable given its acute shortage of everything, from raw materials to adequately trained soldiers, but it was the particular personality of Mussolini which ensured failure would become catastrophe. He was, according to one of his generals, “not mad – he just reasoned in a different way, working through intuition with results that were sometimes brilliant, sometimes catastrophic.” This is perhaps an overly generous assessment of someone who was incapable of confronting reality.

Italy didn’t get everything wrong. The invasion of Ethiopia required a huge effort of logistics and planning which was, overall, a remarkable success. The successful conquest of British Somaliland was perceived by Churchill as a humiliation. In Giovanni Messe the Italians possessed one of the war’s most capable commanders. It was Messe who ensured that the Italians on the Eastern Front were properly equipped with winter clothing in 1941-2, unlike the Germans. Stories of Italian incompetence and cowardice are unjust: they did have successes, on land and sea, and they did sometimes fight heroically, and often against the odds.

However, none of this could make up for the impossibly weak starting position which Italy had. And Messe’s brilliance, and the skill or bravery of many others, could not prevail against the appalling incompetence of so many senior commanders (Cavallero and Badoglio being two of the worst) or Mussolini’s fatal failure to grasp reality.

This is war seen mostly from Mussolini’s desk and concentrates on the greater themes of strategy, command and logistics. On the defence of East Africa, Gooch says the Italians “could have made the enemy’s task harder.” I think this is a bit unfair – their defence was incredibly tenacious and courageous, considering it was an obvious lost cause. And the concentration on the big picture means that some successes are not given their due (such as the remarkable exploits of Prince Borghese’s frogmen). But overall this is a fascinating and convincing portrait.

[Luis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Este es de esos libros que si son clavados de la segunda guerra mundial (como yo) les recomiendo mucho, pero que si nada más tienen curiosidad, no.

Suena un poco paradójico, pero no. El libro es de estos libros de historia militar que enfatizan los aspectos estructurales.

Eso en este caso se traduce en una documentación exhaustiva de las capacidades productivas, los avituallamientos y suministros disponibles y las fuerzas y su distribución en el territorio.

Y eso para alguien que no esté muy clavado puede llegar a ser abrumador.

Pero el libro cumple una función crucial: deja en claro que para 1940 Italia no estaba en posición de unirse al conflicto bélico, y que fue el voluntarismo de Mussolini el que lo arrojó a una guerra en la que no podía hacer otra cosa que depender de Alemania.

Eso fue algo que el libro me esclareció mucho: la Italia fascista dependía casi por completo en términos militares de Alemania. ¿La razón? Italia no tenía ni los recursos ni la capacidad productiva para sostener un ejército moderno peleando por mucho tiempo.

Y Mussolini lo sabía (como bien documenta el libro) pero creía que eso era secundario frente al “espíritu heroico”. Y no fue así.

Recomiendo pero no esperen una narración apasionada. Aunque he de decir que la incompetencia de Mussolini sí me sacó un par de carcajadas

[Rafa · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excepcional historia de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, al menos de parte de ella, vista desde el punto de vista de los italianos. Todos estamos acostumbrados a ver esta historia desde el punto de vista alemán, aliado o soviético pero es difícil encontrar libros que se aparten de ese punto de vista y ofrezcan enfoques alternativos.
Con disquisiciones políticas, estratégicas, económicas o logísticas ofrece un punto de vista integral que da soluciones o aporta puntos de vista interesantes o alternativas a cuestiones que a muchos nos intrigaban o atraían.
Escrito con un estilo fácil y ágil. el libro se lee con facilidad e interés.

[Gemma Billington · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was so great at contextualising and adding to what I knew about WWII. Mussolini was determined for Italy to be seen as a major international power, but the country soon became merely a vessel for Germany until Mussolini was toppled and the country’s other leaders managed to organise a clandestine armistice with the Allies in 1943. Mussolini seemed like a totally inept strategist and was completely ignorant of what resources a war needed.

[Marshall Snyder · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting book! I think I expected an operational overview of the Italian military- instead, the book was a study at the strategic and political levels. While I was familiar with the war in North Africa, I knew little about the Italian disaster in Russia, the Italian brutality in the Balkans, and the destruction of the Italian merchant marine trying to get supplies to North Africa.

[Bobby Daugherty · Rating 2 out of 5]

Pretty dry. More of a textbook of names and details than a cohesive outlay of a story.

[Emmanuel Gustin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a sharp dissection of Italy's high-level leadership during World War II: A story of generals, admirals, politicians and Benito Mussolini. If anyone had any illusions left about the Mussolini's leadership of his country during wartime, this should strip away the last of them.

Pinning down the beginning if the World War is always a choice, which tells us something about the priorities of the people making the choice. Gooch starts the story of Italy's war with its invasion of Abessinia and its involvement in the Spanish Civil War. These are very interesting chapters, as these conflicts are not usually recounted in much detail, and they provide an essential back story: Italy had already stretched its resources to their limits before it plunged in even deeper.

All Axis states demonstrated poor strategic leadership, individually and collectively. (If indeed, one can attribute to them any collective strategy at all.) But Mussolini's decision to drive Italy into war was outrageously irresponsible even by their dismal standards. Gooch describes how the Duce cast around for a war in North Africa, Greece, Yugoslavia, Corsica - essentially any and every target within reach. To be told, again and again, by his military advisors that Italy had neither the military forces for such an adventure nor the resources to build them. Which induced Mussolini, again and again, not to give up the thought of war, but merely to switch targets, in a merry-go-round that would have been laughable if the consequences were not so tragic. In June 1940, Mussolini decided to go for the participation prize, arguing that the death and suffering of Italian soldiers would earn him a place at the negotiation table. A flawed reasoning that undercut his military advisors because it obviated any need for predicted victory, and evidently spelt doom for Italy's soldiers.

Italy's war then proved to be an inevitable, slippery slope towards ever greater dependence on its selfish ally. At the outset Mussolini insisted on the absurd notion of a "parallel war", one fought at the same time as Germany's war with France and Britain, but independently. But Italy's shortage of weapons, raw materials, and fuel forced it to go cap in hand begging for the wherewithal to fight its war with, and soon enough Berlin decided that Italy could not be treated as an equal. Gooch recounts in detail how this still failed to produce alignment between the putative allies, which rarely agreed on operations and strategy. In the Balkans, they even failed to agree on who exactly their enemies were.

Gooch goes into some detail of the Italian campaigns in Albania, Greece, Montenegro and Yugoslavia. This is a very confusing story and difficult to read, but the brutality of the Italian actions in the region, which even the Italian high command admitted to be illegal, makes it necessary to account for them. Characteristically, the Italian generals looked down on the barbaric methods employed by the German occupation force, but most of them behaved little better.

The Italian war effort had numerous weaknesses, was often denigrated by the Germans, and was the target of effective Allied propaganda. Which resulted in the Italian army becoming something of the laughing stock in the eye of a later public. Historians have been at pains to correct an often unfair image. However, at the level of strategy, it is hard to deny that the Italian leadership comprehensively failed. Mussolini allocated extensive powers to himself, but from Gooch's retelling of the wartime meetings that he held, it is hard to imagine that anyone could emerge from these with anything else than deep despair about the spectacular incompetence of the Italian dictator.

The author takes it to the final collapse of the Italian war effort in the autumn of 1943, the fall of Mussolini, and the surrender of the Badoglio government. But he stops the story there: The story of the later fighting in Italy, the activities of the partisans, and the brief course of the Salo Republic are not within the scope of this work. That is a choice too, but perhaps after 400-odd pages, it is well to leave the final act of the drama for another work.

[Jean Bonilla · Rating 3 out of 5]

Just as Adolph Hitler called on the German people to support his drive for “Lebensraum,” Mussolini calls for Italy to fight for Spazio vitale or “living space.” It was the territorial expansionist policy of his Fascist government. This book outlines the history of Italy’s war experience, beginning with the invasion of Abyssinia and ending with Mussolini’s arrest. The first battles described in the book are in Italian East Africa, Abyssinia, and in Libya. Looking at how close Italy dips down to Africa at that point, I suppose it’s not a surprise.

Unlike reading about Germany, I find my lack of familiarity with the Italian players, the landscape, and the timing of events makes for slow going. Not knowing how to pronounce words in Italian, much less Serbo-Croat, Polish, or a host of African dialects means my brain doesn’t read as fast or as smoothly. The author does a good job of laying out information about the battles and the politicking that leads up to them. As always, it’s helpful that I read that book about Rommel’s campaign in North Africa because it sets me up in advance with an idea of locations and geography. Maps at the beginning of the book are somewhat helpful, though they would benefit from having more place names. The glossary of abbreviations also is a good resource; the short glossary of key players could have used a few more names.

Gooch gives a deluge of data. He numbers men fielded in different battles and Italian losses, but mostly he talks about the lack of soldiers available for all the units that Mussolini wants to put into the field. The Italians don’t appear to have trucks, they don’t appear to have tanks, they don’t even appear to have weapons. Their air force is small and ill-equipped; they’re being asked to go into the field practically defenseless.

Gooch makes countless references to short meetings, as if to emphasize how cursory government discussions and planning were. Definitely, he makes his point. There is no question that major decisions about troop movements in and around North Africa and in the Balkans were made on the basis of an hour long conversation, sometimes with not even all the players present in the room.

Mussolini seems almost obsessed with his relationship with Nazi Germany. He constantly is trying to position himself so that it’ll he appears to be a worthy Ally, one that can win battles, deliver troops were needed, and make a real contribution to the war. Unfortunately, he is handicapped by the fact that Italy is none of those things and can do none of those things.

Mussolini keeps offering Hitler whole divisions. He sends one division to Russia to support the effort of the Germans there, and offers two more. Fortunately, Hitler didn’t accept them! Even the division that went to Russia was ill-equipped and had to walk thousands of miles for lack of transport. They started in Romania and hiked all the way to Ukraine. There weren’t even airlift efforts to supply them with foods and ammunition and the other things that an army needs. One lesson they apparently learned from their fight in Greece earlier was the need for cold-weather gear, so the Italians had boots and warm weather coats, hats, and gloves, which the Germans did not have. So, when the dreadful Russian winter came with -30 degree temperatures, the Italians were fairly well equipped and the Germans were not. But it was so cold, Gooch says their fingers even froze stuck to the triggers of their guns!

Mussolini was keenly interested in the Balkans. At least in part it seems that Croatia offered “one of the most pleasant, fertile and rich countries of Europe, which could for sure provide Italy with important reserves of farm animals, cereals, wood and minerals.”

I am accustomed from my own work in the foreign policy sphere to think of the Croatians as a friendly country, one with which we have a positive relationship. Their portrayal in this book is of a people that behaved in a truly appalling manner. As Muslims they were persecuting and murdering defenseless Serbian Orthodox people and they generally behaved as “worthy” allies of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Jews, Roma, and Serbian Orthodox where herded into concentration camps, if they weren’t brutally slaughtered. The Italians appeared to want to ally themselves with the Croatians and ignored all of this dreadful behavior.

Constantly there were from Mussolini requests for more troops. At the start of Mussolini’s movements in 1932, more troops were needed in Abyssinia. Then attention turned to Spain, where more troops were needed to help Franco the late 1930s. Mussolini was determined to show his strength in Greece and Yugoslavia, but lack of troops prevented any action in the late 1930s. When Italy did get into the Balkans, troops were a constant problem. In July 1941 the Balkan generals wanted the nine divisions stationed along the Dalmatian border with Croatia to be increased to ten. In January 1942, it was determined that occupying the whole of Croatia would need five more divisions, but if Tripolitania fell, every division would then be needed to defend the southern Italian coast from British, and now potentially American attack. Already Mussolini was offering Hitler more divisions for the war in Russia. Everyone wanted troops and Italy didn’t have them. Even if she had had them, moving them would have been an almost insurmountable challenge without vehicles or aircraft.

To cover a vast theater that was largely mountains and forests, the Italians had 12 divisions, only one of which had a full complement of men and transport. Eight had only half the motor vehicles they were supposed to have, and nine had only 3/4 of the required number of pack animals. As well as lacking mobility, the troops were under-armed: with only one light machine gun for every 40 men, one machine gun for every 70 to 80 men, one mortar for every 100 to 150 men, one light gun for every 500 men and one medium gun for every 1,000 men, the occupying army was basically dependent on foot soldiers with rifles. With only eight aircraft allocated to aerial resupply because of the transport needs in Libya, neither the punitive columns nor the isolated garrisons could count on much support from the air.

Mussolini finally recognized in April 1942 that the Italian military could not be everywhere at the same time. The number of regular army divisions in Dalmatia and Slovenia gradually diminished in the months that followed, from 16 in June to 13 in August and 11 by the end of October 1942. Croat Četnik militia filled the gaps.

Note on the effectiveness of Malta as a base for ships and aircraft attacking the Axis interests in the Mediterranean: the Italian Air Force flew over 1,900 sorties against the island between June and November. The effect was minimal. Between June and November 1941 ships and aircraft from Malta sank or damaged 197,500 tons of Italian shipping, and average convoy losses rose from 7% in June to 77% in November.

Early on, before Hitler invaded Poland, the finance minister asked how Italy proposed to pay for all that it would need during a war – and this was a one year conflict they were talking about at this time. How did they propose to import 7,000,000 tons of liquid fuels in war time when all three entrances to the Mediterranean we’re going to be closed to traffic? Italy’s export trade was being sacrificed to the need to meet military orders, income from tourism had more or less disappeared, and the money coming in from Italians living abroad was merely a drop in the bucket the only way was to cut back on everything that was not militarily strictly essential and reduce domestic demand. Hannibal was not yet at the gates, Undersecretary of the Navy Arturo Riccardi told his listeners, “but he has crossed the threshold.”

The battle of Punta Stilo in July 1940 showed clearly some of the deficiencies in the Italian navy and Air Force. Gunfire was poor - Italian salvos were widely spread, due partly to variations in shell weight - and Italian destroyers launched torpedo attacks from too far away. Coordination between ships and aircraft was virtually nonexistent, thanks in large part to the determination with which both services had held each other at arm’s length before the war. Unable to identify its own ships, the Italian Air Force dropped its bombs from too great a height to be accurate.

There were no torpedo bomber‘s because the experiments had been canceled in January 1939 as being too expensive. Perhaps most importantly, Italy had no aircraft carriers. The lack of coordination between Italian warships and Italian aircraft was inadequate; there was a chain of command that was awkward and involved going back to land based authorities to get authorization for a strike.

One thing that’s clear throughout this text is that Mussolini’s battle strategies were often completely counter to those of his generals and admirals. He gives contradictory orders, plans too many battle incursions at the same time, and refuses to accept help from the Germans because he doesn’t want to be seen as the inferior partner.

In sum, Gooch has presented an extensively researched work with an incredible amount of detail. I appreciated the chance to read about this side of the conflict. But it was agonizing to realize how ill-prepared the Italians were from the start and to see how they inevitably chalked up failure after failure from the earliest years of the conflict. Pure hubris!

[Sai Vogirala · Rating 3 out of 5]

I was excited to read this book since the Italian role in World War 2 does not get nearly the same amount of coverage in literature as its Axis allies. John Gooch did a great job of incorporating a high level of detail that truly gave me new insight into a narrative I knew little about.

Due to this level of detail, there are numerous key figures that play a pivotal role in Italy's actions. It can get a bit confusing to keep track of all the key figures, so this is definitely a book that requires a greater level of focus. The weak structure of narrative made it tougher to follow along. Many times the story didn't 'flow' smoothly and the abrupt transition of topics didn't make sense.

Despite the weak structure of the narrative, I would still recommend any World War 2 history enthusiast to read this book due to the rich level of detail.

[David · Rating 3 out of 5]

Overall this book covered the aspects of Italy’s contribution to WW2 that I wished to know, it’s reasons, desires and political aspirations and it’s Facist Imperialism. However although well researched the editing could have been better. A chapter for each campaign, epoch or topic would have been good, or the following of events in chronological order, either way. But this book mixes the two which makes it hard to follow in places and loses itself midway through the book. The topic of Mussolini as an historical figure playing what was at the time a significant part in events, is not really addressed at all. A more accurate title would have been Italy’s War.

[Robert Hinson · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found this much easier to read than Gooch’s earlier work Mussolini and his Generals, I suppose because I have some basic knowledge of the Italian participation in WWII. A good description of how unprepared the Armed Forces of Italy were to enter the War with an explanation of why Mussolini made the decision in June 1940. I was struck by how fragile his control was over the Country and especially the Army.

This work will not give you details of the military campaigns in North Africa, the Balkans, or Russia but will explain why they were doomed to fail. I found his description of the brutality displayed by all sides in the Balkans to be especially interesting.

[Caleb Pykkonen · Rating 3 out of 5]

“Mussolini’s War” provides an informative military history of the wars fought by the Italian Army between 1935 and 1943. Author John Gooch focuses most of his narrative on military engagements that transpired and the decision-making of the top-brass of the Italian military.

It was interesting to follow Italy’s rise as a military power in the inter-War period. Italy initially found military successes in their colonial territories in Africa and in supporting Franco in the Spanish Civil War. But as they neared the outbreak of World War II Italy quickly began facing difficulties which they would never be able to overcome. Gooch highlights the logistical strengths of the Italian military during the pre-WWII period, and how these strengths did not last once Italy began to face enemies with more military resources. Moreover, the Italian military did not develop an overwhelming battlefield tactic like the Germans did with their Blitzkrieg, and this likely slowed the Italian advance in the initial parts of WWII when they invaded Greece and the Balkans.

The most striking aspect of the state of the Italian military during WWII which Gooch brings to light is their lack of sufficient material supplies, and how this eventually led to the army’s and Mussolini’s downfall. Repeatedly throughout WWII Italy’s struggles to provide their army with the necessary supplies led to defeats which likely could have been avoided. Unfortunately, Gooch does not directly analyze the political economic causes of this supply deficiency in Italy and their colonial territories, which led to their eventual defeat. In most conflicts the material supplies for each army will be the decisive factor, while the decision-making of officers is mostly of secondary importance. In “Mussolini’s War” the reader is left wondering why Italy was unable to provide sufficient weaponry and other supplies for their army, which left them wrong-footed throughout many of the engagements during WWII.

Gooch does not fall into the trap that many historians do of making their military history a hagiography of the various generals that fought in the war. (This may be in part because Italy did not have many generals, or even officers, who found much success in WWII). Gooch never fails to highlight the supply deficiencies that arose with increasing frequency over the course of WWII, indicating that there was not much that any general could have done to find success. He points to symptoms of Italy’s steadily failing domestic economy, which at least gives the reader a sense of the pressure that the Italian military was under as the war progressed.

As the War went on, the Italian military was unable to provide the support that Germany needed, both in Russia and Africa. Germany extended their forces beyond their own material capacity, and they needed the support of Italy to cover up their vulnerabilities. Italy was unable to provide the support that Germany needed.

It would be helpful for another work which compares the political economic conditions in Germany prior-to and during WWII with the political economic conditions in Italy. Germany had sufficient material resources to achieve notable military successes at the start of WWII, which is striking when compared to the lack thereof for the Italian military. One wonders if capital and the bourgeois class had a stronger position in Germany leading up to the war and during the wars first phase than the position of capital in Italy. Italy also had the important presence of the Catholic church during the War, which Gooch touches on at times, and this would have pulled power away from the bourgeois and potentially weakened the state of capital during this era. The German bourgeois did not face the same problem of a strong religious force after the rise of Hitler.

[Zachary Barker · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book review is dedicated to my late Grandfather Bill.

You served on the Italian Campaign but no one had any right to call you a “D Day Dodger”. Then you just got on with your life and helped raise my wonderful Mum. Thank you for your service and your love. I only wish we had the opportunity to get to know each other more.

I have finished reading “Mussolini’s War: Fascist Italy From Triumph to Collapse, 1935-1943” by John Gooch.

This is a historical account of Fascist Italy’s military campaigns from the invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) to the regime’s downfall at the hands of the Allied campaign culminating in the liberation of Italy.
The author makes the sobering point at the start of the book that Italian Imperialism wasn’t created by Fascism. Liberal Italy of the late 19th century and early 20th century had initiated the brutal creation of what would become the Italian East African Empire. The death toll inflicted on the Libyans was comparable proportionately to the casualties Nazi Germany inflicted on occupied Poland.

Fascist Italy’s military campaigns that took place before the Second World War, the invasion of Ethiopia and it’s intervention to help Franco in the Spanish Civil War were very successful. Unfortunately, valuable lessons from both conflicts were ignored and these interventions set back Italy’s military build-up for bigger fights ahead. Ironically both Fascist Germany and Italy could have benefitted enormously from simply waiting for their military programmes to develop for several years. Then again, given that the British Empire was also rapidly rearming, Fascist Italy’s odds of winning would not necessarily have changed.

Italian Fascist Dictator “Il Duce” Benito Mussolini was no doubt deluded, militarily He opportunistically threw Italy into opening up more and more fronts. When military successes didn’t happen he attributed them more to a lack of will rather than to his country’s lack of military, industrial and logistical capacity. Arguably Fascist Italy’s downfall was assured by him tying his country’s fate to that of Germany. The dynamic between Hitler and Mussolini is weirdly and unsettlingly similar to the dynamic between Putin and Trump. Mussolini seemed unable to say “no” to him and was ever eager to believe Hitler’s tall promises of military aid even as his forces were being defeated. Mussolini remained paranoid about Hiter’s attempts to form a German-French-Francoist Spain union of action, which may potentially sideline Italy.

In the final analysis, the author makes clear that Fascist Italy was only ever in theory able to fight one limited war. Mussolini’s ambitions and megalomania far outpaced what his county could deliver in creating him an empire. His overreach also added to Hitler’s woes, with the German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece delaying the start of the Nazi Invasion of the Soviet Union, pulling the timeline closer to the deadly winter months. Unwisely Mussolini also sent Italian forces to help in that campaign, although he at least did his troops the courtesy of making sure they had winter clothing, which is more than Hitler did.

I felt there were some odd narrative choices made in the book by the author. Much was made of the manoeuvring between Mussolini’s scheming and often inadequate generals, but sometimes large descriptions of campaigns such as those in Yugoslavia and Greece ended without revealing how the forces there were eventually defeated. I felt like the narrative didn’t flow quite as well as other military history’s I have read, which is a shame since this aspect of World War 2 is too rarely looked at. For encouraging more discussion and analysis about it, the author definitely deserves some credit.

[Peter Fox · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mussolini's War


Musso and the Italian war machine have always been figures of fun in Britain; not taken seriously and certainly not held in the same regard as German forces. This book does little to amend that impression. It quickly becomes apparent that Mussolini's ambitions and Italy's material position were in no way in harmony. On occasion, Italian forces could fight relatively well, but they were often on the back foot. You get the strong opinion that given the manifest material and economic superiority of allied forces, a lot of the rank and file realised they were onto a loser and so didn't see any point in fighting for it.


This book includes Abyssinia and Spain as well as the lesser well known Italian involvement in Russia and the Balkans, which is all to its credit. However, Mussolini doesn't really feature as much as you'd expect from the title. He makes the occasional cameo as the arbiter of conflicting demands made by generals and his mostly unhelpful comments suggest a more than shaky grasp of strategy. You don't get any real feeling for him having a larger role in the war, though, or even an appreciation of his general activities during these years. It's as if he had spent three years at home with his feet up. Similarly, the lack of quotes from soldier's letters home or later memoirs (there are a few, but they are sparse), gives you no viewpoint from this perspective, either, which is a shame. You end up with a book detailing Italy's war, but not really Mussolini's or the soldier's.


One thing that did come as a bit of a surprise was Italy's brutal behaviour in the Balkans; but as Yugoslavia went Communist in 1945 and Italy was a bulwark against this, no one was particularly interested in going into it all after the war.


Given the industrial and material weaknesses of Italy, they would have been much better off following a neutral course, or possibly even joining the allies. In fact, it's quite possible that the Germans may also have been better off if the Italians had remained neutral, too.

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

Italy entered the Second World War on a gamble, aiming to take advantage of the fall of France and Nazi Germany’s ascendancy to realise their aims of a colonial empire and great power status. As Mr Gooch outlines from the very start of Italy’s wartime adventures in Abyssinia and the Spanish Civil War, there was limited strategic direction, myriads of poor economic planning, an utter inability to accept the help of their German allies until it was too late, and constant meddling by Mussolini.

Gooch covers the Italian war effort from the first invasion of Abyssinia to the armistice with the Allies in 1943, following the war strategically: the decisions by the high command, the political manoeuvring, and the economic planning needed to fight a modern war (or lack thereof in the case of the Italians). This means unfortunately that certain tactical elements are not covered in such detail (for example, the invasion of Albania) but there is a wealth of detail on the North and East African campaigns and the disastrous collapse of the Italian army in the east.

Gooch’s main concern is to showcase how utterly unprepared the Italians were for war: their own economic forecasts predicted an Italian entry in the late 40s and economic activity wouldn’t be ready until the 1950s. This, alongside the weaker position as Germany’s “ally”, meant the war was doomed from the outset. The Italians tried vainly to influence the Germans to cut their losses in Russia and focus on the Mediterranean theatre but for Hitler, his cataclysmic battle against Communism overshadowed Mussolini’s concerns about North Africa and Malta.

This is a strong narrative and analysis of the Italian fascist wars - one that isn’t too common in western historical works on WW2 - and it gives vital insight into the contemporary Italian political and military mindset. More maps and photographs would’ve been gladly welcomed - especially in the chapter on the Balkans - but on the whole, this is a good, detailed understanding of a lesser-known part of the Second World War.

[Hamid · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good history with a very tight focus though it feels that ending in 1943 (and not, at least, in 1945) leaves the work lacking in the detail that would be necessary to really describe 'Mussolini's War'. So we miss out really on the Republic of Salo, the death of Mussolini and what the repercussions meant for Italy as a whole. I think also, Italy's crimes throughout the period *feel* somewhat glossed over. While Gooch touches on colonial and wartime atrocities (the use of gas in Africa, extrajudicial executions etc), we never get an understanding of what the results were for those responsible (or not, as the case may be). And that's probably a function of the period chosen.

Saying that, it's refreshing to read a (primarily military) historical review of Italy's role in the war with Italy as the focus, rejecting some of the common historical tropes of the Italian armed forces as a collection of cowards, while detailing all the logistical challenges that meant Italy's eyes were always bigger than its grasp. The work probably focuses a little too much on the leading political and military actors as well logistical descriptions, leaving Italian society mostly in the background.

[Kevin Foehrkolb · Rating 2 out of 5]

Take my review with a grain of salt. I only made it through about 90 minutes of the audiobook before stopping. I was looking for a biography of Mussolini and not finding a good one, decided to give this a try. It's definitely not a biography. It is an account of Italy's wars in Africa in the 1930s, and then, I assume, the rest of WW2. It went into excruciating detail about every general involved on both sides of every battle, how many men were under the command of each, how many deaths, the dates of the battles, etc. Of course, Mussolini was involved in making decisions, approving military actions, giving instructions, etc., but only briefly, without an in-depth discussion of his thoughts or actions. It was all about the battles and the major players in them.

So if you are looking for insight into who and what kind of man Mussolini was, I don't believe you will find it here, at least not without pushing yourself through hours and hours of battle minutia. There may be some insights sprinkled in there but I'm not going to invest that much time in looking for them. I'll look elsewhere.

[C.A. A. Powell · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very detailed account set up in a stage by stage development, through each chapter. Mussolini's rise to power and the gradual triumphs over the 1920s and early 1930s. All these early and terrible colonial wars that build up an ill-deserved confidence from the territorial gains in North and East Africa to the Italian involvement in the Spanish civil war, etc. All these messy and costly ventures, portrayed as great national successes. Such achievements that make it easy to lay down a fragile foundation of national pride. An ominous and continued ill-deserved confidence of the Fascist Italian regime. Then the chapters deal with the Italian nation's real industrial output against the real and further needed output for a WWII adventure. (Adventure in the minds of Mussolini and his hardcore followers.) It's almost like a huge castle made of sand waiting for the inevitable tide to come in. This is a well researched and very interestingly presented account of Mussolini's rise and fall. Taking a great nation on the nightmare journey with his ambition.