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The Morality of Freedom
Ranging over central issues of morals and politics and the nature of freedom and authority, this study examines the role of value-neutrality, rights, equality, and the prevention of harm in the liberal tradition, and relates them to fundamental moral questions such as the relation of values to social forms, the comparability of values, and the significance of personal commitments.
435 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1986
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
January 5, 2017
This is a complicated book and a slog to get through, but also very rewarding. The big picture for Raz is a non-individualistic defense of freedom. In particular, Raz argues for a theory of freedom that's consistent with rather than opposed to state action. This thread underlies his discussion of authority (authority is about promoting interests), political ideals (specifically autonomy), and rights (rights are about protecting interests).
I read it for a class that focused on his theory of authority in Part I. Raz's theory of authority, and political authority specifically, is subtle and persuasive but ultimately unsuccessful in my view. For example, Raz thinks that when an authorities should only make decisions on the basis of reasons that apply to their subjects. But he also says that when an authority makes a decision, the reason for action embodied in that decision replace the ones we previously had. However, this leads to counter-intuitive results once you start looking at the action of authorities over time. At a later point, for example, the authority must make decisions based on subjects' reasons that are reasons the authority gave them. There are also problems with claiming that we should obey an authority when it is in our interest to obey. That is sufficient to show it is rational to obey, but not that there is a duty to obey.
These difficulties aside, Raz's theory of authority is an important alternative to most of the theories in the literature and extremely influential.
I read it for a class that focused on his theory of authority in Part I. Raz's theory of authority, and political authority specifically, is subtle and persuasive but ultimately unsuccessful in my view. For example, Raz thinks that when an authorities should only make decisions on the basis of reasons that apply to their subjects. But he also says that when an authority makes a decision, the reason for action embodied in that decision replace the ones we previously had. However, this leads to counter-intuitive results once you start looking at the action of authorities over time. At a later point, for example, the authority must make decisions based on subjects' reasons that are reasons the authority gave them. There are also problems with claiming that we should obey an authority when it is in our interest to obey. That is sufficient to show it is rational to obey, but not that there is a duty to obey.
These difficulties aside, Raz's theory of authority is an important alternative to most of the theories in the literature and extremely influential.
May 27, 2021
This is a really remarkable book that stands with the work of Rawls, Nozick, etc., offering a foundational statement of liberalism. It is not possible to recount the many topics addressed by Raz; instead, I will note three central themes.
First, is the idea of the "normal justification of authority." This is the claim that authority is normally justified insofar as it enables one to better act upon reasons that one has reason to act upon. This notion, evidently indebted to Parfit's critique of commonsense morality, amounts to an instrumental, epistemic justification for political authority. Because of the fundamental importance of coordination, this offers a sensible, albeit modest, account of political authority. Raz recognizes that this account represents a much more limited notion of political authority but he also argues that insofar as persons identify with a political community the normal justification of authority underwrites a more wide reaching account of authority. In this case, one has reason to act as commanded because one shares the reasons of the political authority, and acting accordingly, is ipso facto a better way of achieving those reasons.
Second, Raz offers an extremely interesting account of wellbeing. Eschewing hedonistic, subjectivist / desire-fulfillment, and objective-list theories of wellbeing, Raz adopts, what might be called, a cultural approach. Aside from basic needs which have an important, but subordinate place in wellbeing, Raz argues that one's wellbeing is primarily a matter of acting upon purposes that one has adopted, purposes that are genuinely valuable, that is, purposes for which one has valid reasons to pursue. Raz is careful to note that often one has no decisive reason to choose one valid aim rather than another. But after one has chosen, say to be a doctor, one has decisive reasons to do all sorts of things. As such, wellbeing is closely related to participation in various practices and institutions. This account is clearly indebted to Mill, and through him to Herder, and has much similarity to claims made by Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre.
Third, Raz focuses on autonomy as a central concern of liberalism. Autonomy involves having a variety of worthwhile options and the ability to make good decisions. This is presented as a central of aim of modern liberal political authority. It underwrites a commitment to the harm principle. Political authority should not coerce persons unless they are harming others. But this is understood "not as a restraint on the pursuit of moral goals by the state, but as indicating the right way that the state could promote the well-being of people." Accordingly, this allows the state to promote valuable cultural practices and institutions, and implement welfare programs to ensure that persons have the ability to make autonomous choices. For Raz this amounts to a form of pluralism rather than an endorsement of neutrality.
Raz's work raises many questions that are left unanswered but it very clearly offers an alternative vision of liberalism that rejects the individualism of rights-based approaches and the commitment to neutrality of high liberalism.
First, is the idea of the "normal justification of authority." This is the claim that authority is normally justified insofar as it enables one to better act upon reasons that one has reason to act upon. This notion, evidently indebted to Parfit's critique of commonsense morality, amounts to an instrumental, epistemic justification for political authority. Because of the fundamental importance of coordination, this offers a sensible, albeit modest, account of political authority. Raz recognizes that this account represents a much more limited notion of political authority but he also argues that insofar as persons identify with a political community the normal justification of authority underwrites a more wide reaching account of authority. In this case, one has reason to act as commanded because one shares the reasons of the political authority, and acting accordingly, is ipso facto a better way of achieving those reasons.
Second, Raz offers an extremely interesting account of wellbeing. Eschewing hedonistic, subjectivist / desire-fulfillment, and objective-list theories of wellbeing, Raz adopts, what might be called, a cultural approach. Aside from basic needs which have an important, but subordinate place in wellbeing, Raz argues that one's wellbeing is primarily a matter of acting upon purposes that one has adopted, purposes that are genuinely valuable, that is, purposes for which one has valid reasons to pursue. Raz is careful to note that often one has no decisive reason to choose one valid aim rather than another. But after one has chosen, say to be a doctor, one has decisive reasons to do all sorts of things. As such, wellbeing is closely related to participation in various practices and institutions. This account is clearly indebted to Mill, and through him to Herder, and has much similarity to claims made by Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre.
Third, Raz focuses on autonomy as a central concern of liberalism. Autonomy involves having a variety of worthwhile options and the ability to make good decisions. This is presented as a central of aim of modern liberal political authority. It underwrites a commitment to the harm principle. Political authority should not coerce persons unless they are harming others. But this is understood "not as a restraint on the pursuit of moral goals by the state, but as indicating the right way that the state could promote the well-being of people." Accordingly, this allows the state to promote valuable cultural practices and institutions, and implement welfare programs to ensure that persons have the ability to make autonomous choices. For Raz this amounts to a form of pluralism rather than an endorsement of neutrality.
Raz's work raises many questions that are left unanswered but it very clearly offers an alternative vision of liberalism that rejects the individualism of rights-based approaches and the commitment to neutrality of high liberalism.
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June 24, 2007Just begun a summer reading group on this book--. It is a work dealing with the old-fashioned core of political theory: theories of political authority and obligation. But it deals with more topics than just that one. It is a robust and rigorous challenge to a certain strain of liberalism, i.e., neutralist liberalism. The book is largely a defense of perfectionist liberalism, where that means a kind of liberalism which embraces a conception of the good life as its basis for liberal policies. As a perfectionist, where this term is a philosophical term of art, not a term for a nagging habit of perfecting one's personality, I find it extremely helpful.
December 13, 2022
The Morality of Freedom is one of the best contemporary political philosophy monographs. In this book, Raz uniquely defends the value of liberty. Liberty does not have value in itself, instead, its value lies in that it can help and guide us to pursue the valuable options of our lives. In other words, unlike many so-called "liberals" who hold dogmatic beliefs of liberty, Raz uses his meticulous analysis and rigorous arguments to debunk many myths of liberty, such as the relationship between individualism and liberalism, right and liberty, egalitarianism and liberty, and so on. After demolishing these liberal caricatures, Raz claims that autonomy is only an instrument for us to pursue happiness and it is the governments that are obliged to create suitable circumstances to serve us using autonomy, and even though liberty only has an external and instrumental value, it is still an extreme critical value in our modern society. Without liberty, a person would have no possibility to lead a successful life. Apart from the discussion of the value of liberty, in the first three chapters, Raz also defends an important conception of authority: "the service conception of authority" laying a solid foundation for any further discussion of authority.
September 21, 2021
A revolutionary work in political philosophy which calls for combining the appeal of perfectionism and liberal anti perfectionist principles and ideas. Profound in scope and philosophy depth.
October 11, 2023
Hard to read but worth it because Raz is quite rational compared to other philosophers. He has become one of my favorites. If you enjoy political philosophy this is a great book.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews