درب السلام الصعب

by Henry Kissinger, هنري كيسنجر, علي مقلد (ترجمة)

كتاب درب السلام الصعب الاسم القديم للكتاب " عالم أعيد بناؤه كاسلري ومترنيخ واعادة بناء السلام "
تأليف هنري كيسنجر
#نبذة_عن_كتاب
تعود ابرز افكار واراء هنري كيسنجر في إدارة الصراعات الدولية والسياسة الخارجية إلى المرحلة التي درس فيها الدكتوراه عام 1954 في جامعة هارفارد عن أطروحته الموسومة ب " عالم أعيد بناؤه كاسلري ومترنيخ واعادة بناء السلام " في اشارة الى مؤتمر فيينا عام 1815 ، فقد رأى ان ما فعله نابليون في أوروبا بالقوة لا يواجه بنفس القوة لانه لن يتحقق الاستقرار فيها الا من خلال المفاوضات التي حققت السلام لقرن كامل بعد هذا المؤتمر ،

وقد تأثر كيسنجر كثيراً في دور #مترنيخ مستشار النمسا آنذاك في المؤتمر وكذلك في تاليران وزير خارجية فرنسا الذي حول هزيمة بلده تضاف الى القوى الأوربية الاخرى في المؤتمر عبر سياسته ودبلوماسيته الفذه ، ويعلق هنري كيسنجر على مؤتمر فينا 1815 بقوله " ان مصدر الدهشة لا يمكن في الاتفاق الذي توصل اليه المؤتمرون ولا يكمن في رجعيته وشره … وانما يكمن الاعجاب به في التوازن الذي حققه والذي قاد الى استقرار طويل نوعاً ما

ويعتقد كسينجر ان شعارات السلام لا يمكنها تحقيق السلام نفسه ، بل ان السياسة الواقعية هي التي تعتمد على القوة من اجل تحقيق السلام لان الرغبة غير كافيه لتحقيقه فالقوة عنصر محايد يقودك الى السلام ولكن عند استعمالها تكون غير محايدة ، وان ساسة مؤتمر فينا كانوا قد استخدموا الصبر والدهاء ومارسوا لعبة القوة "التهديد " بسرية ومؤيدين بأكبر قوة من الأحلاف ولم يجزعوا عن استعمال القوة لفرض النظام اذا تطلب الامر ذلك كما أنهم لم يتمسكوا بحرفية القواعد الاخلاقية ولم يخجلو من الازدواجية في التعامل لانهم اعتبروا كل ذلك ادوات مشروعة في ممارسة السياسة
وبعد ذلك خرج كيسنجر بمادئ اساسية شكلت تصوره وفكره في السياسة الخارجية في ذلك الوقت ، اذ اعتقد ان القوى المحافظة الملكية " الدول الغربية " في تصادم مستمر مع القوى الثورية " الاتحاد السوفييتي مثلا " ، الامر الذي يقود دائما الى الاحتكاك ، لذلك فان هدف السياسة الخارجية هو تلافي ذلك عبر الاستعمال الامثل للتوازن ما بين القوى المتصارعة عبر مزج المفاوضات السرية بالاستعداد الدائم لاستعمال القوة ثم استخدام القوة فعلاً ان تطلب تحقيق السلام هذا ، لذلك يرى كيسنجر ان السلام هو استقرار القوة داخل اطار نظام شرعي يسوده حسن المعاملة والقانون ، ويصبح النظام شرعياً اذا كانت قواعد سلوكه محترمة من القوى العظمى

Genres: History, Politics, International Relations, Nonfiction, European History, Biography, Political Science

Paperback

First published January 1, 1957

About the author

Henry Alfred Kissinger (born Heinz Alfred Kissinger) was a German-born American bureaucrat, diplomat, and 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the Richard Nixon administration. Kissinger emerged unscathed from the Watergate scandal, and maintained his powerful position when Gerald Ford became President.

A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente.

During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.

Reviews

[Ian]

This book was published in 1957, but was originally written in 1954 as Kissinger’s doctrinal dissertation at Harvard. I sometimes think I over-tax myself in attempting to read these academic books, and this was another example. I found the book quite dense and a slow read. That’s not to say though, that it didn’t provide some insights, particularly in the early stages.

The book is a very detailed examination of the diplomatic machinations in Europe in the immediate post-Napoleonic period, and the attempt, led by the Austrian foreign minister Prince Metternich, to restore the political structure of pre-Napoleonic Europe and the “equilibrium” between the four main continental powers, namely Austria, Russia, Prussia and France. Great Britain was of course a fifth great power, but as an offshore island, tended to pursue an isolationist policy towards continental Europe, only becoming involved when it perceived a direct threat to its interests.

Kissinger argues that 18th century warfare was limited and took place within an agreed world order. The losing side in a war paid an indemnity and handed over some colonies, sometimes a province or two, and then both sides got ready for the next round. Revolutionary France – a state which morphed into a military dictatorship – disrupted this equilibrium because it was not part of the system. It considered the system itself as oppressive, and it was the aim of France, during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, to smash the existing system of order.

Writing in 1954 and with his German-Jewish background, Kissinger was also keenly aware of the example of Nazi Germany. Although it is mostly unfair to compare Napoleon with Hitler, they did both share the ambition of ruling the whole of Europe. Kissinger argues that, in both cases, the other powers took too long to recognise the nature of the threat, imagining that it could be dealt with by diplomatic means:

“Appeasement”, where it is not a device to gain time, is the result of an inability to come to grips with a policy of unlimited objectives.’

I found this assessment very perceptive, but the bulk of the book is taken up with the attempts of conservative statesmen – primarily Metternich and the British Foreign Secretary Viscount Castlereagh – to “restore” the world to what it had been. Napoleonic France had been faced with the four-power coalition of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria, but as in 1945, the allied powers were only in coalition as long as they had a common enemy.

In Kissinger’s account, Prussia was quickly sidelined and Castlereagh and Metternich largely worked together to isolate Alexander I of Russia and his foreign minister, Count Kapodistrias (referred to in this book as “Capo D’Istria”), who had liberal and democratic ideas.

It’s clear that Kissinger greatly admired Metternich for his diplomatic skill. Metternich is nowadays seen as the deepest of social conservatives. Kissinger argues that much of this was down to the fact he was in the service of Hapsburg Austria, a polyglot, multinational state held together purely by the idea of loyalty to the Crown. Of all the states of Europe, it was the one that could least withstand the growth of popular nationalism and democracy. Kissinger acknowledges that Metternich’s efforts, for all their success, merely provided a reprieve for the multinational Hapsburg empire.

Kissinger, I would say, admired Metternich as a practitioner of “Realpolitik,” over ideological and moral considerations.

I found the book worth reading for its insights, but I won’t deny I also found it a bit of a slog.

[Aaron Liebman · Rating 5 out of 5]

A profound study of leading diplomats Metternich (Austro-Hungarian Empire) and Castlereagh (Great Britain) as effective actors in the decade 1812-1822 which included the defeat of Napoleon, the Treaty of Paris, The Bourbon Restoration, and the re-organization of states in Europe towards a balance of power that came to be called (perhaps unjustly) 'The Metternich System'. Treacherous maneuvers in defining borders and governing structures for Poland, Prussia, and the German principalities are acknowledged. There is no forgetting that the events under discussion set the stage for World War I even while reflecting on the almost century long European peace viewed as an achievement of this diplomacy. Kissinger teaches his readers how to conceptualize events. Terms such as 'legitimate regime,' and 'revolutionary regime,' take on a technical aspect. Legitimacy: defining it, controlling who gains and who loses it, allows political actors to seize the moral high ground and increase the freedom of action enjoyed by their state in international arena. Kissinger read all the relevant diplomatic statements and correspondences (in English, German, and French) from the period. These he interprets with the aid of categories from his diplomacy vocabulary. He articulates the means by which successful diplomats shape events. Kissinger explains how at times the 'conference system' became a de facto governing mechanism for Europe with Metternich its de facto Prime Minister. He depicts how Czar Alexander became to an extent Metternich's dupe. The motives and manipulations come to life in the narrative without exaggerating Metternich's role and lapsing into 'hero worship.' Kissinger avoids this error partly by acknowledging Metternich's flaws and partly by admitting the importance of other actors and factors besides diplomacy. Kissinger wrote in his conclusion: "It is fortunate for the lessons posterity may draw from this period that its chief protagonists were men of marked individuality, each in his own way symbolizing an answer to the problem of order: Napoleon of the claims of power; Alexander of the indeterminacy of a policy of absolute moral claims; Castleraegh of the conception of an equilibrium maintained by the recognition of the self-evident advantages of peace; Metternich of an equilibrium maintained by an agreement on a legitimizing principle." The revolutionary impulses of the period were often liberal (or nationalistic) while the reorganization of states advocated by Metternich in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars consolidated power in a conservative (and multi-national because imperial) direction. Metternich has a reputation as a conservative ideologue comparable in stature to Edmund Burke but coming out of the tradition of continental idealism, but his writings as a conservative ideologue Kissinger mostly dismisses. The profundity of Kissinger's presentation arises from its detailed and precise, but mostly implicit, explanation of how some individuals 'make history' consolidating power even while laboring under formidable political disadvantages and despite the chaos events.

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

We have here a book from before Kissinger's more famous offerings that came after his White House years. It doesn't quite have the level of writing that those later works do but still has the same level of interesting and subtle understanding of great power politics. Here this is specifically applied to the Concert of Europe, the early days after it, and in particular the relationship between the two most far sighted-if different- diplomats of the age, Metternich and Castlereagh. The two often serve as stand ins for their nations with their overlapping-yet-divergent interests but are also shown to be very much successful diplomats precisely because they were nothing like most of their fellow countrymen.

[Mansoor Azam · Rating 4 out of 5]

This ain't an ordinary read that one picks up on travels and finishes in a scoop. This one demands attention. And once attention is drawn it's a masterly work by Henry Kissinger.

If one wants to learn about the politics and times of Europe taken up in this book, one is advised to turn away. Because this one, though claims to be about two master statesmen of the era and their efforts at peace, is a far more complex tale full of Maxim's.

One reads, rereads and then falls in love with it. It's a superlative work on diplomacy. The moments, the issues, the thoughts, the moves confronting giants of diplomacy like Metternich, Castlereagh, Hardenberg & Talleyrand are discussed in detail laying bare the courses open to them at critical moments and the one they chose with analysis of why and how...

Not only this book gives a tale in detail but gives the reader so many lessons in the art or problem of diplomacy that I recommend this to be a must keep for all diplomats. There's just so much learning in offering.

It's a well researched work drawing from first sources and tries to analyse the actions in retrospect. The language is by far one of the most difficult I've come across. May be it owes it's difficulty to the fact that while writing this Kissinger was teaching at Harvard, a teacher is not an easy writer, using bombastic words.

For those looking for pure history of the specified era (1812-1822) this ain't the book. This one Problems of peace, dealt with diplomacy, by giants of those times, planning the downfall of Napoleon along with the contemplated divisions of the spoil, need for an equilibrium & it's creation, creation of alliances & counter alliances, the in-house fights amongst Allies, the Europe as it was, as viewed by the main allied foreign ministers, and the conciliation of these thoughts. ......

[P. · Rating 3 out of 5]

I wasn't quite sure that this was really the work of Henry Kissenger when I first got a copy of it... but after reading it is (I guess) obvious.

It starts slow, and it took me a good month or so of having it sitting around looking at me before I got though the first chapter, but after that it went fairly quickly.... definitely some parts that drag. However, a very interesting book for two reasons.

First, the narrative that Kissinger writes makes it sound as if diplomats were the only movers in the twilight of Napoleonic Europe, and that diplomacy was the only means by which a new order was established. To the extent that war is just politics by other means, I suppose this is true, but when reading this one gets the impression that Henry believes that Metternich could for instance nullify the presence of the Czar's 100k troops on the Rhine with a well timed note or judiciously dropped morsel of disinformation. Not surprising that a diplomat might somewhat overstate the importance of diplomacy, but interesting to read nonetheless.

Secondly, I really developed an... appreciation of the motives of the conservatives of the period. Previously I was pro-revolution, and then pro-empire, and then pro-revolution again come the 1830-40s. I got good perspective though on what exactly the conservatives may have been thinking though, in their defense of monarchy and (often) squelching of liberalization.

[Armin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Bücher, die ein wenig gegen den üblichen Strom argumentierten, haben mich schon immer neugierig gemacht. Abgesehen davon hielt ich Henry Kissinger in jungen Jahren für einen von den Guten. Aus diesen beiden Gründen habe ich Muttis Fehlgriff in die Grabbelkischte in zwei Anläufen bewältigt.
Aber Henry brauchte schon damals allen Bonus und die komplette Glaubwürdigkeit auf. Netter Versuch, bringt meine Gefühle bei der ersten Lektüre ganz gut auf den Punkt. Die Fakten dafür liefert Adam Zamoyski in seinem Buch über den Wiener Kongress. Im letzten Kapitel folgt die persönliche Kugel für Kissinger, die mir das Büchlein wieder ins Gedächtnis brachte, das manche Leute für eine Art Vorstudie zur späteren Politik halten. Die Verhältnisse waren bei Vietnam und Watergate aber anders kompliziert als bei Wien und Waterloo.

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 3 out of 5]

Kissinger's reflections on the nature of statecraft and diplomacy here are interesting, as is his basic overview of the building of the Congress of Vienna and Concert of Europe systems. He gives a great sense of who Metternich and Castlereagh were and how they approached diplomacy and built a new international order that lasted pretty much for a century. However, the page-by-page reading here isn't terribly compelling, as there is a TON of detail on diplomatic missives and machinations. Kissinger also doesn't really explain a lot of the basic history, so I ended up firing up Wikipedia so I could follow along. A book for those interested in Kissinger's development as a thinker and diplomat in his own right, but for a more straightforward and concise view of the Concert of Europe's formation, check out the chapter in Ikenberry's After Victory.

[Greg · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a fantastic book on the Congress of Vienna and the two principal figures who forged the post-Napleonic international order in Europe. Metternich and Castlereagh. When you get past the bombastic language of Kissinger, you find some amazing insights into the diplomatic maneuvering that went one. This is the benefit of reading a history by a practicing diplomat rather than an academic historian studying the period.

[Sasha · Rating 5 out of 5]

I would not blame someone for refusing to read Kissinger. This book is not about modern politics or what Kissinger did as much as what mechanisms he believes turns history.
To put the book in perspective, this was his PhD thesis, which means it was years spent in a deep dive into a specific topic. His choice was the Austrian politician Metternich, who acted during the post French Revolution, Napoleonic era. This was a time in history when west Europe was being reorganized, when modern borders began (but did not finish) taking shape.
What makes the book fantastic is that Kissinger was obviously passionate about this work. He read extensively and spent time forming his own ideas about a man and time period that is typically given less than a week of time in a typical high school history class. What do I know though? I have asked a few people and they seem vaguely familiar with Napoleon, but haven’t heard of Metternich. Most people also could not explain which major powers were reshaping Europe at the turn of the 19th century. So unless you took those extra history courses at some point, or have read extensively about that time period, I imagine the average reader could learn a lot reading this book.
The second best part about this book is the writing style. It certainly is not an easy read, but it is so thoughtfully constructed. Each sentence sits alone it in a style that is not that typical quick contemporary flash, which so often avoids the difficult concepts, because they are so challenging to convey.
Finally, my favorite aspect of the book is thematic. What Kissinger is really writing about, what I would argue is his true fascination, is the idea that history is not shaped by the masses but rather by the character traits of a small number of people holding positions of power. What he shows is not only how countries hold leverage with land and armies, but also how people gain power through their emotional intelligence. He explores how Metternich moved councilmen, emperors and Kings with far more power than him, simply because he had social grace and tact. These powers can easily be cast in a negative light. You might also call him evil and manipulative. Regardless, the point is that Kissinger is highlighting how small random variance, in who was where and when, changed history.

[Sean Keeley · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a dense book, packed full of intricate, subtle diplomatic insights that I cannot claim to have fully grasped upon first reading. But man, is the young Kissinger brilliant. His ability to describe the political and psychological reality of key negotiations, while drawing out larger lessons for statecraft across the ages, is remarkable. He's also a witty writer, issuing ironic and acerbic commentary on the key players involved in a way that he became reticent to do when he became more famous.

Key takeaways for me: one, leadership and personality matter. This may seem banal, but considering that Kissinger is famously known as a "realist," and most realists place a lot of emphasis on the immutable laws of international relations, Kissinger actually stresses the role of contingency, personality, and character quite a bit. Metternich is his ideal statesman, clearly, but he's also able to show how Castlereagh rose to the moment—and why the personal limitations of Alexander, Napoleon, and countless others made them easier to manipulate.

Two, any coherent "world order" needs to have a legitimating principle that its stakeholders buy into. Kissinger shows again and again how Metternich sought to create this legitimacy, and why that was the most difficult task in negotiating a post-war settlement. This, too, belies the popular "realist" notion that might always makes right, that hard power is the only factor that matters.

I can't vouch for Kissinger the man, but Kissinger the doctoral student really is worth reading.

[Bill Manzi · Rating 3 out of 5]

Kissinger, in his unmistakable style, gives us a seminar on Castlereagh and Metternich, with the emphasis on Metternich. Dr. Kissinger is an unabashed admirer of Prince Metternich, and he shows us how Metternich used his guile, and superior understanding of his diplomatic opponents (allies) to achieve policy goals that helped extend the life of the Austrian Empire while keeping at bay the forces of "revolution". Kissinger admires Metternich's understated finesse, and although lightly critical of the eventual results he shows how Metternich constructed a system that stood the test of time, balancing divergent national interests to produce a European equilibrium that lasted for decades. A bit thick at times, and not for anyone not interested in diplomatic history. Metternich's approach certainly contrasts with the blunt force trauma advocated by so many today.

[Wm · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is amazing subject matter for the time it was written. Most political scientists were focused on nuclear diplomacy, while Kissinger reached all the way back to the Napoleonic Wars.

[Eli Giltrow · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great look at this pivotal event.

[Thomas Dotson · Rating 2 out of 5]

It feels as though half the book is grounded in historical fact, the other half is Kissinger retroactively imposing meaning on events that were far less coherent at the time.

[J.G. Collins · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kissinger is always a bear to read. When I read his "Diplomacy", years ago, I did it in two parts: up to WWII and then thereafter, taking a break of several weeks before returning. My reading of this was interrupted by successive bouts of flu-like symptoms that caused me to sleep any time I attempted to read it.

This book, which was Kissinger's Ph.D. thesis circa 1950, was written without the benefit of big time book editors that his prestige in later years brought him. So you get lengthy sentences, separated by semicolons, that you must read and re-read to comprehend.

Like most Americans of less than superior education (and mine is a BS in business, not History), I am largely ignorant of the details of 19th Century European history, save for what I have read in books like this. We all - or most of us - know there was a "Concert of Europe", but not, exactly, how it was achieved or what conflicts its "adjustments" helped to avoid full-out, kinetic warfare. And we all know about balance of power, but less so about the moralistic imperatives that Metternich was able to foist upon the alliance, mostly to his own advantage.

So, given my ignorance, I read "Restored" with Google and Encyclopedia Britannica bookmarked at the ready. (How many Americans know the "Liverpool Cabinet" was named for Britain's early 19th Century prime minister and not for some subcommitte of Parliament sitting in the city best known for producing The Beatles? There are a lot of obscure (to Americans, at least) references like that throught the book that I hope later editions will help us idiots understand via a simple footnote. And how about some legible maps, so that we can discern all the countries and regions at issue at a glance?)

Still, worth the read, though I hope the publisher will revise the edition with much better maps and better footnotes to help those of us suffering ignorance of many of the matters discussed. Perhaps a memorial edition to the author himself? If there is anything Americans need to know and do better, it is diplomacy. Or we will forever be trapped in our 40-year habit of being like the hammer that sees every problem as a nail (i.e., one requiring the use of military force.)

That said, "Restored" is a wonderful exposition of how Castlereagh conceived, and Metternich exploited, cabinet diplomacy to create a stable - if not a just - post-Napoleonic Wars peace for Europe. Metternich's need for stability for his central European polyglot empire against liberal and nationalist ambitions that threatened it no less than its neighbors and reional adversaries, Russia, Prussia, or the Ottomans could or than France did. But he did so quite masterfully by inducing in them the sense of "legitimacy"; that rule - and back then it was monarchal - should should be accepted and that revolutionary powers - often in the form of nationalist and liberal thinking - in Italy, Greece, and France needed to be contained or extinguised for fear of another Jacobite revolution.

But the best chapters are probably the first 20% of the book, where Metternich feigned alliance with Napoleon (in order to survive and avoid war), only to set him up with Russia and Britain so that he could be defeated. (Perhaps there is a lesson there for President Zelensky in Ukraine? The goal of successful diplomacy is stability and the avoidance of war, not necessarily justice.)

Good read, albeit a bit dense-packed.

[J.A.A. Purves · Rating 5 out of 5]

I never expected it, but this book is a page turner. It's a story of chess and risk with real world high stakes, involving unpredictable, egotistical, and temperamental characters who can be the difference between saving and losing the lives of thousands. And then, amidst the human follies, blunders, and crusades of various world leaders, Kissinger tells the story of two diplomats who understand, to differing degrees in different circumstances, how to strategically maneuver so as to arrange for order and peace under impossible circumstances with impossible rulers in a war-torn Europe threatened by one of the greatest military commanders in all of world history.

To Kissinger's credit, this isn't a story of Machiavellian manipulation by amoral cynics treating the world map like a game. Instead, Kissinger explains the moral aspirations of both Castlereagh and Metternich, and how they learned even to restrain their own worst tendencies in order to accomplish objectives that served the common good, both of Europe and of their own countries. That's not the sort of story from history that is easy to find. This book should be a must read, and then a must re-read, for any diplomat, statesman, world leader, business leader, military leader, judge, lawyer, chess player, psychologist, therapist, board member, negotiator, or any other professional who has to act within a sphere of contending and competitive powers.

[Edward · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kissinger may be an arsehole, the jury is out there, but this book is a work of genius.

I rank this book higher than Kissinger's Diplomacy, popularly considered to be his magnum opus, for two reasons. First, it's got more diplomacy going on than Diplomacy. Second, Kissinger's grasp of the events leading up to the Congress of Vienna, the period of the Congress, the motivations and ambitions of the leading actors, and the overall analysis is masterful. I have read this book twice: the first time I was impressed by the personalities and workings of Metternich and Castlereagh, while the second time I was impressed by the details of negotiations, negotiating tactics, diplomatic conducts, and the diplomatic manouevres in general.

It is obvious that Metternich is Kissinger's hero, but anyone who reads this account would more or less agree that Metternich was a diplomat par excellence. My impressions of him, prior to the reading of this book, was that of an aristocratic reactionary, but he comes out of this book as a cosmopolitan determined to preserve the European order. The stern and austere Castlereagh, on the other hand, was equally influential, but his circumstances always seemed to work against him, like a character out of a Greek tragedy.

I am certain that I shall continue to re-read this book, simply because of the interesting and intricate story it covers.

[Dan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Po tej lekturze nie mogę wyjść z podziwu dla kunsztu autora, jego dociekliwości i analitycznego podejścia. Wnioski jakie wysnuwa na podstawie dokumentów i faktów historycznych są uniwersalną lekcją.
Nie sposób przejść obojętnie i bez tęsknoty za kulturą, szacunkiem i porządkiem czasów, które Meternich - główny bohater chciał uratować. Jak bardzo przydaliby się ówcześni cześć mężowie stanu dzisiaj.
Mimo wszystko ich rozwiązania nie były idealne, tak jak i wizja Austrii, która już nie miała racji bytu. Wynikiem kurczowego trzymania się dawnego świata były dwie kolejne wojny światowe.
Dla mnie osobiście była to nie lada gratka czytać o tym jaką grę toczyły mocarstwa, zwłaszcza to, w którego granicach znajdowała się Polska, która jak zawsze była i jest geopolitycznym języczkiem u wagi. Dzięki tej książce możemy również w obecnych czasach wysnuć wiele wniosków dla stabilności państwa polskiego i zrozumieć historię dziejącą się na naszych oczach. Możemy też odsiać czcze obietnice i tłumaczenia polityków z każdego kraju.
Książka pozwoliła mi wczuć się w klimat klasycznej, poukładanej, wolnej Austrii, której wynikiem była austriacka szkoła ekonomii. Tak bliska memu sercu i tak potrzebna światu dzisiaj.

[Citrus]

"Things which ought to be taken for granted lose their force when they emerge in the form of arbitrary pronouncements.” My brother in hell you would do well to follow the words of the titular hero you are quoting 😭😭 Instead theorems are put forth clearly with an eye on sounding snappily prescient for a post-WW2 audience, and rigidly overfitted as such.

Lamenting the asserted limitations of Metternich, Kissinger writes that statesmen "must be judged not only by their actions but also by their conception of alternatives."...

Those statesmen who have achieved final greatness did not do so through resignation, however well founded. It was given to them not only to maintain the perfection of order, but to have the strength to contemplate chaos, there to find material for fresh creation.

In hastening to cloak all analysis in an air of inevitability and finality, by fixating on fitting all post-1812 events within a granular framework stamped with the Kissinger name, he himself abandons the courage and optimism professed.

A deservedly prestigious doctoral thesis clearly written with a mindset of one being interviewed and vetted for prestigious advisory roles, gotta respect the hustle.

[Zubayir Kazi · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was Kissinger’s PhD thesis at Harvard published in 1954, and outlines a theory of international relations based on the balance of power model, (which it does contrast with other conceptions) in the historical context of restoring order after the disruption created by Napoleon, primarily conceding the period between 1812-1822 in the near the middle of which, was the Congress of Vienna.

This balance of power model is where the notion of limited war came from and in the context of the Cold War, and what was formally known as containment (eg. Korea, Vietnam etc.), (perhaps arguably), was in maintenance of broader balance of power.

The book itself is largely strictly historical analysis of pre established facts. (As it says in Walter Isaacson’s Biography of Kissinger, it does not do much for original data).

Furthermore, if this book is enjoyed, then one ought to read ‘Diplomacy’ as it extends the general ideas, (realpolitik v. Wilsonian idealism, which are the two main conceptions with which he is centrally concerned), to prior and following historical events (Richelieu, Bismarck, Napoleon III, WWI and Versailles, Wilson, WWII, Cold War and Containment, Vietnam etc.)

[Richard Ripamonti · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bisects the Congress of Vienna and beyond to show the brilliance and shortcomings of the Concert of Nations as created by Castlereagh and legitimised by Metternich. Kissinger gets nuance where other historians have missed it. Instead of labelling the new International Order which followed the Napoleonic Wars as something which stifled liberty, Kissinger shows how Castlereagh's Congress system gave Europe the stability it needed to achieve actual social progress.

Great argumentation throughout, Kissinger is a great teacher on diplomacy not least because he is one of the 20th century's greatest statesmen himself.

[Eric Michels · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very interesting read with unique insights into the dynamics in play during a pivotal time for European affairs. The book is also a fascinating insight into the thinking of the person who was instrumental to U.S. diplomacy and international activity in the 1970's. For these reasons, I would have given it an even stronger recommendation but for a writing style that can be a bit difficult. While the writing is clear, it never really develops the flow that the best authors achieve, making it a bit of a slog at times. Kissinger also displays a tendency toward repetition, which further slows the reader. Overall still a good read.

[Ro452main · Rating 3 out of 5]

Livre très technique et érudit sur une période et des personnages très précis. Lire un livre de Kissinger, le goat des diplomates pour beaucoup, m’enthousiasmait initialement mais je pense que je ne suis pas culturellement assez développé pour comprendre un ouvrage universitaire si soutenu.

J’ai tout de même pris du plaisir à découvrir les fondements de la Sainte Alliance ainsi que les personnalités de Metternich (le goat du goat), Castelreagh ou Alexandre III ainsi que les rapports entre eux.
La chute de Napoléon et l’organisation de l’Europe actuelle sont l’héritage d’une période qui mérite plus d’intérêt de ma part à l’avenir

[Rajiv Chopra · Rating 2 out of 5]

I started this book with little hope, having been disappointed by the last two Kissinger books I read, and this book lived up to my low expectations. There is no doubt that Kissinger had deep knowledge of geopolitical strategy and how leaders behave in different situations.
However, in his writing, I find that he often leaves out inconvenient facts. In this book, however, he launched into the narrative without providing any context, which was confusing.
As a result, I found myself skipping through large sections of the book. No doubt there is much that I missed but, I did not wish to spend my time googling information to try and understand the book’s historical context.

[Jack Janzen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kissinger analyzes many of the diplomatic moves in the decade and a half after Napoleon with the focus on Metternich. The events during this period represent the first time a multinational governing body was attempted. It was a delicate balance that went on for a surprising length of time.

Sprinkled in the narrative are Kissinger's basic lessons of statesmanship and international relations. I would think this book would be required reading for anyone seriously wanting to enter the field of international relations.

[Sanjay Banerjee · Rating 5 out of 5]

An account of how the post-Napoleanic European order was created and the role played by the two Foreign Ministers of Austria and Britain apart from Tsar Alexander and others. A system created on the principle of balance of power and legitimacy to ensure stability from social upheavals led ultimately to a period of relative absence of war till almost the 1st World War (for almost 100 years).

[Jerry Landry · Rating 3 out of 5]

Definitely not for the casual reader. While it did provide some insight into Metternich, Castlereagh, and the European Conferences of the post-Napoleonic era, Kissinger did have a tendency to go on at times and add in numerous restatements of the same idea. If you're really interested in this period, it is worth a read, but just know that it can be rather verbose at times.

[Sefi Keller · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kissinger uses a historical example to draw deep conclusions about the nature of international relations and statesmanship. It's not the easiest to read due to overly complicated language, but it can be entertaining at times due to the colorful descriptions Kinnsinger uses.

[Prez · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very interesting to me, exactly the moment in history and the characters that I wanted to know more about. Kissinger's style clear and catchy. The only problem is level of political complication. Especially with audiobook - impossible to catch everything at first time.

[Joe · Rating 5 out of 5]

"The conservative in a revolutionary period is always somewhat of an anomaly."

An exceptional dissemination of both Metternich's artful diplomatic subtlety, and Castlereagh's championing of Continental co-operation.