Jin Xu's Empire of Silver is an interesting book that delves into the complex topic of China's financial history up to the Nationalist regime preceding Mao. It covers a fairly long period, from the bronze age to the mid-1940s. Most of the book is, nevertheless, spent on the Tang/Song, the Ming, and the Qing dynasties, ending with the post-Qing era of the republican and Nationalist regimes. While being previously steeped in Chinese history would be useful, it's not necessary. Xu does a great job relating events both to historical events in China and in Europe, and eventually the United States.
China was the first country to experiment with paper currency, and in that sense it was ahead of the curve. Why did a country that was the source of so many of western civilization's initial innovations fall behind? Xu argues that, despite innovation in the shape and nature of currency, China lacked the necessary political innovation to properly use paper money. As a result, the benefits turned into weaknesses, as unconstrained printing catalyzed by the constant fiscal needs of war led to inflation and, ultimately, regime-change.
For Xu, silver — historically, China's primary commodity standard — was not a source of strength, but a signal for its weakness. That is, Chinese society recurred back to the demand for silver when Chinese government abused its ability to print currency. Silver's relative stability was not a product of its inherent strength, but rather a result of the weakness in the balance between monetary centralization and the distribution of political power.
At the beginning of the book, there is an interesting foray into political philosophy that sets the stage for the rest of the narrative. Xu talks about libertarian small government, and there's an indirect or unsourced reference to Hoppe's (and other libertarian's) idea of monarchy being preferential due to low nominal taxation. She shows that China was, by that definition, a small government for most of its history. But, small government is not always good government. China was a small government because of lack of political innovation that disallowed scaling tax revenues through commercial stimulation (and taxation), and therefore China could not provide the legal framework of property rights protection that in the West gave rise to complex finance. And, if taxes were low nominally, they were not low in real terms — (a) there were hidden local taxes as a result of local corruption; (b) real incomes were lower than those in the West, and therefore the latter may have had higher taxes but these were less liable to strangle economic growth.
In fact, the lack of political sophistication and the necessary infrastructure to leverage higher tax revenues meant that China had to rely on inflation to pay for military expenses. These military expenses were dictated by the need to defend against northern nomadic tribes, as well as Japanese incursions into Korea in the 16th century and, finally, the critical defensive needs against the brutal Japanese invasion of China during the 1930s and 40s.
Xu contrasts Chinese fiscal financing to that developed by the Italian city-states of the 13th and 14th centuries. She notes that the latter could count on complex finance, namely public loans, that used larger tax revenues as collateral. The Chinese state did not have this type of fiscal power and that was not a source of strength, it did not lead China to economic prosperity, the reality was the exact opposite.
There is an interesting citation of Jesus Huerta de Soto in the "further reading" section of the book. Huerta de Soto is not cited in the bibliography, rather Hernando de Soto (The Mystery of Capital) is cited. Neither is Hayekian capital theory really referenced or used in the book, so I'm not sure if the reference to Huerta de Soto was a typographical error. That being said, there are undertones of Hayekian capital theory (although as someone who knows Hayekian capital theory it's much more likely that I am reading into it).
After the Mongolian Yuan dynasty, there is a retreat from paper currency. Government has lost trust as an issuer of money, and therefore there is a demand for silver. Why silver? It's about the relative value of commodities. The value of gold was too high, therefore the Chinese considered silver a better choice as the "parent" currency (for large transactions and clearance operations) to copper, which was used for everyday exchanges. This demand for silver increased its price in China, leading to a huge inflow of silver from Japan and, more importantly, the Americas after the Spanish conquest. The inflow of silver is associated with commercial prosperity in China. In the 19th century, as Western trade with China grows, these Western countries take affront to the outflow of silver from their markets into the Chinese market. This was driven by a trade imbalance; China did not buy foreign goods, but foreigners bought Chinese silk and tea. The Western solution was to capitalize on a growing opium addiction to buy Chinese silver, leading to a silver drain that the Chinese government could not end (even through a drug ban).
There is a similar period of inflow-outflow dynamics after the fall of the Qing dynasty. The shift away from bimetallism in the West to the gold-exchange standard led to a relative increase in the value of silver in China, and therefore a capital inflow of silver. This is associated with prosperity. In 1934, as governments in the Great Depression leave the gold-exchange standard, the United States passes an act to buy silver and stabilize the price of silver in the United States. The relative value of silver shifts in favor of the U.S. and there is a capital outflow of silver in China, leading to a monetary crisis that also aligns with growing defense spending needs as a result of Japanese encroachment in Manchuria.
Within these inflow-outflow dynamics there is an Austrian business cycle story. Xu doesn't really go into it, but given the single citation of Jesus Huerta de Soto one wonders whether this is the underlying assumption in her narrative.
Ultimately, Xu's book is not about monetary instability as a result of foreign exchange rates and the vacillations of metallic capital flows. Rather, her book is about how weak Chinese government was the underlying common factor behind its history of weak finance and monetary structure. All Chinese governments inevitably ran into large fiscal requirements as a result of war and national defense, but no Chinese government was able to develop the necessary political infrastructure to fund these through taxes and, ultimately, complex finance. Instead, it had to rely on inflation with the inevitable result of financial crisis and regime-change.
Empire of Silver covers more ground than what this review suggests. It's a serious multi-disciplinary economic history of China. The complexity is why this book could have been much longer. It doesn't really dive deep into why no Chinese regime, prior to the modern period, could develop a complex bureaucracy. There is some discussion of misaligned incentives, and there's the beginnings of a very interesting narrative, but it's not the main focus of the book. The narrative is that in the West political fragmentation led to competition, so some European governments (e.g. Spain) followed a Chine-esque trajectory, while metallic commodity-weak governments (e.g. England's) followed a different path toward industrialization. China, as a historically unified and centralized state, lacked this critical political competition that leads to political innovation. This is an area for further research, at least to the extent that we can draw parallels between Europe and Asia.
Overall, Xu does a great job introducing China's monetary history. It's a fairly quick read and the translation is good, except for a very small handful of editorial mistakes (typos).