What do you think?
Rate this book
Winning Independence: The Decisive Years of the Revolutionary War, 1778-1781
From celebrated historian John Ferling, the underexplored history of the second half of the Revolutionary War, when, after years of fighting, American independence seemed very nearly lost.
It was 1778, and the recent American victory at Saratoga had netted the U.S a powerful ally in France. Many, including General George Washington, presumed France's entrance into the war meant independence was just around the corner.
Meanwhile, having lost an entire army at Saratoga, Great Britain pivoted to a “southern strategy.” The army would henceforth seek to regain its southern colonies, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, a highly profitable segment of its pre-war American empire. Deep into 1780 Britain's new approach seemed headed for success as the U.S. economy collapsed and morale on the home front waned. By early 1781, Washington, and others, feared that France would drop out of the war if the Allies failed to score a decisive victory that year. Sir Henry Clinton, commander of Britain's army, thought “the rebellion is near its end.” Washington, who had been so optimistic in 1778, despaired: “I have almost ceased to hope.”
Winning Independence is the dramatic story of how and why Great Britain-so close to regaining several southern colonies and rendering the postwar United States a fatally weak nation ultimately failed to win the war. The book explores the choices and decisions made by Clinton and Washington, and others, that ultimately led the French and American allies to clinch the pivotal victory at Yorktown that at long last secured American independence.
It was 1778, and the recent American victory at Saratoga had netted the U.S a powerful ally in France. Many, including General George Washington, presumed France's entrance into the war meant independence was just around the corner.
Meanwhile, having lost an entire army at Saratoga, Great Britain pivoted to a “southern strategy.” The army would henceforth seek to regain its southern colonies, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, a highly profitable segment of its pre-war American empire. Deep into 1780 Britain's new approach seemed headed for success as the U.S. economy collapsed and morale on the home front waned. By early 1781, Washington, and others, feared that France would drop out of the war if the Allies failed to score a decisive victory that year. Sir Henry Clinton, commander of Britain's army, thought “the rebellion is near its end.” Washington, who had been so optimistic in 1778, despaired: “I have almost ceased to hope.”
Winning Independence is the dramatic story of how and why Great Britain-so close to regaining several southern colonies and rendering the postwar United States a fatally weak nation ultimately failed to win the war. The book explores the choices and decisions made by Clinton and Washington, and others, that ultimately led the French and American allies to clinch the pivotal victory at Yorktown that at long last secured American independence.
736 pages, Hardcover
First published May 11, 2021
67 people are currently reading
396 people want to read
About the author
John Ferling
22 books203 followersJohn E. Ferling is a professor emeritus of history at the University of West Georgia. A leading authority on American Revolutionary history, he is the author of several books, including "A Leap in the Dark: The Struggle to Create the American Republic", "Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence", and his most recent work, "The Ascent of George Washington: The Hidden Political Genius of an American Icon". He has appeared in television documentaries on PBS, the History Channel, C-SPAN Book TV, and the Learning Channel.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews
May 18, 2021
Clinton Acclaimed — The other side of the story!
Ferling’s thoughtful, well-documented, and well-written book focuses upon the British “Southern Strategy” (to retake South Carolina and Georgia) and the second half of the Revolutionary War. Showing much potential for success, the Southern Strategy was Lord George Germain’s idea. Unfortunately for Germain, the author blames him, George III, and Cornwallis for mucking up Clinton’s implementation. In the process, Ferling elevates Clinton from the Revolutionary War’s incompetent schmuck to the star-crossed hero on the wrong side of the Revolution. Giving example after example of Clinton’s talents as a strategist/planner and executive, Ferling succeeds admirably in more or less a “first of a kind” Clinton rehabilitation.
Washington
On the subject of George Washington, however, be prepared if you’re a big George Washington fan. The book is pretty much a downer for him as Ferling again shines a light on Washington’s warts, making up for the praise he gave him in some of his previous books. What could Washington do? Ingloriously block Clinton, only attacking when a win was possible and otherwise waiting out the war until the British gave up. Also, work in concert with the French, not crossing them or Congress to work as a loyal and trustworthy partner to engender (and not lose) further support. While Ferling gives supreme credit to Rochambeau for orchestrating Yorktown with DeGrasse, realize Washington didn’t speak French and didn’t have the same access as French Admiral DeGrasse as did Rochambeau, but did orchestrate the duplicity and secrecy that allowed the rebels to slip off to Yorktown without alerting the British, and to set up a logistical masterpiece of getting the troops to their destination.
Ferling gives General Charles Lee much credit as a strategist and criticizes Washington for not using him more. However, Lee was known to be a longstanding Washington critic and was non-responsive to Washington when asked to return men to Washington’s command for the eventual assault on Trenton, and became so careless that Lee found himself captured by the British. There was also suspicion that Lee possibly disclosed American plans to the British after his capture, with some hinting that he had continued working with them after his release.
P 27: “Washington unwisely opted to leave a bit more than three thousand Continentals garrisoned in Fort Washington, a post that overlooked the Hudson River in the rural northwestern reaches of Manhattan. It was an absurd decision.” But, according to Wikipedia: Washington had considered abandoning Fort Washington, but he was swayed by Nathanael Greene (Ferling's "master strategist," aside from Clinton and Rochambeau), who believed the fort could be held and that it was vital to do so. Greene argued that holding the fort would keep open communications across the river and might dissuade the British from attacking New Jersey. Magaw and Putnam concurred with Greene. Washington deferred to Greene and did not abandon the fort.”
P 40: “It was delusional to think that Howe could take Philadelphia and thereafter transport his army to Albany. The advance on Philadelphia would be a time-consuming undertaking, followed by a campaign certain to face worthy resistance by rebel defenders.” But Howe had expected to quickly march to Philadelphia, which would have allowed him to later help Burgoyne. It was Howe’s discovery that Washington was blocking his land march at Middlebrook Encampment that caused Howe to be delayed by having to take the sea route, leading to his later inability to rescue Burgoyne.
P 48: “Washington fibbed to Congress that the enemy had gotten across because of the poor intelligence he had received.” But, Ferling doesn’t say why Washington was fibbing.
P 95: “Despite the exaggerations of the two commanders, the engagement [Monmouth] was a standoff that had no immediate impact on the course of the war.” Well, except for proving to the rebels (and the British) that they could stand up and fight the British and especially for sending General Lee to his retirement!
P 98: Ferling touts an invasion of Canada as an attractive strategic option. However, Lafayette, to his credit, smoked out the suggested option as a ruse that would get him out of the way of supporting Washington, saddled with insufficient men and equipment to make the invasion successful. The idea was rightly abandoned to most everyone's satisfaction.
P 113: In pinpricking Washington’s reputation, Ferling doesn’t mention much of Gates and the Conway Cabal or Gates’ likely involvement in the Newburgh Conspiracy. This “cabal” so frustrated and embittered Washington that, contrary to Ferling’s intimations, he indicated that he would resign from the army if his performance continued to be brought into question: “Congress does not trust me. I cannot continue thus.”
P 290: Washington was not 27, as Ferling asserts, when he married Martha, but 26 (over six weeks short of 27). He was also likely not 6 four; tallest measurement of six feet 3 and ¾ inches only by Washington’s undertaker, when Washington’s feet were pointed downward. By my calculations, averaging a number of assessments throughout Washington’s life, he was six feet 2 and ¾ inches tall. As Ferling mentions, Washington was shorter than DeGrasse, who by some accounts was said to be six feet four inches (depends upon if larger than English-scale French measurements were used).
P 301: “Reports and letters aside, there is no evidence that Washington read anything other than an occasional newspaper.” Other historians have found that Washington frequently consulted his military books, and friends inundated him with political tracts, sermons, and newspapers. Quite possibly, he was also reading journals on architecture and agriculture to improve Mount Vernon., further prompting his estate improvement suggestions sent home to Lund Washington.
P 509: “So why did America win the war?” From his ordered list, Ferling seems to imply Washington is way down on the list of credits.
Between the two men and their mastery of the art of war, Ferling strongly tilts towards Clinton over Washington, especially in spectral linguistic nuances (e.g., me steadfast; you stubborn?). Along these lines, Ferling asserts Clinton was “not unscrupulous” for allowing rebel towns to be put to the torch, while Washington seems to suffer a stream of slams as “disingenuous,” “fibbing,” etc.
Cornwallis
P 368: Ferling reports Cornwallis purposely fired on his own men at Guilford Courthouse. Historians Babits and Howard and John R. Maass contend this was a myth created by not-quite-at-the-scene Lighthorse Harry Lee in his decades-later memoirs.
For clarification, while associated with Cornwallis’ plan to move to North Carolina, the battles of Kings (no apostrophe) Mountain and Cowpens were in South Carolina. The final battle of the foray, Guilford Courthouse, was in North Carolina.
Another Assessment: Cornwallis was upset that Clinton was not retiring to England, per Clinton’s previously expressed wishes, so that Cornwallis could not ascend in command.
Others
P 434: “Like Balfour, Rawdon was tall and strapping, but behind his back some limned him the ugliest man in England. That cruel and tasteless barb was unwarranted. Portraits by Joshua Reynolds and Thomas Gainsborough captured a figure who was plain rather than handsome, but not unsightly.” But portrait artists were not paid to make their patrons look ugly!
Note: Admiral Rodney shouldered some of the blame for not informing Clinton about DeGrasse’s progress. It should be pointed out that, due to the British Admiralty’s policy of rewarding admirals and captains with a percent of booty captured, Rodney was taking his time on St. Eustatius, also with expressed concern that the people were hiding wealth they would use to assist America. As well, he was plagued with severe prostate problems.
Note: Ferling mentions only the rebels and Tarleton (who would have ridden to Ferguson's aid at Kings Mountain had he not been stricken) as having problems with yellow fever. Ferling also says Phillips died of typhus; other reports say malaria. As many other Brits likely contracted yellow fever as well, it is strange that Ferling does not mention the role mosquitoes played in the American Revolution. One respected report says, “Reading the evidence in contemporary accounts, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the microbes [especially via mosquitoes] may have done more than the patriots to ensure an American victory.”
For those curious, the first (little known) Fort Lafayette was located at Verplank's point, across from Stony Point. Subsequent (one at a time) Fort Lafayettes were located in Pennsylvania and NYC.
Overall assessment
In conclusion, the book is a very worthy summary and recounting of the second half of the American Revolution, albeit, IMHO, with assertions sometimes hard to reconcile with conflicting accounts. Nevertheless, it effectively lays out the myriad pros and cons of the combatants’ strategic options. In doing so, Ferling makes a very substantial contribution to justifiably rehabilitating General Clinton’s reputation. Not to miss being mentioned, the maps and portraits Ferling provides are excellent. Bottom-line, I highly recommend this book!
Of possible interest: George Washington's Liberty Key: Mount Vernon's Bastille Key - the Mystery and Magic of Its Body, Mind, and Soul , a best-seller at Mount Vernon. “Character is Key for Liberty!” and
Strategy Pure and Simple: Essential Moves for Winning in Competition and Cooperation
Ferling’s thoughtful, well-documented, and well-written book focuses upon the British “Southern Strategy” (to retake South Carolina and Georgia) and the second half of the Revolutionary War. Showing much potential for success, the Southern Strategy was Lord George Germain’s idea. Unfortunately for Germain, the author blames him, George III, and Cornwallis for mucking up Clinton’s implementation. In the process, Ferling elevates Clinton from the Revolutionary War’s incompetent schmuck to the star-crossed hero on the wrong side of the Revolution. Giving example after example of Clinton’s talents as a strategist/planner and executive, Ferling succeeds admirably in more or less a “first of a kind” Clinton rehabilitation.
Washington
On the subject of George Washington, however, be prepared if you’re a big George Washington fan. The book is pretty much a downer for him as Ferling again shines a light on Washington’s warts, making up for the praise he gave him in some of his previous books. What could Washington do? Ingloriously block Clinton, only attacking when a win was possible and otherwise waiting out the war until the British gave up. Also, work in concert with the French, not crossing them or Congress to work as a loyal and trustworthy partner to engender (and not lose) further support. While Ferling gives supreme credit to Rochambeau for orchestrating Yorktown with DeGrasse, realize Washington didn’t speak French and didn’t have the same access as French Admiral DeGrasse as did Rochambeau, but did orchestrate the duplicity and secrecy that allowed the rebels to slip off to Yorktown without alerting the British, and to set up a logistical masterpiece of getting the troops to their destination.
Ferling gives General Charles Lee much credit as a strategist and criticizes Washington for not using him more. However, Lee was known to be a longstanding Washington critic and was non-responsive to Washington when asked to return men to Washington’s command for the eventual assault on Trenton, and became so careless that Lee found himself captured by the British. There was also suspicion that Lee possibly disclosed American plans to the British after his capture, with some hinting that he had continued working with them after his release.
P 27: “Washington unwisely opted to leave a bit more than three thousand Continentals garrisoned in Fort Washington, a post that overlooked the Hudson River in the rural northwestern reaches of Manhattan. It was an absurd decision.” But, according to Wikipedia: Washington had considered abandoning Fort Washington, but he was swayed by Nathanael Greene (Ferling's "master strategist," aside from Clinton and Rochambeau), who believed the fort could be held and that it was vital to do so. Greene argued that holding the fort would keep open communications across the river and might dissuade the British from attacking New Jersey. Magaw and Putnam concurred with Greene. Washington deferred to Greene and did not abandon the fort.”
P 40: “It was delusional to think that Howe could take Philadelphia and thereafter transport his army to Albany. The advance on Philadelphia would be a time-consuming undertaking, followed by a campaign certain to face worthy resistance by rebel defenders.” But Howe had expected to quickly march to Philadelphia, which would have allowed him to later help Burgoyne. It was Howe’s discovery that Washington was blocking his land march at Middlebrook Encampment that caused Howe to be delayed by having to take the sea route, leading to his later inability to rescue Burgoyne.
P 48: “Washington fibbed to Congress that the enemy had gotten across because of the poor intelligence he had received.” But, Ferling doesn’t say why Washington was fibbing.
P 95: “Despite the exaggerations of the two commanders, the engagement [Monmouth] was a standoff that had no immediate impact on the course of the war.” Well, except for proving to the rebels (and the British) that they could stand up and fight the British and especially for sending General Lee to his retirement!
P 98: Ferling touts an invasion of Canada as an attractive strategic option. However, Lafayette, to his credit, smoked out the suggested option as a ruse that would get him out of the way of supporting Washington, saddled with insufficient men and equipment to make the invasion successful. The idea was rightly abandoned to most everyone's satisfaction.
P 113: In pinpricking Washington’s reputation, Ferling doesn’t mention much of Gates and the Conway Cabal or Gates’ likely involvement in the Newburgh Conspiracy. This “cabal” so frustrated and embittered Washington that, contrary to Ferling’s intimations, he indicated that he would resign from the army if his performance continued to be brought into question: “Congress does not trust me. I cannot continue thus.”
P 290: Washington was not 27, as Ferling asserts, when he married Martha, but 26 (over six weeks short of 27). He was also likely not 6 four; tallest measurement of six feet 3 and ¾ inches only by Washington’s undertaker, when Washington’s feet were pointed downward. By my calculations, averaging a number of assessments throughout Washington’s life, he was six feet 2 and ¾ inches tall. As Ferling mentions, Washington was shorter than DeGrasse, who by some accounts was said to be six feet four inches (depends upon if larger than English-scale French measurements were used).
P 301: “Reports and letters aside, there is no evidence that Washington read anything other than an occasional newspaper.” Other historians have found that Washington frequently consulted his military books, and friends inundated him with political tracts, sermons, and newspapers. Quite possibly, he was also reading journals on architecture and agriculture to improve Mount Vernon., further prompting his estate improvement suggestions sent home to Lund Washington.
P 509: “So why did America win the war?” From his ordered list, Ferling seems to imply Washington is way down on the list of credits.
Between the two men and their mastery of the art of war, Ferling strongly tilts towards Clinton over Washington, especially in spectral linguistic nuances (e.g., me steadfast; you stubborn?). Along these lines, Ferling asserts Clinton was “not unscrupulous” for allowing rebel towns to be put to the torch, while Washington seems to suffer a stream of slams as “disingenuous,” “fibbing,” etc.
Cornwallis
P 368: Ferling reports Cornwallis purposely fired on his own men at Guilford Courthouse. Historians Babits and Howard and John R. Maass contend this was a myth created by not-quite-at-the-scene Lighthorse Harry Lee in his decades-later memoirs.
For clarification, while associated with Cornwallis’ plan to move to North Carolina, the battles of Kings (no apostrophe) Mountain and Cowpens were in South Carolina. The final battle of the foray, Guilford Courthouse, was in North Carolina.
Another Assessment: Cornwallis was upset that Clinton was not retiring to England, per Clinton’s previously expressed wishes, so that Cornwallis could not ascend in command.
Others
P 434: “Like Balfour, Rawdon was tall and strapping, but behind his back some limned him the ugliest man in England. That cruel and tasteless barb was unwarranted. Portraits by Joshua Reynolds and Thomas Gainsborough captured a figure who was plain rather than handsome, but not unsightly.” But portrait artists were not paid to make their patrons look ugly!
Note: Admiral Rodney shouldered some of the blame for not informing Clinton about DeGrasse’s progress. It should be pointed out that, due to the British Admiralty’s policy of rewarding admirals and captains with a percent of booty captured, Rodney was taking his time on St. Eustatius, also with expressed concern that the people were hiding wealth they would use to assist America. As well, he was plagued with severe prostate problems.
Note: Ferling mentions only the rebels and Tarleton (who would have ridden to Ferguson's aid at Kings Mountain had he not been stricken) as having problems with yellow fever. Ferling also says Phillips died of typhus; other reports say malaria. As many other Brits likely contracted yellow fever as well, it is strange that Ferling does not mention the role mosquitoes played in the American Revolution. One respected report says, “Reading the evidence in contemporary accounts, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the microbes [especially via mosquitoes] may have done more than the patriots to ensure an American victory.”
For those curious, the first (little known) Fort Lafayette was located at Verplank's point, across from Stony Point. Subsequent (one at a time) Fort Lafayettes were located in Pennsylvania and NYC.
Overall assessment
In conclusion, the book is a very worthy summary and recounting of the second half of the American Revolution, albeit, IMHO, with assertions sometimes hard to reconcile with conflicting accounts. Nevertheless, it effectively lays out the myriad pros and cons of the combatants’ strategic options. In doing so, Ferling makes a very substantial contribution to justifiably rehabilitating General Clinton’s reputation. Not to miss being mentioned, the maps and portraits Ferling provides are excellent. Bottom-line, I highly recommend this book!
Of possible interest: George Washington's Liberty Key: Mount Vernon's Bastille Key - the Mystery and Magic of Its Body, Mind, and Soul , a best-seller at Mount Vernon. “Character is Key for Liberty!” and
Strategy Pure and Simple: Essential Moves for Winning in Competition and Cooperation
October 31, 2022
An accessible, engaging and fast-paced work.
The book looks at why the Americans won the war against such tall odds, focusing on the war in the southern colonies and the decisions of British generals. Ferling blames George III, George Germain, and Cornwallis for the strategy’s failure, arguing that they did a bad job executing and supporting Clinton’s plans. He’s also critical of Washington and appreciative of Charles Lee. He does a good job comparing Washington’s and Clinton’s respective strategies. The coverage of France’s involvement is pretty thorough. There is more on Jefferson than I expected. The maps are good.
The narrative is dense but thoughtful. Ferling is sympathetic to Clinton, and much of the book is a reappraisal of his career (not everyone will find it persuasive, though) Clinton is often portrayed as indecisive, inactive, overly cautious, confused, and lacking in strategic vision. Ferling disputes these, arguing that Clinton was judicious, thoughtful, and a gifted strategist and tactician, and that he mostly responded to crises with energy and boldness, all while being hampered by the insubordination of Cornwallis and the meddling of the poorly informed George Germain. Ferling notes that much criticism of Clinton by historians is due to the “psychohistory craze of a bygone era, ” and that there isn't actually much documentary evidence regarding Clinton's private thoughts.
There’s a few nitpicks here and there. Ferling writes that Washington was 27 when he married (he was 26) He also writes that Washington didn’t read much other than newspapers here and there. Didn’t he learn a lot about military science, strategy, etc. by reading books? Ferling also writes that Cornwallis intentionally fired on his own men at Guilford Courthouse. This story comes from Henry Lee's memoirs, and remains disputed. There’s also some annoying typos.
A well-written and mostly well-researched work.
The book looks at why the Americans won the war against such tall odds, focusing on the war in the southern colonies and the decisions of British generals. Ferling blames George III, George Germain, and Cornwallis for the strategy’s failure, arguing that they did a bad job executing and supporting Clinton’s plans. He’s also critical of Washington and appreciative of Charles Lee. He does a good job comparing Washington’s and Clinton’s respective strategies. The coverage of France’s involvement is pretty thorough. There is more on Jefferson than I expected. The maps are good.
The narrative is dense but thoughtful. Ferling is sympathetic to Clinton, and much of the book is a reappraisal of his career (not everyone will find it persuasive, though) Clinton is often portrayed as indecisive, inactive, overly cautious, confused, and lacking in strategic vision. Ferling disputes these, arguing that Clinton was judicious, thoughtful, and a gifted strategist and tactician, and that he mostly responded to crises with energy and boldness, all while being hampered by the insubordination of Cornwallis and the meddling of the poorly informed George Germain. Ferling notes that much criticism of Clinton by historians is due to the “psychohistory craze of a bygone era, ” and that there isn't actually much documentary evidence regarding Clinton's private thoughts.
There’s a few nitpicks here and there. Ferling writes that Washington was 27 when he married (he was 26) He also writes that Washington didn’t read much other than newspapers here and there. Didn’t he learn a lot about military science, strategy, etc. by reading books? Ferling also writes that Cornwallis intentionally fired on his own men at Guilford Courthouse. This story comes from Henry Lee's memoirs, and remains disputed. There’s also some annoying typos.
A well-written and mostly well-researched work.
May 30, 2021
About time
This new history takes on a much covered topic and makes it fresh. By placing the emphasis on the tactics and strategies of the generals in the American Revolution, most notably Clinton and Washington, the author ably shows how was are won and lost: by mixture of boldness and caution, great Intel and lost information, luck and patience. Nobody here is a genius, and there are few fools. Everybody has a pretty good ego, and is usually willing to give a few ribs to keep that ego intact. Battles are often won by who has the better retreat. And yes, the battle for " hearts and minds" is two and and a half centuries old. And it is an excellent reminder that the enemy always had a vote on your plans.
While mentioned, I would have loved to understand more on how the American army kept improving, yet the British, notably Germaine remained stuck in preconceptions. With an expansion to more thoroughly cover pre-1778, this could serve as a text. But as is, it should serve as a great start to a better balanced view of this war.
This new history takes on a much covered topic and makes it fresh. By placing the emphasis on the tactics and strategies of the generals in the American Revolution, most notably Clinton and Washington, the author ably shows how was are won and lost: by mixture of boldness and caution, great Intel and lost information, luck and patience. Nobody here is a genius, and there are few fools. Everybody has a pretty good ego, and is usually willing to give a few ribs to keep that ego intact. Battles are often won by who has the better retreat. And yes, the battle for " hearts and minds" is two and and a half centuries old. And it is an excellent reminder that the enemy always had a vote on your plans.
While mentioned, I would have loved to understand more on how the American army kept improving, yet the British, notably Germaine remained stuck in preconceptions. With an expansion to more thoroughly cover pre-1778, this could serve as a text. But as is, it should serve as a great start to a better balanced view of this war.
April 28, 2021
An outstanding thesis that’s well written and extensively researched. A must read for fans of the American Revolution.
This was an ARC.
This was an ARC.
July 23, 2021
Absolutely outstanding military history of the Revolutionary war. Told from the perspective of the generals on each side it opened my eyes to how miraculous our independence was. I learned more from this one book than i ever knew about this lengthy struggle. The author points out the multiple times the British could have destroyed Washington's army and ended the revolution. He points out the massive interference from London which forced Gen Clinton into moves he did not want, and massively reduced his army. Further, were it not for French support, and the vagaries of intelligence, Yorktown might never have happened in spite of Cornwallis missteps. The book is a goldmine for anyone interested in this period. A final note, the British actually offered the colonists everything they wanted but independence in a peace plan, but by that time the French had joined in, and independence was the final objective. I cant rate this book highly enough.
April 4, 2023
Ferling is really good at this writing-history-of-the-Revolution thing. Here, he mostly tells a narrative that is very easy to follow and engaging. He makes a few main points. First, the war could've been lost and surely could've been only a partial victory with less than 13 states in the new union. He thinks people have been way too hard on Gen. Henry Clinton, whose caution Ferling argues has been overstated, and whose decisions as chief general were almost always sound, and his strategic overview very solid. He thinks Cornwallis was worse, making too many impulsive moves, most notably defying orders by moving his army into Virginia despite orders to the contrary telling him to secure the Carolines by staying there. Ferling singles out the generalship of Nathaniel Greene as the tipping point in the war.
It gets a little slow when talking about 1781 (which is nearly half of the book), but in the grand sweep I have no problems giving it five stars.
It gets a little slow when talking about 1781 (which is nearly half of the book), but in the grand sweep I have no problems giving it five stars.
May 14, 2021
Winning Independence is the book both for those of us who are looking beyond what was covered in our history classes and for anyone who wants a better and deeper presentation of the hows and whys of the US War of Independence. Most importantly, the reasons behind political and policy decisions, and the effort and the sheer amounts of skullduggery involved, are illustrated--France's decision to align and support the nascent United States doesn't spring from the seafoam; it is a calculated decision by France to out-maneuver the UK in an ongoing cold war as well as gain traction in the North American continent via political alliances.
Ferling's writing draws the reader in and keeps their interest with vivid descriptions. This is the book about the US War of Independence we wished we had in our history courses.
Ferling's writing draws the reader in and keeps their interest with vivid descriptions. This is the book about the US War of Independence we wished we had in our history courses.
May 12, 2021
FREE ARC from NET GALLEY, the PLACE for real READERS!!!!!!!!!!
Too many readers of history (like me) don;t think there is much new out there concerning the revolutionary war and that we are not going to learn anything new.
This author will be a pleasant surprise for you. Meticulously researched he brigs to life the opinions and thoughts of commanders on both sides enabling the reader to make their own tactical decisions.
Few of us have seen the southern campaigns which were critical in rebuilding the morale and faith of the fledgling army of the US and yet Ferling does a masterful job in doing just that.
Many will be surprised at how close Britain was to victory and yet failed to capitalized on seizing several southern colonies.
Well done!!
Too many readers of history (like me) don;t think there is much new out there concerning the revolutionary war and that we are not going to learn anything new.
This author will be a pleasant surprise for you. Meticulously researched he brigs to life the opinions and thoughts of commanders on both sides enabling the reader to make their own tactical decisions.
Few of us have seen the southern campaigns which were critical in rebuilding the morale and faith of the fledgling army of the US and yet Ferling does a masterful job in doing just that.
Many will be surprised at how close Britain was to victory and yet failed to capitalized on seizing several southern colonies.
Well done!!
October 20, 2021
Great read... filling in the gap of the last few years of the war..... mostly the Southern campaign and culminating in the close run thing of the Yorktown caper. Visiting son in Wmsbrg (and nearby Yorktown) caused me to want to know more about the details of this most fortunate set of events. Author does a great job summarizing the 1st few years of the war to get us off to real launching off point for the book ... 1778. Fair accounting of Washington and Clinton and a bit down on Cornwallis, but the author is quite convincing.
November 22, 2021
Excellent writing, fascinating subject with appropriate level of detail that helps the reader understand the actions of each actor. He removes some of the tarnish from Clinton's legacy, humbles Washington, elevates Greene and appropriately castigates Cornwallis and Germain. As with all historically significant campaigns, the 'could have beens' are numerous and for an American they can be quite disturbing to contemplate. The events that culminated in the seige of Yorktown provide an opportunity to admire luck or to believe in a divine national destiny.
February 1, 2022
A very interesting and detailed account of the pivotal moments of the revolutionary war, this book consistently kept me turning the page. I found the author to be incredibly critical of Washington, sometimes justified, sometimes not, as well as incredibly sympathetic to British General Clinton. Overall and engaging and thorough read.
July 21, 2021
A good history of the end of the revolution highlighting the successes and gafes on both sides. Could have used some better editing--there were misspellings and some grammatical snafus that made one pause and wonder.......
November 2, 2021
Long paragraphs but I learned a lot
Wordy at times but I learned a bunch of things so overall worthwhile. I liked the verbatim excerpts from letters the most.
Wordy at times but I learned a bunch of things so overall worthwhile. I liked the verbatim excerpts from letters the most.
December 4, 2021
Great book
Another great book by Ferling on the American revolution. Read this book after almost a miracle, you wii love then both.
Another great book by Ferling on the American revolution. Read this book after almost a miracle, you wii love then both.
June 25, 2022
Fantastic. As all of his books are that I have read.
Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews