Povestea banilor

Naked

by Charles Wheelan, Simona Drelciuc (trad.)

Folosim banii în fiecare zi. Cu toatea astea, obiceiul de a oferi bucăți de hârtie pentru a cumpăra bunuri și servicii pare, în fond, complet absurd. O bancnotă de 20 de dolari, de exemplu, nu valorează mai mult, ca simplă bucată de hârtie, decât banii folosiți în jocul de Monopoly. Cum se face astfel că 20 de dolari valorează de fapt 20 de dolari? Plecând de la această întrebare simplă, Charles Wheelan ne dezvăluie universul surprinzător de viu din spatele banilor și al sistemului bancar și ne oferă răspunsuri la multe alte dileme ale lumii financiare: De ce există bani de hârtie (sau monede fiduciare, ca să folosim un termen sofisticat) și de ce unele țări, precum Zimbabwe în anii ’90, au tipărit atât de mulți, încât au ajuns să fie folosiți ca hârtie igienică? Cum utilizează băncile centrale puterea de a crea bani pentru a gestiona crizele financiare? De ce mare parte din țările europene au aceeași monedă, iar acest lucru provoacă atât de multe probleme? Este Bitcoin soluția pentru toate aceste dispute? În Povestea banilor, Charles Wheelan ne arată cum ar trebui să funcționeze băncile și sistemul monetar, precum și efectele devastatoare pe care le pot avea asupra societății inflația, deflația, ilichiditatea și alte fenomene monetare.

Genres: Economics, Nonfiction, Finance, Business, History, Money, Audiobook

408 pages, Paperback

First published April 1, 2016

About the author

Charles Wheelan is a senior lecturer and policy fellow at the Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth College. He joined the Dartmouth faculty fulltime in June of 2012.

Wheelan’s most recent book, Naked Statistics: Stripping the Dread from the Data, was released by W.W. Norton in January of 2013. Three weeks later, it reached the New York Times bestseller list for hardback nonfiction. The San Francisco Chronicle called it a “brilliant, funny new book.” The New York Times described Wheelan as “the Dave Barry of the coin-flipping set.”

From 2004 to 2012, Wheelan was a senior lecturer in public policy at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago. He taught several courses on understanding the policy process for Master’s students. For the 2004-05 academic year, he was voted Professor of the Year in a Non-Core Course by the Harris School student body.

In the fall of 2005, Wheelan created and taught the inaugural International Policy Practicum (IPP), in which 12 students studied economic reform in India for an academic term followed by a 10-day trip to Bangalore and Delhi to meet with economists, politicians, educators, civic leaders, and other experts. Subsequent IPPs have visited Brazil; Jordan and Israel; Turkey; Cambodia; and Rwanda and Madagascar.

In March of 2009, Wheelan ran unsuccessfully for Congress as the representative from the Illinois 5th District in the special election to replace Rahm Emanuel. In its editorial assessing the race, the Chicago Sun-Times wrote, “Voters will find a ballot filled with impressive and thoughtful candidates . . . especially Charlie Wheelan, a University of Chicago lecturer who combines a razor-sharp mind with a boatload of charm and an impressive expertise in economics and foreign policy. We expect great things from Wheelan in the future.”

Prior to joining the faculty at the University of Chicago, Wheelan was Director of Policy and Communications for Chicago Metropolis 2020, a business-backed civic group promoting healthy regional growth in the Chicago area.

From 1997 to 2002, Wheelan was the Midwest correspondent for The Economist. His story on America’s burgeoning ex-convict population was the August 10, 2002, cover story. He has written freelance articles for the Chicago Tribune, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and other publications.

Wheelan’s first book, Naked Economics: Undressing the Dismal Science, was published by W.W. Norton & Company in 2002. The book, an accessible and entertaining introduction to economics for lay readers, was released in paperback in September 2003 and is now published in 13 languages, including Arabic and Hebrew. The Chicago Tribune described Naked Economics as “clear, concise, informative and (gasp) witty.”

In 2007, Naked Economics was selected by 360 Degrees of Reading as one of the 360 books that every college bound student should read, alongside authors ranging from Sophocles to Malcolm X. Naked Economics was also selected as one The 100 Best Business Books of All Time by 800-CEO-READ.

Wheelan is also the author of 10 ½ Things No Commencement Speaker Has Ever Said and An Introduction to Public Policy, a comprehensive textbook on public policy published by W.W. Norton in November of 2010.

Wheelan holds a Ph.D. in public policy from the University of Chicago, a Master’s in Public Affairs from Princeton University, and a B.A. from Dartmouth College. He lives in Chicago with his wife and three children.

Reviews

[Fatma Al Zahraa Yehia]

للأسف لم أستطع تخطي منتصف الكتاب، وذلك على الرغم من محاولات الكاتب الخلّاقة في قص أمثلة قد تُيسر الفهم لغير المتخصصين.
اجتهدت قدر إستطاعتي، ولكني وجدته جهداً بلا طائل.
أظنه يحتاج لقارئ لديه خلفية اقتصادية تُمكّنه من الفهم الحقيقي للكتاب.

[عبدالرحمن عقاب · Rating 5 out of 5]

‏"تشارلز ويلان" مبدعٌ في تبسيط الأفكار، وتقريبها لقارئه. بعد كتابيه (الاقتصاد ‏عاريًا) و(الإحصاء عاريًا) -ولمّا أقرأ الأخير بعد- يأتي الدور إلى "المال" في التعرية. ‏
يشرح "ويلان" في كتابه هذا قصّة المال وقضاياه. من الحاجة والفكرة إلى الطباعة ‏والشكل والنوع. ومن التضخّم والإنكماش إلى لعبة الأسعار والتسعير. ومن النقود ‏بشكلها الأوّل إلى المال المدعوم بالذهب ثمّ المال المفروض إلى البيتكوين. ومن ‏مؤامرات التلاعب بالنقود إلى واجبات البنوك المركزية وأدوارها وأدائها. ويختم في ‏جزئه الثاني بضرب الأمثلة العملية من الكساد الكبير في الثلاثينيات و مقدّمة ‏الكساد في 2008. كما يناقش العلاقة الاقتصادية المريبة بين الصين وأميركا، وفشل ‏اليابان الاقتصادي في خلق تضخّم، والمخاطر التي يقوم عليها اليورو! ‏
الكتاب ممتعٌ جدًا في أسلوبه، ومفيدٌ جدًا في مادته. وتلك طريقة "ويلان" في تناول ‏مواضيعه وضرب أمثلته. ‏
يميل الكاتب إلى الرأي الليبرالي بحكم انتمائه العلمي وقناعاته الرأسمالية، ويرفض ‏المال المدعوم (بالذهب مثلاً) لصالح المال المفروض(بسلطة الدولة والسوق). ‏
يفسّر الكتاب الكثير من ما نعايشه من آلامٍ اقتصادية في عالمنا المحكوم بأسواقهم، ‏كما يفسّر كثيرًا من مفاتيح القوّة الخفيّة لمؤسسات المال العالمية، ومحتكريه ‏الكبار. والتي تتجلّى في النهاية على أرض الواقع، على شكل سياسة وأخبار. ‏
ختامًا، يتحدث الكتاب عن الأدوار التي تلعبها البنوك المركزية ببراعة ومجازفات-‏أحيانًا- في السيطرة على أسعار صرف العملة، وحدود التضخّم واحتمالات ‏الإنكماش، والتي قد تصل أحيانًا رغم الدقّة والخبرة و"الاستقلالية" السياسية إلى ‏حدّ الكوارث الاقتصادية. وهنا يحقّ لنا التساؤل بقلقٍ عن ما يحدث وكيف يحدث ‏الأمر عندنا ؟ ‏

[Charles Haywood · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Naked Money,” by Charles Wheelan, has a primary goal and two secondary goals. The primary goal, admirably accomplished, is to simply, but not simplistically, explain monetary policy. One secondary goal, also well accomplished, is to defend fiat money against those who call for going back to a currency backed by gold or some other physical asset. The other secondary goal, less well accomplished, is to justify aggressive government action, in particular by central banks, to shore up the American financial system during the 2008 crisis.

Wheelan says this was a difficult book to write, and I believe him. I certainly struggle with understanding money and monetary policy. It is easy enough to say abstractly what money is, though even that is often attended with confusion. It is harder to precisely grasp how, especially in a world of fiat money that can be created or destroyed at will, money affects society, both the overall economy and individual lives. Of course, attempting to get too firm a grasp on economics concepts is a fool’s errand, since economics is not a science (despite frequent claims to the contrary), and trying to pin down a precise, linear answer to a specific question is often like grasping smoke. But Wheelan’s book occupies a middle ground—clearly explaining undisputed concepts, without making too broad claims for that knowledge.

Wheelan begins, in his Introduction, by clearly laying out the topics he intends to cover. He divides the book into two major parts: Part I covers “What It Is” (money, that is) and “Why It Matters.” Thus, Part I is focused on descriptions and economic analysis; Part II is focused on history through the lens of that analysis, coupled with recommendations for the future based on that history. Naturally enough, he begins by defining money, distinguishing it from cash and assets, and noting its traditional role as unit of account, store of value, and medium of exchange. He imparts interesting facts such as that prisoners in the federal prison system use foil packs of mackerel as money, ever since smoking was banned several years ago. Wheelan notes that “modern money depends on confidence,” as well as on social customs in a given location—thus, torn notes are accepted by people in the US, but not in India, even though the banks accept them equally in both places, and in Somalia, money issued by the defunct central government is still accepted as money. It is also here that he introduces his convincing objections to the gold standard, on which he expands in later chapters. And he points out that a suggested alternative, a currency backed by a basket of commodities, is in many ways exactly what we have now—after all, you can in fact exchange your money for those commodities, and what you receive for a set amount of dollars does not fluctuate much.

The next chapter covers inflation and deflation. This, like almost all of the book, consists of crystal clear exposition free of ideological cant. (Wheelan seems aligned with no particular school of economists; he says as much positive about Paul Krugman as Milton Friedman, though he says nothing about the Austrian School. Thus, the book is not at all a polemic, other than perhaps with respect to justifying government action in the 2008 crisis). Wheelan illustrates inflation and its impacts with, among other pithy examples, airline frequent flyer miles. Most importantly, to me at least, he gives a clear explanation of velocity and its impact on inflation, noting that it is poorly understood and impossible to use as a clear prediction or calculation device, which explains, perhaps, why I’ve never understood it (but I think I do now). Velocity at least in part explains why not all spending is equal; where the money ends up and how it is treated affects the economy as a whole. Finally, Wheelan notes that while mild, predictable inflation is beneficial for a variety of reasons high, unpredictable inflation is a disaster for most people. This topic anchors much of his discussion about central banking, along with its evil cousin, deflation.

Wheelan then turns to price calculation, including the CPI and its variants, and its effects. Here shows up, though, the only annoying part of this book, which is that literally way more than half of the quotes, cites and attributions in the book are to the “Economist” magazine. I am not exaggerating. It is almost like this book is an advertisement for the magazine (to which, as far as I know, Wheelan has no connection). Sure, the magazine has some clever phrases, but really, so does Wheelan, and the “Economist” is not some Nobel Prize-winning authority on economics, so the reader gets tired of references to it. Anyway, here Wheelan continues his argument that a country’s goal should be to achieve mild, predictable inflation, basically because it (falsely) makes everyone feel richer and better off (the “money illusion”), it prevents slipping into deflation, and it gives central banks more room to maneuver using simple mechanisms to affect the interest rate and money supply, rather than more aggressive “quantitative easing.”

Following this, Wheelan pivots to “Credit and Crashes.” He gives an excellent explanation of the mechanics of central banking, showing that the Federal Reserve’s main tasks are managing the money supply and acting as a lender of last resort. He discusses how open market operations work to affect the money supply, and therefore interest rates, as well as the mechanics of other tools such as reserve ratios for banks. Using “It’s a Wonderful Life,” he explains how financial crashes work, for banks or for the broader universe of financial firms—sometimes “people want their money now.” He distinguishes liquidity and solvency, such that a firm can be solvent but not adequately liquid—and in particular, how “In a crisis, illiquidity can turn into insolvency”—just like George Bailey’s bank would have become insolvent had depositors withdrawn their money (because banking means illiquid loans are made with theoretically liquid actual deposits, and fractional banking means loans exceed deposits, which is good when times are good and not so hot in a bank run). It is this possibility of insolvency, widespread across the system, that Wheelan fears would have occurred in 2008 absent government action.

Unfettered praise for such government action is my main problem with Wheelan’s book. Wheelan feels very strongly that central bank action, in the United States and abroad, saved the world in 2008. A threshold problem is definition—Wheelan doesn’t adequately distinguish between providing liquidity in the crisis, in order to prevent illiquidity from metastasizing into insolvency (like George Bailey), and the bailouts/handouts that characterized programs such as TARP and “cash for clunkers.” In fact, he deliberately conflates the two. The former, done through lowering interest rates and then further increasing the money supply through quantitative easing, certainly risked future harms, such as massive inflation, but did not directly reward bad actors and is a traditional central banking mechanism. TARP, on the other hand, was a new tool designed to address insolvency directly while benefiting the people, equity holders, who created the problem—as well as their friends in government. These two things are very different.

“Naked Money” tells us, again and again, that the entire globe would have come crashing down had the government not, through TARP, rescued firms that might become insolvent. We are told that Bernanke, advising Congress, “came in with Secretary Paulson and a couple of staff. They sat down, and without any sort of opening remarks, Chairman Bernanke simply said, “If Secretary Paulson doesn’t get what he’s asking for, and he doesn’t get it within seventy-two hours, the entire banking system of the United States will fail, and it will bring the world banking system down with it.” We are told that “Alistair Darling, British chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, has said ‘I think we came within hours of a collapse of the banking system.’” We are told that Darling’s staff told him “’Chancellor, we don’t know exactly how, but we think that there is a significant probability that every credit card in the world and every cash machine will stop working tomorrow.’”

Buried in that last quote is the reality—none of these people “knew exactly how.” More accurately, they were just guessing, in a self-interested way, where the actions demanded of the politicians would cost the bankers nothing and would hugely benefit them, whereas not acting had no possible upside to them, since no reward is given for good results following from inaction, and inaction might have easily saved the financial system but still wiped them and their friends’ assets out.

Wheelan endlessly compares the 2008 crisis to a fire, where to save the neighborhood we must also save the house of the fool who stored gasoline next to the furnace. But nowhere at all are we told why or how this parade of horribles would actually have happened—why the fire would have spread if not for TARP. We are assured, by way of a hypothetical rice merchant in a hypothetical village, that small individual businesses would have been “wiped out.” How is not explained, other than vague references to being unable to “get even a basic, well-collateralized loan to keep his business running.” But most small businesses do not need loans (and usually cannot get loans). The reality is that if Goldman Sachs went bankrupt, and its equity holders were vaporized, the firm’s assets would still have had the same value, just under new ownership, and there is no reason that liquidity for normal-course business loans would have dried up, for long if at all.

Instead of vaporizing the equity holders, though, Congress, as demanded by Treasury and the Fed, handed them unlimited money and absorbed their bad assets so they did not have to deal with the consequences of their actions. If Goldman had been declared bankrupt, new investors (say, Warren Buffett) could just have assumed ownership of Goldman’s assets, and continued its profitable lending activities, while those who invested in now worthless assets took the consequences on the chin, sold their houses in the Hamptons to meet their personal debts, then moved to Des Moines to work at Target. Sure, there would likely have been a variety of short term disruptions to society and operating businesses. But Wheelan adduces no evidence or arguments that they would have been particularly dramatic or long term. He only give us hysterical conclusions made by people with massive personal conflicts of interest, demanding action by bankers and political leaders with their own massive personal conflicts of interest, to use the money and resources of the people at large to insulate risk takers from the consequences of their risk taking and allow them to keep their rich rewards. We should not forget that Paulson’s TARP proposal, which as we saw above he demanded be accepted right now by Congress, or else, included such gems as “Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court of law or any administrative agency.” Congress didn’t bite on that, but the gall is literally unbelievable, and gives a window into the Master of the Universe thinking of men such as Paulson (that is not a compliment). Yes, Wheelan sees clearly, and fully admits, the moral hazard to future decision making resulting from the bailouts. But he ignores the moral hazards confronting the government in its 2008 decision making, and, more importantly, the overwhelming conflicts of interest.

The reality is that no liquidation of financial firm equity holders would actually have destroyed value. Any value destruction had already occurred. So what if this “was an old-fashioned financial panic,” where “firms and institutional investors were demanding their cash back from financial firms like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Citibank, and the other names you’ve seen in the news.”? After all, the first two disappeared and their assets were redistributed. So what? Why not do that to everyone?

It’s not just me who thinks along these lines. Take, for example, Luigi Zingales, professor at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business (which Wheelan loves, since he keeps citing its professors as authorities, and also it’s my own business school, so I agree with Wheelan on that) and author of “A Capitalism For The People.” He says, criticizing the bailouts, “The problem is that people who have spent their entire lives in finance have an understandable tendency to think that the interests of their industry and the interests of the country always coincide. When Treasury Secretary Paulson went to Congress in the fall of 2008 arguing that the world as we know it would end if Congress did not approve the $700 billion bailout, he was serious. And to an extent he was right: his world—the world he lived and worked in—would have ended had there not been a bailout. Goldman Sachs would have gone bankrupt, and the repercussions for everyone he knew would have been enormous. But Henry Paulson’s world is not the world in most Americans live in or even the world in which the economy as a whole exists.” Zingales also notes that all decision-makers only were able to obtain information and advice from the same insular group of people, creating self-reinforcing groupthink.

In fact, Wheelan himself notes that now “Dodd-Frank requires institutions to create a ‘living will,’ which is a hypothetical bankruptcy plan showing that the institution can collapse without bringing down the rest of the financial system.” It’s pretty obvious, at least to someone not in bed with Goldman Sachs, that if this is possible now, it would have been equally possible to create a bankruptcy plan on the fly for Goldman Sachs (and other institutions) in 2008. After all, that’s what bankruptcy is for—to wipe out equity holders and replace them with new owners who will run things better. In fact, many normal course bankruptcies are done in great haste. Wheelan claims that “Bernanke reckoned . . . there was no orderly process for allowing a handful of giant troubled firms to go bankrupt in a way that would not cause the rest of the system to unravel.” Maybe. But more likely, as Zingales said, is that the cushy, insular world of Bernanke and Paulson would have unraveled, and the system would have done just fine, even in the short term—and it was that prospect of his world unraveling that, magically, made Bernanke unable to see an alternative orderly process for bankruptcy.

Wheelan makes a great deal of the role of a central bank as a lender of last resort, and claims this was the role of the Fed in the crisis. But if the central bank does that, and it’s necessary (a somewhat different question than TARP as executed, but closely related) why can’t it lend in exchange for equity, wiping out the guilty and then reselling the equity to new owners? That’s how many prepackaged bankruptcies are structured. Or, as Paul Krugman suggested, equity capital could be provided to the banks directly in exchange for preferred stock, again harming common equity holders without affecting the broader financial markets. Or why couldn’t Congress place a 100% tax on equity held by stockholders in firms accepting last-resort lending, say, above a value held of $100,000? Or, as Zingales suggested at the time, we could add a new section to the bankruptcy code to simply and easily convert bank debt to equity, diluting existing equity holders involuntarily. Instead, the government simply absorbed bad assets and left the existing, responsible equity holders with the benefits of their bad acts. Why?

I’ll tell you why (my background as a lawyer is largely in this world, as is my M.B.A. education, and I could probably pretty easily have worked for Goldman had I chosen to do so). The reason is because a tight, insular clique of people who all basically know each other, view the world the same way, and have parallel financial motives and incentives, made all the decisions and received all the benefit. If Ben Bernanke had wiped out equity holders, he wouldn’t have been invited to all the right parties, and his friends would have cut him off. How terrible. Much better that the little American get screwed, both now and in the future as a result of moral hazard not having any consequences. All you need to know, really, is that the man chosen to administer the 2008 TARP bailout, Neel Kashkari, was a 2002 Wharton M.B.A. (before which he was an engineer), whose only job in school and thereafter was working for Goldman Sachs, until he went to Treasury in 2006, as the hand-picked aide to the Secretary of the Treasury, Paulson. Paulson, of course, also worked for Goldman his whole life, including as CEO and chairman, and held hundreds of millions of dollars in Goldman stock until the instant he became Secretary. Paulson (surprise, surprise) brought along numerous other Goldman employees—I bet every single person in Paulson’s meeting with Congress referred to above was a former Goldman employee. And Paulson actually also hired Goldman to be his formal external advisors. To nobody’s surprise, after his TARP work, Kashkari then got a job with the investment firm Pimco, where his performance was miserable but his compensation was not. Again to nobody’s surprise, as the “New York Times” noted, “Pimco’s publicly stated strategy [during the TARP program] was to invest money in areas that would benefit from the government’s rescue efforts.” It’s almost like it’s all a nasty little circle where those outside the charmed group are milked for the benefit of the in-group. Certainly, by Ockham’s Razor (or its debased modern usage), that’s the most likely explanation. True, I’m picking on Goldman. Although it is the worst offender with the smartest people, the problem is, of course, much more widespread (though confined to a relatively small world and group of people). But Goldman is the ringleader and one should always begin with monsters by chopping off their heads.

Wheelan ignores all this. (He also, in passing and without explanation, rejects that lenient government policy toward Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or forced lending by banks to bad credit risks as the result of the Community Reinvestment Act, had any significant role.) Moreover, by not distinguishing liquidity increases from TARP bailouts, he fails to make clear that TARP was not technically a central bank action at all. It was a Congressional action—one dictated to the people’s representatives by self-interested central bankers, screaming that the sky was falling. Furthermore, that TARP supposedly, in the long run, made a small profit is meaningless. First, it’s probably false, since that’s a self-interested government calculation where lying would involve no penalty at all and the benefits to the liars are immense. Second, any profit does not alleviate the structural and moral defects of the program. All of this passes by Wheelan in silence, doubtless with Wheelan absentmindedly rubbing the head of his brass statute of Bernanke for good luck in the future.

[Review finishees as first comment.]

[Ahmed Hussein Shaheen · Rating 5 out of 5]

كتاب صعب مقارنة بكتاب الاقتصاد عاريا ولكنه مفيد جدًا حيث يتحدث عن المال والعديد من القضايا المتعلقة به
أكثر ما اعجبني هو حديثه عن ربط العملات بالذهب وعن عدم فعالية هذا الربط
كتاب مهم

[Eimantas · Rating 3 out of 5]

Keynesian economics in a nutshell. I admire the authors attempt to present both sides of the argument, but mostly, the book turned out to be 100% orthodox with limited presentation of contrarian views.

The current monetary policy is still a colossal experiment best summarized in the final chapter with a line "we're going to figure that one out."

Other than that, I liked the explanations from the viewpoint of current policymakers. It's truly educational and eye-opening, and it's definitely not all sunshine and rainbows out there. People are trying to do their best.

However, I don't believe in radical government interventions, and "trust the FED" narrative just doesn't do it for me.

Tl;Dr: Good educational resource on the current state of finance but a poor representation of it's broader implications and alternative views.

[Mehrsa · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great nutshell economic history, but not much discussion about the debates about all of these things. It's billed as an explanation, but many of these principles are hotly contested and are by no means settled principles. But it's still worth a read.

[Jon Swartz · Rating 4 out of 5]

Surprisingly enjoyable book on monetary policy. I still can't get a handle on exchange rates, but I understand much better the role of a central banking system and why moving back to the gold standard is silly/unworkable.

Unfortunately lost this (physically) about 3/4 the way through... :( Might grab from the library and finish at a future date

[Youghourta · Rating 5 out of 5]

كتاب يتحدّث عن المال وعن خباياه، وعن آليات عمله. كتاب يأخذ في رحلة مُمتعة لسبر أغوار عالم كنت تعتقد بأنك تعلم عنه ما يكفي لاعتقادك بأنه مجال بسيط لا يملك أي عمق، وستخرج بعد الفراغ من قراءة الكتاب – أو على الأقل هذا ما حدث معي- بأنك تجهل أكثر مما كنت تتصوّر، لكن على الأقل ستكوّن فكرة عن الأفكار التي تجهلها، أو كما يُسمّيها دونالد رامسفيلد "المجاهيل المعروفة".

صراحة يصعب تلخيص كتاب مثل هذا الكتاب، ليس للكم الهائل من المعلومات الذي يحتويه فحسب، بل لكثرة تعقيد الموضوع، ولصعوبة فهمه (رغم البساطة التي قد يبدو عليها)، إضافة إلى صعوبة التّحقق من الفهم الصحيح لها، تبيّن الحقائق من الآراء، ومُحاولة فهم الأمور من جانب مُحايد وليس من جانب كاتب أمريكي مُقيم في أمريكا ينظر إلى الأمر من زاوية الأمريكي الذي يكترث لمصالح بلده بشكل أساسي (سأعود إلى هذه النقطة لاحقًا).

مجموعة من الأفكار الأساسية التي وردت (حسب فهمي لها) في الكتاب (قد لا تكون المعلومات في السطور التالية صحيحة أو دقيقة بشكل أساسي، حيث أنني لا أتحكم بشكل جيّد في الموضوع الذي يُعالجه هذا الكتاب):
• لكي نُطلق على أي "أمر" ما وصف "المال" فإنه يجب أن يحمل على الأقل المواصفات التالية: يصلح كوحدة قياس، يُحافظ على القيمة ويُسهّل التّبادل، وعليه فإنه يُمكن إطلاق وصف "المال" على ما يُستخدم للتبادل التجاري داخل السجون الأمريكية، فكان السّجناء الأمريكيون يستخدمون السجائر كعملة داخلية، وبعد أن مُنع التّدخين فيها أصبح المساجين يتبادلون السلع والخدمات مُقابل علب الأسماك المُصبّرة
• ما يُعطي للمال قيمته هو الثقة التي يضعها المُستخدمون فيه، فعلى سبيل المثال سيقبل منك أي أمريكي أية عملية ورقية رسمية (الدولار الأمريكي) حتى ولو قصّيت صورة الشخصية التي فيها أو كتبت عليها، مادام تظهر على الورقة النقدية الرقمان التسلسليان الخاصان بها، لأن الأمريكي يثق بأنه ما دام الرقمان حاضران فإنه بإمكانه استبدال تلك الورقة النقدية في أي بنك، في حين لو قدّمت لهندي ورقة نقدية مُمزّقة (مثلما يحدث في الجزائر مع بعض القطع النقدية التي أصابها تشوّه) فإنه لن يقبلها منك، رغم أن القانون الهندي ينصّ على نفس ما ينص عليه القانون الأمريكي فيما يخص الرقمين التّسلسليين.
في المقابل فإنه في الصومال وبعد انهيار الحكومة المركزية هناك، لا يزال الصوماليون يتبادلون بعملتها رغم أنه لا وجود ل"راعٍ رسمي لها" (الحكومة المركزية)، بل وحتى أن بعض العملات الورقية المُزوّرة بإتقان تُقبل كوسيلة للتبادل.
• الكاتب يؤكّد على أن ليس من الحِكمة إطلاق عملات في الورق الراهن تكون مقترنة بشكل مُباشر بالذّهب، حيث يُشير إلى أنه كان السبب الرئيسي وراء الكساد الكبير الذي عرفه الاقتصاد الأمريكي في ثلاثينيات القرن السابق. يشير الكاتب أنه للتحكم في الوضع الاقتصادي ولامتلاك القدرة على إنعاش الاقتصاد بعد كساده فإنه ينبغي للبنوك المركزية أن تمتلك آليات للتحكم في أسعار الفائدة وفي الكتلة النقدية المتوفرة في السوق. إن كانت العملة مُرتبطة بشكل مُباشر بالذهب (الكمية المُتوفّرة منه) فإنه سيستحيل طباعة/ضخ المزيد من العملة في السوق للتأثير عليه. كما أن توفر أية كميات إضافية مُعتبرة من المعدن النفيس سيؤثر بشكل كبير على الأسعار والتّضخّم، مثلم�� حدث في الفترة التي اكتشف فيها الأوروبيون العالم الجديد، حيث أنه وبعد أن جلبوا كمّيات مُعتبرة من الذهب معهم إلى أوروبا، حدث تضخم في الأسعار بشكل مُعتبر (كمية المال المُتوفّرة لشراء السلع أكبر بكثير من السابق دون نمو فعلي للاقتصاد، وبالتالي ارتفعت أسعار المُنتجات لتتوافق مع ذلك . وعليه فإنه وحسب الكاتب أي اقتصاد تكون عملته الرئيسية مرتبطة بالذهب بشكل مُباشر هو اقتصاد مُعرّض للأزمات الاقتصادية التي ما تلبث أن تعصف به إن لم يُفكّك الارتباط ما بين عملة البلد وقيمة الذهب، مثلما فعلت أمريكا للخروج من أزمتها الاقتصادية الكبيرة (الكساد الكبير)، حيث لم يعد ال��ُواطن الأمريكي قادرًا على استبدال الدولار بالذهب في فترة أولى، قبل أن يقضي الرئيس الأمريكي ريتشارد نيكسون سنة 1971 على ما تبقى من ارتباط، حيث ألغى إمكانية تحويل باقي الدول الدولار إلى ذهب (كان مُمكنا إلى غاية ذلك الإعلان). هذه النقطة بالذات دفعتني إلى أن التشكيك بشكل ما في الفكرة التي يُحاول الكاتب إيصالها (عدم جدوى الرجوع إلى معيار الذهب في العملات)، فما أشار إليه هو صحيح وفعّال من وجهة نظر الاقتصاد العالمي، لكن هل هو صحيح من وجهة نظر باقي الاقتصادات العالمية؟ لا أملك إجابة على هذا السؤال بعد.
• حسب الكتاب، التّضخم شر لا بد منه، بل ويُمكن القول بأنه لا وجود لحركة اقتصادية دون تضخّم. يُشير الكتاب إلى أن البنوك المركزية والحكومات يجب أن لا تسعى إلى القضاء على التضخم بشكل كامل، بقدر ما يجب عليها استهداف تضخم يُمكن التحكم فيه (ما بين 1 إلى 3 بالمئة)، حيث أنه وفي حالة وقوع اقتصاد تلك الدولة في أزمة اقتصادية، فإنه يُمكن للبنك المركزي التأثير على سعر الفائدة (السعر الذي يُعير به البنك المركزي الأموال للبنوك التجارية) سلبًا، مما سيدفع تلك البنوك للاقتراض وتمويل العجلة الاقتصادية من جديد. سيكون بإمكان البنك المركزي إعارة البنوك بفائدة 1 بالمئة مثلا إن كانت نسبة التضخم هي 3 بالمئة (يعني سيكون "سعرًا" مُغريًا) لكن لن يكون في يد البنك المركزي أية حلول لو كانت نسبة التضخم 0، فلن تستطيع بكل بساطة أن تُعير أموالها بسعر فائدة سلبي (-1 بالمئة مثلًا).
• فكرة جانبية خلصت إليها بعد قراءتي لبعض فصول الكتاب، قد لا تكون صحيحة وقد لا تكون مقصودة من الكتاب: بحكم أن التضخم شر لا بد منه، وبحكم أن جميع الاقتصادات العالمية تعرف نسبًا مُتفاوتة منه، فإن أية قروض آجلة (سداها بعد سنوات) تكون نسبة الفائدة فيها أقل من نسبة التضخم، هو أشبه باستعارة مبلغ مُعين من المال (100 دولار مثلا) وإرجاع مبلغ أقل منه (98 دولار) خلال 5 سنوات إن لم يعرف الاقتصاد أي تضخّم. هل يعني ذلك لا وجود لما يُسمى بالقروض الربوية إن كانت نسبة الفائدة أدنى من نسبة التّضخّم؟ (أو ربما مفهوم الربى ينطبق على المعادن النفيسة فقط؟).
مثال عملي لتوضيح الفكرة. لنفرض وجود عملة قيمة الواحدة منها تُعادل قيمة غرام من الذهب الآن. إن أقرضتك 100 وحدة الآن على شرط أن تُرجع لي المبلغ العام القادم، ولنفرض أنني أقرضتك المبلغ بفائدة قدرها 5 بالمئة (يعني يجب أن ترجع لي 105 وحدة) ولنفرض أن العملة تعرف تضخما قدره 10 بالمئة. والمبلغ الذي سترجعه لي (105 وحدة) سيمكنني من شراء 94.5 غرام من الذهب فقط (سترجع لي 105 وحدة لكنها فقط 10 بالمئة من قيمتها)، أي أقل من الذهب التي كان بإمكاني شراءه العام الماضي لو لم أقرضك ذلك المال.
• بحكم أن معيار الذهب ليس معيارًا عمليا حسب الكاتب، فكيف يُمكن لنا معرفة القيمة الحقيقية لكل عملة مُقابل العملات الأخرى؟ يشير الكاتب إلى وجوب ربط العملة بسلة من المنتجات الأساسية ومعرفة مقدار العملة اللازمة للحصول على نفس السلة في بلدان مُختلفة. فعلى سبيل المثال يعتمد بعض الاقتصاديين على معيار بيج ماك إندكس، والذي يقارن سعر وجبة بيج ماك من ماكدونالدز في مُختلف البلدان، حيث تحتوي الوجبة على مكونات أساسية مُختلفة (الحبوب، اللحم، …) ويُمكن معرفة ما إذا كانت سعر عملة ما مُضخّما أومنكمشًا مقارنة بعملات أخرى اعتمادًا على هذا المعيار.

لم تكن هذه سوى بعض من الأفكار الأساسية في الكتاب (الكتاب يحتوي على كم كبير من المعلومات). أنصح الجميع بقراءة هذا الكتاب أكثر من مرة، وأنصحك بتدوين ملاحظات لدى قراءتك له.

[Mike · Rating 3 out of 5]

Probably 4 stars for the layperson, I get a lot of exposure to monetary policy at work. That said, author does a fine job explaining fiat money, prices/inflation, central banks, and exchange rates. His explanation of the Great Depression (France hoarded gold while the US had tight monetary policy, causing an artificial shortage of reserves) includes the example of George Bailey in "It's a Wonderful Life" which is quite relevant and accurate. In the US, there wasn't enough currency to go around, and as a result businesses, people, and even governments accepted scrip (IOUs) or even common goods.

The segment on the 2008 financial crisis is strong and succinct. It is worth borrowing this book for that segment alone, and calls out how Fed Chair Bernanke had a background in the mistakes made during the depression, which guided him to make sure the Fed was ready to lend to anyone (except Lehman, I guess).

My main takeaway was that central banks have a "trilemma":
1. Make the economy open to international flows of capital, allowing citizens to diversify and foreign investment to come in.
2. Use monetary policy to help stabilize the economy, using interest rates and the money supply to prod or slow the economy.
3. Maintain stability in the exchange rate.

Central banks can't get all 3, so trade offs must be made.

[Anna · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent. This is not a personal finance book, but rather a deeply informative book about what money is and how it works, what banks are and how they work and what happens when they stop working; it even goes a little bit into why that happens. This naturally includes a lot of difficult concepts such as inflation, deflation, central banking (i.e. The Fed), Bitcoin and etc. which are explained in a fun, humorous, easy to understand way, without an obvious political bias and with a positive outlook that didn't leave me cowering in fear about the future, but without downplaying the serious issues the world faces in the future such as the precarious situation between China and the U.S.

[Jovi Ene · Rating 3 out of 5]

”Povestea banilor” nu este o poveste istorică (așa cum am situa volumul în funcție de colecția din care face parte), ci un manual destul de tehnic despre economie, monedă, bani și instrumente financiare. Sigur, autorul oferă aproape 200 de pagini despre ”Ce sunt banii”, dar analiza lui este în mare parte adresată specialiștilor sau celor care vor să se specializeze în domeniul economic. Noi, ”profanii”, vom descoperi informații noi, vom înțelege unele procese, ne vom hlizi alături de autor atunci când încearcă să folosească umorul și ne vom îmbogăți cultura generală cu privire la Marea criză economică, moneda euro, inflația și deflația sau felul în care am supraviețuit crizei mondiale din 2008.

[Libby C · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not as good as Naked Economics, but well researched nonetheless. The first half was full of interesting examples I'd never heard of; the second a bit drier and more obvious.

Learned a lot of fun facts, including: there are people who try to measure how much better products get year over year to more accurately calculate inflation! E.g. this TV is now 4% better; its price also went up 4%. Thus there was no inflation on it.

[Dorin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Să citesc despre bani, inflație, dobânzi, crize economice într-un moment în care inflația a trecut de 10%, fără ca guvernanții să dea vreun semn că ar fi capabili să stabilizeze și amelioreze situația, a fost o experiență cam deprimantă.

Cartea mi-a explicat destul de bine niște concepte esențiale, care ne reglează viața și comportamentele, dar care rămâneau undeva, inaccesibile, învăluite în mister. Wheelan are talentul de a explica și povesti, deși, aici, am observat că încearcă să comprime prea multe concepte pentru mintea unui ne(slab)inițiat

Mai pe scurt, we are fucked. Sistemul se va regla, cumva, singur sau ajutat, asta e partea bună. Partea rea e că sistemul nu ține cont de cei mici.

Traducerea este foarte bună.

[Joseph Hoehne · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is not a get-rich-quick book. It’s a book about money - not wealth.

Have you ever wondered about inflation, deflation, the federal reserve, financial crises (including the recession in 2008)? Then this book is for you.

It’s fun. It’s witty. It’s concrete and easy to understand. It’s most of all just a great read.

I ended up following Ben Bernanke and the Federal Reserve on Twitter because of this book. It’s because I can see how interesting money is and what role it plays in our modern lives.

[Meredith · Rating 5 out of 5]

I really enjoyed the monetary theory and policy class that I took in college, so picked this book to stay sharp on my econ skills. It was just what I was looking for! Charles Wheelan either reinforced or expanded on pretty much everything I learned in that class. For a book on essentially textbook concepts, this book did not read like a textbook. Wheelan does an excellent job illustrating examples, breaking down concepts, and sprinkling in jokes. I think (and he mentions it too) that monetary policy is generally misunderstood by “Main Street”, but this book serves to break down any barriers. I highly recommend this book for anyone looking to better understand monetary policy!

[Sahar Samhan · Rating 5 out of 5]

بعد قرائتي ل كتاب الاقتصاد كما اشرحة لابنتي الذي يعد مدخل مبسط الى علم الاقتصاد يأتي كتاب المال عاريا بلغه اقتصاديه عاريه ليشرح كل ماهو مهم وأساسي في الثقافة المالية بكل ما تحويه من نظم و مؤسسات اقتصادية وسياسية، كتاب ممتاز

[Chloe · Rating 5 out of 5]

Absolutely phenomenal! I loved Naked Statistics so much that I decided to read this book by the same author, Naked Money: A Revealing Look at Our Financial System. A great overview of modern macroeconomics, global trade, and the impact of major financial crises on today's world. Among other topics, the book covers the 2008 global financial meltdown, the euro crisis and the unique Japan situation, including recent Abenomics policies. A must read to "speak" money and understand the essence of monetary and fiscal policies.

A humorous note from the book, attributed to Warren Buffet:

"[Gold] gets dug out of the ground in Africa, or someplace. Then we melt it down, dig another hole, bury it again and pay people to stand around guarding it [in the vaults of the Federal Reserve Bank of NY]. It has no utility."

[Jon Kiefer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great overview of monetary policy with many real life examples

[Xiaodan Sun · Rating 5 out of 5]

Good structure and organization and the author is very good at explaining complicated things in a simple way.

[Ana-Maria Voloc · Rating 4 out of 5]

Banii ne însoțesc în toate tranzacțiile noastre de zi cu zi, indiferent că preferăm forma lor fizică (bancnotele de polimer, în cazul în care vorbim despre leii românești) sau pe cea electronică (atunci când folosim mijloacele de plată fără numerar). O gestiune eficientă a banilor implică și câteva cunoștințe elementare de educație financiară, precum și o bună înțelegere a economiei moderne, la baza căreia stau băncile comerciale, băncile centrale și… banii.

Acest instrument de plată nu are o valoare intrinsecă (este doar o bucată de hârtie sau plastic), însă toți îl folosim cu încredere atunci când vrem să cumpărăm bunuri sau servicii. De ce? Pentru că autoritatea monetară care l-a emis îl declară ca fiind monedă oficială. În plus, banii trebuie să îndeplinească trei funcții: unitate de cont – adică să putem stabili valoarea lucrurilor raportându-ne la ei; mijloc de tezuarizare – dacă ne hotărâm să-i economisim, să avem siguranța că puterea noastră de cumpărare va rămâne aproximativ aceeași (evident, ea va fi influențată de inflație sau deflație, dar măcar orientativ, vom ști că valoarea respectivului depozit nu se va schimba semnificativ în timp) și mijloc de schimb – pentru a achiziționa bunuri sau servicii.

Dacă tot am adus vorba mai devreme despre inflație, adică creșterea prețurilor, acest fenomen pe care băncile centrale încearcă să-l țină sub control, vă voi spune că Charles Wheelan ne prezintă pe larg cum ajung banii să se deprecieze, propunându-ne ca studiu de caz hiperinflația din Zimbabwe din 2008, când s-a tipărit bancnota cu cea mai mare valoare din istorie – 100 de trilioane de dolari. Autorul ne atrage, însă, atenția că deflația este mult mai puțin dezirabilă pentru o economie, după cum a dovedit-o Japonia la începutul anilor ’90. În momentul în care prețurile scad, la fel se întâmplă și cu veniturile și activele noastre, dar nu și cu datoriile. O rată la bancă va rămâne la fel. Facturile – de asemenea. Efectul? Credite neperformante, bănci falimentare, decădere financiară, șomaj.

Cum putem evita aceste scenarii sumbre pentru orice economie? În primul rând, învățând din greșelile trecutului. Autorul ne prezintă măsurile luate de către Rezerva Federală a Statelor Unite ale Americii ca reacție la criza din 2008 și cum a reușit să evite erorile făcute în anii ’30. Apoi, încercând să înțelegem fenomenele economice și care sunt premisele pentru a avea o dezvoltare sănătoasă și durabilă a societății. Nu în ultimul rând, cunoscând cum funcționează băncile și sistemul monetar, devenind mai educați din punct de vedere financiar și mai atenți la semnalele pe care le transmite banca centrală:
"… pentru că sistemul care vă pune o bancnotă de 20 de dolari în buzunar facilitează în același timp și toate celelalte activități economice de care ne pasă".

[George Odera · Rating 4 out of 5]

Glad to have finally completed Charles Wheelan's trilogy of nakedness (Naked Economics, Naked Statistics, and Naked Money). As with the first two, Wheelan displays his unique ability of writing about esoteric and abstract topics in comprehensible and readable form. Naked Money explains various topics in the financial system: the nature of money, inflation and deflation, financial panics and crashes, foreign exchange rates, contemporary affairs in banking and finance, monetary policy, and cryptocurrencies. The book employs a good mix of anecdotes and dry humour making an otherwise not so enjoyable subject quite enjoyable.

I was most impressed by the book's compelling case against my libertarian predilection for a return to the gold standard. However, I give it a 4 rather than 5 because I don't agree with some other of the author's views. Wheelan comes off as a monetary dove, favouring a central banks' intervensionist approach to the economy at the expense of high inflation. Also, his approval of the Fed's response to the 2008 financial crisis is a bit too hagiographic when the ultimate effects of quantitative easing are yet to be seen. Further, he does not address the grievances that libertarians and members of the Tea Party raise about the Fed's role in the steep fall of the dollar's purchasing power since it's inception in 1913.

Well written overall. Greatly educative.

[Otajon · Rating 5 out of 5]

Charles Wheelan, in "Naked Money", explains complex economic processes in a clear and accessible way, focusing on monetary systems, central banks, and financial markets. The author explores the history of money, the impact of inflation and deflation, the mechanisms behind currency exchange rates, and the causes of global financial crises.

I found the chapters on the 2008 financial crisis particularly interesting, along with the analysis of the Federal Reserve’s decisions during that time. As a fan of Ben Bernanke, I was especially engaged in the discussion of his strategy during this challenging period. Wheelan also conducted interviews with Ben Bernanke and Paul Volcker—both former Federal Reserve chairs who played key roles in U.S. monetary policy.

A separate section of the book is dedicated to digital money and cryptocurrencies. The author explains their role in the modern economy, the potential risks they pose, and why Bitcoin, despite its popularity, will never replace the U.S. dollar as a fiat currency.

Overall, "Naked Money" is an accessible yet informative introduction to the world of finance, making it a great read for both beginners and those looking to consolidate their knowledge.

[Bugzmanov · Rating 5 out of 5]

I'm blown away by quality of "Naked ..." book series. This is a the second book I've read and it's amazing. These books are "for dummies", but they are not dumbed-down.
I've never really understood the role of fed reserve and was mostly just aware of conspiracy theories around it ("It's not fed and it's not reserve"), so for me reading this book was instant level up in understanding.
Despite the fact that the book does cover fundamentals and first principles, it's noticeably biased towards US. That being said the chapters on EURO, Japan and China was super interesting and eye opening. I do remember hearing about Greek-German crisis, China owning US and Japan's decades of stagnation in the news, but never did I understood the root cause of this, until i read the book. It was a wild ride.
And the chapter with critic of bitcoin was remarkable. All the points are common knowledge in 2023, but the guy did it in 2015 using first principles when the hype was growing. It deserves respect.

Audio book format is pretty good for this one.

[Maya · Rating 4 out of 5]

I struggled to get into this book. I didn't enjoy it from the beginning, as I did Naked Economics, and considered abandoning it, but I'm glad I didn't! I learned so much about money, currency, banking, central banks and the Fed specifically. I have a much better understanding and greater appreciation for all these topics now. I enjoyed the second half much more (with specifics about the US, Japan, China and the Eurozone) than the first half (general knowledge about currency, banks, central banks), but of course you can't understand the second half without the foundation of the first half.

I really appreciated how the author understood the challenging task of making these topics readable and understandable. He constantly gave relatable examples and repeated those a lot - and this is one book where repetition is a huge plus! I also appreciated his references to pop culture and little jokes sprinkled throughout - I actually laughed out loud a few times.

Overall, if someone is trying to understand the topics discussed in the book, I would definitely recommend it!

[Michael L · Rating 4 out of 5]

Wheelan describes the history of money, the role of banks, and the importance of monetary policy, both in the United States and around the world. He devotes special attention to the financial crisis of 2008 and to the duties of the central bank--in the U.S., the Federal Reserve Bank. He explains why deflation is bad, and why China and the U.S. have a co-dependent relationship. The writing is irreverent. For example, to illustrate the lax rules for real estate lending in the early 2000s, Wheelan reports that his dog was pre-approved for a mortgage. This book would benefit the general reader who is not already well informed about monetary policy.

[Doa'a Ali · Rating 4 out of 5]

كتاب ممتاز يعطي خلفية راسخة عن موضوع المال بكل ما يحوي من بنوك ونظم وقوانين اقتصادية، تقلبات الاقتصاد ومحاولة استخراج تعليمات مفيدة لتجنب الكوارث الاقتصادية... ملخصات سريعة عن الدول الاكثر بروبزا وتأثيرها في الاقتصاد العالمي وأهم محطات تاريخ الاقتصاد..
انصح به بشدة

[Kevin Keating · Rating 5 out of 5]

Really good book. Explains some difficult concepts more easily than elsewhere. Still can't figure out the bitcoin stuff, but it gave it a shot. Good information as recently as 2018. I'll read his other stuff. Has a good sense of humor.

[Daryl · Rating 5 out of 5]

4.5, easy and fun read if you've had exposure to economics. Great analogies spaced throughout the book helped to reenforce core ideas (a great way to learn fwiw). I'll be trying another in this series soon!

[Tanmoy · Rating 5 out of 5]

A deeper look into the worlds monetary systems. Gives an understanding of how money and currently works across economies and factors influencing it.
Most common people do not understand the working machinery behind currency and its value. Its a good start for them.

[Michael Compton · Rating 5 out of 5]

I guess the highest compliment you can pay this author is that he makes government monetary policy understandable, interesting and sometimes even fun. Wheelen has a good sense of what his readers may want out of this book, and he delivers it in an engaging, conversational style. There may be an excess of corny jokes, but it doesn't detract (too much) from the seriousness of the subject.