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Deadly Vices
Gabriele Taylor presents a philosophical investigation of the "ordinary" vices traditionally seen as "death to the soul": sloth, envy, avarice, pride, anger, lust, and gluttony. This complements recent work by moral philosophers on virtue, and opens up the neglected topic of the vices for further study. While in a mild form the vices may be ordinary and common failings, Deadly Vices makes the case that for those wholly in their grip they are fatally destructive, preventing the flourishing of the self and of a worthwhile life. An agent therefore has a powerful reason to avoid such states and dispositions and rather to cultivate those virtues that counteract a deadly vice.
In dealing with individual vices, their impact on the self, and their interrelation, Deadly Vices offers a unified account of the vices that not only encompasses the healing virtues but also engages with issues in the philosophy of mind as well as in moral philosophy, and shows the connection between them. Literary examples are used to highlight central features of individual vices and set them in context.
In dealing with individual vices, their impact on the self, and their interrelation, Deadly Vices offers a unified account of the vices that not only encompasses the healing virtues but also engages with issues in the philosophy of mind as well as in moral philosophy, and shows the connection between them. Literary examples are used to highlight central features of individual vices and set them in context.
- GenresPhilosophy
163 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2006
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
September 2, 2022
I did not get much from this book, but, to be charitable, this has probably more to do with the kind of philosophy I do appreciate than with the book itself. I have little patience for most philosophy outside of analytic (including proto-analytic, if that's a word) and pre-modern philosophy (from Ancient to Medieval), and this is neither. Taylor's approach is perhaps the most eclectic I have ever seen. In addition to the modern classics of virtue ethics (Foot, MacIntyre, Hursthouse, Shklar) the index contains about two dozen references to Aquinas, eighteen to Kant, about a dozen each to Aristotle and Hume, and then at least one to Kierkegard, Kolnai, Machiavelli, Mill, Murdoch, Nagel, Nietzsche, Rawls, Reid, Sartre, Scheler, Schopenhauer, Scruton and Spinoza. This intellectual diversity might seem attractive to some, but I found it quite distracting. Indeed, the topic of the book, virtue ethics, it intimately connected to moral psychology, anthropology and metaethics. But, to take the three most frequently cited authors, Aquinas, Hume and Kant had extremely different positions on these topics, and I don't think their virtue ethics can be detached from these positions and made to complement one another in such a decontextualised fashion.
Second, the book contains a lot of psychologising, by which I mean descriptions of what the author thinks is going on in the heads of the people characterised by the "deadly vices" (and their subtypes) which she discusses. Unfortunately, she does that without any input from modern psychology or brain science, and chooses instead to focus on characters from various plays and novels (and even operas), which she proceeds to treat as a psychoanalyst would a patient. Much of the book is devoted to exemplars of the vices discussed, drawn from Shakespeare, Dante, Dickens, Balzac, Becket, Ibsen, Flaubert, Ibsen, Dostoevsky, Eliot, Proust, Molière and Sartre. Individual characters even have their own entries in the index. This may be a useful approach, but I am much more receptive to, say, arguments from evolutionary psychology. For instance, at one point (p132), Taylor criticises Kant's conception of love as "delight in the other's perfection", saying "Love is rarely so motivated. More plausibly it might be said that it is in the nature of love to ascribe to the other certain perfections. It is no doubt true that often, at least in personal love, the other's image is an idealized one and his or her value plain to the lover only". This is merely asserted, and not argued for. But from an evolutionary perspective, it is clear that we have evolved to respond to genuine qualities in our potential partners. Louise Perry's recent book on the failures of the sexual revolution, for instance, shows that women in particular are very discriminating as to the kinds of men they want to father their children (even if their good sense has been hijacked by the brainwashing of the sexual revolution.)
Third, the book is supposed to show that the so-called deadly vices (sloth, envy, avarice, pride, anger, lust and gluttony) "were correctly so named" (p1.) But because the author fails to specify her anthropology, it is not clear how literally this is meant to be taken and what exactly gets killed. In Catholicism, a deadly sin is one that kills the life of the soul, i.e. makes it fall from the state of grace to the state of mortal sin, out of which it can only rise through confession or perfect contrition, and which, if the person dies in it, will doom her to eternal damnation. This much I can understand, even if I don't think that was the teaching of either ancient Judaism or of the historical Jesus. But Taylor probably does not believe in a soul and she does not appear to be a Christian or even a theist (at one point, she writes that "Humility is understood as a specifically Christian virtue, concerned with the relation of human beings to a deity, and awareness of their insignificance from that point of view" p146- the expression "a deity" is telling.) So what does she mean exactly by the vices being "deadly"? Probably nothing more than that they are particularly serious, and more so than vices not on the list. But I don't remember her making any attempt to show why that list was definitive and exhaustive, and why other vices are not deserving to figure on it.
Interestingly, the Christian phrase is "deadly sins". But Taylor has chosen to replace it with "deadly vices", treating the two phrases as synonymous (the first sentence of chapter two talks of "the vices traditionally labelled 'deadly sins'" p13.) But a vice is a character trait, a pattern of behaviour, while a sin is an act. So the two phrases are obviously not synonymous.
Finally, I am not sure how carefully Taylor has read the philosophers she quotes (it's hard enough when you focus on just one, let alone two dozen.) For instance, she says of the "deadly vices" that traditionally, "their overall defect was said to consist in inadequate control of reason over the passions" (p13.) In support of this, she only quotes Thomas Aquinas: "vice is contrary to man's nature, insofar as it is contrary to reason". Obviously, there is a difference between what this quote says and what she makes it say.
So if you like an eclectic, decontextualised approach to ethics based on the great classics of fiction, and are not averse to armchair psychology, you might find this book to your liking. Indeed, Jean Porter (who is a much better philosopher than I am, because she is actually a philosopher) thinks that Taylor has a "very good discussion" of the intentionality of the appetites.
Second, the book contains a lot of psychologising, by which I mean descriptions of what the author thinks is going on in the heads of the people characterised by the "deadly vices" (and their subtypes) which she discusses. Unfortunately, she does that without any input from modern psychology or brain science, and chooses instead to focus on characters from various plays and novels (and even operas), which she proceeds to treat as a psychoanalyst would a patient. Much of the book is devoted to exemplars of the vices discussed, drawn from Shakespeare, Dante, Dickens, Balzac, Becket, Ibsen, Flaubert, Ibsen, Dostoevsky, Eliot, Proust, Molière and Sartre. Individual characters even have their own entries in the index. This may be a useful approach, but I am much more receptive to, say, arguments from evolutionary psychology. For instance, at one point (p132), Taylor criticises Kant's conception of love as "delight in the other's perfection", saying "Love is rarely so motivated. More plausibly it might be said that it is in the nature of love to ascribe to the other certain perfections. It is no doubt true that often, at least in personal love, the other's image is an idealized one and his or her value plain to the lover only". This is merely asserted, and not argued for. But from an evolutionary perspective, it is clear that we have evolved to respond to genuine qualities in our potential partners. Louise Perry's recent book on the failures of the sexual revolution, for instance, shows that women in particular are very discriminating as to the kinds of men they want to father their children (even if their good sense has been hijacked by the brainwashing of the sexual revolution.)
Third, the book is supposed to show that the so-called deadly vices (sloth, envy, avarice, pride, anger, lust and gluttony) "were correctly so named" (p1.) But because the author fails to specify her anthropology, it is not clear how literally this is meant to be taken and what exactly gets killed. In Catholicism, a deadly sin is one that kills the life of the soul, i.e. makes it fall from the state of grace to the state of mortal sin, out of which it can only rise through confession or perfect contrition, and which, if the person dies in it, will doom her to eternal damnation. This much I can understand, even if I don't think that was the teaching of either ancient Judaism or of the historical Jesus. But Taylor probably does not believe in a soul and she does not appear to be a Christian or even a theist (at one point, she writes that "Humility is understood as a specifically Christian virtue, concerned with the relation of human beings to a deity, and awareness of their insignificance from that point of view" p146- the expression "a deity" is telling.) So what does she mean exactly by the vices being "deadly"? Probably nothing more than that they are particularly serious, and more so than vices not on the list. But I don't remember her making any attempt to show why that list was definitive and exhaustive, and why other vices are not deserving to figure on it.
Interestingly, the Christian phrase is "deadly sins". But Taylor has chosen to replace it with "deadly vices", treating the two phrases as synonymous (the first sentence of chapter two talks of "the vices traditionally labelled 'deadly sins'" p13.) But a vice is a character trait, a pattern of behaviour, while a sin is an act. So the two phrases are obviously not synonymous.
Finally, I am not sure how carefully Taylor has read the philosophers she quotes (it's hard enough when you focus on just one, let alone two dozen.) For instance, she says of the "deadly vices" that traditionally, "their overall defect was said to consist in inadequate control of reason over the passions" (p13.) In support of this, she only quotes Thomas Aquinas: "vice is contrary to man's nature, insofar as it is contrary to reason". Obviously, there is a difference between what this quote says and what she makes it say.
So if you like an eclectic, decontextualised approach to ethics based on the great classics of fiction, and are not averse to armchair psychology, you might find this book to your liking. Indeed, Jean Porter (who is a much better philosopher than I am, because she is actually a philosopher) thinks that Taylor has a "very good discussion" of the intentionality of the appetites.
May 26, 2021
Ook bij herlezing blijft dit een van de allerbeste conceptuele studies in de deugdethiek, ook en vooral omdat Gabriele Taylor in debat gaat met alle relevante auteurs, klassiek en hedendaags, telkens to the point uitgebeend, toegepast op analyse van specifieke (on)deugden. Elke hoofdzonde (traagheid, jaloezie en hebzucht, hoogmoed en toorn, gulzigheid en wellust) wordt getypeerd vanuit een focus op de persoon wiens karakter geheel daarvan doortrokken is. Telkens toegelicht met treffende voorbeelden uit de wereldliteratuur. Blij dat ik een 2e hands kopie vond, want 15 jaar geleden was ik al onder de indruk van het UvA-exemplaar en onthutst dat dit boek toen zo onbekend was/is op de faculteit wijsbegeerte aldaar! Taylor had in Oxford en GB in 1985 al naam gemaakt met haar fantastische studie 'pride, shame and guilt, emotions of self-assessment'. Zo jammer dat zij tegen mijn advies in nooit uitgenodigd is voor de Spinoza leerstoel in Amsterdam. Dit boek bouwt voort op de inzichten van 1985 maar is veel lichtvoetiger geschreven. Beginnend met de relatief meest afwijkende ondeugd van de Traagheid/acedia/sloth, laat Taylor zien dat alle 7 traditionele hoofdzonden bovenal zonden tegen zichzelf zijn, waarbij zij (vooral in hoofdstuk 4) dat Zelf vooral als 'strong evaluator' a la C.Taylor, H.Frankfurt e.a. definieert, idaliter met zowel subjectieve als objectieve gerichtheid via 'engagement with the world'). De 7 klassieke ondeugden (superbia, avaritia, luxuria, invidia, gula, ira en acedia) zijn allereerst DEADLY en pas in afgeleide zin CAPITAL (other-regarding) sins, want zij leiden tot 'death to the soul'.
Het laatste (en naar mijn mening iets minder sterke) hoofdstuk probeert dan nog countervailing of 'self-healing' virtues te benoemen die het gecorrumpeerde zelf van elke hoofdzonde terug op de goede weg zou kunnen brengen: moed, gematigdheid, en vooral liefde zijn eigenlijk bij alle zeven dringend nodig.
Het laatste (en naar mijn mening iets minder sterke) hoofdstuk probeert dan nog countervailing of 'self-healing' virtues te benoemen die het gecorrumpeerde zelf van elke hoofdzonde terug op de goede weg zou kunnen brengen: moed, gematigdheid, en vooral liefde zijn eigenlijk bij alle zeven dringend nodig.
June 23, 2020
A different Sunday read: a book on developing a secular (& rational) account of why vices are a threat to the human soul. Was initially suspicious how going through ancient, medieval & modern philosophical accounts of vices would be rewarding. But Gabriele Taylor made it easy & interesting while successfully convincing me to reflect & pay serious attention to her own approach. 👌🏻
November 11, 2013
This is one of the main textbooks used when I was studying emotions in a graduate student exchange program in the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Our philosophy professor brought us through the whole book one chapter per week. I thank him for his excellent explanation of this book without which I wouldn't have fully appreciate its beauty. The core of this book is in chapter 4, "self and self-consciousness". The author has identified rightly the source of human sins - the awareness and propagation of the self. This book explores the 7 cardinal sins of man, differentiating them from one another before dissecting each into different sub-categories. (Our discussions on envy, lust and pride were the most memorable.)
Interestingly the consuming effects of these sins are actually "destructive to the self and prevent its flourishing." In that light, the book ends with an interesting take on "countervailing virtues", seeking to offset the vices and realise the self. Thus by doing so, it seeks to shed new light in the relatively new field of virtue ethics.
Interestingly the consuming effects of these sins are actually "destructive to the self and prevent its flourishing." In that light, the book ends with an interesting take on "countervailing virtues", seeking to offset the vices and realise the self. Thus by doing so, it seeks to shed new light in the relatively new field of virtue ethics.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews