How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict

by Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft

How do the weak defeat the strong? Ivan Arreguín-Toft argues that, although many factors affect asymmetric conflict outcomes (for example, the relative power of the actors, their weapons technology, and outside support), the interaction of each actor's strategy is the best explanation. Supporting his argument with combined statistical and comparative case study analysis, Arreguín-Toft's strategic interaction theory has implications not only for international relations theorists, but for policy makers grappling with interstate and civil wars, as well as terrorism.

Genres: Politics, History, Nonfiction, War, Military History

276 pages, Hardcover

First published December 1, 2004

Reviews

[Navneet Bhushan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Of the 43 asymmetric wars in the period 1950-1999, 51.2% wars have been won by the weaker actor. That the powerful will lose sometimes is in the nature of warfare, in general. However, they will lose in more than 50% of the times is difficult to explain especially in the established way of creating powerful military forces by nations with large populations and high economic resources. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, in his 2005 book, “How the weak win wars – a theory of asymmetric conflict”, analyses the data of asymmetric conflicts in the 200 years’ period from 1800 to 2003 and comes up with this startling trend of David’s have started winning more often than the Goliaths. The overall win percentage, sure enough, is still in favour of stronger, more powerful actors – they winning 71.5% of times. However, when he presents the data in 50-year time slots – the trend becomes increasingly stark and surprising. Consider this, for example, for the 34 asymmetrical conflicts from the year 1800 to 1849, the winning % of strong actors was 88.2%. For the period from 1850 to 1899 it reduced to 79.5% for 78 such conflicts that occurred in that half-century. For the first 50 years of 20th century, the world witnesses 43 asymmetrical conflicts, in those, the winning percentage of strong actors reduced to 65.1%.

This book has given a comprehensive analysis of asymmetric conflicts of past 200 years or so. Further Toft's strategic interaction hypothesis has been explained and verified by the data and analysis that he has.

In fact, it has led me to propose what I call Rapid Strategic Switch method for winning the asymmetric wars by the stronger players.

The article can be read at http://innovationcrafting.blogspot.in...

[Nick Lloyd · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's difficult in Social Science to craft an all-encompassing theory which is capable of explaining all or almost all events. The "closest thing to a law in IR" is Democratic Peace Theory, and even it has vulnerabilities which can be found with little probing. This is the framework through which we view Arreguin-Toft's book.

He asks the simple question: How can weak actors win wars against stronger ones? Traditional explanations include regime type ("democracies are incapable of winning asymmetric wars"), arms diffusion ("with modern weapons, they can even the odds"), interest asymmetry ("powerful states are not threatened by smaller ones, so they have less stake in the outcome"), and "social squeamishness" ("democratic constituencies don't want to fight barbarously"). Arreguin-Toft disassembles and dismisses each of these arguments, and creates his own. Strategic interaction between strong and weak states influences the outcome.

Through the case studies of Imperial Russia in the Caucuses, Britain in the Boer War, Italy in Ethiopia, the US in Vietnam, and the USSR in Afghanistan, we examine the strategic interaction of each side. When both sides fight the same way (conventional vs conventional; barbarism vs guerrilla), the stronger state will win. When the fighting is mixed (conventional vs guerrilla; barbarism vs conventional), the weaker state will win.

The logical conclusion of this argument is to believe that the United States and USSR should have resorted to barbarism in Vietnam and Afghanistan, respectively, in order to achieve victory. Arreguin-Toft addresses these cases, the latter of which runs counter to his theory. His final analysis describes how this is not necessarily the right move. "At best barbarism can be effective only as a military strategy: if the desired objective is long-term political control - e.g., nation-building, "peace" keeping, or other stability or transition missions - barbarism invariably backfires."

This is a book that should be required reading for diplomats, military officers, and Congressional representatives.

[Tim · Rating 2 out of 5]

I found this to be a very weak discussion and one that at times showed poor reasoning as well.

"How do the weak defeat the strong?" This is a flawed question from the start or at least the way the author handles it. Using only a subset of all possible wars and conflicts he tries to then create a theory that will answer the proposition. It's bad logic and it leaves me disheartened. I went into this book with such expectations. The possibilities of unbalanced situations. The possible game theory applications... but no.

There is a real topic to be discussed here but it just isn't handled well. Maybe it is too much of an academic's view, I don't know. But there is too much of a star-struck view of Andrew Mack's 1975 work and (even worse) the self-references to prior publications by the author of a couple years prior. If I write something now, I can then reference it as a fact later? I don't think so. To be one's own reference - short of a repeated lab experiment or formal proof - just strikes me as wrong and a bit desperate to have lots of references quoted. Really, do you need to source yourself? And for your own deductions or opinions?

I won't take the time to run down my list of counter-arguments but I will give a reference to where an easy start for some can be found. Check out "How Can Weak Powers Win?" by Yang Shaohua as published in Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, 2009, 335–371. I wouldn't say Yang has everything figured out but he definitely presents some valid and hard to argue counters to this book.

[Abdulrahman Tingari · Rating 3 out of 5]

قرات بالعربية وعنوان الكتاب كيف يكسب الضعفاء الحروب، الكاتب استخدم التحليلات واحصائيات عميقة في النزاعات بين الاطراف واستراتيجيات المستخدمة عند كل من طرفين قوي وضعيف في حروب.

[Peter Z.]

DNF @ 18%. If this were written into a different format it could be an interesting study of not just strategy, but tactics as well. As-is, the author's hypothesis is straightforward and most of the book is given to just applying the "rule" to a half-dozen conflicts. If one were satisfied to take the author's word for his research, the meat of this could be published in a pamphlet.

[Joshua · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this following up on the bibliography from Malcolm Gladwell's "David & Goliath". Although I'm not an international relations scholar (seemingly intended audience), I enjoyed the historical analyses, particularly of the South African Boer War and Russian intervention in Afghanistan.

[Reed Schwartz · Rating 3 out of 5]

Nothing I love more than a 2x2 matrix

[Adam Carrico · Rating 3 out of 5]

The theory of asymmetric combat that he develops is interesting and is well backed up to explain differences in the outcome of wars than the expectation.

The main problem I have is that the author implies this theory is sufficient to explain how strong actors lose conflicts, when it only explains a smaller subset of conflicts. In the appendix he lists ever case that he uses in the analysis, but most of the wars in which a strong actor lost were under same-approach strategic interactions. This theory doesn't explain those cases at all, leaving a large gap in the overall explanation for strong actors losing at a high rate.

That being said, the theory itself has merits on an individual case by case basis. Although it doesn't explain all variation, it does give a good explanation for conflicts that are under asymmetric conditions.

[Vladimir Kramskoy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Extremely well structured and logically divided on chapters and parts. Author hypothesis is presented first then followed by five cases of wars. Each of the five cases of asymmetric conflicts is examined to test author's theory as well as competing explanations on outcomes of asymmetric conflicts

[صادق جعفر · Rating 1 out of 5]

قرأت الكتاب بالترجمة العربية وهو بعنوان "كيف يكسب الضعفاء الحروب؟" فكرة الكتاب تبدو جيدة ولكن ترجمته العربية سيئة جداً. لا أنصح أحداً على الإطلاق بقرائته بالترجنة العربية.