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Under Beijing's Shadow: Southeast Asia's China Challenge
China’s rise and stepped-up involvement in Southeast Asia have prompted a blend of anticipation and unease among its smaller neighbors. The stunning growth of China has yanked up the region’s economies, but its militarization of the South China Sea and dam building on the Mekong River has nations wary about Beijing’s outsized ambitions. Southeast Asians long felt relatively secure, relying on the United States as a security hedge, but that confidence began to slip after the Trump administration launched a trade war with China and questioned the usefulness of traditional alliances. This compelling book provides a snapshot of ten countries in Southeast Asia by exploring their diverse experiences with China and how this impacts their perceptions of Beijing’s actions and its long-term political, economic, military, and “soft power” goals in the region.
608 pages, Kindle Edition
Published August 15, 2020
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September 4, 2020
According to recent surveys of Southeast Asia, China is now the most influential strategic and political power in the region. Yet China’s rise has been so rapid and consequential that few book-length studies have captured the complexity of Beijing’s expanding regional influence. The new book by Murray Hiebert of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Bower Group Asia, Under Beijing’s Shadow: Southeast Asia's China Challenge, fills this gap and shows in significant detail how Southeast Asian states are responding to China’s rise.
Given his decades working in the region as a foreign correspondent and political analyst, Hiebert is well-suited for this challenge, and the result offers valuable insights on issues related to Southeast Asia, China, and broader rivalries in the region. The book portrays a region riven by a diversity of views toward China; this diversity prevents any unified response to China’s growing influence over Southeast Asia. As Hiebert shows, Southeast Asian states are of two minds regarding China: on the one hand, they are deeply dependent on China’s rise for their own economic growth and keen to continue trade with Beijing. On the other hand, they are increasingly nervous about China’s growing economic, diplomatic, and military power, its more assertive diplomacy, and its willingness to use its might unilaterally to get its way in the South China Sea—and potentially other parts of the region as well.
Hiebert punctures several myths about the China-Southeast Asia relationship. For one, although media reports often portray mainland Southeast Asian states as close to China, or even as satellite states of Beijing, Hiebert offers a different view. He suggests, with considerably detailed country case studies, that mainland Southeast Asian states are not so easy to pigeonhole. China has constructed innumerable dams upstream on the Mekong, choking off much-needed water as countries down river face droughts as a result of climate change. At the same time, Chinese companies—in joint ventures with Southeast Asian corporations in Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia—are building massive hydropower projects on the lower Mekong, leading to increased salt water flooding and environmental degradation. These dams have badly damaged the Mekong’s flow and often stopped the seasonal flow of rich nutrients essential to the cultivation of rice and other crops, and the fish which feed the populations of Southeast Asia. In so doing, they have angered many residents of mainland Southeast Asian states, even though governments like Cambodia and Laos and Myanmar remain highly dependent on Chinese aid, investment, and diplomatic support.
Hiebert also gives ample coverage to the depth of nationalism within modern Myanmar, and how it is facile to say that Myanmar also has become some kind of satellite state of China. There is enormous resistance within Myanmar toward China’s proposed Myitsone Dam in Kachin State, which the previous government of President Thein Sein suspended in 2011 due to popular pressures. At the same time, China has covertly supported ethnic insurgents on Myanmar’s northern periphery, sometimes providing arms and munitions, a reality that has not gone unnoticed by Myanmar’s military, which views dependency on China as a “national emergency.”
In addition, Hiebert shows that Southeast Asian hedging strategies, playing for time and keeping their options open, provides some grounds for believing that the region will not be totally dominated by Beijing. The ambiguity of Southeast Asian loyalties means that Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states have not made up their minds to side with Beijing. Hiebert argues that many of these states—even Cambodia and Laos, which seem to have less leverage to resist China’s influence and cash—will continue to avoid making stark choices.
Malaysia also likely will continue to hedge. It has generally failed to respond to China’s provocations in the South China Sea or has done so quietly, believing that its “special relationship” would protect it from the bullying tactics to which China has subjected Vietnam and the Philippines. However, Hiebert notes Kuala Lumpur’s missile tests in July 2019, after China deployed a Coast Guard vessel near Luconia Shoal on Malaysia’s continental shelf. Later that year, Kuala Lumpur submitted claims to an extended continental shelf in that area to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. In fact, Hiebert’s account leaves open the possibility that Malaysia is standing up to China more often than it appears to outsiders.
Indonesian President Joko Widodo, or Jokowi, visited China four times during his first five years in office and has solicited major Chinese investment, even as Jakarta has pushed back against Beijing’s increased assertiveness in the North Natuna Sea. Indonesia’s economic dependence on China imposes limits to Jokowi’s willingness to stand up to China, but even he has often pursued a hedging strategy.
The book also provides an even-keeled examination of Washington’s regional treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines, frequently described as tilting toward Beijing. Hiebert makes a compelling case that Thailand is still hedging against China, despite prevailing counterarguments regarding Thai foreign policy. Of the Philippines, he notes, “It is far from certain that Duterte’s sharp pivot toward China marks a long-term Philippine trend.” Interestingly, Hiebert predicts that Manila will swing back to an anti-China foreign policy after Duterte’s term ends in 2022 and a future administration in Manila seeks to rebalance relations with the regional powers.
Second, Hiebert makes a compelling case that ASEAN should stop competing amongst itself and enhance cooperation, especially by strengthening dialogue on how to deal with China. As Hiebert points out, the main obstacle to deeper cooperation is the fact that Southeast Asian states often have varying levels of threat perceptions toward China and also often have different needs from the United States, the other major regional power along with Japan. Vietnam, for instance, has in recent years deepened its security cooperation with the United States, allowing a U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS Carl Vinson, to dock at Danang for a week in 2018, for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War. There also has been speculation that Hanoi may file legal arbitration against Beijing’s maritime claims, and Hanoi has fostered military-to-military cooperation with Washington in other ways as well.
Cambodia, on the other hand, has been all too willing to support Beijing’s interests. Under the increasingly authoritarian leadership of Prime Minister Hun Sen, Beijing has often facilitated China’s goals in Southeast Asia, dividing ASEAN. As Hiebert makes clear, Beijing knows how to cater its aid to Phnom Penh’s needs based on Western actions such as sanctions in response to unfair elections. Still, many Cambodians remain wary of China’s expanding influence in their country. Numerous Cambodians resent Hun Sen’s reliance on Chinese investment, which has transformed Sihanoukville into a Chinese outpost and may grant Beijing a naval base in the country. Sophal Ear, a political scientist at Occidental College, also warns about the risks of taking on unsustainable levels of Chinese debt: in 2018 roughly 48 percent of Cambodia’s $7.6 billion foreign debt was owed to China.
Finally, Hiebert turns to the question of what all this regional complexity means for Washington, which has displayed a mixture of heavy-handed demands for regional fealty and ambivalence toward Southeast Asia. The Trump administration’s reduced interaction with the region has fed a perception in Southeast Asia of Washington’s declining influence. Hiebert provides a strong case for why and how the United States should restore its attention to the region and refocus its strategy toward Southeast Asia., including by regularly attending regional summits and increasing funding for much-needed physical infrastructure, including in the Mekong basin countries.
Given his decades working in the region as a foreign correspondent and political analyst, Hiebert is well-suited for this challenge, and the result offers valuable insights on issues related to Southeast Asia, China, and broader rivalries in the region. The book portrays a region riven by a diversity of views toward China; this diversity prevents any unified response to China’s growing influence over Southeast Asia. As Hiebert shows, Southeast Asian states are of two minds regarding China: on the one hand, they are deeply dependent on China’s rise for their own economic growth and keen to continue trade with Beijing. On the other hand, they are increasingly nervous about China’s growing economic, diplomatic, and military power, its more assertive diplomacy, and its willingness to use its might unilaterally to get its way in the South China Sea—and potentially other parts of the region as well.
Hiebert punctures several myths about the China-Southeast Asia relationship. For one, although media reports often portray mainland Southeast Asian states as close to China, or even as satellite states of Beijing, Hiebert offers a different view. He suggests, with considerably detailed country case studies, that mainland Southeast Asian states are not so easy to pigeonhole. China has constructed innumerable dams upstream on the Mekong, choking off much-needed water as countries down river face droughts as a result of climate change. At the same time, Chinese companies—in joint ventures with Southeast Asian corporations in Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia—are building massive hydropower projects on the lower Mekong, leading to increased salt water flooding and environmental degradation. These dams have badly damaged the Mekong’s flow and often stopped the seasonal flow of rich nutrients essential to the cultivation of rice and other crops, and the fish which feed the populations of Southeast Asia. In so doing, they have angered many residents of mainland Southeast Asian states, even though governments like Cambodia and Laos and Myanmar remain highly dependent on Chinese aid, investment, and diplomatic support.
Hiebert also gives ample coverage to the depth of nationalism within modern Myanmar, and how it is facile to say that Myanmar also has become some kind of satellite state of China. There is enormous resistance within Myanmar toward China’s proposed Myitsone Dam in Kachin State, which the previous government of President Thein Sein suspended in 2011 due to popular pressures. At the same time, China has covertly supported ethnic insurgents on Myanmar’s northern periphery, sometimes providing arms and munitions, a reality that has not gone unnoticed by Myanmar’s military, which views dependency on China as a “national emergency.”
In addition, Hiebert shows that Southeast Asian hedging strategies, playing for time and keeping their options open, provides some grounds for believing that the region will not be totally dominated by Beijing. The ambiguity of Southeast Asian loyalties means that Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states have not made up their minds to side with Beijing. Hiebert argues that many of these states—even Cambodia and Laos, which seem to have less leverage to resist China’s influence and cash—will continue to avoid making stark choices.
Malaysia also likely will continue to hedge. It has generally failed to respond to China’s provocations in the South China Sea or has done so quietly, believing that its “special relationship” would protect it from the bullying tactics to which China has subjected Vietnam and the Philippines. However, Hiebert notes Kuala Lumpur’s missile tests in July 2019, after China deployed a Coast Guard vessel near Luconia Shoal on Malaysia’s continental shelf. Later that year, Kuala Lumpur submitted claims to an extended continental shelf in that area to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. In fact, Hiebert’s account leaves open the possibility that Malaysia is standing up to China more often than it appears to outsiders.
Indonesian President Joko Widodo, or Jokowi, visited China four times during his first five years in office and has solicited major Chinese investment, even as Jakarta has pushed back against Beijing’s increased assertiveness in the North Natuna Sea. Indonesia’s economic dependence on China imposes limits to Jokowi’s willingness to stand up to China, but even he has often pursued a hedging strategy.
The book also provides an even-keeled examination of Washington’s regional treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines, frequently described as tilting toward Beijing. Hiebert makes a compelling case that Thailand is still hedging against China, despite prevailing counterarguments regarding Thai foreign policy. Of the Philippines, he notes, “It is far from certain that Duterte’s sharp pivot toward China marks a long-term Philippine trend.” Interestingly, Hiebert predicts that Manila will swing back to an anti-China foreign policy after Duterte’s term ends in 2022 and a future administration in Manila seeks to rebalance relations with the regional powers.
Second, Hiebert makes a compelling case that ASEAN should stop competing amongst itself and enhance cooperation, especially by strengthening dialogue on how to deal with China. As Hiebert points out, the main obstacle to deeper cooperation is the fact that Southeast Asian states often have varying levels of threat perceptions toward China and also often have different needs from the United States, the other major regional power along with Japan. Vietnam, for instance, has in recent years deepened its security cooperation with the United States, allowing a U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS Carl Vinson, to dock at Danang for a week in 2018, for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War. There also has been speculation that Hanoi may file legal arbitration against Beijing’s maritime claims, and Hanoi has fostered military-to-military cooperation with Washington in other ways as well.
Cambodia, on the other hand, has been all too willing to support Beijing’s interests. Under the increasingly authoritarian leadership of Prime Minister Hun Sen, Beijing has often facilitated China’s goals in Southeast Asia, dividing ASEAN. As Hiebert makes clear, Beijing knows how to cater its aid to Phnom Penh’s needs based on Western actions such as sanctions in response to unfair elections. Still, many Cambodians remain wary of China’s expanding influence in their country. Numerous Cambodians resent Hun Sen’s reliance on Chinese investment, which has transformed Sihanoukville into a Chinese outpost and may grant Beijing a naval base in the country. Sophal Ear, a political scientist at Occidental College, also warns about the risks of taking on unsustainable levels of Chinese debt: in 2018 roughly 48 percent of Cambodia’s $7.6 billion foreign debt was owed to China.
Finally, Hiebert turns to the question of what all this regional complexity means for Washington, which has displayed a mixture of heavy-handed demands for regional fealty and ambivalence toward Southeast Asia. The Trump administration’s reduced interaction with the region has fed a perception in Southeast Asia of Washington’s declining influence. Hiebert provides a strong case for why and how the United States should restore its attention to the region and refocus its strategy toward Southeast Asia., including by regularly attending regional summits and increasing funding for much-needed physical infrastructure, including in the Mekong basin countries.
July 5, 2021
One can hardly disagree with top Singapore diplomat Bilahari Kausikan who describes Hiebert's work as 'masterly and monumental'. Indeed, this book is a comprehensive collection of data, news articles, scholarly work and interviews with academics and policymakers alike, succinctly condensed into a single book that describes the Chinese dilemma facing Southeast Asia. Such a dilemma is paramount, and perhaps even existential for the ten countries of Southeast Asia.
Hiebert's book hinges on a singular but prescient theme: while Southeast Asian states want strong relations with China, it also has concerns and doubts on China's ascendance. With this in mind, Hiebert lays out the ground work by addressing the general issues of China in Southeast Asia — its geopolitical interests, the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), the South China Sea (SCS), the Mekong River, and the large ethnic Chinese population in the region, to name a few. He then takes the reader on a journey with a comprehensive description on the relationship, benefits and concerns of each Southeast Asian nation. The result is an extensive account of each country's relationship with China, in which the reader will quickly ascertain as not as auspicious and binary as Western media makes it out to be.
Amongst every impressive chapter, the one on Vietnam stands out as it, in my opinion, is the best example of the aforementioned theme of the book. Vietnam has much to benefit from the BRI, the ideology of its political class is closest to that of China, it shares a border with China and has a population that is almost homogenous with Han Chinese. Yet, Vietnam has significant pause. It is a claimant in the SCS, has existential interests in the Mekong, has a historical mistrust of the Chinese after 18 invasions from the North and an ingrained sense of refusal to once again be subjugated by China. Hiebert explores these factors in detail and reveals the complexity of relations with China in Southeast Asia.
The book also punctures the myth of Chinese ascendance in the region: the BRI, as grand as propagated, has had little progress in Southeast Asia. The BRI is littered with quality issues and has become so broad that it is almost meaningless. Domestic sentiments within Southeast Asia pose a challenge to China's goals for the region as anti-China sentiments rise and as it realises that the ethnic Chinese show little care for the 'motherland's rejuvenation'. Nationalism has triumphed ethic similarities. While China remains Southeast Asia's largest trading partner, economics is not destiny and China's behaviour has won it little friends. One or more of these are apparent in China's relations with Southeast Asia.
Hiebert, as a journalist, writes clearly, sharply and without the intellectual hoops that bedevil the work of some scholars. One critique, however, would be that Hiebert could have included in greater detail the historical relations China has had with each individual Southeast Asian state, and also China relations with ASEAN (the organisation). Instead, the reader has to filter these facts out themselves. To make up for the shortfall, this book should be paired with Sebastian Strangio’s 'In The Dragon's Shadow'. These two books combined are essential in understanding the relationship between China and Southeast Asia.
Hiebert's book hinges on a singular but prescient theme: while Southeast Asian states want strong relations with China, it also has concerns and doubts on China's ascendance. With this in mind, Hiebert lays out the ground work by addressing the general issues of China in Southeast Asia — its geopolitical interests, the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), the South China Sea (SCS), the Mekong River, and the large ethnic Chinese population in the region, to name a few. He then takes the reader on a journey with a comprehensive description on the relationship, benefits and concerns of each Southeast Asian nation. The result is an extensive account of each country's relationship with China, in which the reader will quickly ascertain as not as auspicious and binary as Western media makes it out to be.
Amongst every impressive chapter, the one on Vietnam stands out as it, in my opinion, is the best example of the aforementioned theme of the book. Vietnam has much to benefit from the BRI, the ideology of its political class is closest to that of China, it shares a border with China and has a population that is almost homogenous with Han Chinese. Yet, Vietnam has significant pause. It is a claimant in the SCS, has existential interests in the Mekong, has a historical mistrust of the Chinese after 18 invasions from the North and an ingrained sense of refusal to once again be subjugated by China. Hiebert explores these factors in detail and reveals the complexity of relations with China in Southeast Asia.
The book also punctures the myth of Chinese ascendance in the region: the BRI, as grand as propagated, has had little progress in Southeast Asia. The BRI is littered with quality issues and has become so broad that it is almost meaningless. Domestic sentiments within Southeast Asia pose a challenge to China's goals for the region as anti-China sentiments rise and as it realises that the ethnic Chinese show little care for the 'motherland's rejuvenation'. Nationalism has triumphed ethic similarities. While China remains Southeast Asia's largest trading partner, economics is not destiny and China's behaviour has won it little friends. One or more of these are apparent in China's relations with Southeast Asia.
Hiebert, as a journalist, writes clearly, sharply and without the intellectual hoops that bedevil the work of some scholars. One critique, however, would be that Hiebert could have included in greater detail the historical relations China has had with each individual Southeast Asian state, and also China relations with ASEAN (the organisation). Instead, the reader has to filter these facts out themselves. To make up for the shortfall, this book should be paired with Sebastian Strangio’s 'In The Dragon's Shadow'. These two books combined are essential in understanding the relationship between China and Southeast Asia.
October 28, 2021
Within ASEAN, even as we are all close and connected by boarders, due to geographic, resources, ethnicity, wealth and government, we are all different. The approach by China over the 10 countries are different with some similarities. The label for Singapore that we are majority ethnically Chinese, we must bend towards them is one that is heard often, and to be taken with a deep breath, reading it once more in this book.
Based on the same survey done on all Asean countries, what are the key common findings? Less than half trust China's government, yet a high majority feels trade with China is essential and some even critical. The real cost of China's investment is not benign, and infrastructure projects is to benefit China more than the country is project is based in. With BRI, the initial idea that it might create jobs for local, opportunities and skills exchange, however, things did not work out as plan.
What was eye opening for me was the significance and impact of Mekong River (as South China Sea is already well documented and have lots of attention). Mekong River is a source of livelihood for several countries as it cuts through them. When China built dams and hydro plants, it effectively cuts the rest out as the water and fish flow are affected. I take assumption that the dams and hydro plants are created for the benefit of all along the Mekong river, with no malicious purpose or control, it shows though how 1 big decision can affect many others, in terms of survival, for food and water. If for humanity, reinvestment from gains in one end, can be channel towards the affected regions, though as its cross boarders, it becomes complicated. The benefits of some, is a heavy cost to others. Another reminder of who is really paying.
An observation that was made in the book, is of the attitude of new immigrants to country. The desire to learn, blend and adapt in is low, unlike previous generations. Importing a culture from back home wholesale, and moving the initial residence out, from a perspective is invasive or just simply arrogance. A lesson on humility on this part for me.
Overall, this book gave a backdrop in history, geography and an update of ASEAN's relationship with China. Even with some government officials and government supports China, the people are unsure. What can't be ignore, is the speed and dominance of China's influence has and will continue to grow in this region. Look closer on key relationships, investments, banking, infrastructure, education and tourism. Everything is link and shows how if China is willing to support each country.
Based on the same survey done on all Asean countries, what are the key common findings? Less than half trust China's government, yet a high majority feels trade with China is essential and some even critical. The real cost of China's investment is not benign, and infrastructure projects is to benefit China more than the country is project is based in. With BRI, the initial idea that it might create jobs for local, opportunities and skills exchange, however, things did not work out as plan.
What was eye opening for me was the significance and impact of Mekong River (as South China Sea is already well documented and have lots of attention). Mekong River is a source of livelihood for several countries as it cuts through them. When China built dams and hydro plants, it effectively cuts the rest out as the water and fish flow are affected. I take assumption that the dams and hydro plants are created for the benefit of all along the Mekong river, with no malicious purpose or control, it shows though how 1 big decision can affect many others, in terms of survival, for food and water. If for humanity, reinvestment from gains in one end, can be channel towards the affected regions, though as its cross boarders, it becomes complicated. The benefits of some, is a heavy cost to others. Another reminder of who is really paying.
An observation that was made in the book, is of the attitude of new immigrants to country. The desire to learn, blend and adapt in is low, unlike previous generations. Importing a culture from back home wholesale, and moving the initial residence out, from a perspective is invasive or just simply arrogance. A lesson on humility on this part for me.
Overall, this book gave a backdrop in history, geography and an update of ASEAN's relationship with China. Even with some government officials and government supports China, the people are unsure. What can't be ignore, is the speed and dominance of China's influence has and will continue to grow in this region. Look closer on key relationships, investments, banking, infrastructure, education and tourism. Everything is link and shows how if China is willing to support each country.
November 14, 2021
I have mixed feelings about this book. It’s incredibly comprehensive (400+ pages) and a good reference point on the current relationship between Southeast Asian countries and China as the book captures the word “relationship” in every sense of the term. It’s an impressive stocktake of the geopolitical realities in the region that is useful to a broad set of audiences.
However, I struggled to fully enjoy the book as the writing is bland and it lacks original analysis, leaving mostly a patchwork of news articles and quotations. Some of the details could have been relegated as footnotes instead of repeating them in every chapter such as how it keeps repeating the research scope of an advisory firm when describing the number of BRI-related projects in each country. It also went to great lengths delving into a much longer timeline of the bilateral relationship of each country with China, apparently overlooking its caveat in its introductory pages that states: “This book is a snapshot of China’s relations with Southeast Asia in late 2019 to early 2020.”
Lastly, I particularly liked how the book, in its concluding pages, recognizes that SEA countries have more agency in this ongoing dynamic which is often overlooked by most headlines and commentators. It would be a much more interesting read to have more emphasis on that in future writings in this space.
However, I struggled to fully enjoy the book as the writing is bland and it lacks original analysis, leaving mostly a patchwork of news articles and quotations. Some of the details could have been relegated as footnotes instead of repeating them in every chapter such as how it keeps repeating the research scope of an advisory firm when describing the number of BRI-related projects in each country. It also went to great lengths delving into a much longer timeline of the bilateral relationship of each country with China, apparently overlooking its caveat in its introductory pages that states: “This book is a snapshot of China’s relations with Southeast Asia in late 2019 to early 2020.”
Lastly, I particularly liked how the book, in its concluding pages, recognizes that SEA countries have more agency in this ongoing dynamic which is often overlooked by most headlines and commentators. It would be a much more interesting read to have more emphasis on that in future writings in this space.
October 25, 2020
(full disclosure, I have known Murray Hiebert for years) A tremendously valuable book for watchers of Southeast Asia and China both. Murray's depth of knowledge is combined with a wide range of interviews to create a resource that will be referred to again and again. The book is divided into chapters focusing on each ASEAN countries relationship with China, and is probably best read by picking up particular countries when you are interested, as the narrative can otherwise be quite repetitive. Recommended for all students of the region.
April 11, 2022
Only slightly longer than Shambaugh’s Where Great Powers Meet due to copious citations and more so focused on China’s individual relations with each country as opposed to great power competition. Somewhat repetitive, but a good survey of the region’s Belt and Road Initiative projects and their social, economic, environmental, and especially political ramifications, as well as long-term implications.
November 14, 2020
Insightful summary on the dynamics between China & S E Asia
For those looking for a snappy update on the differing relationships between China & S E Asia - this is the book to get. Whilst it does not go in too much detail, it does sufficiently cover the topic giving the reader a good flavour on the dynamics, their history and potentially their future.
For those looking for a snappy update on the differing relationships between China & S E Asia - this is the book to get. Whilst it does not go in too much detail, it does sufficiently cover the topic giving the reader a good flavour on the dynamics, their history and potentially their future.
June 13, 2023
This is a very long book and is a bit repetitive because of its country-by-country structure; I did feel it could have been structured more clearly, and as a consequence more intelligently. It is nonetheless very well researched, though tending towards descriptiveness - a lot of stuff could have been more deeply considered and causality thought about more, and more specificity in solutions, or at least the solutions landscape.
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